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ABSTRACT 
The six-party dispute concerning the Spratlys in the South China Sea is 
complicated and has been unresolved for centuries. This thesis reappraises it in the 
light of international law with the aim of suggesting feasible solutions to the dispute. 
The analysis of the thesis is based on the most reasonable and generous 
interpretation of Article 121 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) to the 
particular situation of the Spratlys resulting in 12 of 35 islands having potential to 
generate full maritime zones. Concerning the sovereignty issue, this thesis applies 
international law on territorial acquisition to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of 
the parties' claims. In line with most of the leading literature on this subject, the thesis 
identifies major weakness in the various claims. However, it considers Vietnam's 
claim to be the strongest in international law. Regarding the maritime issue, the thesis 
overcomes the difficulty of unresolved sovereignty issues by making hypotheses, so 
that a prospective maritime delimitation is mapped out under contemporary 
international law on maritime delimitation. This demonstrates that maritime rights 
generated from the Spratlys are not as great as expected by the parties, because the 
Spratlys' effect is limited to the remaining area that is left after giving full effect to the 
mainland of littoral states. 
Based on the prospects of the sovereignty and maritime issues, the thesis 
recommends two feasible solutions. The first is unilateral submission to an arbitral 
tribunal under Annex VII of the 1982 LOSC, as applied in the Barbados v. Trinidad 
and Tobago case. Alternatively, diplomatic measures involving negotiation in good 
faith towards joint development may be the best option. 
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1. General background of the dispute 
The South China Sea' is of vital strategic and economic interest. As one of the 
largest semi-closed seas in the world, it is considered "a nexus of maritime routes, "2 
connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Lessons from the past 3 suggest that the South 
China Sea has always played an important role in the security policy of littoral countries. 
Furthermore, the South China Sea possesses a diverse marine environment with rich 
resources of fisheries which are of great potential for economic and marine research 
activities. Also, the seabed of the South China Sea is well known for its considerable 
reserves of oil and gas fields. Located in the middle of such a strategic semi-enclosed sea, 
the Paracels and the Spratlys4 can be used as stepping stones for littoral states seeking to 
grasp all of these advantages of the South China Sea. This situation creates the incentives 
for the various claims over the region. 5 Currently, there are two main issues concerning 
sovereignty and maritime rights in the South China Sea dispute. Five states and one entity, 6 
namely, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines and Taiwan claim sovereignty 
over part or over all of the Spratlys. Vietnam and China also have an overlapping claim to 
the sovereignty of the entire Paracels. From the titles that they claim, there are likely to be 
overlapping maritime claims in the Spratlys and Paracels and between their waters and the 
maritime spaces of the mainland of littoral states in the South China Sea. 
1 The South China Sea is the international name of the area. The author uses this name and other local names 
in this thesis in a neutral sense. 
2 Lim Teck Ghee and Mark J. Valencia (eds. ), Conflict over Natural Resources in South East Asia and the 
Pacific, (Singapore: United Nations University Press, 1990), p. 116. 
3 In the nineteenth century, both Vietnam and China were attacked by British and French's navy forces from 
the South China Sea; And during the World War II, Japan used the Spratlys as a military base to launch 
military attack to the Philippines. 
4 The archipelago has many local names in Southeast Asia languages, e. g. Nansha in Chinese, Truong Sa in 
Vietnamese and Kalayaan in the Philippines. 
s Marwyn S. Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, (New York and London: Methuen, 1982), p. 4. 
6 The term `entity' is used for Taiwan which has not been successful in establishing its statehood, but has 
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Figure 1. Simple map of the South China Sea area 7 
Similar to some other territorial and maritime disputes in formerly colonial areas, 
the South China Sea dispute has a long and complicated history. Before the presence of the 
Western colonial powers in the region, China and Vietnam exercised a maritime presence 
in the South China Sea. However, as international law, which was established by Western 
countries, was not introduced to the region at that time, maritime practices were limited to 
actual exploitation and usage of the water areas, not involving any statements or 
declarations concerning sovereignty. The late eighteenth century saw the establishment of 
colonial powers in the region, including Britain, France and Japan, all of whom made 
statements concerning sovereignty; however, at the end of the Second World War, all of 
them had withdrawn from the region with no clear official statement of the position 
regarding sovereignty over the Spratlys and the Paracels. 
The ambiguous status of the Spratlys and Paracels after the San Francisco 
Conference in 1945 gave rise to escalating competition in claiming sovereignty. The 
bilateral competition between China/Taiwan and Vietnam expanded in 1956 to include the 
Philippines. Along with the development of the international law of the sea which increased 
Sources: Encarta World Alas, online at http: encarta. msn. com map 701516645 South China Sea. html 
(accessed on 9 November, 2004). 
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the significance of islands, Malaysia and Brunei then also joined in the dispute, bringing 
the number of claimants to six. 
Among the six claimants, China is the most powerful country in the region. With an 
abundance of scholars and a long traditional history, China presents its history of maritime 
usage as strong evidence for its claims. Also, its miracle economic growth in recent 
decades has helped China strengthen its capacity in many fields including both the political 
and military. It would be unrealistic to implement any solution without the consent of 
China. However, in the South China Sea dispute China has been intransigent over 
sovereignty issues, or at least soft in rhetoric but forceful in action! In this regard, China 
sets obstacles for the dispute settlement process. 
Also concerning China, the policy of `one China' that is accepted by the vast 
majority of countries in the world prevents Taiwan from having the status of statehood. 
Hence, Taiwan did not fully participate in some of the negotiation processes concerning the 
dispute. In fact, Taiwan still stands as an independent entity in terms of its claim and its 
absence from some of the negotiation processes makes the dispute more difficult to solve 
since Taiwan's interests are marginalised. 
Vietnam bases its claims on historical evidence and succession to the title from 
France. The strength of its legal claims also causes Vietnam to take a hard line approach 
towards sovereignty claims. This is also another obstacle to the settlement process of the 
South China Sea dispute. 
Three other parties to the dispute, namely the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei 
have built up their claim on the basis of specific elements of international law. The 
Philippines with its advantages from the provisions of the 1982 LOSC on archipelagic 
states is the closest country to the Spratlys. Hence, it relied on both proximity and its so- 
called discovery in 1956 to strengthen its claims. Malaysia and Brunei entered the dispute 
by virtue of the claim that some of the Spratlys' features are within their maritime areas 
according to the provisions of the 1982 United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(the 1982 LOSC). Although these claims are relatively weak, their physical presence 
coupled with an element of occupation makes the dispute yet more complicated. 
Other historical developments in the twentieth century have further complicated the 
dispute. The cold war influenced this region and divided the countries by two invisible 
8 For further details, see infra, Chapter 3. 
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frontiers, China and Vietnam belonged to the communist side and the rest belonged to the 
capitalist side. This led to the indirect involvement of third parties to the disputes, namely 
the United States, Russia (the former Soviet Union) and Japan. This has worsened the 
dispute not only by adding complicated patterns of political influence, but also by 
diminishing the confidence of the parties. 
Thus, it can be said that the ebb and flow of the regional history has made the 
dispute one of the most complicated and very difficult to solve. 
Furthermore, for many years, the uncooperative attitude of the parties has also 
prevented the dispute from being solved. China, the most powerful among the claimants, 
chose a military route to consolidate its claims. This resulted in three military clashes in 
1974,1988 and 1995 between China and Vietnam and China and the Philippines. The 
military actions worsened the dispute and made other claimants vigilant regarding the 
threat from China to the security of the South China Sea region. They also destroyed the 
confidence among the parties and triggered an arms race in the region. After these military 
incidents, statistics showed that the military expenditure of Southeast Asian countries had 
increased significantly. 9 Instead of mobilising all available resources for economic 
development, mounting military expenditure of regional claimants created burdens for their 
state budgets and put regional security in danger. Moreover, although most countries drew 
on the international law of the sea as a basis for their claims (indeed they are parties to the 
1982 LOSC), international law was not applied correctly in the South China Sea. For 
example, the parties fortified their claim by creeping occupation and built up artificial 
islands in an attempt to expand maritime areas, thus complicating the dispute. In addition, 
there is an absence of a binding dispute settlement mechanism in the region. Due to the 
strategic importance of the Spratlys and the weakness of their claims, none of the parties, 
except Vietnam is willing to submit the dispute to an international judicial institution. 10 
In the wake of such developments, many efforts have been made to involve China 
in the peace-settling process, urging self-restraint and seeking to build confidence among 
claimants. As a result, tension in the region has been defused, and no further serious 
military incidents have occurred. However, the dispute is far from being fully resolved. 
9 For details, see Timor Kivimaki (ed. ), War or Peace in the South China Sea, (Nias Press, 2002), Chapter 6 
Part II, p. 62. 
10 To be further discussed, infra, Chapter 5. 
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Negotiation is not effective as some of the parties such as China still maintain absolutist 
sovereignty claims. " Also, there exist many potential factors, e. g. the increasing demand 
for natural resources, especially for oil and gas, the impact of the interests of superpowers12 
and the strength of China, which individually or collectively have the capacity to put the 
South China Sea dispute back on the agenda of regional security. Hence, the South China 
Sea dispute is still at deadlock and one of the flashpoints for security concern in the world. 
2. The emerging prospect of dispute settlement 
Economic and security issues were major factors behind the dispute, but they could 
also bring parties together to solve the dispute. Economic development requires the 
consumption of natural resources which are available in the South China Sea and 
cooperation to solve the dispute is the only way to enable the parties to effectively exploit 
these resources. Also, focusing on economic development, peace and stability is of major 
importance and thus requires the parties to restrain themselves and to settle the dispute. 
There has been much improvement in diplomatic relations among the parties 
concerned which creates a favourable environment for settling the dispute. The relics of the 
Cold War have been overthrown. Vietnam joined the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) in 1995. Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar followed suit, resulting in the 
association having ten members. These new developments were of great importance in 
boosting economic cooperation. ASEAN currently is one of the most dynamic regions for 
economic development and plays the role of a junction for economic cooperation not only 
in Asia, but also expanding to Europe and Asia-Pacific. 13 Economic cooperation also brings 
about a more united Southeast Asia which is in a better position to bargain with a powerful 
China regarding the South China Sea dispute. Friendly relations were also seen between 
China and Southeast Asia countries. China is now their biggest commercial partner and this 
inter-dependent relationship helps all parties refrain from the use of force in the South 
11 Negotiation was initiated by Indonesia under a series of South China Sea Workshops, but China always 
insisted that the basis of negotiation was China's sovereignty to the entire Spratlys and the one China policy 
which excluded Taiwan from negotiation. 
12 The South China Sea provides vital navigation for imported oil tanks of Japan and is also of very 
importance in security policy in Asia-Pacific of the United States. 
13 A number of free trade agreements and economic forum were concluded, established and implemented 
recently between ASEAN and EU (ASEM), ASEAN and Asia-Pacific (APEC), ASEAN and South Korea and 
ASEAN and China. Others, namely the free trade agreements between ASEAN and India, ASEAN and 
Australia and New Zealand, ASEAN and Japan are under negotiation. For details, see the ASEAN website at 
http: //www. aseansec. ore/4926. htm (accessed on 15 August 2006). 
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China Sea dispute and offers scope for further cooperation. The South China Sea 
Workshops held in the 1990s represented an initial success in gathering the parties together 
to discuss their conflicting approaches to the dispute. Recently, the tri-party treaty among 
China, the Philippines and Vietnam on cooperation in the exploration of the hydrocarbon 
resources in an area of the Spratlys water demonstrates a positive signal regarding 
cooperation in an attempt to settle the dispute. 
Besides the economic and security factors, the fact that China has become a major 
world power is another good sign for the dispute settlement process. In order to reach a 
position of a power, China should show the world that it is living up to its international 
obligations, thus building up its international prestige. The international law of the sea and 
dispute settlement in South China Sea are fields which China can utilise for these purposes. 
In addition, the South China Sea is a natural marine ecosystem which can bring 
many benefits to the littoral states as well as problems if people over-exploit or improperly 
use it. Environment pollution, piracy and terrorism are such types of transboundary 
problems. To cope with them, there is no better choice for all littoral states than 
cooperation. The improving awareness of the issues by Southeast Asian countries also 
improves the prospect of the South China Sea dispute settlement. 
Finally, more favourable signals for mapping out solutions for sovereignty and 
maritime disputes have emerged recently. Some complicated and long lasting maritime 
disputes have been solved successfully, e. g. Jan Mayen (1986), Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration 
(1999), Qatar v. Bahrain (2001), Cameroon v. Nigeria (2002), Barbados v. Trinidad and 
Tobago (2006), Guyana v. Suriname (2007) and Nicaragua v. Honduras (2007). 14 These 
14 Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen, Judgment, ICJ Reports (1993) p. 34 
(hereafter referred to as the Jan Mayen case); The Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration Awards 1998 and 1999, 
Permanent Court of Arbitration Award Series, (The Hague : T. M. C. Asser Press, 2005), (hereafter referred to 
as the Eritrea/ Yemen Arbitration); Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions 
between Qatar and Bahrain, Judgment, ICJ Reports, (2001) p. 40 (hereafter referred to as the Qatar v. 
Bahrain case); Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria 
(Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening), Judgment, ICJ Reports (2002) p. 303 (hereafter 
referred to as the Cameroon v. Nigeria case); Maritime Delimitation between Barbados v. The Republic of 
Trinidad and Tobago, Arbitration Award, 11 April 2006 (hereafter referred to as the Barbados v. Trinidad 
and Tobago case), full text available at www. pca-cya. orn, Maritime Delimitation between Guyana and 
Suriname, Arbitration Award, 17 September 2007 (hereafter referred to as the Guyana v. Suriname case), full 
text available at www. pca-cpa. org, Case Concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua 
and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea, Judgment, ICJ Reports (2007) (hereafter referred to as the Nicaragua v. 
Honduras case), full text available online at www. icj-cij. ore. One of the reasons for the parties making their 
claims to the Spratlys is their illusion that the archipelago will help to generate a large maritime area. With the 
new development of international law concerning maritime delimitation which evolved through the recent 
15 
INTRODUCTION 
cases mark new developments of international law regarding maritime delimitation which 
no doubt will be helpful for the case of the South China Sea dispute. Also, solutions for 
other maritime disputes in the region were reached; for example, the most recent and 
noticeable is the dispute between China and Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin in 2000. This 
lights up the hope that the solution of the South China Sea will be attained in the near 
future. 
3. Literature review 
As one of the most complicated disputes, the South China Sea has attracted the 
attention of many scholars. However, with regard to the two main issues of the dispute, 
namely the sovereignty and maritime claims, the literature only really focuses on the 
former. Also, as China has more written documents on this than any other claimant, much 
of the literature seems to take the subjective view in supporting the claims of China. ts 
Others tend to point out the weaknesses of all of the claims in order to arrive at the 
conclusion that no one should prevail legally and thus the sovereignty issue is unlikely to 
be solved. 16 This is explained because of the difficulties in applying international law 
concerning territorial acquisition given the long and complicated history of the dispute. 
With regard to the maritime issue, the literature seems to avoid addressing the 
substantive issue by assuming that the issue is too complicated due to the presence of 
hundreds of features of the Spratlys. Some of the literature suggests that the possible effect 
cases, maritime delimitation process of the South China Sea which is always assumed as too complicated to 
solve will be mapped out and results in much less influence of the Spratlys. This may help the parties to take 
less hard line positions on sovereignty claims and agree on a compromise solution for the dispute. For 
discussion on the influence from the development of international law on maritime delimitation through 
recent cases on the dispute, see infra, Chapter 4. 
15 For example, see Tao Cheng, "The Dispute over the South China Sea Islands" (1975) 10 Tex. Int'l L. J. 
265; Richard D. Beller, "Analysing the Relationship between International Law and International Politics in 
China's and Vietnam's Territorial Dispute over the Spratlys Islands" (1994) 29 Tex. Intl L. J. 293; Michael 
Bennett, "The People's Republic of China and the Use of International Law in the Spratly Islands Dispute" 
(1991-2) 28 Stan J. Int'1 L. 425; H Harry L Roque, "China's Claim to the Spratlys Islands under International 
Law" (1997) 15 Energy Natural Resources 189; The-Kuang Chang, "China's Claim of Sovereignty over 
Spratly and Paraccls Islands: A Historical and Legal Perspective" (1991) 23 Case W. Res. J. Int'1 L. 339; 
Jianming Shen, "International Law Rules and Historical Evidences Supporting China's Title to the South 
China Sea Islands" (1997-8) 21 Hasting Int'1 & Comp. L. R. 1. 
16 See Brian K. Murphy, "Dangerous Ground: The Spratly Islands and International Law" (1995) 1 Ocean & 
Coastal L. J. 187; Gerardo M. C. Valero, "Spratly Archipelago Dispute: Is the Question of Sovereignty Still 
Relevant? " (1994) 18(4) Marine Policy 314; Valencia et al., Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea, 
(London, The Hague, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1977); Odgaard, Maritime Security between 
China and Southeast Asia: Conflict and Cooperation in the Making of Regional Order, (Ashgate, 2002). 
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of the Spratlys under Article 121(3) should be ignored in order to simplify the maritime 
issue. 17 
From the conclusion that the dispute is unresolvable if the parties maintain their 
absolutist sovereignty claims, the scholars attempt to find a solution for the dispute by 
calling for the freezing of sovereignty and suggesting the applicability of some joint 
development models, namely the Timor Gap, Antarctica and Svalbard models. 18 
So far, none of the suggestions have come to pass. This may be explained by the 
belief of the parties that the claims over the features of the Spratlys will allow them to 
control large areas of maritime zones. The more features they claim, the greater the 
maritime zone. Thus, the suggested approach of simply shelving all sovereignty claims and 
considering all the features of the Spratlys as having no effect would not persuade the 
parties of a better benefit than what they thought they would have. In that context, a well 
structured organisation for joint development along the lines suggested in some models 
remains elusive. 
4. The purpose and structure of the study 
Given the emerging prospect of the dispute moving towards a possible solution in 
the future and taking into account the limitations of the literature so far, this thesis would 
like to bring a new understanding about the dispute through analysis of the legal aspects of 
the two issues under dispute, namely sovereignty and maritime rights. With regard to the 
sovereignty issue, this thesis agrees with the majority of the literature that the parties to the 
dispute have many weaknesses to their claims. However, by applying international law 
concerning territorial acquisition, the legality of the claims is analysed and the strongest 
claims are identified. This finding reveals that the South China Sea dispute is not at 
deadlock because of the weaknesses of all of the claims and the complicated history of the 
17 Valencia et al., ibid. Article 121(3) provides the limitation for islands which are only have internal water 
and territorial sea. For further discussion on this issue, see infra, Chapter 2. 
18 Valencia et al., ibid; Valero, op. cit., note 16; Charles Liu, "Chinese Sovereignty and Joint Development: A 
Pragmatic Solution to the Spralty Islands Dispute" (1996) 18 Loy. L. A. Int'1 & Comp. L. J. 865; Wei Cui, 
"Multilateral Management as A Fair Solution to the Spratly Disputes" (2003) 36 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 779; 
Kuang-Ming Soon, "Free the Tropical Seas: An Ice-cool Prescription for the Burning Spratly Issues" (1996) 
20(3) Marine Policy 199; Chistopher C. Joyner, "Toward a Spratly Resource Development Authority: 
Precursor Agreements and Confidence-Building Measures", Paper presented at the Conference on "Security 
Flashpoints: Oil, Islands, Sea Access and Military Confrontation" at UN Plaza- Park Hyatt Hotel, New York, 
on February 7-8,1997 and Lian A Mito, "The Timor Gap Treaty as A Model for Joint Development in the 
Spratly Islands" (1998) 13 Am. U. Int'1 L. R. 727. 
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dispute, as most scholars assume. Instead, sovereignty issues may be resolved if there is a 
suitable dispute settlement mechanism. The sovereignty claims and current occupation by 
the parties will be advanced in the analysis regarding maritime issue. The thesis will 
examine the maritime issue in the most complicated scenario for maritime delimitation by 
identifying the maximum effect of the Spratlys in the maritime delimitation with littoral 
states. The thesis will clarify that the possibility of obtaining advantage by claiming the 
Spratlys will not be as great as expected by the parties. The Spratlys will not have the effect 
of reducing the maritime zones generated from the entitlement of the mainland of littoral 
states. They only have the effect of generating maritime zone in the area after giving full 
effect to the mainland of littoral states. 
Based on the prospect of resolution of the sovereignty and maritime issues, the 
thesis will examine feasible solutions to the South China Sea dispute. The thesis suggests 
that diplomatic measure, in which negotiation in good faith may be the best option. In this 
case, based on the limited effect of the Spratlys in maritime delimitation and the unresolved 
sovereignty issue, maintaining sovereignty claims cannot actually benefit the parties as 
much as they thought. Instead, the thesis suggests that the more effective approach for 
everyone would be negotiation towards a comprehensive joint development regime in order 
to both protect the environment and benefit from economic interests in a sustainable way. 
This may also be the way to shelve this long and complicated dispute when no other 
dispute settlement mechanism is available. However, taking into account that joint 
cooperation is not a novel topic as many scholars suggested, so far, none of the suggestions 
have come into effect. Hence, the thesis takes this opportunity to examine state practice in 
joint development. Based on this analysis and taking into account the particular situation of 
the South China Sea region, the thesis arrives at a suitable and feasible regime. 
In order to achieve this, the thesis will consist of five chapters. Introducing the 
background to the legal analysis in the later chapters, Chapter 1 (Introduction to the South 
China Sea) begins with the presentation of some facts and figures on the dispute in the 
South China Sea and the Spratlys, from both the geographical and geomorphologic 
perspective. Due to its geographical characteristics, the South China Sea is of strategic 
importance for navigation and security and it is also a source of great economic potential 
for littoral states. The natural resources in the South China Sea include fisheries, 
hydrocarbon resources and a diverse marine environment in a semi-enclosed sea. Lying in 
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the middle of that sea, the Spratlys are central to its strategic position and have therefore 
become a source of dispute. 
Based on the geographical and geomorphologic situation introduced in the earlier 
chapter, Chapter 2 (The Legal Regime of the Spratlys) moves towards legal analysis of the 
legal regime of the Spratlys. Following Article 121(1), the chapter will list the features 
which are above water at high tide and thus are islands and eligible subjects for sovereignty 
claims. Then, the chapter considers the vagueness of Article 121(3) of the 1982 LOSC and 
applies that Article to the Spratlys in order to identify which of the features can generate 
extended maritime zones for the Spratlys. The chapter also examines the legal regime and 
impact of other features - low tide elevations, reefs, rocks and islands - which do not 
qualify under Article 121(3). Based on the impact of all features according to their legal 
status, the maritime spaces for the entire Spratlys will be mapped out. This gives the basis 
for analysis of sovereignty and maritime issues in the next two chapters. 
The legal perspectives of the sovereignty issues will be examined in Chapter 3 
(Legal perspectives on the sovereignty issue relating to the Spratlys: An Historical 
Approach). The chapter will analyse the legal arguments of the parties' claims through a 
chronological historical development of the dispute. The analysis will be achieved by 
applying the, international law concerning acquisition of title to territory in order to point 
out the strengths and weaknesses of the parties' claims. The chapter will end with the 
identification of the strongest claim in the dispute and statistics on the current occupation 
by the parties on the features which are eligible for sovereignty claims (resulting from 
Chapter 2 analysis). 
Chapter 4 (Prospects for Maritime Delimitation for the Waters of the Spratlys) will 
move on to apply the new developments in the international law of the sea concerning 
maritime delimitation to the case of the Spratlys. This will allow a better understanding of 
the effect of the Spratlys in generating maritime rights to the claimants and map out a 
prospect maritime delimitation process for the South China Sea. From the analysis of 
Chapter 3, the sovereignty issue has not yet been resolved; therefore, there will be no 
decisive answer for the maritime delimitation. However, the difficulty of the sovereignty 
issue will be overcome by hypothesising the potential overlapping maritime zones and 
classifying them into groups. Accordingly, there are two groups of overlapping zones 
which arise in a prospective maritime delimitation process, namely (1) potential 
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overlapping between the maritime zones of the Spratlys and those of the mainland of 
littoral states and (2) overlapping among the Spratlys' features themselves. The principles 
for maritime delimitation will be examined for each group of overlapping maritime zones, 
thus mapping out the prospective maritime delimitation results for the parties. Then, from 
the maximum results achieved in Chapter 2 for the maritime zones of the Spratlys, the main 
sources for maritime overlapping are from the 12 islands which may generate full maritime 
zones. Thus, by making further hypotheses according to sovereignty claims and the current 
occupation by the parties to the 12 islands, as examined under Chapter 3, prospective 
maritime boundaries will be drawn in different scenarios. The chapter will conclude that 
although the presence of the Spratlys makes the maritime delimitation extremely 
complicated, the actual overlapping area can be reduced to a doughnut area which is 
beyond maritime zones generated from the mainland of littoral states. Therefore, if a 
solution to the sovereignty issue is not reached in the coming time, it may be more 
beneficial for the parties to the dispute to put the doughnut area under a special regime for 
better management of the South China Sea dispute which will then be discussed in the last chapter. 
Based on the prospects of the sovereignty and maritime issues which have been 
achieved in Chapter 3 and 4, Chapter 5 (Judicial or Diplomatic Methods: The Feasible 
Solutions to the South China Sea Dispute) will continue to analyse and recommend the 
most feasible solutions to the South China Sea dispute. It will start with the possibility of 
using judicial method to settle the South China Sea dispute. It is likely that the ICJ and 
international arbitration will not have jurisdiction over this dispute because of the lack of 
consensus, a special agreement or a compromise. Although unilateral submission to the 
dispute settlement mechanism of the 1982 LOSC shows its success in the recent Barbados 
v. Trinidad and Tobago case and this would have applied to the South China Sea, the recent 
reservation of China made under Article 297 has ruled out this possibility. Therefore, with 
no possibility for a judicial settlement, diplomatic measure is the only option for the parties. 
Learning from the failure of other diplomatic attempts in the 1990s, the chapter suggests 
that diplomatic measures will be more fruitful if they focus on building a joint development 
regime. Through analysing state practice in joint development and taking into account the 
particular situation of the South China Sea dispute, the chapter will also take a closer look 




The thesis will end by concluding that the contemporary international law 
concerning territorial acquisition and the international law of the sea relating to maritime 
delimitation can provide a new understanding to the South China Sea dispute. In the light 
of this new understanding, the parties may settle the dispute through diplomatic measure 
towards a joint development regime. Settling this dispute will not only help to solve this 
long and complicated dispute in the South China Sea, but also contribute more generally to 
the development of the international law of the sea. If the diplomatic measure towards a 
joint development regime proves its success in settling the dispute, it will provide further 
state practice for the emerging trends of joint cooperation in solving sovereignty and 
maritime disputes. 
Before going into detailed analysis, the two main issues need to be dealt with: (a) 
the scope of the thesis and (b) the status of Taiwan in the examination. Regarding the scope 
of the thesis, although it is true that the Paracels are related to the dispute as a whole and 
the security in the South China Sea can not be maintained without settling the disputes 
related to both the Paracels and Spratlys, the thesis will only focus on the dispute over the 
Spratlys. This selection is based on the fact that the dispute over the Paracels and Spratlys 
are similar in history, but the dispute concerning the latter is the more complicated with the 
participation of multiple parties (as opposed to the bilateral dispute over the Paracels). By 
examining the more complicated dispute concerning the Spratlys, it is submitted that its 
conclusion might be applied to the simpler dispute over the Paracels as well. Furthermore, 
the dispute over the Paracels is a bilateral dispute between Vietnam and China, but China 
currently occupies the entire archipelago and refuses to negotiate. Thus, any solution for 
the dispute over the Paracels is dependent on China and at the moment is difficult to reach. 
Thus, the solution for this dispute might be discussed in another time. 19 In addition, in the 
limited space of a thesis, focusing on the dispute concerning only the Spratlys will allow 
more comprehensive analysis. 
With regard to the status of Taiwan, the thesis will adopt the prevailing majority 
view of the world community, which is that Taiwan is a province of the Peoples' Republic 
of China. The Taiwanese government has not gained enough international recognition to 
" Perhaps after resolving the dispute concerning the Spratlys, China may change its attitude towards a more 
positive approach for dispute settlement of the Paracels. 
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form a separate state. 20 Therefore, in most parts of the thesis, Taiwan will be assimilated 
with China in the examination of sovereignty and maritime issues. However, due to the fact 
that for more than fifty years Taiwanese authority de facto exists in an independent 
territorial unit, it has relatively independent status which may be considered as a separate 
subject of rights and obligations under international law. 21 Therefore, concerning this 
dispute, two issues relating to Taiwan need to be examined. First, the obligations of this 
entity in compliance with international law which is applied in the current examination of 
the thesis, namely the international law concerning territorial acquisition, the law of the sea 
concerning the legal regime of islands and maritime delimitation. With regard to 
international law concerning territorial acquisition, these laws have received wide 
recognition in state practice and have been consistently applied in case law since the 
twentieth century22 and thus, have become international customary law. Regarding 
international law concerning maritime delimitation, equidistance/ relevant circumstances 
rule is currently well recognised as an applicable method for maritime delimitation through 
judgments of the ICJ and international tribunals as well as state practice. 23 With effect of 
20 Taiwan was recognised in the period from 1949 to 1970s. However, by the mid-1970s, a majority of states 
changed their position to recognise the People's Republic of China. By 2005, only twenty-six mostly very 
small states still continued to recognise Taiwan, namely Belize, Burkina Faso, Chad, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Gambia, Guatemala, Haiti, the Holy See, Honduras, Kiribati, Malawi, Marshall 
Islands, Nauru, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Solomon Islands, St 
Christopher & Nevis, St Vincent & the Grenadines, Swaziland and Tuvalu. Statistics in James Crawford, The 
Creation of States in International Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2°d ed., 2006), p. 20 1. 
21 Taiwan appears to be a non-state territorial entity which is capable of acting independently on the 
international scene. This entity still maintains separate and effective authority and claims that it is an 
independent state. In fact, instead of an embassy, it has established its own economic and cultural offices in 
some states. It maintains strong informal and trade relations with some sixty states. Its accession to the WTO 
was approved on November 2001. It is also a member of Asian Development Bank and a party to various 
conventions binding its own territory, including the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefm 
Tuna of 1993. For discussion on the special status of Taiwan, see Malcolm Shaw, International Law, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5's ed., 2003), p. 211-2 and particularly, James Crawford, ibid, 
p. 198-221. In the South China Sea dispute, although Taiwan shared the same historical claims as China, it has 
its own claim and occupation. For details, see infra, Chapter 3. 
22 International law concerning territorial acquisition was developed through some cases, namely island of 
Palmas case (1928) 2 RIAA 829; Clipperton Island Arbitration (France v. Mexico) 2 RIAA 1105; Eastern 
Greenland Case (Denmark v. Norway) (1933) PCIJ Series AB no 53; Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (France 
v. UK) ICJ Reports (1953), p. 47 then was applied consistently in all other cases concerning territory such as 
Qatar v. Bahrain, Cameroon v. Nigeria, Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v. 
Malaysia), Judgment, ICJ Report (2002), p. 625 (hereafter referred to as Indonesia v. Malaysia case) and 
Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration, ect. For further discussion on international law concerning territorial acquisition, 
see infra, Chapter 3. 
23 Malcolm Evans suggested that no one should be surprise if the ICJ in the next available judgement may 
state in clear language that the rule of international customary law is that delimitation of maritime zones is to 
be conducted in accordance with the equidistance/relevant circumstances rules. See Malcolm Evans, 
"Maritime Boundary Delimitation: Where Do We Go from Here? " in David Freestone, Richard Barnes and 
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international customary law and being widely applied in case law and state practice, it is 
submitted that contemporary international law concerning territorial acquisition and 
maritime delimitation will be the applicable law to the South China Sea dispute with 
binding effect to all parties, including Taiwan. Regarding international law concerning the 
legal regime of islands which is provided in the 1982 LOSC, the Court in the Qatar v. 
Bahrain case24 recognised that Articles 13,121(1) and (2) as well as other parts of the 
Convention concerning the regime of territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ and continental 
shelf have become customary international law. 25 Only Article 121(3) is left. However, in 
its reservation to the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, Taiwan reserved that in 
"determining the boundary of the continental shelf of the Republic of China, exposed rocks 
and islets shall not be taken into account' . 26 This declaration implies that Taiwan regards 
rocks and islets having no effect in maritime delimitation, i. e. rocks and islets cannot 
generate full maritime zones. This means that Taiwan's view towards the effect of small 
islands is in line with the stipulation of Article 121(3) of the 1982 LOSC. Therefore, it is 
submitted that all the parts of the 1982 LOSC related to the legal regime of islands may also 
be considered as having binding effect on Taiwan. 
Second, as a de facto independent entity for more than fifty years Taiwan also has 
independent interests and practice, particularly in exercising its maritime rights in the South 
China Sea. 27 However, this entity is still left aside in negotiations due to the issue of 
recognition of its statehood. In order to give Taiwan opportunities to take part in the 
cooperation of the region, any cooperation agreement in the region in the future should take 
David Ong, The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 137 at 
147. Indeed, the Tribunal in the recent case between Guyana and Suriname elaborated that "in the course of 
the last two decades international courts and tribunals dealing with disputes concerning the delimitation of the 
continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone have come to embrace a clear role for equidistance. The 
process of delimitation is divided into two stages. First the court or tribunal posits a provisional equidistance 
line which may then be adjusted to reflected special or relevant circumstances" (2007 Award, para. 335). In 
the latest case between Nicaragua and Honduras, although there were exeptional geographical situations 
giving rise to the decision of the Court not to apply the equidistance/ relevant circumstances in delimiting 
maritime zones for the two countries, the Court at the same time emphasized that "equidistance remains the 
general rule" (ICJ Report, 2007, para. 28 1). 
ICJ Reports (2001), p. 40. In this case the Court applied some stipulations of the Convention related to the 
regime of low tide elevations, islands and maritime delimitation to Qatar, a non-member of the Convention, 
on the basis that these stipulations have become international customary law (at para. 167). 
25 ]b1d, paras. 185,195,201,205-9,219 and 233. 26 Point 1 in the 1970 reservation of Taiwan. For full text, see (1971) 10 ILM 452. 
27 Taiwan is a major player in world fisheries with the fishery export revenue in 2003 of US$ 1,298,564,000 
from a total of 1,486,291 tonnes fish (Statistics of Yearbook of Fishery Statistics of FAO, online at 
httn: //www. fao. oroJft/statist/statist. asp (accessed on 26 November 2005)). 
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Taiwan into consideration by allows other entities to accept the binding effect of that 
agreement by their voluntary declarations. One of the way to allow the participance of 
Taiwan is to learn from the stipulation of Article XII(1) of the Marrakesh Agreements 
establishing the World Trade Orginisation that [a]ny state or separte customs territory 
possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the 
other matters provided for in this Agreement, on terms to be agreed between it and the 
WTO. Such accession shall apply to this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements 
annexed thereto. " According to this stipulation, Taiwan may be considered as a separeate 
entity possessing full autonomy in the conduct of exploiting and exploring maritime 
resources, e. g. in fisheries. This is the way which helps overcome the difficulty of non- 
recognising Taiwan due to the "one China policy" of China, but still allows the 
involvement of Taiwan in the international order by virtue of its legal rights and 
obligations. Even if this entity is united with China, it may retain relatively independent 
rights and obligations like the current situation of Hong Kong or Macao. 28 In fact, feeling 
left aside, Taiwand conducted some millitary actions putting more tension to the dispute. 29 
Therefore, considering Taiwan as an independent entity holder of rights and obligations 
will gather all the parties concerned in the dispute and facilitate the negotiations for a 
dispute settlement and any agreement concerning joint development in the future. 
28 Hong Kong and Macao were transferred to China in 1997 and 1999 respectively, but still enjoy the status of 
one state, two regimes. Accordingly, these territories have their own economic systems like those that they 
had at the time before the transfer. For discussion on the current legal status of Hongkong and Macao, see 
James Crawford, op. cit., note 20, p. 244-252. 
29 On 23 March 2004, Taiwan sent a ship and installed a "bird observation station" on Banthan low tide 
elevation and on 16 December 2005 deployed 600 more soldiers and built an air strip in the Itu Aba Islands. 
Most recently, on 12 and 13 February 2007, Taiwan conducted military maneuver at water in the west of Itu 
Aba Island. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
1. Geographical characteristics of the South China Sea area 
1.1. Geographical and geomorphologic situation 
As part of the Pacific Ocean, the South China Sea runs in a Southeast to Northeast 
direction from 3°N and 99°E towards the Taiwan Strait at 23°N and 120°E. The total area 
of the South China Sea is estimated at four million square kilometres. 30 Its depth is 
extremely variable, from 200 feet (60 meters) or less in the shallowest areas to over 16,000 
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Figure 2. Map of the South China Sea area31 
30 Bob Catley and Makmur Keliat, Spratlvs: The Dispute in the South China Sea, (Aldershot, Brookfield 
USA, Singapore and Sydney: Ashgate, 1997), p. 2. 
31 Sources: Adapted from Encarta World Alas, online at 
http: encarta. msn. coin map 7015 16645 South China Sea. html (accessed on 9 November, 2004). 
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with almost 90 percent of its perimeter consisting of land, in the form of land mass or 
islands. 32 It is bordered by China (including Taiwan) in the North, Vietnam, Cambodia and 
Thailand in the West, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Brunei in the South and finally, 
the Philippines in the East. The countries surrounding the South China Sea's rim are the 
fastest growing, the most vibrant, and densely populated economies of the world, and 270 
million people live in the coastal sub-regions of the South China Sea. 33 
The South China Sea contains two gulfs, 
namely the Gulf of Tokin shared by China and 
Vietnam in the Northwest and the Gulf of 
Thailand surrounding Vietnam, Cambodia, 
Thailand and Malaysia in the Southwest. 
Several large rivers also flow into the South 
China Sea including the Pearl River of 
Guangdong (China), the Red River of the North 
Delta (Vietnam) and the Mekong River 
(flowing from Tibet-China, through Myanmar, 
Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam). 
Figure 3. Topographical features of the 
seabed of the South China Sea34 
In the middle of the South China Sea, there are hundreds of islands, islets, rocks, 
reefs and banks which can be classified into four groups, namely the Pratas Reefs, the 
Macclesfield Bank and two archipelagos, the Paracels and Spratlys. Most of them are coral 
reefs and have not been settled by human habitation. 
The Spratlys, the archipelago under examination in this thesis, comprise of 
hundreds of features. Since many features are very tiny in size, they have not been named 
consistently by individual or group, thus the reported number of features in the Spratlys can 
vary from 148 to 235 features. The Spratlys are located between 4 and 12°N and between 
32 Douglas M. Johnston and Phillip M. Saunders (eds. ), Ocean Boundary Making: Regional Issues and 
Developments, (London, New York and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1988), p. 78. 
33 Brian Morton and Graham Blackmore, "South China Sea" (2001) 42 (12) Marine Pollution Bulletin, 1236 
at 1236. 
34 Ibid, p. 1237. 
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109 and 118°E approximately. 35 The shortest distances from littoral states to the centre of 
the Spratlys is measured as about 200 nm from the Brooke's Point of the Philippines, 330 
nm from the Southern coast of Vietnam, 247 nm off the coast of Malaysia, 405 nm from 
southern islands in the Paracels archipelago, 540 nm from the Hainan Island of China and 
860 nm from Taiwan. 36 The whole archipelago occupies nearly 160,000 square kilometres37 
with a coast line totalling some 926 kilometres. 8 Of all the features in the Spratlys, only 
about 20% will be able to sustain human life, since the rest are either too small or do not 
always emerge above water. 39 
In the north and north-western part of the Spratlys, the features are close together 
and usually named by group, such as the North Danger Reefs, Thitu Reefs, Tizard Bank, 
Loaita Bank, Jackson Atoll, Union Reefs and London Reefs. Each group is a combination 
of some small islands, islets, reefs and banks. Meanwhile, in the south and south-east, the 
features tend to be separate from each other and stand as individual features. The features 
of the Spratlys are quite small as the biggest feature, the Itu Aba Island, has an area of only 
about 0.5 square kilometres. Although the Spratlys have long been used as temporary 
shelter for the fishermen in the region, there has been no permanent human habitation on 
any of the features, except for some military occupation by the littoral states. This may be 
due to the small size of all the features and the extreme weather. The Spratlys area is reported 
3S Chemillier-Gendreau (Chemillier-Gendreau, Monique. La Souverainetd sur les Archipels Paracelss et 
Spratleys, (Paris: 1'Harmattan, 1996)) described the Spratlys location at 12°N latitude and 111°E longitude; 
Hancox and Prescott (Hancox, David and Prescott, Victor. "A Geographical Description of the Spratlys Island 
and an Account of Hydrographic Surveys amongst those Islands" (1997) 1 (6) Maritime Briefing, p. 3-30) 
stated that the location of the Spratlys was 12°N and 112°E; while according to Heinzig (Dieter Heinzig, 
Dispute Islands in the South China Sea, (Hamburg Institute of Asian Affairs, 1976), p. 17) and Samuels 
(op. cit., note 5, p. 188), these figures were between 4 and 11.30°N and between 109.30 and 117.50°E 
respectively. The last statistic was in line with that of China's Xinhua News Agency and also used in Odgaard 
(Odgaard, op. cit., note 16, p. 61). 
36 Cheng-yi Lin, "Taiwan's South China Sea Policy" (1997) 37(4) Asian Survey, 323 at 328. 
37 Chemillier-Gendreau, op. cit., note 35, p. 24. 
'$ CIA- The world factbook, online at: http: //www. cia. zov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pf. html (accessed 
on 18 November, 2004). 
39 Catley and Keliat, op. cit., note 30, p. 3. For analysis of how the criteria of human habitation affect the titles 
of claimants to the features in the South China Sea dispute, see infra, Chapter 2. For the lists of features of 
the Spratlys archipelago is of 148 in Hancox and Prescott (op. cit., note 35, p. 3-30) or of 170 in Dzurek 
(Dzurek, Daniel J. "The Spratlys Island Dispute: Who's on first? (1996) 2 (1) Maritime Briefing, p. 1). Also 
see Mark J. Valencia et al., op. cit., note 16, for a description of features in Appendix 1, p. 230. 
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Figure 4. Features of the Spratlys Archipelago40 
40 Source: http: //www izlobalsecurit org/military/world/war/Sl2ratlys-mar)s. htm (accessed on 18 November, 
2004). 
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to have 9 months of rainy season with an average rainfall of 2575 mm in 198 days per 
year. 41 The Spratlys are also considered dangerous grounds for maritime navigation, 
especially the central area of the archipelago which was usually highlighted as impossible 
for international navigation. However, fresh water and considerable phosphate deposits are 
found on some features of the archipelago. Also, some of the features are habitats of wild 
birds and contain coconut trees and small bushes. 42 This means that with the development 
of modern technology, the Spratlys may be suitable for human habitation in the future and 
from this archipelago people may be able to make use of the strategic location of the South 
China Sea for navigation and for its natural resources. 
1.2. Strategic location for navigation and security of the South China Sea 
Surrounded by the most dynamic economies in the Pacific Rim, the South China 
Sea occupies a vital strategic position in both maritime navigation and security not only for 
the littoral countries, but also for some others states outside the region. Although the 
Spratlys archipelago lies in its centre, occupying about 160,000 of 4 million square 
kilometres of the whole sea and appearing in maritime navigation maps as dangerous areas, 
the South China Sea still serves as one of the world's busiest international sea lanes. 
The South China Sea has five straits playing the role of five gates for vessels 
coming in and out of the area: the Malacca Strait at the southwest, the Sunda and Lombok- 
Macassar Straits at the southeast and the Luzon and Taiwan Straits at the northeast. 
Travelling from or to Indian Ocean in the southwest, vessels can pass through the Malacca 
Strait, follow the sea between Vietnam and the Spratlys and exit through the Luzon or 
Taiwan Straits to arrive in the East China Sea or continue to the Pacific Ocean. This is the 
most popular sea route, which makes the Malacca Strait the second busiest in the world 
after the English Channel. 3 Vessels travelling to and from Africa also frequently pass 
through the Sunda and Lombok-Macassar Straits into the region; these entrances are 
primarily used by Australian North-South trade. 44 
+1 Research of the Boundary Committee of Vietnam (Ban Bien gibi Chfnh phü, Kit Qua Wu Tra vt Dieu 
Kiln Tv nhien vüng Quän Wo Trubng Sa vä cäc VAn De Khoa Hqc CAn Giäi Quyet trong Giai Doan 1993- 
1995,1993), p. 20. 
42 For details of the description on the natural conditions of the Spratlys features, see Annex 1, infra. 
43 Timo Kivimaki (ed. ). op. cit., note 9, p. 58. 
44 Ibid. 
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Figure 5. Shipping lanes in Southeast Asia 45 
All the routes make the South China Sea a nexus on the world maritime navigation 
map. Normally, oil and minerals are shipped northwards, while food and manufactured 
goods are shipped southwards. 46 Of all the countries which are exploiting the sea routes in 
the South China Sea, China, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines depend the most on 
this route to transport their oil and gas imports. Estimates reveal that oil consumption in 
developing countries is expected to raise about 4 percent annually to reach 25 million 
barrels per day by 2020, especially for China, 47 therefore, the South China Sea will 
continue play its vital role as a navigational route. 
Not only does it have one of the busiest sea lanes, the South China Sea also has a 
significant role to play in terms of security. After a long period of war resulting from 
colonial regimes and the divided situation brought about by the cold war, the vulnerable 
states in the region all consider the South China Sea to play a very important role in their 
45 Sources: Presentation of Professor Beckman in the 5`h Science Council of Asia Conference, Hanoi, May 11- 
13,2005. 
46 Timo, op. cit., note 9, p. 58. 
°' Noer, John H. Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in the Southeast Asia, (Washington: National 
Defense University Press, 1996), p. 9. 
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security policies. For Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei, the South China Sea is the only sea 
which abuts all their long coastlines. Indeed, Vietnam and Malaysia have faced real 
military threats from the South China Sea, e. g. the attack by France in 1856 on the Da Nang 
coast of Vietnam, the air strike over North Vietnam by the United States as a result of the 
Gulf of Tokin incident in 1964 and the conquest by Japan of Malaysia in the Second World 
War. The Philippines were also a target for military attack from Japan from the South 
China Sea, although the South China Sea was not the only maritime entrance to the 
country. Control of the South China Sea would enable states to monitor ship movements, 
especially naval reconnaissance craft. As the Spratlys are located in the middle of the sea, 
they offer an ideal site for monitoring the South China Sea waters as well as allowing the 
littoral states to prevent `leap-frogging' attacks from the Spratlys features to the mainland 
territories. This gives rise to the strategic position of the Spratlys in the security policies of 
the littoral states and makes them an object of overlapping sovereignty claims. 8 
Paradoxically, these overlapping claims to the Spratlys have themselves led to military 
action which now pose a great threat to international navigation and make the South China 
Sea a flash point for instability in the Asia Pacific region. 49 
2. Natural resources in the South China Sea 
In addition to its strategic location, the South China Sea is one of the world's most 
diverse shallow water marine areas and one of the thickest of sedimentary basins. Its 
favourable geographic location endows the South China Sea with a diverse marine ecology, 
and a variety of natural resources, including hydrocarbons and fisheries. The South China 
Sea is one of the richest seas in the world, with thousands of species of flora, fauna, coral 
reefs, mangroves, sea grasses, fishes and plants. 50 Furthermore, the two archipelagos, the 
Paracels and Spratlys, are "major nesting areas for migratory sea tortoise, the eggs, flesh 
and shells of which have been harvested for centuries' . 51 Also, being attractive areas for 
48 For example, the monograph of the Philippines Ministry Defense in 1992 remarked that: "It may be 
recalled that the territory was used by Japan in World War II as a staging area for the conquest of the 
Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Kalayann group is therefore considered vital to the national defense and 
security of the Philippines. Adversarial occupation of these islands by an unfriendly power will constitute a 
threat to the national security and territorial integrity of the Philippines". Quoted in Catley and Keliat, op. cit., 
note 30, p. 98. However, all these security consideration might be changed now as with the development of 
modem technology, the monitoring can be conducted by satellite. 
49 For details of the military actions, see infra, Chapter 3. 
50 Brian Morton and Graham Blackmore, op. cit., note 33, p. 1240. 
51 Samuels, op. cit., note 5, p. 3. 
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birds, they contain rich reserves of phosphate deposits from bird manure. All this combines 
to create an ideal natural environment for living resources and a spectacular marine ecology 
for the South China Sea, giving rise to significant economic interests of the littoral states. In 
addition to the phosphate deposits and fishery resources which have been known to be 
under exploitation for a long time, the littoral states have recently discovered the potential 
of the marine ecology in the South China Sea to act as a catalyst for the development of 
tourism and marine research. 52 However, among many economic interests, the richness of 
the fisheries and the value of hydrocarbon resources remain the principal reason for the 
parties'claims to the Spratlys. 
2.1. Hydrocarbon Potential 
The major hydrocarbon potential in the South China Sea lies in its considerable 
amount of oil and gas reserves. In the onshore areas of the South China Sea, the black gold 
resources have been known since the colonial period, 53 and reserves are estimated (in 
million of barrels) at 1,500 for Southern China, 210 for South Hainan Island, 95 for the 
Gulf of Tokin, 2847 for Southern Vietnam, 180 for the Sunda Shelf, 9,260 for 
Borneo/Sarawak and 409 for the Philippines. 54 So far, littoral states have effectively 
conducted exploitation in these areas. For example, China currently exploits the huge 
Yacheng gas field south of Hainan Island and the Xijiang fields near the Pearl River Delta. 
Malaysia has already produced gas in the Central Luconia and James Shoals gas fields off 
the coast of Sarawak. The Philippines is exploiting the Camago and Malampaya gas fields 
which are located in the Northwest water of Palawan. Indonesia has -exploited the Natuna 
gas field which is located at the far south of the Spratlys and is in dispute with Vietnam. 
Indonesia plans to install pipelines from this field to Singapore. Vietnam is operating joint 
ventures with BP and ONGC, an Indian oil company, in the Lan Tay and Lan Do gas fields. 
52 Although the Spratlys is currently under dispute, some littoral states such as the Philippines, Malaysia and 
Indonesia have already made use of this advantage to develop marine-based tourism which yields valuable 
foreign exchange and creates job opportunities for local people. Vietnam, recently, also reported to conduct 
the first organised tourist visit to the Spratlys in April 2004 under the Defence Ministry auspices. 
(Information from Comparative Connection, Pacific Forum `s Quarterly Electronic Journal on East Asian 
Bilateral Relations, 1' quarter 2004, online at http: //www. csis. orgipacfor/cceioumal. html (accessed on 2 
February 2005)). 
s; The first modem well in coastal areas was drilled in West Java in 1872 and similar exploitation also took 
place in the Philippines in 1896. Then, much later, in 1957, the first offshore well was drilled by Royal Dutch 
Shell on North Borneo's continental shelf (Samuels, op. cit, note 5, p. 154). 
54 Brian Morton and Graham Blackmore, op. cit., note 33, p. 1237. 
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Vietnam has also very successfully exploited the Bach Ho, Dai Hung and Thanh Long oil 
fields, which are situated off the southeast coast near Ho Chi Minh City, and which have 
total reserves of 550 billion barrels of oi1.55 In addition to separate exploitation activities, 
Vietnam and Malaysia also have agreed to set up a joint exploitation of hydrocarbon 
resources in the overlapping marine areas between them. 
In the offshore areas, especially the Spratlys area, the hydrocarbon resources are 
also thought to be available in large quantities, although the estimates from different 
countries vary enormously. In 1989 China sent a survey vessel through the South China Sea 
and estimated that the Spratlys area held deposits of 25 billion cubic metres of natural gas 
and 105 billion barrels of oil. In 1988, US geologists estimated that the Spratlys only had 
reserves of 2.1 to 15.8 billion barrels of oil. 56 Meanwhile, Russia's Research Institute of 
Geology of Foreign Countries in 1995 gave the estimate of 7.5 billion barrels of oil 
equivalents, of which 70% are probably gas. 7 In the framework of the Workshop on 
Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, a survey of natural resources in the 
South China Sea was assigned to the Technical Working Group on Resource Assessment. 
However, due to the sensitive sovereignty and territorial issues, no result was submitted for 
hydrocarbon resources S8 Recently, under the joint exploration agreement in the eastern 
area of the Spratlys among China, the Philippines and Vietnam, 59 the survey vessel of 
China collected seismic data from the seabed on 16 November 2005 and the statistics of 
hydrocarbon resources for the region are expected to be available in the coming years. 60 At 
the moment, there is no dependable estimate for the hydrocarbon resources of the Spratlys. 
Comprehensive exploration of the area may take many years and may involve millions of 
53 Timo, op. cit, note 9, p. 55 and Craig Snyder, `The Implications of Hydrocarbon Development in the South 
China Sea" online at http: //facul! y. law. ubc. ca/scs/ (accessed on 24 November 2005). 
56 Craig Snyder, ibid. 
57 Mark J. Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes, (Oxford University Press, Adelphi Paper, 
1995), p. 10. 
58 For further information on the Workshop on Management Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, see 
Chapters 3 and 5, infra. 
s' China and the Philippines reached an agreement in joint scientific research between the Philippines 
National Oil Company and the China National Offshore Oil Company in the South China Sea in September 
2004. Vietnam also jointed in this agreement in March 2005. The agreement will last for three years and 
cover an area of 143 square kilometres. This movement was hailed as a diplomatic breakthrough for peace 
and security in the region. For details, see Press Release of The Department of Foreign Affairs of the 
Philippines, online at http: //www. dfa. gov. ph/news/pr/nr2004/sep/pr524. htm (accessed on 19 October 2004). 
60 China, Vietnam and the Philippines end seismal survey in the South China Sea, for details see: 
http: //tuoitre. com. vn (accessed on 20 November 2005). 
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dollars and numerous wells because of the complicated geological situation of the 
archipelago 61 
Despite the lack of reliable statistics, the high potential for hydrocarbon resources 
in the Spratlys is one of the reasons that inspire the parties to make claims to the 
archipelago, given the importance of oil and gas in the national economies of the littoral 
states. China, with the highest economic growth rate and a huge population, is always 
hungry for oil and gas resources. In fact, the energy consumption of China has risen 1.8 
times faster than the increase of its gross national product and it has had to import oil since 
1974.62 For Vietnam and Malaysia, crude oil and gas are the main sources of export 
revenue. Brunei, a zone-locked country which has marine access only to the South China 
Sea, is also totally dependent on oil for its income. This is not the situation of the 
Philippines, where oil imports create a heavy financial burden. Therefore, all of the littoral 
states are really keen to expand their sovereignty over any area which contains hydrocarbon 
resources. Also, the Spratlys provide ideal and convenient sites for transportation and 
installation of oil drilling for exploration and exploitation activities in the shallow water of 
the South China Sea. 
The scramble for oil in the Spratlys began with the Philippines in 1974 when this 
country invited some foreign oil companies, namely Mobil, Exxon, Shell and Standard Oil 
of Indiana, to explore the oil resources in the eastern area of the Spratlys (the Reed bank 
and its surroundings area) 63 These activities were continued in 1979 and oil reserves were 
found in one of the islands in this area. Then, Kirkland Oil received a concession in the late 
1980s. Most recently, Alcorn, the Philippines' subsidiary of the American Vaalco Energy 
Company, was permitted to conduct a desk-study, also in the Reed Bank area, in 1994. 
China also joined the search for oil in the Spratlys area when it gave a contract to 
Crestone Energy Corporation of the United States in 1992 to explore oil and gas in the 
Western Spratlys, the Vanguard Bank, 600 miles south of China's Hainan Island. Vietnam 
claimed that the area was within its continental shelf and at that time under the lease to BP, 
whereas China argued that the concession belonged to its historical sovereign area of the 
61 Craig Snyder, op. cit., note 55. 
62 It is estimated that every 1% increase of GNP goes along with a 1.8% increase in oil consumption. For 
further analysis on China's oil consumption, see Marko Milivojevic, "The Spratly and Paracel Islands 
Conflict" (1989) January-February Survival, p. 76. 
63 Catley and Keliat, op. cit, note 30, p. 47. 
64 Timor, op. cit., note 9, p. 56. 
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South China Sea. This led to military confrontation between China and Vietnam when 
China declared its intention to use military force to back up the operation of Crestone. 65 
The tension was eased after the leaders of China and Vietnam met in Hanoi and agreed to 
refrain from all acts that complicated and broadened the conflict. 66 
Some oil and gas fields which have been explored and exploited by claimants in the 
adjacent waters to their coastal lines and the South China Sea area are illustrated in Figure 6: 
Oil and Gas Resources 
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Figure 6. Allocation of oil and gas resources in the South China Sea region67 
65 Liselotte Odgaard, op. cit., note 16, p-95- 
66 Craig Snyder, op. cit., note 55. 
67 Source: CIA Maps and Publications for the Public. On line at: 
http: www eia doe eov erneu-cabsschinatab. html (accessed on 31 January 2005). As the sovereignty in some 
area of the South China Sea region was in dispute, the countries' names indicated in gas and oil fields on the 
map only showed that the exploitation activities at that field were carried out by those countries. 
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2.2. Fishery resources 
The South China Sea ranks as one of the richest fishing grounds in the world with 
many varieties of fish such as round scads, sardine, big-eye scads, mackerel and tuna. It 
stands at number 4 among the 19 richest world fishing zones 68 In the waters around the 
Spratlys alone, fishing capacity is estimated at 7.5 tonnes per square kilometre a year. 69 
Annually, the South China Sea states and entity produce over 8 million metric tonnes live 
weight of marine fish, accounting for 10 percent of the total world catch and 23 percent of 
that of Asia. 70 
Fishing has been the primary and traditional activity within the Spratlys waters with 
the operation of fishermen from China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines. 
Fish is the main source of protein for a large part of the regional coastal populations. Also, 
fishing creates millions of jobs and facilitates the development of the aquaculture and aqua- 
processing industries of the populous littoral states. 
With regard to China, fish provides a significant source of food for its huge 
population as well as the input for the aquaculture and aqua-processing industries of the 
country. China has one of the biggest fishing industries in the world with the fastest 
development in the last ten years. In 1990, the fishery export revenue of China reached 
US$1,622,123,000, and in 2003, the revenue was increased about three times to 
US$5,243,459,000 with total of 45,647,658 tonnes of fishes. Not only leading in fishery 
exports, statistics in 2003 also showed that China was ranked 80' in the world of fishery 
importers with the total import revenue of US$ 2,388,590,000. Taiwan is also a major 
player in world fisheries with the fishery export revenue in 2003 of US$ 1,298,564,000 
from a total of 1,486,291 tonnes of fish. 71 
In other Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines, the 
lives of the majority of the people also heavily rely on their work in the fishing industry in 
the South China Sea region. In 2003, Vietnam ranked 8th among world fishery exporters 
with the fishery export revenue of US$ 2,207,578,000 from 2,604,388 tonnes of fish. 
68 Timo, op. cit., note 9, p. 44. 
69 Alan Dupont, The Environment and Security in Pacific Asia, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Adelphi 
Paper, No. 319,1998), p. 53. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Statistics of Yearbook of Fishery Statistics of FAO, online at http: //www. fao. orgjfi/statist/statist. asp 
(accessed on 26 November 2005). 
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Malaysia and the Philippines also hold considerable fishing industries of 1,454,244 and 
2,628,799 tonnes of fishes respectively from capture and aquaculture in 2003 72 
As fishing plays an important role in the region and the Spratlys are ideally located 
in the middle of the richest fishing grounds of the South China Sea, it comes as no surprise 
that the archipelago is an attractive place for the littoral states to expand their sovereignty. 
The Spratlys become even more desirable when the 1982 LOSC gives rise to the possibility 
of mid-ocean islands having expanded maritime zones (EEZs and continental shelves), 
granting them extended fishing rights. 3 Also, for a country like China, with a huge territory 
but comparatively modest coastlines, its claim to the Spratlys is the way for the country to 
expand its fishing rights to the rich fishery resources of the South China Sea. 
So far, with regard to fishing rights, tensions have occurred among the littoral 
states. In the waters adjacent to the coastlines of the littoral states, disputes over fishing 
rights have occurred in the South-west of the South China Sea between Thailand, Malaysia 
and Vietnam and in the North-east of the South China Sea between China and Taiwan from 
1994 to 1997. More seriously, in the adjacent waters to the Spratlys archipelago, disputes 
among China, Vietnam, the Philippines and Taiwan have occurred. These disputes led to 
the capture of many fishermen and fishing boats, most of which were from China from 
1997 to 2002 as follows: 74 
Date Incidents 
8 August 1997 The Philippine navy arrested 23 Chinese fishermen for illegal fishing in the waters 
around Northeast Cay. 
November 1998 The Philippine military arrested 20 Chinese fishermen on board 6 sampans near 
Arellano Reef. 
20 July 1999 A Chinese fishing boat was sunk by a Philippine gunboat near the disputed Spratly 
Islands in the South China Sea. Two others were chased and fired on by a Philippine 
naval vessel. One was rammed and sank with 11 people on board. 
6 an 2000 A Philippine naval vessel sighted six Chinese fishing vessels, reportedly carrying 
72 Ibid. 
" According to Article 121(3) of the 1982 LOSC, only an island that can sustain its own economic life can 
have all maritime zones. Not all of the features of the Spratlys meet this condition, thus may not have EEZs 
and continental shelf zones. For the analysis of the sovereign rights which might be generated from the two 
archipelagos, see infra, Chapter 2. 
74 Sources: Compiled from the database on South China Sea of the International Boundaries Research Unit of 
the University of Durham, online at http: //www-ibru. dur. ac. uk/database/data. html and the Comparative 
Connection, Pacific Forum `s Quarterly Electronic Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, From the 
volumes of Yd quarter 1999 to 4`s quarter 2003, online at http: //www. csis. org/t)acfor/ccejournal. html 
(accessed on 2 February 2005). 
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coral, off Scarborough Shoal. 
26 May 2000 A Philippine naval vessel fired upon and killed the captain of a Chinese fishing boat 
and detained other fishermen. The fishing boat was reportedly spotted poaching turtles 
8 km away from Palawan island. 
15 January 2001 A Philippine air force plane sighted four Chinese fishing boats near Scarborough 
Shoal. 
1 February 2001 The Philippine navy boarded four Chinese fishing boats, confiscated their catch of 
endangered sea turtles and ordered them to leave Philippine water. 
May 2001 23 April the Philippines navy reported that 10 Chinese fishing vessels were spotted 
poaching off Thitu Island, Nanshan Island and Thomas Shoal. On 1 May Philippine 
navy patrol boat fired warning shots on a Chinese vessel fishing in the same area and 
confiscated five sampans. At the end of May Philippine maritime police detained two 
Chinese fishing vessels and 34 crews. 
10 June 2001 Vietnamese Coast Guard seized four Chinese vessels and 51 crews for illegal fishing 
in the waters off central Vietnam. 
20 September 2002 Chinese Ambassador in Manila demanded that the Philippine government release 
some 122 Chinese fishermen being held in custody pending trial. 
October 2003 Taiwan expelled 11 Vietnamese fishing boats from the Spratlys. 
This situation partly resulted from the fact that the fishery legislations of littoral 
states take account of territorial claims and these generate many overlapping fishing 
areas. 75 In addition, in order to fortify their claims in the claimed waters, some countries 
have increased their own fishing activities while the others have responded with increasing 
captures of fishing boats and fishermen. With the highest fishery production, China was the 
country which exploited the most fishery resources in the disputed areas. These arrests have 
increased the tension among claimants and could well trigger a military confrontation in the 
future. Therefore, it is desirable to build a fishery regime applicable in the disputed area in 
order to reduce such tensions and facilitate settlement of the South China Sea dispute. The 
places where fishing clashes usually occur are marked in Figure 7 as follows: 
75 For details of the territorial claims in the South China Sea, see Chapter 3, infra. 
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Figure 7. Clashes over fishing rights in the South China Sea76 
3. Conclusion 
The Spratlys is an archipelago located in the middle of the South China Sea, one of 
the biggest semi-enclosed oceans in the world. The geographical location, the resources 
based in its features and surrounding waters, are all factors which individually and in 
combination make the Spratlys of vital strategic interest to the littoral states. The Spratlys 
can be used as a stepping stone for littoral states seeking to grasp the entire `geostrategic 
lake' of the South China Sea. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that they are objects of a 
long-lasting dispute with multiple parties in the region. A careful examination of the 
geographical characteristics of the South China Sea area will facilitate the understanding of 
76 Sources: Adapted from the map provided by the Foreign Policy Association of the United States, online at: 
http: //cat. middIebury. edu/southchinasea/maps/dupont3.0pg (accessed on 2 February 2005). 
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the application of international law and help clarify the legal regime of the Spratlys and 
provide an answer to the territorial dispute over the Spratlys. 
It is also noteworthy that it is not only the ownership of the Spratlys themselves, 
but also the fishery and hydrocarbon resources in the surrounding waters which have 
triggered the dispute among littoral states. With the development of the international law of 
the sea, the role of islands in generating maritime zones is increased significantly. Thus, the 
Spratlys features also play an important role in `economic' security. Control of the enlarged 
features of the Spratlys might open the possibility of entitlement to maritime zones in the 
South China Sea, from which littoral states could have sovereign rights over the natural 
resources of the sea, including fishery and hydrocarbon resources of great potential. Also, 
the current facts and figures concerning exploration and exploitation activities of fishing 
and hydrocarbon resources in the South China Sea will assist the maritime delimitation 
process and build up other necessary cooperative mechanisms in order to arrive at a feasible 
solution for the South China Sea dispute and better manage potential conflict in the region 
in the future. The next chapter will take this study forward by analysing the legal regime of 
the Spratlys. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE SPRATLYS 
1. Introduction 
From the analysis presented in the previous chapter of the strategic location, 
economic interests, navigation and security it comes as no surprise that the Spratlys have 
been an object of dispute among the littoral states in the South China Sea. From those 
disputes, two main legal issues have emerged, namely the sovereignty over the features of 
the Spratlys and the maritime delimitation of the adjacent waters. International law 
provides that sovereignty claims can only be made to territory and the capacity of 
generating maritime zones also varies according to the legal status of the different features 
in question. 
In general, seabed elevations are classified into three legal groups: islands, low tide 
elevations and others which are always under the water even at low tide. Of the three 
groups, islands are the most important features as they allow states to generate title and 
entitlement to certain maritime zones. The maritime zones of islands depend on a further 
distinction, in which due to human habitation and economic life, some islands are only 
entitled to a territorial sea and contiguous zone, whereas others are enable to generate all 
maritime zones including territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ and continental shelf 77 
These different groups of features have different legal regimes. 
The legal classification is especially important to the Spratlys as it is necessary to 
clarify which features are islands, and thus eligible for territorial claims. It also helps to 
estimate the maritime zones, if any, of the features of the Spratlys and how these maritime 
zones can be delimited among the littoral states. This examination, due to the difficulty of 
geography and the disputed situation, will be based on some objective geographical 
statistics of scholars in reliable publications. 8 
77 These are the requirements of Article 121(3). For further discussion, see infra this Chapter. 
78 Due to the fact that the Spratlys is occupied by military forces and the parties have conducted many 
activities to expand the features which they are occupying, it is difficult to visit the scene to obtain precise 
geographical information. The distinctions between islands and other elevations in the Spratlys in this thesis 
will be based on the available information from reliable and objective sources such as the sailing directions 
and research published by American, British and French scholars. The sources of the information are David 
Hancox and Victor Prescott, op. cit., note 35; Valencia et al., op. cit., note 16, Appendix 1, p. 227; Alex G. 
Oude Elferink, "The Islands in the South China Sea: How does their Presence Limit the High Seas and the 
Area of the Maritime Zones of the Mainland Coast" 32 (2001) ODIL, 169; Joseph R. Morgan and Mark 
Valencia (eds. ), Atlas for Marine Policy in Southeast Asian Sea, (University of California Press, 1983). 
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2. Islands, low tide elevations and other elevations: A classification for the Spratlys 
2.1. Islands in the Spratlys: The application of Article 121(1) of the 1982 LOSC 
The distinction between islands and other elevations is set out in Article 121(1) of 
the 1982 LOSC which provides that "[a]n island is a naturally formed area of land, 
surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide". 79 
The criteria of "natural formed area of land" sets out the strict requirement that 
primarily, an area of land will only be considered an island if it is a product of nature. It 
eliminates the possibility of applying the article to artificial islands, i. e. islands formed by 
the interference of human beings. 80 Furthermore, the requirement of being "above water at 
high tide" establishes the distinction between an island and a low tide elevation as the 
common characteristic between an island and a low tide elevation is "a naturally formed 
area of land surrounded by water" but an island is above, whereas a low tide elevation is 
submerged at high tide. 81 
In order to qualify as an island, all of the requirements of the Article 121(1) should 
be met in combination. This means that any elevation which does not meet the requirement 
of Article 121(1) is not entitled to the legal status of an island. 
In the case of the Spratlys, due to the geographical and geomorphologic situation, 
there are a large number of features, most of them, with a coral structure, are submerged at 
high tide. In order to make the elevations above water at high tide, some parties to the 
dispute have attempted to build structures such as lighthouses, military structures, weather 
stations, etc. These actions will not change the legal status of low tide elevations to that of 
islands because of the requirement that islands be "naturally formed". 82 
Applying the double tests of "natural formed area of land surrounded by water" and 
"above at high tide" of the Article 121(1) in the geographical and geomorphologic situation 
of the Spratlys, there are 35 features that qualify as islands. 83 They are listed from the North 
to the South and from the East to the West as follows: 
7' This definition was also stipulated in Article 10(1) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone. 
80 Artificial islands will be discussed, infra this Chapter. 
81 Article 13 of the 1982 LOSC. For further discussion on the elements constitute an island under Article 
121(1) see John Briscoe, "Islands in Maritime Boundary Delimitation" (1988) Ocean Yearbook, 14 at 15-20. 
82 These actions may help some low tide elevations to qualify base points for straight base lines. This 
Fossibility will be discussed, infra this Chapter. 
3 For statistics of the natural conditions of the features of the Spratlys, see Annex 1, infra. 
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- Northeast Cay and Southeast Cay in North Danger Reef 
- Sandy Cay and Thitu Island in Thitu Reefs 
- Loaita Cay, Lankiam Cay, Loaita Island and West York Island in Loaita Bank 
- Flat Island and Nanshan Island in Jackson Atoll 
- Itu Aba Island, Sand Cay, Eldad Reef, Nanyit Island, Gaven Reef and Discovery 
Great Reef in Tizard Bank 
- Sin Cowe Island, Collin Reef, Whitsun Reef and Lansdowne Reef in Union Reefs 
- Spratly Island, West Reef, East Reef and Cuarteron Reef in London Reefs 
- Fiery Cross Reef, Pearson Reef, Pigeon Reef, Amboyna Cay, Barque Canada 
Reef, Mariveles Reef, Swallow Reef, Royal Charlotte Reef, Louisa Reef, Alicia 
Reef and Commodore Reef. 
2.2. Low tide elevations: The application ofArticle 13(1) 
Many other features in the Spratlys do not fall within the definition of an island and 
so must be further classified as either a low tide elevation or another feature. A low tide 
elevation, or a "drying rock" or a "bank", (other names in some older text books), is 
defined by Article 13(1) of the 1982 LOSC as "a naturally formed area of land which is 
surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide". Applying this 
definition to the case of the Spratlys, the following features are low tide elevations: 
- North Reef, South Reef in the North Danger Reef 
- Subi Reef in Thitu Reef 
- Irving Reef in Loaita Bank 
- Petley Reed and Discovery Small Reef in Tizard Reef 
- Johnson South Reef, Loveless Reef, Hughes Reef, Higgens Reef, Kennan Reef, 
Holiday Reef and Zhangxi Jiao in the Union Reefs 
- Central Reef, Ladd Reef in the London Reefs 
- Cornwallis South Reef, Alison Reef, First Thomas Shoal, Erica Reef, Ardasier 
Reef, Dallas Reef, Livock Reef, Boxall Reef, Mischief Reef, Bombay Shoal, 
Iroquois Reef, Royal Captain Shoal and Half Moon Shoal in other areas of the Spratlys. 
The special geographical structure of coral, low tide elevations and other features which 
are submerged at low tide in the Spratlys can also be called reefs. Other features which are built 
up by human activities in order to be above water at high tide or to have their areas expanded 
43 
CHAPTER 2. THE LEGAL REGIME OF TIE SPRATLYS 
are categorised as artificial islands. In comparison to islands and low tide elevations, artificial 
islands and reefs have a different legal status. 84 Islands, low tide elevation and artificial 
features, depending on their legal regime, will have different effects on generating maritime 
zones of the Spratlys and upon the maritime delimitation of the South China Sea. 85 
3. Legal regime of islands in the Spratlys: The application of Article 121(3) of 
the 1982 LOSC 
Although Article 121(3) is part of the 1982 LOSC to which all interested parties in 
the dispute are either bound or have expressed their acceptance, 86 there is a question mark 
over its customary law status due to its not being followed in state practice, and because it 
has not been clearly endorsed by the ICJ. 87 This may lead to further arguments that as a 
result of state practice a new customary international law might be formed superseding 
Article 121(3). 88 If it has not yet become general customary international law, at least it 
" Reefs under the provision of Article 6 of the 1982 LOSC will serve as basepoints in certain circumstances. 
For further discussion, see infra in this Chapter. 
85 See infra, Section 5, this Chapter for further discussion. 
86 See supra, Introduction for the acceptance of Taiwan. 
87 Kwiatkowska and Soons argued that Article 121(3) had not been followed by coastal states, and thus was 
not binding law. For details, see Kwiatkowska and Scions, "Entitlement to Maritime Areas of Rocks which 
Cannot Sustain Human Habitation or Economic Life of their Own" 21(1990) NYIL, 174 at 174-80. 
88 The possibility of new customary law formed to supersede treaty law was long discussed in international 
law. Many writers have acknowledged the possibility of changes occurring to treaty rules through the process 
of customary international law. For discussion, see Karol Wolfke, Custom in Present International Law, 
(Dordrecht, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2nd ed., 1993), p. 101-2; H. W. A. Thirlway, 
International Customary Law and Codification, (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1972), p. 131; Mark E. Villiger, 
Customary International Law and Treaties, (Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1985), p. 215; Michael Buyers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and 
Customary International Law, (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 174; Nancy Kontou, The Termination 
and Revision of Treaties in the Light of New Customary International Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 
p. 22; Fitzmaurice, "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation 
and other Treaty Points" (1957) 33 BYIL 203 and Bowed, "Reservations to Non-restricted Multilateral 
Treaties" (1976-7) 48 BYIL 66. The writers agree that customary law as a result of social development can 
serve as a codifying instrument to supersede international law. This is particularly correct as there is no 
hierarchy of sources in international law, and customary law and treaties are equal. This possibility was also 
discussed in the negotiation process of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in which the draft 
of Article 38 said "A treaty may be modified by subsequent practice in the application of the treaty 
establishing the agreement of the parties to modify its provisions" (Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of its 18th Section (1966) 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 172 at 
182). Although this Article was not included in the final text of the Convention, the International Law 
Commission commented that "... a consistent practice, establishing the common consent of the parties to the 
application of the treaty in a manner different from that laid down in certain of its provisions, may have the 
effect of modifying the treaty. 
... As to the case of modification through the emergence of a new rule of customary law, [the 
commission] concluded that the question would in any given case depend to a large extent on the particular 
circumstances and on the intentions of the parties to the treaty. It further considered that the question formed 
part of the general topic of the relation between customary norms and treaty norms which is too complex for it 
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might be a regional customary law of the South China Sea region. Otherwise, the parties must 
apply Article 121(3) as a treaty obligation in good faith. Accordingly, the requirements of 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties concerning interpretation a treaty 
must be followed, i. e. a treaty must be interpreted with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 89 Hence, the 
next section of this part will discuss this possibility. 
3.1. Purpose ofArticle 121(3) 
As defined in paragraph (1) of Article 121, an island is an area of land which is 
naturally formed, paragraph (2) further stipulates the equal legal effect of islands and 
continental land in generating maritime zones. However, if some islands are very small and 
do not sustain human habitation or have economic life, it is unreasonable for them to have all 
maritime spaces because this will cause a significant distortion in maritime delimitation. In 
this light, Article 121(3) is necessary to reduce the distortion by limiting the maritime zones 
of rocks. That is to say the purpose of paragraph (3) of Article 121 is to set out the conditions 
for islands in order to have equal status with other areas of land. This is a limitation to avoid 
distortion, not the expansion of maritime zones for every island. 90 Therefore, it is submitted 
that similar to the approach of paragraph (1), islands under paragraph (3) also need to be 
tested in the light of their natural attributes without any artificial addition. However, the two 
conditions of paragraph (3) stand individually, not in combination, i. e. an island which meets 
one of the two conditions will be entitled to all maritime zones. 91 Bearing in mind the 
purpose of the Article will be helpful in the interpretation of these conditions in fact 92 
to be safe to deal only with one aspect of it in the present article" (Yearbook of International Law 
Ccommission 1966, Vol. 11, p. 236). 
89 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties provides that a treaty must be "interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and 
in the light of its object and purpose. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall 
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with 
the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the 
treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. " 
90 An analogy can be drawn here. If Article 60(8) on legal regime of artificial islands is stipulated to 
discourage nations from building artificial islands solely to expand their jurisdiction over the ocean resource, 
Article 121(3) should also be interpreted to discourage nations from populating their uninhabited insular 
possessions for the same purpose. 
In the travaux preparatoires of the 1982 LOSC, Article 121(3) was drafted as "... human habitation and 
economic life". If this phrase was kept in the official text, an island would have to qualify both conditions. 
However, the word "and" was replaced by "or". Therefore, meeting either of the two conditions will be 
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3.2. The effect of Article 121(3) 
3.2.1. New customary international law superseding Article 121(3) 
Customary law is unwritten international law based on a general and consistent 
practice of states accepted by them as legally binding. 93 In order to form a new customary 
law, two elements are required, namely state practice and opiniojuris. It is generally agreed 
that state practice establishes customary law only if it is general and consistent 94 Also, 
state practice must be accompanied by opiniojuris, i. e. states act not only because of their 
concern of they "amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out 
in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the 
existence of a rule of law requiring it". 95 
Reviewing state practice relating to the application of Article 121(3), one can find 
both compliant and resistant state practice. State practice can be seen from unilateral 
legislation, bilateral treaties and judicial decisions. Compliant state practice can be seen 
from an example that in 1997, after United Kingdom ratified the 1982 LOSC, it redefined 
the fishery limit off Rockall of 200 nautical miles from the stipulation in the Fishery Limit 
Act of 1976.6 By issuing a reservation with the view that rocks and small islets should be 
enough for an island to generate all maritime zones. For details, see UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. III, 
p. 195 (The replacement of the word "or' was introduced in the third session of the conference in the Informal 
Single Negotiation Text. ) However, the Norwegian translation of Article 121(3) only uses a comma to 
separate the two conditions of the Article. This comma can be interpreted to imply in Norwegian grammar 
that the two conditions must both be fulfilled. For details, see Marius Gjetnes, "The Spratlys: Are They Rocks 
or Islands? " (2001) 32 ODIL, 191 at 194; Also, during the negotiation of UNCLOS III, Denmark was strongly 
in favour of the interpretation that the word `or" means "and". (Statement of Denmark, The Law of the Sea, 
Regime of Islands - Legislative History of Part VIII (Article 121) of the UN LOSC (UN Office for Ocean 
Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 1988), p. 107. 
92 Purpose is one of the requirements for interpretation a treaty under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties. 
93 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 61° ed., 2003), p. 6; 
Malcolm Shaw, International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5'h ed., 2003), p. 68; and Nancy 
Kontou, op. cit., note 88, p. 2. 
94 Ian Brownlie, ibid, p. 7; Shaw, ibidd, p. 70 and Kontou, ibidd, p. 3. 
95 North Continental Shelf Case, ICJ Report (1969), p. 3 at para. 77. This is also the spirit of the judgment in 
the Lotus case (1927), PCIJ Series A, No. 10 at 28; For further discussion, see Lauterpacht, The Development 
of International Law by the International Court, (London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1958), p. 379-81; Ian 
Brownlie, op. cit., note 93, p. 8-10; Shaw, op. cit., note 93, p. 71 and Nancy Kontou, op. cit., note 88, p. 5. 
96 The United Kingdom indirectly stated the 200 nautical miles fishery zone for Rockall in the attached 
nautical chart of the Fishery Limits Act of 1976 (reprinted in 2 F. F. Durante & W. Rodin, Western Europe 
and the Development of the Law of the Sea (United Kingdom) L. 22.12.1976 (1984)), cited in Jon Van Dyke, 
Joseph R. Morgan and Jonathan Gurish, "The Exclusive Economic Zone of the Northwestern Hawaiian 
Islands: When Do Uninhabited Islands Generate an EEZ? " (1988) 25 San Diego L. R., 425 at 453 and Clive 
R. Symmons, The Maritime Zones of Islands in International Law, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher 
Press, 1979), p. 117-8. 
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ignored in maritime delimitation, Taiwan also expressed its view that these features could 
not generate maritime zone, thus indirectly supporting Article 121(3). 97 Also, in some 
bilateral maritime delimitation agreements, states have made distinctions between rocks 
and islands. The common trend is to consider whether the island sustains human 
inhabitation or economic life, and if not to reduce or give it no effect in maritime 
delimitation. This can be seen from the case of Natuna Islands in maritime delimitation 
between Indonesia and Malaysia, 98 Kharg Island in the maritime delimitation between Iran 
and Saudi Arabia, 99 the Evout, Barnevelt and Horn Islands in the Beagle Channel between 
Argentina and Chile, 100 Malpelo Island in the maritime delimitation between Colombia and 
Panama101 and many others. In addition, many decisions of the ICJ and arbitration, 
although not explicitly supporting Article 121(3), were not against the Article. This can be 
seen from the approach of the Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration, 102 Qatar v. Bahrain 103 arid 
Cameroon v. Nigeria cases104 in which small formations are considered a source of distortion, 
thus are given a reduced effect in maritime delimitation. These decisions and awards took a 
97 Point 1 in the 1970 reservation of Taiwan to the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. For full text, 
see (1971) 101LM452. 
98 The Natuna Island of Indonesia was given reduced effect because of their remoteness and small size. For 
discussion, see Jayewardene, The Legal Regime of Islands in International Law, (Dordrecht, Boston, London: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 1990), p. 418-9 and Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, International 
Maritime Boundaries, (Dordrucht, Boston and London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993, Vol. 1), Report 5- 
9(1), p. 1019. 
99 The equidistance line in the northern sector of the boundary was modified in order to give the Kharg Island 
half effect whereas other small islets located near the mainland was disregarded in the delimitation between 
Iran and Saudi Arabia. For discussion, see Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, Vol. 2, ibid, Report, 
7-7, p. 1519. 
10° They are small Chilean islets lying in the Atlantic waters off the Argentina coast of Tierra del Fuego in the 
Beagle Channel. The resolution of the dispute limited the Chilean maritime claim by giving them less than 
full effect. For details, see Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Chile and Argentina, (1985) 24 ILM, 11 at 12. 
'o' The Malpelo Island and dependent islets are `wrong side' features lying approximately 245 and 190 miles 
from Colombian and Panamanian coasts respectively. The maritime boundary divided the water between the 
Malpelo and Panama according to the ratio 1: 2 in favour of Panama. Thus, it appeared that the parties gave 
Malpelo a reduced effect in maritime delimitation due to its small size and distant location from the 
Colombian coast. This also ensured an equitable solution and took into account the general direction of the 
coast of Panama. For discussion, see Jayewardene, op. cit., note 98, p. 450-1 and Jonathan I. Charney and 
Lewis M. Alexander, op. cit., note 98, Report, 2-5, p. 519. 
102 Although the Tribunal in this case consider that the mid-sea islands could not be discounted altogether, and 
had somehow weighted in maritime delimitation, the single island of Al-Tayr and the island group of Al- 
Zubayr were given no effect in median line boundary in the Northern Stretch (Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration 
Awards, especially at paras. 83 and 138-158). 
103 In this case the presence of a tiny island, Qit'at Jaradah, was a relevant circumstance in maritime 
delimitation. With the delimitation line passing immediately to the east of it, it was submitted that the Court 
was of the view that due to its small size Qit'at Jaradah was not given full effect. For full text of the 
Judgment, see Qatar v. Bahrain, ICJ Reports, 2001, p. 40 at para. 219. 
104 In this case, the effect of Bioko Island was ignored in maritime delimitation (Cameroon v. Nigeria, ICJ 
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consistent view in reducing the effect of small insular formations in maritime delimitation, i. e. 
although not directly stated in these judgments, Article 121(3) was followed. 
In addition to compliant practice, there are number of other examples which are not 
inconformity with Article 121(3). This can be seen from the claims of full maritime zones 
for small features such as the Aves Island of Venezuela, 105 the Northwestern part of Hawaii 
of the United States, 106 the Ceva-i-Ra of Fiji, '07 L'Esperance Rock of New Zealand, '°8 
etc. 109 These islands are claimed to have extensive maritime zones, even though they are 
uninhabited and do not really have an economic life of their own and some of these claims 
have been successful, e. g. the Aves Island of Venezuela receive recognition from many 
parties concerned. 110 
It can be argued that the degree of state practice which conforms with Article 121(3) 
far exceeds the resistant state practice, and thus the contrary practice could not amount to 
general and consistent state practice. Furthermore, the states who have claimed extensive 
maritime zones for small features have not shown their belief in a legal right in doing so 
and thus there is a lack of opinio juris. Therefore, it is submitted that the resistant state 
practice to Article 121(3) has not formed a new customary international law to supersede 
the treaty rule of the article. However, the contrary state practice to Article 121(3) did 
prove that there is a divergence in the application of the article and Article 121(3) is not 
implemented consistently. Moreover, the violation of states, even the parties to the 1982 
'os Aves Island is situated centrally in the Eastern Caribbean, 435 kilometres away from the nearest 
Venezuelan territory. The island measures about 585 metres in length and at it narrowest point 30 metres in 
width. It was claimed and recognised to generate full maritime zone in the maritime delimitation between 
Venezuela and Puerto Rico without any consideration under Article 121(3). 
106 The Northwestern Hawaiian Islands include a number of small bits of land extend in a long chain, namely 
the Nihoa Island, Necker Island, French Frigate Shoals, Gardner Pinnacles, Maro Reef, Laysan Island, 
Lisianski Island, Pearl and Hermes Atoll, Midway Island and Kure Atoll. Although some of these islands are 
only suitable for small plants, such as coconut tree and brush and all are not capable for current habitation, the 
United States still claims their EEZs. 
107 The Ceva-i-Ra is a six and a half acres sandy cay located about 300 miles from the nearest Fijian territory. 
This is also uninhabited islet, but Fiji still claims its full maritime zone in order to protect its interests in 
fishery and mineral resources. 
108 L'Esperance Rock is the uninhabited insular formation in the southernmost of the Kermadec Islands group 
which lies some 600 miles from the North Island of New Zealand. The only inhabitants on the entire `rocky 
group' of islands are about ten staffs of the meteorological station on Raoul, the northernmost islet in the 
chain. However, New Zealand claims that the L'Esperance Rock generates its own 200 nautical mile zone on 
New Zealand's maps. This claim seems contradict with Article 121(3) because New Zealand wants to protect 
the fishing and mineral resources in the area. 
109 For further discussion of these state practices, see Jon Van Dyke et al., op. cit., note 96, p. 451-463 and 
Barbara and Soons, op. cit., note 87, p. 177-8. 
10 The claim of Venezuela was recognised by US, France and the Netherlands. 
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LOSC, e. g. the South China Sea states, shows that Article 121(3) is not considered as legal 
obligation. Hence, without consistent state practice and opiniojuris Article 121(3) has not 
yet become customary international law either. Article 121(3) is only a treaty obligation for 
the member states of the 1982 LOSC. 
3.1.2. New regional customary law superseding Article 121(3) in the South 
China Sea re, ion 
The elements for regional custom were pronounced in the Asylum cases. "' Differing 
from international customary law whose scope is global, regional customary law is 
considered applicable to a particular area. If such a regional customary law exists in the South 
China Sea region, according to the principle of lex posterior derogate legi priori, when two 
rules on the same subject-matter differ in their contents, the rules originating later in time will 
prevail. Therefore, in this case, if the regional customary rule of the South China Sea region 
concerning the legal status of small islands is established after the time when the parties 
ratified the Convention, this customary rule will supersede the rule of Article 121(3) of the 
Convention. Otherwise, if the resistant regional practice is before the time of ratification, the 
rule of Article 121(3) will prevail. Ratifying the Convention may indicate that the parties 
have abandoned their previous practice. However, as between treaties and customary, the 
rules of one source may supersede rules of the other, the ratification of the Convention may 
not prevent the parties from building up a contrary practice, and the rule of the Convention 
may be superseded again once this practice is firmly established as new regional customary 
rule of law. 112 In order to examine the existence of such a regional customary in the South 
China Sea region, this section will analyse the two requirements for the establishment of a 
111 Asylum Case (Columbia/Peru), Judgment, ICJ Report (1950), p. 266. The Court in this case held that "the 
party which relies on a custom of this kind must prove that this custom is established in such a manner that it 
has become binding on the other party... The facts brought to the knowledge of the Court disclose so much 
uncertainty and contradiction, so much fluctuation and discrepancy in the exercise of diplomatic asylum and 
in the official views expressed on various occasions, there has been so much inconsistency in the rapid 
succession of conventions on asylum, ratified by some states and rejected by others, and the practice has been 
so much influenced by considerations of political expediency in the various cases, that it is not possible to 
discern in all this any constant and uniform usage, accepted as law... " (p. 276-7, ICJ Report, 1950). For 
discussion, see Lauterpacht, op. cit., note 95, p. 381-4. 
112 For further discussion, see M. E. Villiger, ibid, p. 34-6 and N. Kontou, ibid, p. 16-36. Concerning the 
relationship between customary law and treaties, there is another principle of lex specialis derogate legi 
generali, i. e. a more special rule may prevail the general rule. However, as the regional customary law and the 
treaty rule of Article 121(3) are regulating the same subject of the legal status of small islands, the application 
of this principle is not relevant in this case. 
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regional customary law, namely general and consistent state practice and opiniojuris within 
the region. 
Examining the state practice in the South China Sea region, it seems that the littoral 
states concur in giving full maritime zones for all the islands of the Spratlys. Regarding 
China's position, as the mainland of China is far from the Spratlys, its claim to a large area 
of maritime zones in the South China Sea may only result from two possibilities, namely 
historic waters113 or from the maritime zones of the Spratlys. 114 The Philippines and 
Malaysia also seemingly support the view of extensive role as it is reported that Malaysia 
has built a tourist resort with an air strip on an uninhabited island. 115 Therefore, it can be 
argued that common state practice of the littoral states in the South China Sea region in 
giving extensive maritime zones for uninhabited features might form a new regional 
customary law. However, the regional state practice is not clearly made with the aim to 
generate extensive maritime zones for the features of the Spratlys. Furthermore, regional 
state practice lacks the consistency and opinio juris elements as the parties oppose each 
other's claims to extensive maritime zones. 116 In addition, other states due to the concern of 
international navigation also oppose the claims of the littoral states. 17 Hence, the claims of 
extensive maritime zones of the parties is a violation their treaty obligation, rather than 
forming a new and contrary regional customary law. 
Without any superseding customary international and regional law, Article 121(3) 
still has binding effect on the parties in the South China Sea dispute. 
113 In the Declaration on Territorial Sea of 1958, China applied the straight baselines to both the Paracels and 
the Spratlys. From these baselines, it was inferred that China might claim full maritime zones for the two 
archipelagos. This point of view was repeated in other recent legislation of China, namely the 1992 Territorial 
Sea Law (Article 2) and 1996 Declaration when the country accessed to the 1982 LOSC. 
114 That means that the claim to maritime zones is based on a claim to maritime zones of the Spratlys 
themselves, i. e. to a certain extent the Spratlys must qualify under Article 121(3) to generate all maritime zones. 
115 The construction in the Swallow Reef, see the picture infra at Figure 11. With such construction, Malaysia 
seems to have turned the Swallow Reef from an uninhabited feature to an island which can sustain human 
habitation and has economic life in the form of tourism and thus it may be claimed to generate full maritime zones. 
116 For example, the dispute over the concession of China in the Vanguard Bank led to the opposing claim of 
Vietnam that there was no possibility for China to extend its maritime zone to Vanguard Bank, even if China 
were successful with sovereignty claim to the Spratlys, i. e. Vietnam opposed the possibility that the Spratlys 
could generate extensive maritime zones. 
117 For example the US stated that "the United States would, however, view with serious concern any 
maritime claim, or restriction on maritime activity, in the South China Sea that was not consistent with 
international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea". Statement made by 
Christine Shelly, Acting Spokesperson of the US Department of State on 10 May 1995. For full text, see 
"State Department Regular Briefing" Federal News Service, 10 May 1995. 
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3.3. Difficulty in interpretation and application ofArticle 121(3) 
3.3.1. The role of `size' of islands in travaux preparatoires and state 
practices in the application ofArticle 121(3) 
Article 121(3) provides that "[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or 
economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf'. 
The 1982 LOSC does not clarify the definition of rock, but from the stipulation of Article 
121(3), one can argue that in terms of size, rock must be smaller than island, thus not 
qualifying to generate all maritime spaces. This assumption is clear when one examines the 
travaux preparatoires of the Article. During the travaux preparatoires of the Article in the 
1982 UNCLOS, the size of island, a quantitative criterion, was recommended. For example, 
in the draft of the group of 14 African states, the size of islands was considered as one of 
the relevant factors to determine the maritime spaces of islands! is Romania also proposed 
a clear distinction among islets, small islands and large islands and `less than 1 square 
kilometre' was suggested to differentiate islets from islands! 19 Unfortunately, these efforts 
were not successful and the size of islands was not one of the criteria of Article 121(3) to 
determine the capacity of islands to generate maritime zones. 
Although not being an explicit criterion in the text of Article 121(3), from state practice 
and case law, the size of island still has certain significance in clarifying the application of this 
article. For example, in the Jan Mayen case, 120 as the Jan Mayen Island is 54.8 kilometres 
length, the ICJ stated that because of its size alone Jan Mayen is not a rock. 121 This means, in 
terms of size, if an island is big enough, it may avoid the test of Article 121(3) and enable it to 
generate all maritime zones. On the other hand, the case of Rockall with a size of 0.624 square 
kilometres is assumed to be an example of a typical rock. 122 However, this assumption is still 
controversial, as it has not been confirmed by other state practice and judgments of the ICJ. A 
similar controversy was seen in the arguments for maritime spaces of a tiny island, the Aves 
Island. With a size of approximate 0.066 square kilometres (550 metres length and 120 metres 
"s Center for Oceans Law and Policy, University of Virginia School of Law, The UNCLOS 1982: A 
Commentary, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), p. 329 and 334. 
119 Ibid, p. 332. 
120 ICJ Reports (1993), p. 34 at para. 80. 
21 Ibid, para. 61. 
u See E. D Brown, "Rockall and the Limits of National Jurisdiction of the UK" (1978) Marine Policy, Part I, 
205-208; E. D. Brown, Seabed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime: The Continental Shelf, 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, Vol. 1,1992), at p. 39; Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 
(Manchester University Press, 3'd ed., 1999), at p. 50; Clive R. Symmons, op. cit., note 96, at p. 41. 
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at the widest), Venezuela claims that the island has full maritime effect to generate all maritime 
spaces. This claim was recognised by US, France and the Netherlands but was opposed by all 
other Caribbean states. 123 Therefore, the consensus on the minimum size of island that meets 
the test of Article 121(3) in state practice has not yet been reached. 
In an attempt to clarify the size of islands in the application of Article 121(3), a 
reference to the definition of the International Hydrographic Bureau that small islets are 
from 1-10 square kilometres, islets are from 10-100 square kilometres and islands are from 
100 - 5x106 square kilometres was made. 124 Rocks in Article 121(3) are argued to be 
smaller than small islets, thus according to this hierarchy, rocks must be less than 1 
kilometre. '25 In order to clarify rocks and islands, Hodgson suggested that rocks should be 
less than 0.001 square mile, thereafter, islets from 0.001-1 square miles, isles from 1- 1000 
square miles and islands from larger than 1000 square miles. 126 From the definition of the 
International Hydrographic Bureau to the suggestion by Hodgson, rocks are nearly 400 
times greater or smaller in terms of size. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude which figure 
will be used to define rocks. 
With regard to the relation between size and the application of Article 121(3), Jan 
Mayen is the only one in case law so far having all maritime zones without the test of 
Article 121(3). Given the approach to Jan Mayen, uninhabited islands such as the Spratlys, 
the biggest of which is of about 0.46 square kilometres, 100 times smaller than Jan Mayen, 
can safely be presumed to have to fulfil the other tests. 
3.3.2. The difficulties in interpreting the ability to sustain human habitation 
and economic life o their own 
The test of paragraph 1 of Article 121 of the 1982 LOSC distinguishes between islands, 
low tide elevation and other features. Paragraph 2 of the Article 121 continues by a declaration 
that an island may generate all maritime zones. The conditions of having all maritime zones are 
at paragraph 3 that "[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their 
own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf'. This implies that rocks will 
123 CIA fact book online at: http"//www cia og v/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ve. html (accessed on 17 April 
2005). 
124 Hart Dubner, "The Spratly "Rock" Dispute- A "Rockapelago" Defies Norms of International Law", 9 
(1995) Temp Intl & Comp. L. J., 291 at 303. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Robert D. Hodgson, (Geographer of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State) 
"Islands: Normal and Special Circumstances" in Gamble J. K. and Pontecorvo G. (eds), Law of the Sea: The 
Emerging Regime of the Oceans, (Ballinger Publishing Company, 1974), 137 at 150 and 151. 
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have only internal water, territorial sea and contiguous zones, while other islands will have all 
maritime spaces. The key criteria for this distinction are the two conditions, namely the ability 
to "sustain human habitation' 'and "economic life of their own". 
Relying on the conditions set by the Article 121(3) to classify which islands qualify 
as generating all maritime zones is even more difficult and controversial because the two 
conditions of Article 121(3) are worded in a vague and imprecise manner, with no 
quantitative criteria to assert what will constitute either "sustaining human habitation" or 
"economic life". 127 
With regard to "sustaining human habitation", the issues which will be raised in 
application are contained in the interpretation of each word in the phrase. First, "human" in 
the condition refers to ordinary people, i. e. the presence of civilians or military troops or 
scientific staffs will be accepted. Although there is a suggestion that only civilians qualify 
as human in this consideration, 128 it is still difficult in the case that the habitation of a 
civilian is a result of an encouraged and subsided policy of a government in order to make a 
small island qualify under Article 121(3). Second, "habitation" may be interpreted as 
covering both long term habitation and short shelter. 129 In order to qualify, the meaning of 
habitation, the number people inhabiting an island, is another controversial issue. There is a 
suggestion that 50 people are the minimum number to be considered as "habitation, . 
130 but 
from the travaux preperatoires and state practice, there is no evidence to confirm that 
suggestion. 13 1 Finally, the ability to "sustain" refers to the actual ability, i. e. the existence of 
human habitation in the past and the present, or a possibility in the future is enough for the 
requirement of paragraph 3. If the capacity to "sustain human habitation" is accepted for 
127 For a discussion of the difficulty in interpreting this Article, see Charney, "Rocks Cannot Sustainable 
Human Habitation" 93(1999) AJIL, p. 863-77 and Kwiatkowska and Soons, op. cit., note 87, p. 139-181. Brown 
commented on the wording of Article 121(3) that "in its present form, Article 121(3) appears to be perfect 
recipe for confusion and conflict". For further, see Brown E. D., "Rockall and the Limits of National 
Jurisdiction of the UK" (Part 1) (1978) Marine Policy, p. 181 at 206. 
128 Marius Gjetnes, op. cit., note 91,191 at 195. 
129 Long habitation refers to a stable community of people who are permanently living in the island. Short 
shelter may be the visiting of fishermen or the sending of occasional explorers or scientists to conduct some 
research. 
130 Jon Van Dyke et al., op. cit., note 96, at 438. The authors considered that five persons would be too few to 
constitute a stable community, but fifty could very well serve as a population of sufficient size. Karagiannis 
went even further to suggest that the presence of one person on an island may provide an indication that the 
island can support human habitation. For further, see Karagiannis, "Les Rochers Qui ne se Pretent pas ä 
1'Habitation Humaine ou ä une Vie Economique Propre et le Droit de la Mee' (1996) 29 Revue Belge de 
Droit International, 559-624 at 573-574. 
131 In fact, many islands with extensive maritime zones do not have 50 persons living on them. For example, 
Jan Mayen of Norway. 
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the future, which conditions will be required for having that capacity? Dealing with this 
problem, many scholars believe that the availability of vital conditions for human living 
such as fresh water, cultivated land, food and shelter is a decisive test. '32 However, with the 
development of modem technology, the conditions which allow human living may change 
and thus claimants may not need the availability of all these conditions. 133 
With regard to the second criteria of Article 121(3), it is not clear whether 
`economic life of its own' means economic significance or economic resources of the 
island. If it means economic significance, it is hard to say that any island possesses no 
economic significance because of the potential resources of the surrounding sea water. If 
economic life requires the presence of economic resources, whether it requires the 
availability of valuable natural resources on the island itself or just the availability of 
valuable natural resources in the adjacent waters around the island is sufficient to qualify 
the article. 134 In addition, if economic resources are accepted in surrounding water, what 
extent of waters will be considered as adjacent, within territorial sea or within exclusive 
economic zone? 
The difficulty in interpreting the Article 121(3) leads to different approaches for the 
legal regime of tiny islands, 135 especially for the case of the Spratlys. Whatever the 
approaches are, the interpretation of the article must be "in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose". '36 
132 The specific description of conditions for human habitability was initially developed by Gidel, see Clive R. 
Symmons, op. cit., note 96, at 46, referring to Gidel B., Le Droit International Public de la Mer (1934) at 684. 
Then this was mentioned in all discussions on the meaning of 'human habitation' in Article 121(3). 
133 For example, some devices will allow people to live by rain water instead of fresh water. 134 For example, Charney argued that having economic resources in the adjacent water is enough for islands to 
pass this test of Article 121(3). For details, see Charney, op. cit., note 127,863-878. 
33 This can be seen from inconsistent state practice in claiming maritime zones for small and inhabited 
islands. It is because some states are not the members of the 1982 LOSC, or despite being members of the 
Convention, still make a claim due to the economic interests in ocean resources. For example, the United 
States claims full effect for some small and inhabited islands in Northwestern Hawaii (For details, see Jon 
Van Dyke et al., op. cit., note 96) and Venezuela claims full maritime zones for the Aves Island (For further, 
see CIA fact book online at: http: //www. cia. oQ v/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ve. html (accessed on 17 April 
2005)), also in Alex G. Oude Elferink, "Clarifying Article 121(3) of the Law of the Sea Convention: The 
Limits Set by the Nature of International Legal Process" (1998) Boundary and Security Bulletins, 58 at 61. 16 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. 
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3.4. A better view for the application ofArticle 121(3) in the case of the Spratlys 
Due to the complexity of interpreting Article 121(3), there are many different 
approaches to its application to the islands in the South China Sea. Some consider that all 
islands of the Spratlys are too small to generate all maritime zones and thus they only have 
internal water, territorial sea, and contiguous zones. Other may argue that due to the 
significance in terms of economic life, i. e. the presence of oil and fishing resources, 
although they are tiny in size, all islands in the Spratlys are still eligible for all maritime 
zones. Between the two extreme approaches is a middle approach of interpreting Article 
121(3) in the case of the Spratlys in order to reach an understanding that some, but not all, 
islands which qualify to have all maritime zones. 
Different approaches arrive at different results, but they do not give a decisive 
answer on which how many features, if any, of the Spratlys would qualify under Article 
121(3). In general, based on the results of these arguments, the approaches can be examined 
and assessed in three main groups as follows: 
3.4.1. All islands of the Spratlýgualify under Article 121(3) 
This approach is the result of a broad interpretation of Article 121(3). 137 According 
to this approach, in order to meet the condition of sustaining human habitation, the shelter 
of fishermen during fishing trips will be taken into account. Moreover, the second condition 
of economic life is understood as economic significance. This means that if an island is 
important in terms of economic resources in its surrounding water, it will be entitled to 
generate all maritime spaces. 138 Applying these interpretations to the Spratlys, many islands 
were used for shelter for fishermen in the region, especially for fishermen from China and 
Vietnam. The adjacent waters around the Spratlys are great important as they contain great 
potential for hydrocarbon resources. They are also known as rich in fishing and guano 
resources, which have been exploited by states in the region for a long time. Islands in the 
"' This approach may be implied from the claim of China to a vast area of the South China Sea. As this area 
is too far from the mainland of China, if it is not considered within the historical water, it must be maritime 
zones of the features of the Spratlys. Iain Scobbie also supports this position of China by his arguments of 
maritime zones of the Spratlys. For details, see lain Scobbie, "The Spratlys Islands Dispute: An Alternative 
View" (1996) S Oil and Gas Law and Taxation Review, 173 at 180-182. For further discussion of China's 
claim to historical water, see infra, Chapter 4. 
138 From the argument of Charney that the "economic of its own" can be understood that of the adjacent 
water, all Spratlys features should have all maritime zones as the surrounding water is of very importance. For 
Charney's arguments, see Charney, op. cit., note 127. 
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Spratlys are also attracting tourism. 139 All this economic significance suggests that if based 
on an extremely broad interpretation, all islands of the Spratlys must have all maritime spaces. 
3.4.2. None of the islands of the Spratlys qualifies under Article 121(3) 
In contradiction to the broad approach, there is another trend in clarifying the legal 
status of islands in the Spratlys. This approach is based on a strict interpretation of Article 
121(3) to the situation of the Spratlys. So far, in the Spratlys, there is no long-term 
habitation. All the islands in the Spratlys are very small in size and located far away from 
the mainland of littoral states. Therefore, it is difficult to manage and exploit the resources 
of the islands. 140 Based on this argument, Gjetnes concluded that all islands in the Spratlys 
were rocks under the classification of Article 121(3). 141 Valencia, although he did not 
examine in detail the conditions of the Spratlys in comparison with the stipulation of 
Article 121(3), also asserted that "in terms of international law, logic and practicality.. . the 
extended zones [for islands of the Spratlys] should not be permitted". '42 
3.4.3. Some islands of the Spratlys qualify under Article 121(3) 
This third approach results from the interpretation and application of the two 
conditions of Article 121(3) to the features of the Spratlys. 143 The thesis will argue that this 
is the best approach for the application of Article 121(3) to the case of the Spratlys. It is the 
vital importance for the legal regime of the Spratlys, this argument will be examined in 
details in the next section. 
3.5. Twelve islands of the Spratlys qualify under Article 121(3): The most 
generous approach 
With regard to "sustaining human habitation", the issues which will be raised with 
regard to its application are (i) whether "human" means civilian or whether the presence of 
139 For analysis on the importance of the water in terms of economic resources, see supra, Chapter 1. 
140 Gjetnes also argues that so far the only resource available in the features of the Spratlys is guano. This 
resource was exploited in the 1930s. For details of the examination of the conditions of the Spratlys to qualify 
under Article 121(3), see Marius Gjetnes, "The Legal Regime of Islands in the South China Sea", Masters 
Thesis of Law, Department of Public and International Law, University of Oslo, 2000, p. 48-92; Although not 
directly analysing on the case of the Spratlys, Chamey in his general comment on the legal regime of islands 
under Article 121(3) also believed that some features would previously have been entitled to extended 
maritime zones but today may fall within the Article 121(3) definition as rocks with the ending of a natural 
resource, e. g. guano. For further, see Charney, op. cit., note 127, p. 867. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Valencia et al., op. cit., note 16, p. 45. 
13 Alex G. Oude Elferink supports this interpretation and suggests that the Itu Aba, Spratly and Thi Tu 
Islands in the Spratlys may qualify under the test of Article 121(3). For details, see Alex G. Oude Elferink, 
op. cit., note 78, at 178. 
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military troops or scientific staff will also be accepted, (ii) whether "habitation" means long 
term habitation or whether short shelter can also be taken into account, (iii) whether 
"sustain" refers to the habitation of humans in the past, the present, or the future, and if the 
capacity to "sustain human habitation" is accepted for the future, which conditions will be 
required for having that capacity. 
As for the first question, as the conditions of islands must be natural in the test of 
Article 121,144 the presence of military troops and scientific staff will not qualify. Military 
troops are on special duty and implement the political decisions of governments. Their presence 
is a matter of state direction rather than habitation. If the presence of troops is to be accepted 
under Article 121(3), all governments will order their troops to occupy all the islands, even 
islands not capable of habitation, and thus the purpose of the article will not be achieved. The 
special duty can also be seen in the work of scientific staff. Due to the requirements of their 
research, scientific staff have to stay in the field of their work even if the place is a desert or 
anywhere else that cannot support human habitation. Therefore, similar to the presence of 
troops, the presence of scientific staff should not be taken into account in considering human 
habitation. Human habitation should be understood as habitation by a settled population. 
Hence, in this case, the presence of troops and some scientific staff in some lighthouses or 
weather stations in features of the Spratlys will not be considered as human habitation. '45 
With regard to the second question, from the travaux preparatoires of the article, the 
phrase "cannot be inhabited (permanently)" is used as one of the criteria to distinguish islands 
from islets. 146 This means that temporary habitation such as seeking shelter during the fishing 
season does not qualify as habitation under Article 121(3). 147 In the case of the Spratlys, the 
I" Charney, however, argued that the text of paragraph 3 of Article 121 does not specify that the conditions 
set out must also exist naturally like the requirement of paragraph 1. For details, see Charney, op. cit., note 
127, p. 867. However, if this argument is accepted, states will find it easy to change the conditions of all their 
tiny islands in order to pass the test of Article 121(3), thus in fact Article 121(3) will be meaningless. Hence, 
it is submitted that the two conditions of Article 121(3) must also be tested under the natural condition of the 
islands as under paragraph 1. 
'as This is also the views of Mark Valencia et al., op. cit., note 16, p. 42; Clagett, Brice M. "Competing Claims 
of Vietnam and China in the Vanguard Bank and Blue Dragon Areas of the South China Sea. " 10 (1995) Oil 
Gas Law and Taxation Review (UK), Part I, p. 375-88, at 386; Marius Gjetnes, op. cit., note 91, at 195. 
146 Article I of Romania's Draft on definition of and regime applicable to islets and islands similar to islets. 
Document A/CONF. 62/C. 2/L. 53 in United Nations, Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: 
0 cial Record, Vol. lII, p. 228. 
14 Jon Van Dyke and others also agree on the permanent nature of the habitation by referring to the term 
"stable community" and thus they suggest that the infrequent visits from interested scientists would not be 
sufficient to constitute a stable community. For further information, see Jon Van Dyke et al., op. cit, note 96, 
57 
CHAPTER 2. THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE SPRATLYS 
historical record showed that the Spratlys were considered as little more than a dangerous 
ground for international navigation. There was no civilian habitation except the visiting of 
fishermen of the region when they had to avoid storms or seek shelter during a long fishing trip 
in the South China Sea and the short-term presence of some workers for guano exploitation. 
These activities did not lead to any long-term habitation of people in the Spratlys. Until the 
early years of this century, military troops and scientific staff were deployed in the archipelago 
to occupy islands and conduct marine scientific research. This means that there was no actual 
human habitation in the Spratlys in the past as well as the present. Therefore, the test for the 
first criterion of Article 121(3) will be left for the third question about whether `sustain' refers 
to the habitation of humans in the past, the present or the future. 
From the text of paragraph (3) the word "can" implies the ability to sustain rather 
than actually having human habitation. 148 This means that even if an island has not 
sustained human habitation in the past or present but has the ability to sustain human 
habitation in the future, it still qualifies under the test of Article 121 (3). In order to have 
such a capacity, an island, without any support from outside, must be able to provide the 
vital conditions for human living such as the presence of fresh water, cultivable soil and 
other resources. 149 Searching for the presence of these natural conditions in the Spratlys, 
there are some islands which do have fresh water and on which vegetables are found. These 
islands are Southeast Cay, Thitu Island, Loaita Island, Nanshan Island, Itu Aba Island, Sand. 
Cay, Nanyit Island, Spratly Island, West York Island and Amboyna Cay. 150 This means that 
these islands have some conditions that may sustain human habitation in the future. 
After examination of some of the natural conditions, it may be argued that with the 
new development of technology, people are finding more ways to live in such difficult 
conditions as those in the Spratlys. On the other hand, it is noted that even with the new 
p. 438; Also in Jon Van Dyke and Dale L. Bennett, "Islands and the Delimitation of Ocean Space in the South 
China Sea" (1993) 10 Ocean Yearbook 54-89 at 79. 
148 Brown also agrees that "can' 'refers to capacity to sustain human habitation rather than the actual existence 
of human habitation. For details of the arguments see, Brown E. D., op. cit., note 127, p. 206. Also, in Chamey, 
op. cit., note 127, p. 868 and Barbara and Soons, op. cit., note 87, p. 160-3. 
19 These are natural conditions requirement for an island initially listed by the definition of Gibel, and 
received support of all other scholars when they discuss on the vital criteria for human habitation. For details, 
see B. Gidel, Le Droit International Public de la mer, 1934, at 684. 
150 Results obtained from the statistic of David Hancox and Victor Prescott, op. cit., note 35; Valencia et al., 
op. cit., note 16, Appendix 1, p. 227; Alex G. Oude Elferink, op. cit., note 78, p. 169-190 and Joseph R. 
Morgan and Mark J. Valencia (ed. ), Atlas for Marine Policy in Southeast Asian Sea, (University of California 
Press, 1983). For a statistic from these works, see Annex 1, infra. 
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development of technology, the features are required to have at least enough space for 
humans to stay without any artificial assistance. In the case of islands in the Spratlys, due to 
being very tiny in size, even with new technology, it is unlikely that some of the islands will 
be able to sustain human habitation without artificial assistance. The ten islands which are 
listed above are already based upon a very broad interpretation of the Article 121(3). They 
are listed even though they only have a potential capacity, illustrated by the presence of 
bushes and small vegetable. Therefore, it can be argued that the ten islands listed above are 
the maximum number of islands which qualify as being able to "sustain human habitation". 
With regard to the second criterion of Article 121(3), "economic life", it is necessary to 
justify "economic life" in combination of the phrase "of its own" to answer (i) whether the 
"economic life of its own" requires the availability of valuable natural resources on the island 
itself or (ii) whether the availability of valuable natural resources in the adjacent waters around 
the island is sufficient for it to qualify under the article. The first assumption that natural 
resources must be available on the island itself is the strict interpretation of the text from Article 
121(3). In this consideration, mineral resources will be accepted as valuable resources. With 
regard to the islands in the Spratlys, the availability of guano resources in some islands will 
enable those islands to pass the test of Article 121(3). These islands are Northeast Cay, 
Southeast Cay, Flat Island, Itu Aba Island, Spratly Island and Amboyna Cay. 151 
In the second approach, a broader interpretation is that economic life may derive from the 
economic resources of the adjacent waters of an island. 152 This interpretation will create 
controversy as the natural resources such as fisheries or potential for tourism are available in 
almost all ocean spaces. It is unlikely that there is some water which does not have any economic 
significance. Therefore, the broad interpretation will probably result in all features generating all 
maritime zones. This is not the spirit and purpose of Article 121(3) in avoiding inequality and 
distortion in maritime delimitation. Furthermore, in the case of the Spratlys, as many small 
features are located close to the others (most of the distances between the features are less than 
200 nautical miles) in a rich resource water, the natural resources in the adjacent waters already 
belong to the maritime zones of some bigger features (which qualify under Article 121(3)). If the 
'51 Ibid. 
152 Charney argued that economic life may include exploitation of the living and mineral resources found in 
the territorial sea as the sovereignty over the island includes the territorial sea and its natural resources. 
Moreover, if an island is used as a base for the exploitation of resources further offshore, it would be 
sufficient to establish "economic life of its own". Charney, op. cit., note 127, p. 868. 
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broad interpretation is applied, i. e. all features will have full maritime zones, it will not only create 
much overlapping among all the features, but will also give rise to a distortion as some of the 
islands such as Whitsun Reef is only a few rocks at high tide. Therefore, it is arguable that this 
broad interpretation should not be applied. 
To combine the two tests mentioned above, there are two conditions that can enable 
some islands of the Spratlys to generate all maritime zones, namely (i) the availability of 
some vital conditions for human habitation in the future and (ii) the availability of natural 
resources on the islands. More concretely, the availability of fresh water, trees and guano 
resources are the elements to help the islands to pass the test of Article 121(3). A search for 
these elements occurring naturally within the Spratlys produces a list of 12 islands as follows: 
Name Natural conditions 
Northeast Cay Area: 685x90m; Height: 3m; Covered with grass and thick trees in 1963. 
Southwest Cay Area: 650x280m; Height: 4-6m; Covered with a 10 metre coconut tree, grass with low 
bushes and guano with considerable scale. Also, reported to have two wells. 
Thitu Island Area: 22ha; Height: 3.5m; Covered with low bushes, coconut palms and plantain trees. 
Loaita Island Area: 6ha; Height 2m; Covered with mangrove bushes in 1933, above which rose 
coconut palms and other small trees. 
West York Island Area: 500x320m (15 ha); Covered with mangroves and coconut palms (1963). 
Itu Aba Island Area: 960x400m (0.46kmz or 46ha); Height: Sm; Covered with shrubs, coconut and 
mangroves in 1938 and have guano deposit. 
Sand Cay Area: 7ha; Height: 3m; Covered with trees and bushes in 1951. 
Nanyit Island Area: 104m2; Height: 6m; Covered with trees, bushes and grass. 
Flat Island Length from 90 to 210 m; A low flat, sandy cay with large guano deposits but no vegetation. 
Nanshan Island 575m long, 2.5m height; Covered with coconut trees, bushes and grass in 1963. 
Spratly Island Area: 13-1Sha; Height: 2.5m; Covered with bushes, grass, guano in 1963; Fringing reef 
is above water at low tide. 
Amboyna Cay Area: 1.6ha; Height: 2m; Sand and coral with guano deposits and little vegetation. 
Surrounded by fringing reef. 
The examination of the two conditions of "sustaining human habitation" or "economic 
life of its own" confirms that although tiny in size, some islands in the Spratlys are still capable 
of generating maritime spaces under a permissive, but not maximalist, interpretation of Article 
121(3). 153 On the one hand, if all maritime effect of the islands of the Spratlys is ignored, this 
153 This is a maximum effect of the interpretation of Article 121(3) which results in the most complicated 
scenario for the dispute but in fact, it might be not that much. 
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may make the maritime delimitation in the South China Sea more simple and practical . 
154 
Nevertheless, this is not the appropriate approach according to Article 121 as the article 
allows an island to generate maritime zones if it meets either of the two conditions of 
paragraph 3. On the other hand, if the emphasis is put on the significance of natural 
resources and the strategic position of the Spratlys in order to reach the conclusion that all 
the islands are able to generate maritime zones, this will lead to great distortion in maritime 
delimitation. As mentioned above, one of the purposes of Article 121(3) is to avoid the 
distortion in maritime delimitation caused by giving too much maritime space to a tiny 
island, thus giving full maritime zones for all islands will go against the purpose of Article 
121(3). Therefore, although it will be difficult in practice, the better approach is to conduct 
the test of the two conditions in the context of the specific situation of the Spratlys to find 
out which islands in the Spratlys will probably have all maritime zones. As the 
requirements of Article 121(3) are either to "sustain human habitation" or have "economic 
life of its own", all islands which pass one of the two conditions will be able to generate all 
maritime zones. To combine the results from the tests of the two conditions, 12 islands of 
the Spratlys will have all maritime spaces, namely Northeast Cay, Southeast Cay, Thitu 
Island, Loaita Island, Flat Island, Nanshan Island, Itu Aba Island, Sand Cay, Nanyit Island, 
Spratly Island, West York Island and Amboyna Cay. 
Of the three approaches on application of Article 121(3) in the case of the Spratlys, 
this approach provides the better way as it is based on the ordinary meaning of the terms of 
Article 121(3) and in line with the purpose and object of the 1982 LOSC. This is also the 
most generous outcome possible for the Spratlys to generate maritime zones. 
4. Legal regime of low tide elevations and artificial features in the Spratlys 
4.1. Legal regime of low tide elevations 
The legal status of low tide elevations is not fully clarified in the 1982 LOSC, as 
low tide elevations are only mentioned in three articles relating to their possible use as base 
points. '55 With regard to the normal baseline, Article 13(1) of the Convention only 
stipulates that if "a low tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not 
exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, the low-water 
154 This is the suggestion of the authors in Valencia et al., op. cit., note 16, p. 45. 
155 For history of the stipulations about low tide elevations in international law of the sea before the 1982 
LOSC, see Geoffrey Marston, "Low Tide Elevations and Straight Baselines" (1972-1973) 46 BYIL 405. 
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line on that elevation may be used as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the 
territorial sea". This implies that if a low tide elevation is located within 12 nautical miles, 
coastal states can exercise their sovereignty rights in using it as a basepoint. 
Regarding straight baselines, Article 7(4) of the 1982 LOSC laid down a different 
requirement that "straight baselines shall not be drawn to and from low tide elevations, unless 
lighthouses or similar installations, which are permanently above sea level, have been built on 
them". Provided that the coastal states are entitled to apply the straight baseline method in 
accordance with the provisions of the law of the sea, 156 this provision implies that irrespective 
of its distance from the mainland or an island, any low tide elevation will qualify as a basepoint 
for a straight baseline if there is a lighthouse or similar installation which is permanently above 
sea level built upon it. '57 A similar requirement is included in the provision of Article 47(4) on 
the use of low tide elevations as basepoints for archipelagic baselines. 158 
Articles 13(1) and 7(4) suggest that low tide elevations, which are located within 12 
nautical miles in the case of the normal baseline or are built upon with lighthouses or 
similar installations in the case of the straight baseline, are objects of territorial claims of 
coastal states for the use as basepoints. With the presence of such a low tide elevation, the 
territorial sea of the coastal state may be extended to 24 nautical miles (instead of 12 
nautical miles) from the mainland or an island. 159 Hence, although having a limited role, 
low tide elevations in these circumstances are not worthless in terms of sovereignty and 
capacity to generate maritime zones. 
In the other cases when a low tide elevation is located outside the breadth of the 
territorial sea from a mainland or an island as well as not qualifying as a basepoint for 
'56 Article 4 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and Article 7 of the 1982 
LOSC. 
15' For further discussion on the possibility of low tide elevations to serve as basepoints for straight baseline, 
see Roberto Lavalle, "Not Quite a Sure Thing: The Maritime Areas of Rocks and Low-tide Elevations under 
the UN Law of the Sea Convention" (2004) 19(1) IJMCL, 43 at 49-52. 
18 Article 47(4) of the 1082 LOSC says that archipelagic baselines "shall not be drawn to and from low-tide 
elevations, unless lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently above sea level have been built 
on them or where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of 
the territorial sea from the nearest island. " 
159 Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., note 122, p. 49. 
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straight baseline, it has no territorial sea of its own. 160 Thus, in these cases, low tide 
elevations are worthless in terms of capacity to generate maritime zones. However, this will 
not rule out the possibility that coastal states may use low tide elevations to build artificial 
islands. In this situation, the legal regime of the low tide elevation will be changed to that 
of an artificial island. 161 
With the recent judgement of the ICJ in the Qatar v. Bahrain case162 the legal 
regime of low tide elevations has been developed. By recalling the rule of Article 13(2), the 
conditions for a low tide elevation to be used as a basepoint under Articles 13(1) and 7(4) 
and reviewing the current treaty law and state practice, the Court concluded that "the few 
existing rules do not justify a general assumption that low tide elevations are territory in the 
same sense as islands". 163 Even though low tide elevations can be used as basepoints under 
the provisions of Articles 13(1) and 7(4), "the law of the sea does not in these 
circumstances allow application of the so-called `leap-frogging' method". 164 
The Court went further in examining the possibility of using low tide elevations in a 
disputed territorial sea, as in this case Bahrain made a sovereignty claim over the low tide 
elevation of Fasht ad Dibal and used it as a basepoint. Bahrain supported its claims by saying that 
when a low tide elevation was situated in the overlapping area of the territorial sea of two states, 
whether with opposite or with adjacent coasts, both states in principle were entitled to use its low 
water line for measuring the breadth of their territorial sea. 165 They also argued that for 
delimitation purposes the competing rights derived by both coastal states from the relevant 
provisions of the law of the sea would by necessity seem to neutralise each other. However, based 
on the view that low tide elevations could not be fully assimilated with islands and other land 
territory, the Court ruled that in the case of low tide elevations which are located in zones of 
overlapping claims, there was no ground for recognising the right of any party in the overlapping 
area to use the low water line of the low tide elevations as baselines. 166 Moreover, for the 
purposes of drawing the equidistance line, such low tide elevations had to be disregarded. 167 
160 Article 11(2) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and Article 13(2) of 
the 1982 LOSC. 
161 The legal regime of artificial islands will be discussed later in this chapter. 
162 Qatar v. Bahrain, ICJ Reports (2001), p. 40. 
'63 Ibid, paras. 206. 
164 Ibid, para. 207. This method is allowed to apply in the case between two islands. 
'65Ibid, para. 202. 
66 Although low tide elevations in Qatar v. Bahrain only located in the overlapping territorial sea, but 
para. 209 did not narrow the limitation of the using such low tide elevations as basepoints in the overlapping 
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The conclusion of the Qatar v. Bahrain case can be used to supplement the 
provisions of Articles 13(1) and 7(4) that the use of low tide elevations as basepoints will 
not be applicable if the low tide elevations are located within an overlapping territorial sea 
area. The right of coastal states to the low tide elevation in this case will be decided through 
the process of maritime delimitation. In other overlapping maritime zones, namely the EEZ 
and the continental shelf, the rights of coastal states to low tide elevations, e. g. to build 
artificial islands, will not be affected. In a similar approach to the territorial sea, it is 
submitted that the rights of coastal states to these low tide elevations will also be decided 
by the result of the maritime delimitation. 168 
Also regarding the use of low tide elevations as basepoints in overlapping territorial 
seas, there is an exceptional possibility that a low tide elevation is located between two 
opposite mainland coasts or islands the distance between which is more than 24 but less 
than 36 nautical miles. In this case, if there is no low tide elevation situated within 12 
nautical miles of the mainland or island of one coastal state, there will be no overlapping 
territorial sea, but it is the presence of such low tide elevations which creates an overlap. 
For example, in the case of the West Reef and Cuateron Reef, there would be no 
overlapping territorial sea between the two if the low tide elevation of Central Reef was not 
within the territorial sea breadth of the West Reef. 
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Ease+, ne of West Reef 
r«, th expansion from Central Reef] 
® Overlapping territorial sea between 
Hest Reef and Gueteron Reef 
Territorial see of Cuateron Reef 
Figure 8. Exceptional effect of low tide elevation with regard to the overlapping 
territorial sea of islands" 
territorial sea only. Therefore, it is submitted that low tide elevation cannot be used as base points if they are 
located in other overlapping maritime zones as well. 
16' ICJ Reports (2001), p. 40, para. 209. 
nx In the Qatar v. Bahrain case, after maritime delimitation, the Fasht ad Dibal is situated in the territorial sea 
of Qatar, thus Qatar has sovereignty over it. 
169 Map drawn by Mapinfo. 
64 
CHAPTER 2. THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE SPRATLYS 
The Qatar v. Bahrain case did not deal with this situation. However, from the 
approach of the judgment that low tide elevations cannot be fully assimilated with islands 
and other land territory and that in the case of overlapping territorial seas, for the purpose 
of drawing the equidistance line, low tide elevations which are located within the 
overlapping area must be disregarded, it is recommended that in this situation the mainland 
or island without such low tide elevations should be given full effect. That means that after 
giving full effect to the opposite mainland or island, the mainland or island with such low 
tide elevations will have the remainder of the overlapping territorial sea, i. e. the low tide 
elevation still has some effect in expanding territorial sea for the coastal states. However, 
due to the presence of the opposite mainland or island within 36 nautical miles, this effect 
must be reduced. For example, in the case between the West Reef and Cuateron Reef 
mentioned above, the Cuateron Reef should have full effect of 12 nautical miles of 
territorial sea, while all the maritime zone generated from the Central Reef which does not 
overlap with that of the Cuateron will belong to the West Reef. Hence, the low tide 
elevation of Central Reef still can bring some extension in generating territorial sea for the 
West Reef but it is not given full entitlement, i. e. a full 12 nautical mile zone. Such 
extended maritime zones may not only comprise the territorial sea as in the case of West 
Reef, but also other maritime areas if the feature qualifies under Article 121(3). 170 
Reef 
" Island 
f Low tide elevation 
Suggested territorial sea boundary 
between West Reef 8. Cuateron Re 
Territorial sea of West Reef 
(with exj noon born Central Reef) 
Tenrtonal sod r Cuate, on Reef 
Figure 9. Suggested maritime boundaries for islands with expansion effect 
from low tide elevations17' 
170 From the combination of Articles 121(3), 13 (on low tide elevations), 57 (on the breadth of EEZ) and 76 (on definition 
of the continental shelf), low tide elevations in this case may help extend all other maritime zones for features which 
qualify under Article 121(3). However, as Qatar v. Bahrain suggested that low tide elevations should not be used for 
baseline in overlapping areas, this scenario may not happen in the case of the Spratlys due to the close distance between 
the Spratlys' features. Even if this happens, it is illogical that much extended maritime space should result from just a low 
tide elevation. This may be because the Spratlys are an exceptional case with their complicated geographical situation. 
Map drawn by Mapinfo. 
65 
CHAPTER 2. THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE SPRATLYS 
Applying these clarifications to the legal status of low tide elevations in the case of 
the Spratlys, low tide elevations which are located within 12 nautical miles from islands 
can be used as basepoints to expand their territorial seas. Figure 10 illustrates the territorial 
sea of islands in the Spratlys, and all low tide elevations located within 12 nautical miles 
from them. They are, namely the South Reef and North Reef in the North Danger Reefs; 
the Discovery Small Reef and Petley Reef in the Tizard Bank; the Ladd Reef and Central 
Reef in the London Reefs; the Johnson South Reef, Loveless Reef, Hughes Reef, Higgens 
Reef, Kerman Reef, Holiday Reef and Zhangxi Jiao in the Union Reefs and the Dallas Reef 
and Ardasier Reef for the Swallow Reef. 172 As they are located within the breadth of the 
territorial sea of islands, under Article 13(1) these low tide elevations can be used as 
basepoints. However, due to the short distance between some islands of the Spratlys, a 
large number of the low tide elevations which are located within the overlapping maritime 
zones of some islands173 will have no effect in generating baselines for those islands. For 
example, the low tide elevations in the North Danger Reefs, Tizard Bank, Union Reefs and 
London Reefs may not be used to generate maritime zones, if the islands in each group 
belong to different states. 174 
With some low tide elevations which are located between two islands the distance 
between which is less than 36 nautical miles, e. g. the Central Reef, Dallas Reef and 
Ardasier Reef, the maritime delimitation should be decided as in the exceptional situation 
mentioned above. 
Other low tide elevations situated beyond 12 nautical miles are worthless as regards 
being used as base lines as well as regards generating maritime zones. If lighthouses or 
similar installations which are permanently above sea level are built upon these low tide 
elevations, these actions will change the legal regime of such low tide elevations to that of 
artificial islands. 175 However, the rights to such construction will be decided by rules 
172 Due to the small scale of the map, the Subi Reef on the map seems to be within the territorial sea breadth 
of the Loaita Bank, but in fact the distance from the Subi to the shortest island of Loaita Cay is 12.31 nautical miles. 
173 This will happen if these islands belong to different countries. 
174 For illustration of maritime zone of these groups and all features of the Spratlys, see figures 12-17, infra. 
175 There is also a possibility of using these low tide elevations with such constructions as basepoints in a 
straight baseline system under Article 7(4) of the 1982 LOSC. However, due to the short distance between 
some islands of the Spratlys and the presence of the twelve islands which may generate full maritime zones, a 
large number of the low tide elevations may be located within the overlapping maritime zones and thus 
according to Qatar v. Bahrain case, this possibility is unlikely. 
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concerning maritime delimitation, i. e. coastal states cannot build artificial islands on the 
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Figure 10. Territorial sea of islands in the Spratlys1 " 
With regard to the effect of low tide elevations in generating basepoints, it is worth 
recalling the provisions of the 1982 LOSC concerning reefs. 178 Article 6 of the Convention 
176 This has happened on the Subi Reef, Irving Reef, Cornwallis South Reef, Alison Reef, Erica Reef, Livock 
Reef, Boxall Reef, Mischief Reef, First Thomas Shoal, Bombay Shoal, Iroquois Reef, Royal Captain Shoal 
and Half Moon Shoal. 
1" Map drawn by Mapinfo. 
17x Although this had been discussed in the Expert Committee Meeting of the International Law Commission 
in 1953 and used in state practice, the use of reefs as base points was not included in the international law of 
the sea until the UNCLOS Ill. For legislation history of this stipulation, see Ian Kawaley, "Delimitation of 
Islands Fringed with Reefs: Article 6 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention" (1992) 41(I) 1CQL, 152-160 at 
153-156, P. B. Beazley, "Reefs and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea" (1991) 6(4) LIE('L, 291 at 
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provides a slightly different legal status for reefs in comparison with low tide elevations 
concerning the generation of baselines, that "[i]n the case of islands situated on atolls or of 
islands having fringing reefs, the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is 
the seaward low water line of the reef, as shown by the appropriate symbol on charts 
official recognised by the coastal states". The Article did not provide any definition for the 
relevant terms such as reef, atoll and fringing reef. However, these terms were defined in 
research for the application of baselines in 1989 by the Office for Ocean Affairs and the 
Law of the Sea. '79 Accordingly, a reef is defined as a mass of rock or coral which either 
reaches close to the sea surface or is exposed at low tide. That part of a reef which is above 
water at low tide but submerged at high tide is a drying reef. 180 An atoll is a ring-shaped 
reef with or without an island situated on it surrounded by open sea that encloses or nearly 
encloses a lagoon. 181 A fringing reef is a coral reef that is directly attached to the shore or 
continental land mass, or located in their immediate vicinity. 182 
Article 6 is applicable to all type of reefs, not only to coral reefs. ' 83 Also, it clearly 
entitles islands on atolls and those with fringing reefs to expand their territorial sea by using 
surrounding reefs as basepoints. 184 Article 6 does not make clear whether it is only 
applicable to drying reefs or also to submerged reefs, as it only stipulates that the baseline 
for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the seaward low water line (not the low 
water line) of the reef. However, from the travaux preparatoires and opinions of many 
scholars, it is understood that Article 6 only applies to drying reefs or at least does not 
apply to permanently submerged reefs. 185 It is also noteworthy that Article 6 applies 
288-296 and P. B. Beazley, "Coral Reefs and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea" in Gerald H. Blake 
(ed. ), World Boundaries, (London: Roudledge, Vol. 5., 1994), p. 60 at 63-64. 
79 Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Baselines: An Examination of the Relevant Provisions of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (1989). This document, according to Churchill and 
Lowe, provides valuable analyses and is a source of modern international law of the sea as writing of highly 
'qualified 
publicists. For further discussion, see Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., note 122, p. 5,6,13 and 27. 
o ]bid, p. 58. 
'81 ]bid, p. 49. 
182Ibid, p. 58. 
83 The previous draft of the International Law Commission only restricted on coral reefs by suggesting that 
"as regards coral reefs, the edge of the reef as marked on the above-mentioned charts, should be accepted as 
the low-water line for measuring the territorial sea". Quoted in Kawaley, op. cit., note 178, p. 156. 
'" However, Jayawardence believes that Article 6 seemingly applies to both island territories and islands 
which are appendages of continental states, for example, in the case of Australia with the Great Barrier Reef. 
For details, see Jayawardence, The Regime of Islands in International Law, (Dordrecht, Boston and London: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 1990), p. 99. 
185 From travaux preparatoires, it was the intention of the drafting group to restrict the application of Article 
6 to drying reefs, not submerged reefs. For details, see the proposal of Hodgson and Smith, "The Informal 
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irrespective of the distance requirement from the reef to the island as under Article 13(1) as 
well as the requirement of construction under Article 7(4). Therefore, in some 
circumstances, even if not qualifying as basepoints under Articles 13(1) and 7(4), drying 
reefs may still be used as base points under Article 6 if they pass the geographical 
requirement for atolls and fringing reefs. In this regard, Kawaley argued that Article 6 only 
applies to atolls and fringing reefs as mentioned in the text of the article, not to barrier 
reefs, which are walls of coral rock generally separated from the island or mainland by a 
deep channel or lagoon. 186 It is also not clear whether the restriction of using low tide 
elevations as basepoints in the cases of overlapping territorial seas as elaborated in Qatar v. 
Bahrain case is applied to the use of reefs as basepoints under Article 6. 
As a result of the application of Article 6, closed lines are drawn to connect the 
islands with the fringing reefs creating a lagoon between the reefs and the island. The 
lagoon water within the closed lines is considered as internal waters in accordance with 
Article 8. This is another advantage of reefs in comparison with normal low tide elevations 
as the water area between an island and a normal low tide elevation which is used as 
basepoint is territorial water. 187 In addition to Article 6, Article 47(1) also stipulates that 
drying reefs may be used as basepoints for an archipelagic baseline. 188 
Applying these stipulations to the geographical situation of the Spratlys, which have 
coral structures, the North Danger Reef, Tizard Bank, and Union Reefs qualify under 
Article 6.189 This means that in this case, these groups can use the line connecting all reefs 
and islands as baselines and the areas within the baselines are internal water. Such 
basepoints are the North Reef and South Reef in North Danger Reef; Petley Reef and 
Discovery Small Reef in Tizard Bank; and Johnson South Reef, Loveless Reef, Hughes 
Reef, Higgens Reef, Kennan Reef, Holiday Reef and Zhangxi Jiao in Union Reefs. 19° 
Single Negotiating Text (Committee II): A Geographical Perspective", (1976) 3 ODIL, 225 at 230. For 
scholars' opinions see: Kawaley, op. cit., note 178, p. 157, Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., note 122, p. 52, Beazley 
(1991), op. cit., note 178, p. 303 and Jayawardence, op. cit., note 184, p. 96. 
'" Kawaley, op. cit., note 178, p. 156. However, according to a UN study in 1989, it is suggested that fringing 
reefs may include barrier reefs as well. For details, see Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., note 122, p. 52. 
187 This is implied from the stipulation of Article 13(2) that a low tide elevation which is wholly situated at a 
distance exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island has no territorial sea of its own. 
188 Article 47(1) says that "an archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the 
outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago... " 
189 For a geographical description of the Spratlys' features, see Annex 1, infra. 
190 For the baselines and maritime zone of these groups, see infra, Figures 13,14 and 16. 
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For the other reefs which are located outside the territorial sea breadth of islands, if 
they are still within an atoll or fringing reefs in terms of geography, they may be used as 
basepoints. According to the geographical situation of the South China Sea, no reef is 
found other than low tide elevations under the application of Article 13(1). 191 
4.2. Legal regime of artificial features 
In addition to low tide elevations, the other features in the Spratlys do not have any 
impact on questions concerning territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation. However, 
the practice of the parties to the South China Sea dispute, especially of China, suggest that 
some elevations, although submerged at high tide or even low tide, are still objects of 
occupation and claims for both territorial issues and maritime zones. The parties have 
fortified these claims by constructing structures such as lighthouses, military structures, and 
weather stations in order to make the elevations stand above water at high tide. This is the 
case of some elevations such as Macclesfield Bank, Alexandra Bank, Prince Consort Bank, 
Prince of Wales Bank, Rifleman Bank, Vanguard Bank, Mischief Reef, etc. With states' 
activities, these elevations lose their characteristic of being "naturally formed" and become 
artificial islands. 192 Not only have states built artificial island on submerged and low tide 
elevations, but the parties have also made constructions on some tiny islands in order to 
expand their areas. For example, the Swallow Reef, a very small reef in the Spratlys, has a 
long and narrow island, stretching from the north-east to the south-west in an area of only 
around 0.1 square kilometres. Due to the man-made activities by the Malaysian 
government, the 0.1 square kilometres island became an airstrip, diving resort and military 
installation for seventy soldiers in 1983. The pictures of the Swallow Reef before and after 
being occupied show significant differences: 
191 This search was based on the map of the Spratlys' features, supra in Chapter 1 and the geographical 
description of Hancox and Prescott, op. cit., note 35 and Valencia et al., op. cit., note 16, Appendix 1, p. 227. 
192 In an attempt to define an artificial island, Johnson specified that an artificial island must be an island in 
the same sense that a natural island is an island, i. e. must be surrounded by water and permanently above 
water at high tide. However, it differs from a natural island as the natural element. For further discussion on 
the history of the legal regime of artificial islands, see Johnson D. N. H. "Artificial island" (1951) 4 ILQ, 203. 
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Figure 11. The shape of 'the Swallow Reefbefore and after being occupied19' 
The legal regime of artificial islands depends on their status before improvement. 
Firstly, in combination with the legal regime of low tide elevations, artificial islands may 
be used as basepoints in straight baseline system only if they are built upon low tide 
elevations. To this extent, provided that coastal states are entitled to apply straight baseline 
method in accordance with the provisions of the law of the sea, the limitation in the legal 
regime of low tide elevations still applies, i. e. they will be excluded from use as basepoints 
in all disputed area. Secondly, dealing with the issue of artificial islands which are built on 
elevations submerged at low tide or built on low tide elevations located in continental shelf 
and EEZ, Article 11 of the 1982 LOSC stipulates that -[o]ff-shore installations and 
artificial islands shall not be considered as permanent harbour works. " Articles 60(8) and 
80 of the 1982 LOSC further clarify that "[a]rtiticial islands, installations and structures do 
not possess the status of islands. They have no territorial sea of' their own, and their 
presence does not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone 
or the continental shelf'. The construction and installation of artificial islands within the 
maritime zones must be permitted because of the sovereign rights of the coastal state to 
natural resources in these maritime areas. Artificial islands in this case only result in an 
19' Sources: httn: %%"'µ' gllobalsecurity. or milita[y world ý. ar snratly. htm (accessed on 17th March 2005). 
After construction, the Swallow Reef was changed not only dramatically in its area, but also differently in its 
angle and position. 
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entitlement to a safety zone of 500 metres. 194 Thirdly, with artificial islands which are built 
on tiny islands, the improvement will not change the status of those islands, i. e. the new 
improvement may not help the tiny islands to pass the test of Article 121(3) to generate all 
the maritime zones, except for the territorial sea to which they were entitled before 
changing from the "old coastline". 
5. Maritime zones for the Spratlys 
In the case of the Spratlys archipelago, the islands are of great number and located 
in groups, so it is necessary to examine whether any special regime can be applied all to the 
Spratlys. 
S. 1. The application of straight baselines 
The 1982 LOSC gives rise to the new concept of archipelagic baselines in order to 
identify maritime zones of archipelago states. Archipelago in Article 46(b) of the 1982 
LOSC is defined thus: 
... "archipelago' means a group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting waters and other natural features which are so closely interrelated 
that such islands, waters and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, 
economic and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such. 
In this case, as a result of the above analysis, the Spratlys consist of numerous 
islands; hence, it is possible to argue that the Spratlys are archipelagos and eligible for 
archipelagic baselines. 195 However, Article 47 of the 1982 LOSC also makes clear that the 
archipelagic baselines are only applied to an archipelagic state, i. e. "a state constituted 
wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other islands". 196 In the case of the 
Spratlys, the sovereignty of the archipelago does not belong to any one state. In addition, 
all of the parties except the Philippines are mainland territories, so even if they are 
successful in claiming the entire archipelago, the Spratlys will not fall within the 
archipelagic regime. If the requirement of archipelagic state is ignored, with many tiny 
islands spreading in a large area of water, the ratio of water to land in the Spratlys will not 
194 Articles 60(5) and 80 of the 1982 LOSC. '" In fact, China claims to apply straight baseline in both the Paracels and Spratlys in its Declaration on 
Territorial Sea in 1958. 
'"Article 46(a) of the 1982 LOSC. 
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meet the requirement of "between 1 to I and 9 to 1" and thus it is not eligible for 
archipelagic baselines. 197 
With regard to the Philippines, this country is an archipelagic state, but their claims 
are only lodged with part of the Spratlys, thus they are not entitled to apply any 
archipelagic regime for the entire Spratlys. The only possibility is that if the Philippines 
were successful with their claim, some features of the Spratlys could be used as basepoints 
for the Philippine archipelagic baselines. Article 47(1) provides that "[a]n archipelagic 
State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the 
outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago". The basepoints of archipelagic 
baselines may draw from the low tide elevation provided that "lighthouses or similar 
installations which are permanently above sea level have been built on them or where a 
low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the 
territorial sea form the nearest island". 198 However, the archipelagic baselines must meet 
the condition on ratio of water and land and the length of baselines under Article 47 of the 
1982 LOSC. Accordingly, "[t]he length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical 
miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any 
archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of . 125 nautical miles in the 
archipelagic baseline regime". 199 Due to the location of the Spratlys, the distance from the 
nearest islands of the Spratlys to the Philippines likely exceeds 125 nautical miles. 200 
Hence, even if the Philippines success with their claims, they may be unable to use the 
Spratlys' features as basepoints to extend there archipelagic baselines. Given this analysis, 
there will be no special regime for the entire Spratlys. The generated maritime zones will 
depend on the legal regime of each island in the archipelago. 
197 Article 47(1) provides the one of the conditions for the application of archipelagic baseline that "[a]n 
archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost pointskof the outermost 
islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands 
and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 
I to I and 9 to 1". 
196 Article 47(4) of the 1982 LOSC. 
'9' Article 47(2) of the 1982 LOSC. 200 Such shortest distance is of about 130 nautical miles between the Commodore Reef and the western coast 
of the mainland of the Philippines. For illustration on map, see Figure 33, infra, Chapter 4. There are also 
possibilities of using some low tide elevations which is located in shorter distance as basepoints such as the 
Bombay Shoal, Royal Captain Shoal and Half Moon Shoal. However, these low tide elevations are located 
within overlapping maritime zones, and thus according to Qatar v. Bahrain case, they will not be used as 
basepoints. 
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5.2. Maritime generation and the application of Article 121 
5.2.1. Maritimes spaces for islands which qualify under Article 121(3) 
Of the 12 islands which pass the test of Article 121(3), the Loaita Island, West York 
Island, Amboyna Cay, Flat Island and Nanshan Island will generate the maritime zones 
individually while the others islands may expand their maritime zones by means of low tide 
elevations and reefs according to the provisions of Articles 13(1) and 6.201 Some of these 
islands combine with low tide elevations and reefs to form group of islands, namely the 
North Danger Reefs, Tizard Bank, London Reefs. The features which may be used as 
basepoints in the baseline of each group are named as follows: 
- Spratly Island and Ladd Reef in the London Reefs. 
- Northeast Cay, Southeast Cay and two low tides elevations of North Reef and 
South Reef in the North Danger Reefs 
- Itu Aba Island, Sand Cay, Nanyit Island, Eldad Reef, Gaven Reef, Discovery 
Great Reef and the low tide elevations of Petley Reed and Discovery Small Reef in 
the Tizard Reefs 
The baseline and territorial sea of each group will be illustrated in the following figures: 
Sprat island 
Figure 12. Territorial sea of the Spratly island taking account of the Ladd Reef 
02 
201 See sutra discussion, Section 4.1. 
202 Map drawn by Mapinfo. The blue line illustrates the territorial sea from the baselines of the group. 
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Figure 13. Baseline and territorial sea of the North Danger 
Reefs1113 
The baselines illustrated in the above maps will be used to generate 
EEZ and 




Figure 14. Baselines and Territorial sea of the Tizard 
Bank 204 
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5.2.2. Maritimes spaces for islands which do not quality under Article 
12](3) 
The other islands only have internal waters, territorial seas and contiguous zones. 
However, in some cases the low tide elevations and reefs still can help some islands to 
expand these zones. This is the case of the Union Reefs which consists of the Sin Cowe 
Island, Johnson South Reef, Collins Reef, Whitsun Reef, Lansdowne Reef and some low 
tide elevations namely Loveless Reef, Hughes Reef. Higgens Reef, Kerman Reef, Holiday 
Reef and Zhangxi Jia. The Swallow Reef may also extend its maritime zones by using the 
Dallas and Ardasier Reefs. 
Figure 15. Territorial sea of the Swallow Reef with basepoints from low tide elevations205 
Figure 16. Baseline and Territorial sea of the Union Reefs2°6 
205 Ibid. 
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Other islands namely Fiery Cross Reef, Pearson Reef, Pigeon Reef, Barque Canada 
Reef, Mariveles Reef, Royal Charlotte Reef, Louisa Reef, Alicia Reef and Commodore 
Reef will have internal water, territorial sea and contiguous zones independently. 
All other low tide elevations, namely Cornwallis South Reef, Alison Reef, Erica 
Reef, Livock Reef, Mischief Reef, First Thomas Shoal, Boxall Reef, Bombay Shoal, 
Iroquois Reef, Royal Captain Shoal and Half Moon Shoal, due to their distance from the 
surrounding islands exceeding 12 nautical miles and the geographical situation do not 
qualify as reefs, thus they will have no effect in generating maritime spaces in the Spratlys. 
All maritime spaces of the Spratlys will be illustrated in Figures 17 and 18 as follows: 
rtneaa Cav 
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at ! stand 
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Figure 17. Territorial sea of all islands and groups of islands in the Spratlys207 
206 Ibid. 
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Figure 18. Maritime zones of the Spratlys`'08 
6. The significance of the legal regimes of the Spratlys to the South China Sea dispute 
6.1. The significance to territorial issues 
The legal regimes of the Spratlys under the provisions of the 1982 LOSC as 
analysed above critically affects the South China Sea dispute. For the territorial issues, all 
of the claims of the parties in the dispute are only applied to the features which qualify as 
islands under Article 121(1). 
201 Map drawn by Mapinfo. 
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With regard to low tide elevations, states can only use some low tide elevations as 
basepoints if they are within the breadth of the territorial sea from an island according to 
Article 13(1) or if they qualify as reefs under the provision of Article 6 or if some 
constructions are built upon them according to Article 7. This may be the case for the low 
tide elevations of the North Danger Reefs, Tizard Bank, London Reefs, Union Reefs and 
Swallow Reef, namely the North Reef, South Reef, Petley Reed, Discovery Small Reef, 
Central Reef, Ladd Reef, Loveless Reef, Hughes Reef, Higgens Reef, Kennan Reef, 
Holiday Reef, Zhangxi Jia, Ardasier Reef and Dallas Reef. However, such low tide 
elevations will not be used as basepoints if they are located within overlapping area. 209 
Other low tide elevations, namely the Subi Reef, Irving Reef, Cornwallis South 
Reef, Alison Reef, Erica Reef, Livock Reef, Boxall Reef, Mischief Reef, First Thomas 
Shoal, Bombay Shoal, Iroquois Reef, Royal Captain Shoal and Half Moon Shoal, due to 
their geographical situation, do not qualify to be used as basepoints. 
210 However, this will 
not rule out the possibility of coastal states using these low tide elevations to build artificial 
rte. - rý x , ý"+a. ý islands provided that the coastal states have 
the sovereignty rights over the water area 
where the low tide elevations are located. The -' -- 
sovereign rights of coastal states in the 
overlapping waters will depend on the outcome 
of maritime delimitation. 
It is impossible for any state to claim 
sovereignty over a low tide elevation other 
than for the purpose of using it as a basepoint 
or for building an artificial island in the 
conditions mentioned above. For example, the 
claim of a state to a low tide elevation in the 
Spratlys in the following picture is not 




Figure 19. Sovereignty claim over an "island ""ý! 1 
209 This restriction is in line with the judgment of the Qatar v. Bahrain case, see . supra, this 
Chapter. 
210 However, state practice shows that the parties still claim low tide elevations for their own sake. This may 
be because of the possibility of using the low tide elevations as base point in order to generate maritime claims. 
211 Source: hup: facultv. law. ubc. ca-scs (accessed on 7 December 2005). 
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6.2. The significance to maritime issues 
The presence of the features of the Spratlys in the South China Sea will have an 
effect on maritime delimitation. With 12 islands in the Spratlys which may generate full 
maritime zones under Article 121(3), there may be no areas of high sea in the South China 
Sea. 212 This may entitle the successful claimants to exercise sovereign rights to all the 
natural resources in the South China Sea. However, due to the small size of the islands in 
the Spratlys, international navigation may not be affected as vessels still have the freedom 
of navigation in the EEZ. 213 
Also, the extension of maritime zones from 12 islands with entitlement to full 
maritime zones is likely to create large overlapping areas between the maritime zones of the 
Spratlys with those of littoral states. This means the successful claimants will have some 
advantage in maritime delimitation with the adjacent littoral states. However, due to their 
tiny size, these features may not have full effect in comparison with the mainland of the 
littoral states. This issue will be analysed in further detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
In addition to the possibility of overlapping maritime zones between the Spratlys 
and the littoral states, it is possible to have overlapping maritime zones among the features 
of the Spratlys themselves if they belong to different countries. There are three such 
possible overlappings. First, overlapping may result between the EEZ and continental shelf 
of the 12 islands which have full maritime zones under Article 121(3). Second, overlapping 
may occur between the EEZ of the 12 islands and the territorial sea and contiguous zones 
of other islands which are classified as rock under Article 121(3). Third, territorial seas and 
contiguous zones may overlap between the islands which are classified as rocks under 
Article 121(3). 
The use of low tide elevations as basepoints may further expand the maritime zones 
for some islands up to a maximum of 12 nautical miles and thus may increase the 
overlapping zones. In addition, the states may also use some other low tide elevations 
within their EEZ to build artificial islands and these artificial islands will have 500 metre 
safety zones. 
212 For illustration on map, see figure 28, infra. 213 At the moment the main navigation route is along the coast and within the EEZ of Vietnam. This water 
area, even after any maritime delimitation will likely unchanged the legal regime as EEZ. Therefore, although 
they will be subjected to more restrictions than those in the high sea, the navigation rights of international 
vessels will almost unaffected. 
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7. Conclusion 
The legal regime of islands is controversial in the international law of the sea due to 
the imprecise text of paragraph 3 of Article 121. It gives rise to a tension between the trend 
to extend sovereignty rights of coastal states and the protection of freedom of international 
navigation. It also causes many difficulties in maritime delimitation as a tiny island, once it 
is able to generate full maritime spaces, will create distortion. In the case of the Spratlys, all 
of these problems are present and the issue of the legal regime of islands will play a key 
role in resolving the sovereignty and maritime disputes among the claimants. Therefore, the 
sole way to overcome the vagueness and difficulty of Article 121 is to reasonably apply this 
article in the special situation of the Spratlys. 
Article 121 (1) gives a decisive answer to the sovereignty issue by the test of natural 
formation and the need to be above water at high tide. Accordingly, 35 features in the 
Spratlys which qualify as islands will be eligible for territorial sovereign claims. Other 
features, except for the use of some low tide elevations as basepoints and for building up 
artificial islands under the conditions provided by the international law of the sea, will not 
be subjected to any territorial claim. 
An application based on the travaux preparatoires, the text and the purpose of 
paragraph 3, in combination with the special facts of the Spratlys case may result in the 
generation of all maritime spaces for 12 islands, namely Northeast Cay, Southeast Cay, 
Thitu Island, Loaita Island, Flat Island, Nanshan Island, Itu Aba Island, Sand Cay, Nanyit 
Island, Spratly Island, West York Island and Amboyna Cay. All maritime spaces which are 
generated from these islands, on the one hand, may help the claimants expand significantly 
their sovereignty, but on the other will probably create many overlapping maritime areas. 
This no doubt will cause great difficulty in maritime delimitation in the South China Sea. 
Although it is likely eliminate the existence of the high sea in the South China Sea, 
international navigation will not be affected. 
Based on the finding of this Chapter, sovereignty issues and the prospects for 
maritime delimitation will be examined in the next two chapters respectively. 
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CHAPTER 3. LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES 
RELATING TO THE SPRATLYS: AN HISTORICAL APPROACH 
1. Introduction 
I. I. The applicable law: International law concerning territory acquisition 
With a long history and complicated claims from multiple parties, the sovereignty 
question in the South China Sea dispute raises a number of issues of international law 
concerning territory acquisition, namely the modes of territory acquisition, recognition, 
estoppel and state succession. A brief examination of international law concerning these 
issues will allow an overview of the application of the law and facilitate legal analysis of 
the sovereignty issues in dispute. 
1.1.1. Modes of territory acquisition 
Under international law concerning acquisition, a title to territory can be obtained 
through five modes, namely occupation, prescription, cession, conquest and accession. 214 
If a territory belongs to no one, it is terra nullius and open to acquisition through 
legal process of occupation. 215 This process begins with discovery which creates `inchoate 
title'. Then, in order to obtain a full title, the inchoate title must be followed by effectivites. 
In a slightly different mode, prescription "is a portmanteau concept that 
comprehends both a possession of which the origin is unclear or disputed and an adverse 
possession which is in origin demonstrably unlawful' . 216 If a state is successful in 
establishing a title but after that fails to maintain a reasonable level of state activity, i. e. 
abandonment, the state may loss the title. 217 Other states by making use of abandonment 
214 These modes were described in many text books of international law such as Brownlie, Principles of 
Public International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 6t' ed., 2003), Chapter 7, p. 123; Malcolm Shaw, 
International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5'b ed., 2003), Chapter 9, p. 409; Robert 
Jennings and Arthur Watts (ed. ), Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1997,7`h ed. ), Chapter 10, p. 147 and Oppenheim's International Law, 
(Harlow: Longman, 9`h ed., Vol. 1,1992). In Oppenheim's International Law, the 6th mode is included, namely 
adjjudication. 
21 This definition was clarified in the case of Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Report, 1975, p. 12 at 
para. 79. 
16 Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1963), p. 23. 
217 For further see, Brownlie, op. cit., note 214, p. 138. 
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may reverse the established title by a new occupation. Again, the occupation under 
prescription only leads to lawful title if it is supported by effectivites. 
In the two modes of occupation and prescription, effectivites are of central 
importance for the purposes of both the acquisition and maintenance of title. 218 In order to 
clarify the requirements for effectivites, it is worth recalling the dictums of some judgments 
concerning territory acquisition. In the Eastern Greenland case, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice laid down two elements for effective occupation, namely "the intention 
and will to exercise... sovereign and the manifestation of state activity" . 219 Intention can be 
inferred from official notifications and the display of sovereignty may be satisfied by 
concrete evidence of possession or control. Effectivitis were also clarified by Arbitrator 
Huber in the Island of Palmas case as an actual and durable taking of possession within a 
reasonable time, i. e. the continuous and peaceful display of territorial sovereignty. 220 
Furthermore, in the Clipperton Island Arbitration, the arbitrator held that effective 
occupation consists of a physical act or acts, the purpose of which is to exercise exclusive 
authority. 221 `Authority' according to Oppenheim means the establishment of proper state 
machinery, the actual display of state jurisdiction. 222 However, in a special case of 
uninhabited places, the requirements for effectivites are less strict. In the Minquiers and 
Ecrehos case, Judge Basdevant in his separate opinion emphasised that exercising effective 
military control did not necessarily mean garrisoning practically uninhabited or 
uninhabitable places, but that, for this purpose, power to hold such areas at will and to 
prevent other states from occupying them was sufficient 223 Also related to a special case of 
a very small island, in the Qatar v. Bahrain case, the Court held that certain activities such 
as the construction of navigational aids could be sufficient to support sovereignty claims. 224 
In addition, acts of individuals by themselves are no substitution for the display of state 
28 Georg Schwarzenberger, "Title to Territory: Response to a Challenge" 51 (1957) AJIL 308-324 at 315. 
Zig Eastern Greenland Case (Denmark v. Norway) (1933) PCIJ Series A/B no 53 (hereafter referred to as the 
Eastern Greenland case), p. 22 at 63. 
uo This requirement was illustrated in interpretation of terminology employed in the special agreement 
between the Netherlands and the United States in the award of the Island of Palmas case (1928) 2 RIAA, 
829, reprinted in (1928) 22 AJIL 867 at 874-877. ý1 
Clipperton Island Arbitration (France v. Mexico) 2 RIAA 1105, (hereafter referred to as the Clipperton 
Island Arbitration), also in (1932) 26 AJIL 390 at 393. 2n Oppenheim, International Law, (London: Longman, 1955,8th ed., Vol. 1), p. 546. 
223 Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (France v. UK) ICJ Reports (1953), p. 47 (hereafter referred to as the 
Minquiers and Ecrehos case); Individual opinion of Judge Basdevant, ICJ Report (1953), p. 74 at 78. 
224 ICJ Report, 2001, p. 40 at para. 197. 
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authority. Unless authorised in advance or subsequently ratified, the activities of 
individuals can be neither attributed nor imputed to the state whose nationals they are. 225 
In addition to occupation and prescription, title can also be obtained by cession and 
conquest. In cession, the title is shifted by virtue of a treaty or cession. 226 This is the mode 
in which the owner willingly and voluntarily transfers the title, in contrast to the 
transferring through conquest in which the new title is established by the use of force. In 
the nineteenth century, it was inevitable that international law should allow states to acquire 
territory by conquest, because at that time customary international law imposed no limit on 
the rights of states to go on war. 227 In the early twentieth century, various efforts were made 
to prevent the use of force as a legal means under international law. Firstly, the second and 
the third Hague Conventions of 1907 limited the use of force to recover contract debt and 
require war to be preceded by formal declaration. 228 Then, with the unprecedented suffering 
of the First World War, the Covenant of the League of Nations required that war be used 
only as a last resort three months after the parties received a judicial settlement or report by 
the Council. 229 The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 followed in which the use of war was 
outlawed as an instrument of national policy. This marked the first general acceptance of 
the prohibition of the use of force, which was then codified in Article 2(4) of the United 
Nations Charter. Nowadays, war is no longer a legitimate instrument of national policy and 
all of the UN member states must refrain from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state. The establishment of a title 
through the use of force or threat of force will not create a lawful title to territory. In 
addition, although force can be used in self defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, it 
is still not acceptable for acquiring new territory. 230 
In exceptional cases, with the changes of nature, a new piece of land is formed 
resulting in new title, -e. g. land may be added to the seashore, river deltas formed or the 
225 Opinion of Judge Hsu Mo in the Fisheries case, ICJ Report, 1951, para. 157. 
226 Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs: International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the 
United Nations, (The Hague, London, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998), p. 153. 
2V Peter Malanczuk, op. cit., note 214, p. 152. 
228 Hague Convention II (Laws of War: The Limitation of Employment of Force for Recovery of Contract 
Debts) and Hague Convention III (Laws of War: The Opening of Hostilities). For full text, see website of 
Brigham Young University Library at: h=: //net. lib. byg. ed u/-rdh7/wwi/haeue. html (accessed on 20 May 2006). 
229 Article 12(1) of the Covenant. 
230 For further discussion on the legal development of international law on the rights of conquest, see Sharon 
Korman, The Rights of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by Force in International Law and Practice, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 180-248. 
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bank of a river increased or diminished. 231 The generating of title in this special manner is 
called accession or accretion. However, this mode is not relevant in the case of the South 
China Sea dispute. 32 
1.1.2. Recognition and estoppel principle 
With regard to the acquisition of territory, recognition and estoppel play a very 
important role. Recognition is an eminently suitable means for the purpose of establishing 
the validity of a territorial title in relation to other states. With recognition from other states, 
the control of one state may be considered as peaceful, thus satisfying one of the criteria for 
effectivites. Furthermore, "irrespective of any other criterion, recognition estops the State 
which has recognised the title from contesting its validity at any future time. "233 In the case 
of rival claimants, each party can make use of the recognition of the other to exclude the 
rival from the dispute through the application of the principle of estoppel. 
Recognition may take the form of an express statement, or it may be inferred from 
acquiescence, i. e. failure to protest against the exercise of control by another. However, in 
every case recognition or acquiescence by one state has little or no effect unless it is 
accompanied by some measure of control over the territory by the other state; failure to 
protest against a purely verbal assertion of title unsupported by any degree of control does 
not constitute acquiescence. 234 
1.1.3. State succession 
The South China Sea dispute has a long history during which some of the parties 
have experienced changes of sovereignty, developing from being colonies into new 
independent states. Thus, another issue related to the assertion of the parties' claims is state 
succession. International law concerning state succession provides that in the case of a new 
state which was formerly a dependent territory, i. e. a colony, or when a new state was 
231 Georg Schwarzenberger, op. cit., note 218, at 312. 
232 With global warming, the water level is reported to be increasing in the world. If this trend has some effect 
in the South China Sea dispute, it will not give rise to any new territorial acquisition in the South China Sea. 
As all of the features of the Spratlys are very small in size, the rise of water level may result in a reduction of 
number of features which qualify for sovereignty claims. For the legal analysis of criteria for features to be 
eligible for sovereignty claims, see supra, Chapter 2. 
233 Georg Schwarzenberger, op. cit., note 218, p. 316. 
234 Peter Malanczuk, op. cit, note 214, p. 154. 
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formed by the merger of two or more existing states, treaties made by the predecessor states 
continue to apply to the territory to which they applied before the formation. 235 
However, under Articles 17 and 24 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on State 
Succession in Respect of Treaties, 236 a new state is under no obligation to succeed to a 
treaty if it does not want to do so; it can start life with a `clean slate'. Articles 34 and 31 
concerning disintegration and merger also permit a secessionary state to start life with a 
`clean slate'. The clean slate is a doctrine which has been well established in customary law 
since the nineteenth century, although recent practice after 1945 cast some doubt on the 
clean slate doctrine as some independent states seemed to accept universal succession, i. e., 
they succeeded automatically to treaties made by their predecessor states. 237 However, it is 
submitted that small number of states following this way is not sufficient to uphold the 
clean slate doctrine. Furthermore, the practice was based on convenience, not based on 
consideration of legal obligation. 238 
1.2. Overview on the history of the dispute 
The historical documents of the region record the long history of the use and 
exploitation of the South China Sea from 112 to 46 BC. 239 These activities were firstly by 
the Chinese and Annameses (the ancient name of the Vietnamese), then with the 
development of trade, other people, namely Persians, Arabs, Indians, Germans, and the 
Dutch also used the South China Sea as a convenient sea route for trading with Southeast 
235 For general discussion on state succession with regard to treaties, see Malcolm Shaw, op. cit, note 214, 
Chapter 9 and Peter Malanczuk, op. cit, note 214, p. 165. 236 For full text, see (1978) 17 ILM 1488. Notwithstanding the fact that the 1978 Vienna Convention on State 
Succession is not widely accepted and the entire Convention has not yet become international customary law 
(the Convention came into force in 1996 after the required 15' state party and in 2006, it has 18 state parties), 
the reference of international judicial bodies such as the ICJ, and the Arbitration Commission established 
under the auspices of the Peace Conference for the Former Yugoslavia show that the Convention is a guiding 
instrument concerning state succession which sets out the general position of international law to support the 
succession rights of states, particularly after decolonisation. For details of the reference of the ICJ, the 
Arbitration Commission and some state practice, see Andreas Zimmermann, "State Succession in Respect of 
Treaties" in Jan Klabbers et al. (ed. ), State Practice Regarding State Succession and Issues of Recognition, 
The Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999), p. 80-116. 
237 State practice concerning succession in Europe post 1989 showed that states were divided in application of 
the 'clean slate' principle. Russia, Czech, Slovak, and states from the former Yugoslavia accept the automatic 
succession from their former states. Accordingly, all treaties to which the former states had beforehand been a 
party will be succeeded automatically without any further declaration. On the other hand, some states of the 
former Soviet Union, except three Baltic States, follow the 'clean slate' principle. Among some European 
states, Austria expressed support for the 'clean slate' principle, whereas others support automatic succession. 
For further details, see Andreas Zimmermann, ibid, p. 80-116. 
238 Peter Malanczuk, op. cit, note 214, p. 165. 
239 From Chinese documents, cited in Samuels, op. cit., note 5, p. 10. 
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Asia and China. All these activities were conducted peacefully without any dispute 
concerning sovereignty. 
It was not until the early twentieth century that with the presence of the colonial 
powers, a sovereignty claim in 1933 made by France, the protector of Vietnam, triggered 
the first dispute over the sovereignty of the islands in the South China Sea. France's claim 
was challenged by China and Japan. Japan used force to share the occupation of the islands 
with France in 1939. However, with the complicated situation during the Second World 
War, no arrangement was reached to solve the dispute. 
The dispute was even more complicated when the Second World War ended, Japan 
renounced all right, title and claim to the Spratlys and Paracels. Vietnam, with its new 
independence from France, claimed sovereignty over these islands at the San Francisco 
conference and received no objection. China although being absent from the conference, in 
a separate declaration, also claimed sovereignty over the two archipelagos. However, the 
complicated situation of new independent states prevented both Vietnam and China from 
effectively occupying all islands in the two archipelagos. Cloma, a Philippines citizen, 
made use of the situation to claim the discovery of Kalayaan, a part of the Spratlys, and 
sought recognition from the Philippines' government However, the Philippines did not 
make any claim at this time. 
With the new development of the law of the sea, the role of mid-ocean islands is of 
significance in generating maritime zones for coastal states. Furthermore, the discovery of 
oil and other resources in the Paracels and Spratlys attracted the other states in the region to 
enter the dispute. The Philippines changed their attitude to support Cloma's discovery and 
made the first claim in 1971. Then, Malaysia and Brunei, based on the stipulation on 
continental shelf of the 1982 LOSC made their claim to some of the Spratlys islands 
in 
1979 and 1987 respectively. The special situation of China also made Taiwan into a 
relatively independent party in the dispute and brought the number of parties to the South 
China Sea dispute to 6. The main historical events in the dispute will be summarised 
in the 
timeline in Figure 20 below. 
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Of the six parties to the dispute, China, Taiwan and Vietnam claim the entire Spratlys 
and base their claim on historical titles. China and Taiwan share the same historical basis in the 
discovery and the use of the islands by Chinese people in the South China Sea dating back to 
the third century. They also rely on the implied recognition by Japan of China's rights, when 
Japan renounced all rights towards the Spratlys after the end of the Second World War. Also 
relying on historical title, Vietnam has claimed that the country's title was established by 
prescription by Vietnamese Kings during the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, and then was 
succeeded to by France and South Vietnam As the late comers, Malaysia and Beinei entered 
the South China Sea dispute by just relying on the provisions of the 1982 LOSC. They only 
claim a small number of the Spratlys on the basis that these features are within their continental 
shelves. The Philippines claim of a large amount of features of the Spratlys on both historical 
title and intcmational law, basing their claims on the discovery made by their citizen in 1956 
and the proximity from the Spratlys to the Philippines' territory. 
With four of the claimants relying on historical titles as well as the fact that the dispute 
has evolved over centuries, this chapter will make a legal analysis based on historical 
development. From a legal perspective, thrne were several important events, which led to 
substantial changes in the parties' claims such as the presence of colonies in the region, the end 
of the Second World War. the effect of the negotiation of the 1982 LOSC and current 
developments in the dispute. These events Will help to divide the historical development of the 
dispute into four stages, namely before the colonial period, the colonial period, from the end of 
the Second World War to 1980 and further developments according to their impact on legal 
aspects of the parties' claims. The chorological analysis through these periods will identify the 
major legal issues in each party's claims, thus revealing the strength and weakness of each 
claim and suggesting the prospect for the sovereignty issue. 
2. Titles claimed by discovery and prescription before the colonial period 
In this period, historical records show that the regional states operating in the South 
China Sea were mainly China and Vietnam. 
2.1. rule claimed by Ciuna 
According to Chinese sources. China's first practices in the South China Sea were 
fishing activities dating back to the Han Dynasty (112 to 46 BQ-240 Then, from the tenth to the 
20 Wang G g-vm. The Na,, -lwJ Trade, p. 1-45. cited in Sa W L% OP"cit " note 
S. p. 10. 
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sixteenth century, as it ancrged as a maritime power in the region, China used the South China 
Sea as the principal Chinese transit route for world trade. 24' China quoted a wealth of historical 
documents to illustrate their knowledge, discovery and occupation of the archipelagos in the 
South China Sea, in which the Chinese maritime presence was also known for collecting 
tortoises, exploiting guano and seeking shelter during sea storms. 242 
Along with the exploitation and development of the Paracels and Spratlys archipelagos 
by Chinese people, China claimed to have made some naval patrols to both the Paraccls and 
Spratlys, namely a trip conducted by an admiral of the naval forces of the Guangdong province 
from 1710 to 1712 and in 1909. China also provided some maps dating from 1755,1810 and 
1817 from the Ch'ing Dynasty period, which illustrated both the Paracels and Spratlys as 
belonging to C hina. 243 
However, these arguments faced notable problems of authenticity and accuracy. In 
Chinese thinking at that time, similar to the Paraccls, the Spratlys were very dangerous and 
remote areas: 
The [Changsha (Paracels) and Shitang (Spratlys)] area is vast and without a limit, and 
the sky and water meet with the same colour. Ships and boats sailing through the area 
are solely dependant on the compass to guide their navigation. Days and nights the 
compass has to be carefully observed, because even the slightest error may make a 
difference between life and death. 244 
Also, the Chinese historical records did not state clearly that the Spratlys were China's 
territory at that time. They were only described as places which appeared during voyages 
through the South China Sea. 245 The earliest document, Nan-chou I -wu-chih (Record of 
Strange Things of the South) written by Wan Chen in the period of Three Kingdoms (220-265) 
contained controversial information about `magnetic rock- and China believed that these 
241 The route was called the Silk Route, which Kas the connection between China and the West. See Kuang- Min Sun, "Freeze the tropical eels: An Ice-coot Prescription for the Burning Spratly Issues" 20(3) 
(1996) 
Marine Policy. 199-208 at 200; also in Samuels, op. cit.. Dote S, p. 9-30. 24: For further details, see Odgaard, op. cit. Dote 16, p. 63. r" Map from Samuels, op. cit. note S. P39. For details of the Chinese claim, see 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Peeople's Republic of China, Oüna a Indisputable Sovereignty overXuha and Nansha Island, (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1980). 
Zhao Rushi. Zhu Fan Zhi (Records of Various Barbarian Peoples), Volume B: Zhi Wu (Records of Things). under the entry of 'Hainan', translated in Jianming Shen, 1997.29-30. Jianming mentioned that 
some Western and Chinese scholars consider the quote to be about the Paracels only. 
The confusion is likely 
time, know lodge of the South China Sea was so negligible that the people to be due to the fact that at that 
writing about the area did not distinguish between the Paracels and the Spratlys. 
Cf. Chemillier-Gendreau, 
1996, op. cit., note 33, p. 58. Quoted and explained in Odgsard, op. cit.. note 16, p. 62 and 106. Chinese 
limited 
knowledge of geographical location is also analysed in Samuels, op. cit., note 5, p. 10-12. For further analysis of Chinese historical records. see Samuels. op. cit., note 5, p. 10-25. 
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documents referred to the Paracels in the third century. 246 Other historical books (itl the same 
period as "Record of Strange things of the South'), such as "Fu-nan Story" written by Khang 
Thai, Hsin T'ang Shu (New History of the T'ang Dynasty), Ling-wai tai-ta (Information on 
What lies beyond the Passes) and Meng Liang Lu (Dreaming about the Capital), 247 also 
referred to some rocks or corals under different names in the South China Sea. Rocks and 
corals were numerous in both China's coastal area and the South China Sea region, but because 
different publications used different names, there was no evidence to show whether these 
historical books were describing the Paracels or not. This situation, however, had changed as in 
some documents like Kuang Yu Tu (Enlarged Atlas of the World), Tao-I chih lueh (Record of 
Barbarian Isles) and the Ming Atlas, the descriptions were sufficient to prove that China had 
known of the existence of the Paracels. 248 Despite the long historical records, none of the 
documents cited the Spratlys. 
Two other historical books namely Hai -kuo wen-chien lu (Sights and Sounds of the 
Maritime Countries) and Hai-lu (Oceanic Records) were believed to contain the first historical 
record of China to mention the name of the Spratlys as Ch'ien-li shih-tang. However, the 
archipelago was mentioned only as a danger for maritime navigation. For example in Hai-kou 
wen-chien lu, the author said "South of the Sea of Ch'i-chou are the Ch'ien-li shih-yang. Here 
there is a forest of tens of thousands of rocks. Giant waves furiously swamp those ships that 
blunder into this area, and they are smashed to bits' . 249 In addition, the author also noted that 
Wan-li ch'ang-sha "acts as the screen (outer protection) for Annam . 
250 In other words, the 
Paracels in teens of geography were much nearer to Vietnam than China, and the book stated that 
the Paracels were a type of outer defence perimeter for Vietnam. Hence, it was inferred that being 
much further away, the Spratlys were not the subject of much attention from China at this time. 
With regard to naval patrols, according to historical records, the direction of the 
journeys was around Hainan only. 251 There was not enough evidence to conclude that the 
Paracels were part of Hainan and included in the patrol of the admiral, let alone the 
Spratlys 
206 Chemillier-Gendreau, op. cit., note 35, p. 59. Z5, Che 247 For relevant quotation of these historical materials, see Samuels, op. cit., note 6, p. 10- « millier- Gendreau, op. cit., note 35, p. 59 and NguyIn Nhä, unpublished document, PhD Thesis in history' 
QV5 Trmh 




249 Samuels, op. cit., note 5, p. 38. is the 250 Ibid. Wan-li ch'ang-sha is the name of the Paracels in historical document of tuna. p to ancient 
name of Vietnam. 
251 For relevant quotation of the historical record, see ibid. 
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which were not mentioned with regard to patrols. Furthermore, maps provided in these 
historical documents drew both China and other neighbouring territories such as the 
Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia without noting which belonged to China. Meanwhile, other 
official maps describing Chinese territory under the Ch'ing Dynasty showed Hainan Island as 
the southern end of Chinese territory, not the Spratlys. 252 As in the Island of Palmas case, 
`official or semi-official maps... would be of special interest in cases where they do not assert 
the sovereignty of the country of which the Government has caused them to be issued' . 253 In 
this case, the Paracels and Spratlys were excluded from Chinese territory, hence, these ancient 
maps of China might not support the claim of China over the Spratlys. 
Therefore, the use of the historical records would not provide sufficient evidence to 
prove that China had an intention to claim the Spratlys in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. 254 The territory of China was so vast that the Chinese government might not pay 
much attention to such a remote and dangerous area as the Spratlys. This also matched with the 
historical situation of this period when China was no longer a maritime power in the region. 
Many other countries in the region and international maritime powers such as the Netherlands, 
Germany, France, and Britain left their footprints in the islands of South China Sea. 255 From 
historical documents, it can be concluded that China might have discovered the Paracels and 
Spratlys. However, international law clearly recognises that mere discovery of some territory is 
not sufficient to vest in the discoverer valid title of ownership to territory. Rather, discovery 
only creates inchoate title, which must be perfected by subsequent continuous and effective 
acts of occupation, generally construed to mean permanent settlement. Evidence of such 
effective acts was not compelled in China's claim to the Spratlys, thus at the end of the pre- 
colonial period, China's title to the Spratlys was not established. 
256 
2.2. Title claimed by Vietnam 
252 See Nguyen Nhä, op. cit., note 247, Annexes. 
253 Island of Palmas Case (1928) 2 RIAA, p. 829, reprinted in (1928) 22 AJIL 867 at 891.. 254 This is also the conclusion of almost all scholars conducting research on the historical clgjm of China, 
namely Christopher C. Joyner, "The Spratly Islands Dispute: Rethiýg the Interplay of 
Lew, Diplomacy, 
and Geo-politics in the South China Sea" 13(2) (1998) IJMCL 193-236 at 199-200; Koang Min Sun, "Dawn 
in the South China Sea? A Relocation of the Spratly Islands in an Everlasting Legal Stogy" 
16 (1990) SAYIL 
32-60 at 40-42; Gerardo M. C. Valero, "Spratly Archipelago Dispute: Is the QuestioO of 
Sovereignty Still 
Relevant? " (1994) 18(4) Marine Policy, 314-344 at 320-321; Mark Valencia et al., op. cit., tlote 16, p. 23; 
Odgaard, op. cit., note 16, p. 92-93; etc. 
255 Some events related to the traveling of the French, Germans and British were listed in infra '4 this Chapter. 
256 Christopher C. Joyner, op. cit., note 254, p. 200. 
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The above mentioned conclusion was consistent with the historical information from 
Vietnamese sources257 that Vietnamese practices, such as some `exploitation activities' in both 
the Paracels and Spratlys in the South China Sea, were recorded since the fifteenth century under 
the reign of King Le Thanh Tong (1460-1497). 258 However, it was only from the seventeenth 
century that economic exploitation activities were conducted in the Paracels and Spratlys on 
behalf of Vietnamese kings. Based on these historical activities of the feudal government, 
Vietnam claimed that the country initially had historical title over the Paracels and Spratlys. 
Similar to the historical documents of China, there was also some doubt about the 
precision and authenticity of the historical claim of Vietnam. However, from historical 
research, the documents of Vietnam were the official historical materials of the feudal 
Vietnamese government namely Collection of Road-Maps of the Southern Country (17th 
century), Miscellaneous Records on the Government of the Frontiers (18th century), Chronicle 
of Dynasties, published by Institute of National History, Full Map of Dai Nam, published by 
Ministry of Public Works, Codes and Rules of Dai Nam Composed on Imperial Order, Full 
Geographical Map of Dai Nam, and Glimpse of the History of Vietnam (19th century). 259 In 
these materials, the exploitation activities of Vietnam in the Paracels were described as well 
organised. The "Hoang Sa Company" which consisted of 70 seafarers from the coastal 
commune of An Vinh in central Vietnam was established by the Kings' orders to stay in the 
Paracels for six months every year to carry out the exploitation activities. Revenue collectors 
and a small local garrison were also set up to collect duty from all visitors and to ensure 
protection to Vietnamese fishermen. The Hoang Sa Company was also in charge of the Bac 
Hai Company, which conducted the activities of "harvesting valuable sea products and 
conducting salvaging operations to collect cargoes from vessels shipwrecked in the treacherous 
waters of Truong Sa [Spratlys]' . 26° The Company was requested to measure and record 
navigation routes from the mainland to the Paracels and Spratlys to facilitate the exploitation 
257 Although Vietnamese sources were much more limited than those of China, due to the wars that ravaged 
the country in the twentieth century, its practices were only recorded in some atlas written in the seventeenth 
century. 
258 Todd C. Kelly, "Vietnam Claims to the Truong Sa Archipelago [Ed. Spratlys Islands]" (1999) 3(3) 
Exploitations in the Southeast Asian Studies, online at 
http: //www. hawaii. edu/cseas/pubs/explore/v3/todd. html (accessed on 24 November, 2004). 
The materials are available at the Social Sciences Library, Hanoi, Vietnam. This makes a sharp distinction 
about authenticity and precision with the materials of China written by ordinary people. 
260 Le Quy Don, Miscellaneous Records on the Government of the Frontier, Book 2,1776, classical copy held 
at the Social Sciences Library, Hanoi, cited in the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagoes (Paracels and 
Spratlys), (Hanoi: Vietnam Courier, 1985), p. 66 and 118. 
93 
CHAPTER 3. LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES RELATING TO THE 
SPRATLYS: AN HISTORICAL APPROACH 
activities. 261 Economic exploitation was continued in the early nineteenth century through the 
reign of the Nguyen Lords and their successors, the Tay Son. Nevertheless, the Paracels were 
not formally annexed to Vietnam until 1816. The Emperor Minh Mang (1820-41) built a 
pagoda in 1835 on Bana Rock as well as a stone monument to commemorate the event. 
It was noteworthy that, in comparison with the many different names used in the 
historical documents of China, the names used in Vietnamese records and by some foreign 
authors at that time for the location and description of the Paracels and Spratlys are consistent 
with the current Vietnamese names for the Paracels and Spratlys. 262 In addition to Vietnamese 
sources, the exploitation activities of the Vietnamese kings were also confirmed in some 
foreign documents such as the record of Barrow John about a visit to Vietnam of an English 
diplomat in 1793,263 the record of Jean Louis Taberd, a French bishop in the Journal of the 
Asiatic of Bengal in 1837264 and an article by Dr. Gutzlaff in the Journal of the Geographical 
Society of London in 1849.265 In a record of Jean Louis, he even described the Gia Long King 
of Vietnam paying a visit to the Paracels in 1816 and declaring his possession of the 
archipelago by an official ceremony and by hoisting the Vietnamese flag. 266 
The information from these historical documents showed that Vietnam had discovered 
and maintained its exploitation activities in the Paracels from the seventeenth to the nineteenth 
centuries. These activities received no opposition or counter requests from China and only 
stopped because of the entrance of France in the country in 1856. Regarding this point, Chen 
claimed that China did not know that Vietnam had encroached upon the Paracels and 
Spratlys. 267 However, if the argument was true, it only revealed that the occupation of China 
was not sufficient to protect its title from such exploitation over 6 months in a year and from a 
261 For relevant quotations from the historical documents, see NguyIn Nhä, op. cit., note 247, p. 329 and 339. 
262 For the quotation of Vietnamese historical sources and other sources of foreign authors, see the Hoang Sa 
and Truong Sa Archipelagoes (Paracels and Spratlys), (Hanoi: Vietnam Courier, 1985), p. 117-125. 
263 Barrow John, A Voyage to Cochinchina, (T. Cadell and W Davies, 1806). Page 17 of the book contained the 
information that the Cochinchinese vessels "used in trade on the coast, in fishing, and to gather trepan and sea 
swallow's nests in the group of islands called Paracels, are of various constructions". 
264 Jean-Louis, "Notes on the Geography of Cochinchina" (1837) VI (Part II) Journal of the Asiatic Society of 
Bengal, 737-745. 
265 Dr Gutzlaff, "Geography of the Cochinchinese Empire" (1849) Vol. XIX, Journal of the Geographical 
Society of London, 93. 
266 Jean-Louis, op. cit., note 264. This event was challenged by China as it was not recorded in Vietnamese 
historical documents. However, at the time when the Notes were written (1837), France did not have any 
intention as regards sovereignty of the Paracels and the position of the author as a bishop showed that there 
was no momentum for him to distort the information to support Vietnam. 
267 Kuang Min Sun, op. cit., note 254, p. 43. 
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new claim by Vietnam. More logically, in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, China 
was no longer a sea power, thus the country could not control the two archipelagos. 
The activities of Vietnam, which were conducted consistently by the Vietnamese 
government, might prove the intention of the government to assert sovereignty over the 
Paracels and Spratlys. The action of establishing the Hoang Sa Company, setting up a garrison 
to collect duty and measuring navigation routes further demonstrated the actual display of 
authority by the Vietnamese government in the Paracels and Spratlys. In addition, these 
practices, through a period of almost three centuries, did not provoke any protest from China or 
other countries, i. e. they were conducted `continuously and peacefully'. According to the 
judgment of the Permanent Court in the Eastern Greenland case, with regard to inhabited 
territory, the consolidation of title through occupation required "very little in the way of the 
actual exercise of sovereignty rights' . 268 Also, in some recent cases, Indonesia v. Malaysia269 
and Qatar v. Bahrain270, the ICJ ruled that activities such as the construction and operation of 
lighthouses and navigational aids would qualify to establish sovereignty over a very small 
island. It might, therefore, be concluded that from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, 
with its intention and continuous and peaceful management of the archipelago, Vietnam had 
been successfully establishing title to the Spratlys through prescription. 
However, it might be argued that as the act of hoisting the flag only took place in the 
Paracels, the title for the Spratlys might just inchoate title. However, due to the fact that the 
Hoang Sa Company was in charge of exploitation activities not only in the Paracels but in the 
Spratlys through the Bac Hai Company, it might also be argued that Vietnam considered the 
Paracels and Spratlys as a united group of features in the South China Sea, thus the hoisting of 
the flag related to both archipelagos. 
It was also noted that the official visit and hoisting of the flag of the King of Vietnam was 
very similar to the ceremonial declaration of sovereignty under contemporary international law 
on acquisition at that time. Unfortunately, it was not followed by an international declaration. 
Hence, one could argue that due to the lack of an international declaration, to some extent, the 
declaration did not have full effect. The other might argue that this was because the international 
law on acquisition, which originated in the West, was unfamiliar to the states in Asia and thus 
268 Eastern Greenland Case, PCIJ, Series A/B no. 53 (1933), p. 22 at 46. 
269 JCJ Reports (2002), p. 625, at para. 147. 
270 ICJ Reports (2001), p. 40 at para. 197. 
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could not be applied in this case. Therefore, under the intertemporal law principle, 271 such official 
activities might be considered as a declaration of sovereignty by Vietnam's Kings. 
With regard to the historical title of Vietnam and China in this period, it would be 
necessary to mention the arguments of China th at China has historically considered Vietnam as 
a vassal state and accordingly deemed all territories possessed by Vietnam or subject to 
Vietnamese jurisdiction as likewise subject to Chinese suzerainty. 272 This argument derived 
from the fact that the Kingdom of Annam was founded in the 11th century under the name of 
Dai Co Viet by the creation of a political power and administration independent of China but 
acknowledging Chinese suzerainty. Valero supports this argument and argues that the feudal 
relationship between China and Vietnam only came to an end with the conclusion of the Ly 
Frontier Agreement in May 1884, in which China agreed to respect all preceding and future 
agreements between France and Annam273 Hence, any Vietnamese claims to historic title over 
the Paracels and Spratlys before 1884 should be inured to China's benefit. 
However, it should be noted that the vassal concept in the Chinese Confucian system is 
different from that of European feudalism. It is argued that the Viet Dynasty needed the blessing 
of China in order to gain recognition and survive. What it means is that the tribute of Vietnam to 
China concealed an extremely complex system of relations. For China, it indicated the maximum 
independence in which it could hope to maintain the Dai Viet without provoking any reaction 
against imperialism on its part. For the Dai Viet, on the contrary, it indicated the maximum 
independence to which the kingdom could aspire without provoking any imperialistic reaction on 
the part of China. In either case, bearing in mind the Confucian nature of the two countries, the 
tribute, in part at least, evinced common adherence to one system of values. 274 Thus, the vassal 
relations between Vietnam and China could not compare with the model of European, which was 
highly structured and well known by Western jurists as semi-sovereignty. 
271 The operation of the principle of `intertemporal law' was dealt with in the Island of Palmas arbitration. After 
conceding that a juridical fact must be appreciated in light of the law contemporary with it and not of the law in force at 
the time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled, the sole arbitrator, Max Huber, made the following 
qualification: 
As regards the question which of different legal systems prevailing at successive periods is to be applied in a 
particular case (the so-called intertemporal law), a distinction must be made between the creation of rights and 
the existence of rights. The same principle which subjects the act creative of a right to the law in force at the 
time the right arises, demands that the existence of the right, in other words its continued manifestation, shall 
follow the conditions required by the evolution of the law (Island ofPalmas Case, (1928) 2 RIAA, p. 829 at 883, 
reprinted in (1928) 22 AJIL 867 at 883). 
Zn Valero, op. cit., note 254, p. 323. 
273 Valero, op. cit., note 254, p. 324. 
274 Francois Joyaux, La Chine et le Reglement du Premier Conflit d'Indochine, (Geneve: Publication de la 
Sorbonne, 1979), p. 44-45; quoted in Chemillier-Gendreau, op. cit., note 35, p. 75-76. 
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In fact, the vassalage nominally accepted by Annam, in the form of honorary service, 
never allowed China to affect the foreign relations of ancient Vietnam. The history of Sino- 
Vietnam relations has seen many Chinese military ventures against Vietnam. When victorious, 
the kings of Vietnam never failed to seek to appease their gigantic neighbour by symbolically 
paying liege. In a similar situation in the Minquiers and Ecrehos case, when considering the 
effect of the vassal relationship between the Kingdom of France and the Duke of Normandy on 
generating title, the Court held that "such an alleged original feudal title of the Kings of France in 
respect of the Channel Islands could today produce no legal effect, unless it had been replaced by 
another title valid according to the law of the time of replacement. It was for the French 
Government to establish that it was so replaced". 275 If it was argued that China had a right over 
what was acquired by Vietnam, at the time the vassal relationship stopped, China did not make 
any reservation to this issue. Also, China itself did not acquire title to the two archipelagos at the 
time Vietnam became a protectorate of France. Therefore, the judgment of the Minquiers and 
Ecrehos case may be applied and means that China has no title over the Paracels and Spratlys. 
Furthermore, the vagueness in the concept of vassal relationship to China can also be 
seen from the record of the Official Yearbook of the Chinese government, which claims that 
vassal states of China in the nineteenth century included Annam, Burma, Siems, Laos, Great 
Britain, the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal and the Holy See. 276 If it is argued that due to the vassal 
relationship, all the territory possessed by Vietnam should belong to China, the territory of all 
the counties under the above list also belong to China. Thus, the claimed vassal relationship 
between Vietnam and China has no legal effect in respect of generating title over the Paracels 
and Spratlys for China. 
2.3. Practice of some other participants 
Although China and Vietnam had known of and successively exploited the resources of 
the South China Sea, they did not make any international declaration. Thus, the effective control 
of the waters in this ocean was never fully monopolised. For a long time, before the presence of 
colonies in the region, Persians, Arabs, Indians, Chinese and the peoples of Southeast Asia, all 
used the freedom of the sea for trade and the islands of the contested archipelagos function either 
as points on the trading networks or as navigational markers. Also, in this period there was a 
275 ICJ Report (1953), p. 47 at 56. 
276 Jean-Pierre, "Le Conflit des Iles Paracels et le Probleme de la Souverainete sur les Iles Inhabitdes" (1975) 
Annuaire Francaiis de Droit International, 173 at 180-181. 
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discovery by French seamen, who had travelled in an Eastern direction and arrived at the Paracels 
on March 7th 1568.277 In addition, the Paracels and Spratlys were well known in world maritime 
history due to the shipwreck of the Amphitrite under the reign of King Louis XIV in 1698, when 
this ship was on the way to China from France. 278 
2.4. The stronger claim of the pre-colonial period 
The situation of this period confirmed the fact that the South China Sea had been known 
for a long time and according to historical records, the Chinese were probably the fast to have 
known of the existence of the two archipelagos. However, prior to the presence of the colonial 
powers, all practices of littoral states were mainly carried out privately and focused on economic 
and maritime activities. None of the states made a declaration of sovereignty under international 
law on acquisition. Of the two dominant states practising in the South China Sea, the stronger 
claims belonged to Vietnam, as many official activities implied a declaration of sovereignty such 
as the King's official visit and the hoisting of the flag carried out by the government of Vietnam 
during the reign of the Nguyen Dynasty. Applying the intertemporal law principle, this may result 
in the first title from prescription for Vietnam. Meanwhile, according to historical records, the 
Chinese government had not yet expressed any intention to claim the Spratlys. 
3. Titles established by colonial powers 
3.1. The inchoate title of the United Kingdom 
As they were interested in establishing trading stations and natural resource suppliers, 
the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and Spain entered the South China Sea region 
and divided the littoral territories of the South China Sea into their respective spheres of 
influence, namely Malaya, the northern Borneo colonies and Hong Kong, Indo-China, the 
Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines respectively. In this period, almost all states 
accepted the principle of the "freedom of the seas" and applied the three mile limit which set 
territorial waters at the distance of a good cannon's range. 279 However, among them, Britain 
was the first European power to gain a footprint in the Spratlys. British seafarers reported the 
277 Chemillier-Gendreau, op. cit., note 35, p. 42. 
278 Claudius Madrolle, La Question de Hainan et des Paracels, (Revue Politique Etrangere, 1939), quoted in 
ibid. The name Amphitrite of the ship was also the contemporary international name of one of the groups in the 
Paracels. However, no document was found to prove a connection. 
279 At the final meeting of its Territorial Waters Committee of the 1930 Hague Conference, there were 20 
states, the majority of the participant, which sought territorial seas of three miles. For details, see Churchill 
and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, (Manchester University Press, 3`d ed., 1999), p. 79. 
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discovery of the Spratlys in 1762, then, in 1821, the British Admiralty published charts for the 
South China Sea. 280 In 1864, the British Royal Navy ship, HMS Rifle, reportedly came across a 
few islands situated in the South China Sea and claimed them as part of the British empire. The 
name of the captain who carved out the discovery, Richard Spratlys, was used to name the 
islands. Therefore, the group of islands were called the Spratlys in English. Afterwards, in 
1877, the governor of British North Borneo, currently the East Malaysian state of Sabah, 
authorised two men to go there and to raise the British flag. 281 These activities formed the 
inchoate title of Britain to the Spratlys. However, after that Britain did not pay much attention 
to the Spratlys and tended to support the claim of France. 
3.2. Title by succession of France 
France entered Vietnam in 1856 and later on became the protector of Vietnam under the 
Protectorate Treaty of 15 March 1874 and the Patentre Treaty of 6 June 1884.282 France did not 
continue the exploitation of resources in the South China Sea by the Vietnamese kings in the 
nineteenth century until 1927, when France carried out patrol trips in the South China Sea to 
combat smuggling and conduct scientific surveys of the Paracels and Spratlys islands. 283 Then, in 
April 1930, during the second expedition to the Paracels and Spratlys by the ship La Malicieuse, 
France declared her formal possession of the Spratlys by hoisting a French flag on the highest 
point of an island called `lie de la Tempete'. Zß4 Britain at that time did not lodge any protest at 
France's occupation. The islands were, in British thinking, deemed of little worth. 285 These initial 
interests were not developed into sovereignty claims until 1933. On 26 July 1933, France 
formally declared its sovereignty of the entire Paracels and Spratlys to the world and took 
physical possession of the archipelagos. It was noteworthy that the declaration clearly stated the 
280 Hancox, David and Prescott, Victor., op. cit., note 35, p. 31-45,50-54; Also in Odgaard, op. cit., note 16, 
64. 
81 Catley and Keliat, op. cit., note 30, p. 6. 
282 The protectorate relationship was established by two treaties in 1874 and 1884, signed by the Nguyen 
Dynasty in Vietnam and France. In fact, Vietnam was colony of French and France devolved to all 
Vietnamese domestic and external affairs. For details, see Luu VAn Levi, Cu¢c Tranh chdp Viet-Trung ve3 Hai 
Qudn D6 o Hoäng Sa vä Trudng Sa, (Hä Nbi: Nhä xuat ban CEng an Nhän dän, 1995), p. 63-65, also in 
Odgaard, op. cit., note 16, p. 64; and Todd C. Kelly, op. cit., note 258. 
283 France previously intended to install a lighthouse in the Paracels in 1899 and carry out a scientific survey 
in this archipelago. This plan was not implemented due to the lack of finance. For detail see Chemillier- 
Gendreau, op. cit., note 35, p. 44; Also in Samuels, op. cit., note 5, p. 53. The 1927 survey was conducted by the 
crew of the SS De Lanessan. Cf. Todd C. Kelly, op. cit., note 258. 
284 Chemillier-Gendreau, op. cit., note 35, p. 44. 
285 For an analysis of British thinking at that time, see Marston, Geoffrey, "Abandonment of Territorial 
Claims: The Cases of Bouvet and Spratlys Islands" (1986) BYIL, 337-356. 
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name of some features in the Spratlys, namely the Spratly Island, Amboyna Cay, Itu Aba Island, 
Sin Cowe Island, Loaita Reefs, Thitu Island, and Northeast and Southeast Cays as well as all 
adjacent reefs and shoals286 These features include 7 of the 12 islands which may generate full 
maritime zones. 87 The declaration was also followed by marking a stone pillar on which was 
written 'Republique Francaise - Royaume d'Annam - Archipel des Paracels 1816 - Ile de Pattle 
-1938' . 28$ Between 24 July and 23 September 1933, France completed the process of notifying 
all nations who might have had an interest in the Spratlys islands about its claim With a 
sovereignty declaration clearly stating the intention of acquiring the Spratlys and a formal process 
to claim possession through hoisting the flag, marking, a stone pillar and informing all other 
states, it can be submitted that France had established its title to the Spratlys. 
Regarding the title of France to the Spratlys, it is noteworthy to analyse the relations of 
this title with two previous titles established by other states, namely the titles of the Annam's 
Kings in the pre-colonial period and of Britain in the nineteenth century. 
Concerning the former title, there was an argument that the title established by France 
in 1933 succeeded to the title of the Annam's Kings as France came in Annam by virtue of 
protectorate treaty in 1856. However, one may raise concerns about the time of such a 
succession, which only occurred lately in 1933, about 70 years after France entered the region. 
The reason given for the delay of these sovereign claims was explained by France that France 
did not know about the title which Vietnam's Kings had established in the last three centuries. 
Therefore, France had to check whether the Paracels and Spratlys already belonged to any 
neighbouring countries, and particularly to China or the Philippines. 289 After having confumed 
that the legitimate rights of Annam (Vietnam) resulted from the effective control of Annam's 
Kings since the seventeen century, France lodged its sovereignty declaration in 1933 through 
an international standard procedure including occupation, marking and declaration. In 
286 This information was recorded in the Official Journal of the France Republic, 26 July 1933, p. 7837. 287 As the result achieved in Chapter 2, supra. Accordingly, 7 islands claimed by France which may generate 
full maritime zones are the Spratly Island, Amboyna Cay, Itu Aba Island, Loaita Reefs, Thitu Island, and 
Northeast and Southeast Cays. 
288 French Republic - Kingdom of Annam - Paracels Archipelago - Pattle Island - 1938. Quoted in 
Chemillier-Gendreau, op. cit., note 35, p. 46; Also in Luv VAn Lqi, op. cit, note 282, p. 194 (with a picture of the 
stone pillar). 
289 The French consideration in this period could be seen through correspondence among its diplomats in 
China, officials in Vietnam and officials at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in France. For details, see 
Chemillier, op. cit, note 35, Annexes 13-17, p. 196-214 and Annex 34, p. 238. 
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memorandums sent to China to affirm French sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratlys, 
France argued that it inherited the islands from King Gia Long of Annam. 290 
With regard to the British title, the discovery of the Spratlys by Britain actually 
happened much earlier in 1762 but after that, only some limited activities were carried out to 
establish an inchoate title to the archipelago in 1877. It seemed that with their remote location 
and tiny size, the Spratlys archipelago did not receive much attention from Britain until France 
occupied the Paracels and Spratlys in 1930. After learning of the occupation of the islands by 
France, the Law Official of the Crown convened a meeting on 29 July 1932 to discuss this 
issue. The Official examined the activities of Britain and made a comparison with other cases 
to conclude that "[w]e are not able to infer from the event which took place in 1877-79 any 
acquisition of even an inchoate title to sovereignty, still less of a title perfected either by actual 
occupation or by some other open display of state authority". 291 Therefore, Britain decided not 
to dispute but to support France's claims. From 1933 to the end of the Second World War, 
Britain always expressed its support for France's sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratlys. 
Thus it may be concluded that Britain had abandoned its inchoate title to the Spratlys. 
Taking into account the fact that the title established by Britain was only inchoate title 
and Britain had abandoned it, there was no fully established title to the Spratlys during the 70- 
year interruption between the two titles established by Annam's Kings and by France. 
Therefore, the title of France was still considered as continuance from the title of Annam's 
King, i. e. France may inherit the title to the Spratlys from Annam. Even if this succession was 
not recognised, the title established by France should be considered as a prescription because in 
accordance to contemporary international law, the previous inchoate title of Britain was 
abandoned and the claim of France to the Spratlys was the first well established through an 
international standard procedure including occupation, marking and declaration. 
Another issue that should be raised concerning the title of France to Spratlys was 
whether France established such title for itself or on behalf of Annam as a protectorate. After 
successfully declaring sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratlys, France established 
administrative regions in the Paracels and Spratlys and attached these archipelagos to Thua 
Thien and Baria provinces respectively. 292 In the Spratlys, the names of the Spratly Island, the 
290 For details see Chemillier, op. cit, note 35, Annex 47, p. 285. 
29' See Marston Geoffrey, op. cit., note 285,337-356. 
292 Thua Thien and Baria are two provinces in the South of Vietnam. For full text of the Decrees to place the 
Paracels and Spratlys to Thua Thien and Baria, see NguyIn Nhä, op. cit., note 247, p. 356. 
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cay of Amboine, Itu- Aba, and the groups of Loaita and Thitu were listed as features to be 
attached to Baria province. This affirmed that France attached the Spratlys to Vietnam's 
territory. It should be noted that under Article 1(2) of the Patentre Treaty, "France represents 
Annam in all external relations". 293 Therefore, the attachment of the Spratlys to Vietnam's 
territory proved that the action of acquisition of the archipelago was conducted on behalf of 
Vietnam through the protectorate relationship. 
3.3. Further practices of China 
With regard to China's claim, in 1895 and 1896, there were two shipwrecks at the 
Paracels, the Bellona (German) and the Imegi Maru (Japanese). Local people from Hainan 
seized goods from the two ships and brought them to Hainan to sell. The British, for insurance 
purposes regarding the ships, made a claim to the Beijing authorities. However, the Chinese 
authorities refused to accept responsibility over the Paracels and stated that this archipelago was 
not part of Hainan. 294 
Facing the threat of the southwards policy of Japan, particularly its claim to sovereignty 
over the Pratas Island in 1907, several expeditions led by Admiral Li Chun of Guangtung 
Province were made to the Paracels from 1902 to 1909.295 In contrast to other expeditions of 
the Chinese people in previous centuries, the trip conducted by Admiral Li Chun in 1909 was 
authorised by the Guangtung authorities with the purpose of acquiring the Paracels. This 
incident was followed by granting exploitation rights for Ho Jui Nien, a Chinese citizen, to 
exploit phosphate at the Paracels in 1921. These actions led to the declaration to merge the 
Paracels with Hainan Island and place them under the southern military authority of 
Guangtung. 296 However, no action was taken with regard to the Spratlys. 
In response to the French declaration of 1933, in 1934 China raised a protest based on 
the interpretation of the Sino-French treaty of land border in 1887, in which there was an article 
concerning the division of the Tonkin Gulf. The Article says that "at Kouang Tong ... the 
islands situated to the east of the Parisian longitude at 105'43 eastern longitude, i. e., the north- 
293 Chemillier, op. cit, note 35, p. 86. 
294 Chemillier-Gendreau, Ibid, p. 44. 
295 Ibid; also see Samuels, op. cit., note 5, p. 53. On these expeditions, it was reported that he was accompanied 
by a number of surveyors, engineers and scientists who participated in undertaking the formal reconnoitre of 
the islands and establishing sites for the construction of houses, roads, a radio station and phosphate 
processing plants. 
'6 This authority was not recognised by central Chinese government and other states. At this time, the 
Republic of China was itself still in the process of formation. Cf. Chemillier-Gendreau, op. cit., note 35, p. 45; 
For further details of these activities, see Samuels, op. cit., note 5, p. 55-57. 
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south line passing through the eastern point of the Tch'a Kou Island or Ouan-chan (Tra-co) and 
forming the border, are attributed to China. The Gotho islands and the other islands to the west 
of this meridian belong to Annam. " 297 Examining the Article in the context of a frontier 
convention, it might be concluded that the purpose of the article was to identify the end of the 
frontier. It did not aim to clarify a meridian line for the maritime area between the two 
countries, as the end of the north-south line mentioned in the article was not clarified, thus it 
was not clear whether the border would apply for the whole South China Sea or just apply for 
the Gulf of Tonkin. In addition, drawn to the South, the meridian line would intersect the 
Vietnamese mainland between Hue and Danang, cross the highlands near Kontum, Pleiku and 
Ban Me Thuot and eventually exit into the South China Sea just west of Phan Thiet. If it was 
argued that the meridian line should be applied to the whole South China Sea, China would 
have title to all islands including the Paracels and Spratlys archipelagos and some parts of the 
mainland of Vietnam. Therefore, it would be unreasonable for France at that time to conclude a 
Treaty with such an interpretation. 298 This meant that the 1887 frontier Convention could not be 
applied to enable China to claim the Paracels and Spratlys. In fact, the French tried to solve this 
issue by both diplomatic and judicial methods; however, due to the domestic situation of both 
China and France at that time, no solution was reached. 299 
With their protest against the sovereignty declaration of France over the Paracels and 
Spratlys, it seemed that China had an intention to claim the two archipelagos. However, except 
for the unpersuasive reasons based on the Sino-French treaty of land border in 1887, China did 
not conduct any other activities to establish their title to the Spratlys. Furthermore, in 1928, 
China published an official map showing that the southernmost delineation of Chinese territory 
as the Paracels and excluding the Spratlys. 300 Thus, it appeared that China had only formally 
protested against French action in the Paracels, not in the Spratlys. This leads to the conclusion 
that during the colonial period no claim to the Spratlys was made by China. 
3.4. Titled claimed by occupation by Japan 
297 Hertslet's China Treaties, 1908, p. 315, quoted in Choon-ho Park, East Asia and the Law of the Sea, (Seoul: 
Seoul National University Press, 1983), p. 187, also quoted in Odgaard, op. cit., note 16, p. 88. 
298 The fact that the recent delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin between Vietnam and China in 2000 also did not 
follow this article endorsed this interpretation. 
299 For a quotation of some diplomatic documents exchanged between China and France, see Chemillier- 
Gendreau, op. cit., note 35, Appendixes. 
300 Lee G. Cordner, "Me Spratly Islands Dispute and the Law of the Sea" (1994) 25(1) ODIL 61 at 63. 
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The emergence of Japan during the early twentieth century led to the expansion of 
Japanese territory toward the South and involvement in the South China Sea dispute from 1939 to 
1945. Japan lodged a formal and explicit protest against the French sovereignty declaration of 
1933 on the grounds that the archipelago had been mined for years by various Japanese 
phosphate companies. 301 The interest of Japan in the South China Sea region starting with the 
phosphate reserves began in the early twentieth century after this country occupied Taiwan in 
1895 and the Pratas Island in 1907.302 Ho Ji Nien who was granted the exploitation rights by the 
Guangtung Province authority to exploit phosphate in the Paracels was actually backed by 
Japanese phosphate companies based in Taiwan. Then, during the late 1920s and early 1930s, 
Japanese phosphate companies also began operating in the Spratlys. 303 However, these activities 
were limited only to economic interests, as Japan had not made any sovereignty claim until she 
protested against French claims and occupied the Paracels and Spratlys by force in 1939. During 
the Second World War, Japan maintained its occupation and placed the two archipelagos under 
the jurisdiction of the Governor General of Taiwan through the Kao-hsiung District. 
304 
In response to Japan's activities, the French government sent a note to the Japanese 
Government to protest at the occupation and reaffirmed the sovereignty of France. 
305 France 
also declared the division of the Paracels into two separate administrative regions and 
appointed personnel for some posts in both regions. These personnel were believed to have 
stayed there until March 1942 despite of the occupation of the Japanese. 
306 
After the end of the Second World War, Japan renounced its rights to all of its occupied 
territories including those in the Paracels and Spratlys without any further reference to the fate of 
the two archipelagos. 307 The linkage between Taiwan and the two archipelagos under Japan's 
occupation led Taiwan to continue to occupy the Paracels and Spratlys. 
308 With the `one China' 
approach, Taiwanese claims would be claimed for China, thus to some extent, Japan's occupation 
in this period also fortifies Chinese claims. It is, therefore, necessary to clarify the legality of the 
occupation of Japan to identify whether any title over the Spratlys was established. 
301 Caley and Keliat, op. cit., note 30, p. 25. 
302 Samuels, op. cit., note 5, p. 63. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Ibid. 
305 Chemillier-Gendreau, op. cit., note 35, p. 42. 
306 Samuels, op. cit., note 5, p. 65. 
307 Article 2(f). For details, see infra in this Chapter. 
308 Due to the victory of the Communist Party in China, the Republic of China fled to Taiwan 
in 1949, leaving 
both the Paracels and Spratlys unoccupied. Then POC replaced Taiwan's occupation in the Paracels but 
Taiwan still resumed its occupation in the Spratlys from 1956 until now. 
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First of all, as regards the legal nature of Japan's occupation from 1917-1919, it was ab 
initio not supported or acquiesced in by the Japanese government, but was private activity 
conducted by some merchants and companies involved in phosphate exploitation. This was 
confirmed by the protest of the Japanese government in 1933 on the basis of the economic 
rights of Japanese merchants. That meant that if the Japanese government did not have an 
intention to occupy the Spratlys in the first place, then its occupation between 1907 and 1933 
would not constitute an 'effective occupation'. Even when Japan first showed its intention in 
1933, this act put Japan at best on the same footing as France. 309 
Second, in competition with France, Japan occupied the Spratlys by force in 1939,6 
years after the occupation of France. 1939 was the time when the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 
and Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations were in force to restrain the use of 
force in state policy. 310 Japan was one of the original members of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, but 
withdrew its membership in March 1933. However, it was argued that the Pact had independent 
effect, which never expired and was immune from denunciation. 311 Thus, the withdrawal of 
Japan from the Pact would not allow this country the use of force. 12 It could also be argued 
that with the severe consequences of the First World War, the prohibition of the use of force, 
developed from the Hague Conventions to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, was widely recognised in 
state practice as a legal obligation. 313 This could be seen as an initial process to form a new 
customary international law concerning the use of force. 314 The use of force by Japan was 
against the common recognition of states at that time, thus might not be considered as 
establishing any legal title. 
309 Kuang Min Sun, op. cit., note 254, p. 43. 
310 For a comprehensive review on the effect of the article and the Pact, see Sharon Korman, op. cit., note 230, 
180-199. 
ýý Oppenheim, International Law, (London: Longman, 1955,7'h ed., Vol. 2), p. 193, quoted in Brownlie, 
International Law and the Use of Force by States, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 92 and Sharon 
Korman, ibid, p. 193. 
312 In fact, when a conflict occurred between Japan and China in Shanghai in 1937, the Far Eastern Committee of 
the League rejected a Japanese plea of self- defence and stated that Japan had violated the Kellogg-Briand Pact. 
Similar views were expressed by the Assembly of the League and by the United States at the Brussels Conference 
on 18 January 1938. See Peace and War, p. 390 (Declaration adopted by the Conference, 15 November 1937) and 
50,389 (the US attitude), quoted in Brownlie, ibid, p. 78. ý" 
Particularly, the Kellogg-Briand Pact was referred to as an existing obligation and not as a temporary aspiration. 
For further discussion on state practice, see Brownlie, ibid, p. 74-80. 
314 Stephen Neff argued that there were three important legal signs for the offing of the use of force. They were the 
financial arrangements of the Treaty of Versailles, the chief features of the League of Nations Covenant and the 
Pact of Paris of 1928. He also emphasised that the significance of the Pact was best summed as saying that it was 
intended to mark the definitive end of the laissez-faire approach to war that had culminated in the nineteenth 
century. Duel-wars were now to become a thing of the past. For further, see Stephen C. Neff, War and the Law of 
Nations: A General History, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 287-95. 
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Finally, the use of force should be examined in the context of the Second World War. 
In fact, the withdrawal of Japan from the Kellogg-Briand Pact in March 1933 was in 
preparation for the Second World War. The time that Japan used force to occupy the Paracels 
and Spratlys was in 1939, when it was conducting hostile activities and aggression against other 
countries in the region. Under the rules of the law of war, 315 Japan's wartime occupation of 
these archipelagos could not transfer any title to it, i. e. by illegal occupation in wartime, no title 
was established by Japan. 316 
Therefore, similar to Spain, in the Island of Palmas case, where the judges concluded 
that Spain "could not transfer more rights than she herself possessed", 317 Japan could not 
transfer any rights to Taiwan (China) over the Paracels or Spratlys after the end of the Second 
World War. 
3.5. The stronger claim in the colonial period 
The colonial period saw the claims of three superpowers in the region, namely the 
United Kingdom, France and Japan. Among them, the United Kingdom, after an early 
establishment of inchoate title, abandoned her title and supported the sovereignty declaration of 
France in 1930. Japan's claim, based on the economic rights of the country towards the guano 
resources in the Paracels and the Spratlys, was manifested in its protest to France's claims and 
by its occupation by force in parts of these archipelagos in 1939. 
Of the two claims made by France and Japan, the stronger belonged to France as this 
country made the official sovereignty declaration to the archipelagos by succession. The claims 
of France were based on the practices of the Annam which later on was the colony of France. 
Although after the entrance of France in 1856, the title of Vietnam from the seventeenth to 
nineteenth century was not continued immediately, from 1856 to 1933 when France declared 
its sovereignty, no new title to the two archipelagos was established. Meanwhile, the claim of 
Japan was only based on the phosphate exploitation activities of Japan's phosphate companies 
between 1907 and 1933. These companies did not operate on behalf of the Japanese 
government. In addition, the use of force to occupy the two archipelagos in the course of the 
315 Article 43 of the Hague Regulations which form the Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention N respecting 
the laws and customs of war on land. 
316 The Kellogg-Briand Pact later still provided a legal basis for the charges of crimes against peace 
contemplated at the International Military Tribunal at Tokyo for Japanese activities during the Second World War. 
317 Island of Palmas Arbitration, (1928) 2 RIAA, p. 829, reprinted in (1928) 22 AJIL 867 at 879. 
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Second World War could not lead to a valid title. As Japan held no legal title in this period, any 
claim of inheriting title from Japan could not be accepted either. 
4. The changes of titles from the end of the Second World War to 1980 
With the end of the Second World War, colonial countries stopped their presence in the 
region. Claims to the Spratlys in this period were made by newly formed independent states. 
However, with the complicated political situation in both Vietnam and China, their claims were 
not consistent and their effective controls also were not continuous, thus creating some weak 
points in their legal arguments. In addition, during the early 1970s, the 1982 LOSC came to 
agreement on some major issues including the legal status of islands. This gave rise to the 
attention of states to islands as its role in generating maritime zones for the owned states. In the 
South China Sea case, with the location of the Spratlys in the middle of the ocean, the 
UNCLOS indirectly ignited another tension with the fortifying of the old claimants and the 
entrance of newcomers. 
4.1. Title claimed by Vietnam 
The successful revolution by Viet Minh in Hanoi led to the establishment of the 
independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV or North Vietnam) in 1945. Under the 
Franco-Vietnamese Preliminary Convention on 6 March 1946, "[t]he French Government 
recognises DRV as a free state having its own government, parliament, army and finances, and 
forming part of the Indochinese Federation and the French Union" and the fate of the South 
would be decided later through a referendum. 318 However, France did not follow the agreement 
in good faith. Under its encouragement, on 8 March 1949, a second Vietnam was created in the 
South which later became the Republic of Vietnam (ROV or South Vietnam) 319 From 1950, 
the two governments of Vietnam existed and were recognised by some countries as two 
independent governments. 320 
With regard to the title to the Paracels and Spratlys, in 1949 and 1950, the French 
government transferred the control in the Spratlys and Paracels to the South Vietnamese 
318 Article 1 of the Convention. For full text see Gravel (ed. ) The Pentagon Papers, (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1971, Vol. 1), Chapter 1, p. 18-19, online at httn: //www. mtholyoke. edu/acad/intrel/pentaoon/int2. htm 
(accessed on 24 November 2004). 
3º9 Cheni liier-Gendreau, op. cit., note 35, p. 43. 320 For details of the recognition, see Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law: With 
Particular Reference to Government in Exile, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 98-9. 
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authority. 321 In 1950, as a participant and signatory to the Peace Treaty at the San Francisco 
Conference, the ROV's Prime Minister, Tran Van Huu, issued a statement at the Seventh 
Plenary Session which, in part, was as follows: "As we must frankly profit from all the 
opportunities offered to us to stifle the germs of discord, we affirm our right to the Spratlys and 
Paracels Islands, which have always belonged to Vietnam! *. 322 With these incidents, the South 
Vietnamese authority would be considered as the successor to France with regard to the title 
over the Paracels and Spratlys. Also, in this connection, the silence of the French delegation at 
the statement of Prime Minister Tran Van Huu, at the San Francisco Conference, also 
confirmed the intention of France to transfer title to the two archipelagos to the South 
Vietnamese government. In addition, the fact that the claim by South Vietnam at the conference 
passed uncontested could be argued as universal recognition of Vietnam's claims 323 
The Foreign Affairs Minister of South Vietnam, Vu Van Man, reaffirmed the sovereignty 
of Vietnam over the archipelagos on 1 June 1956. Then, at the same time, the South Vietnamese 
authority sent a destroyer to patrol the Spratlys, to plant flags and to set up landmarks on the 
islands as symbols of occupation, but did not maintain a permanent presence in the region. On 22 
October 1956, the Saigon government issued a declaration annexing the Spratly archipelago to its 
Phuoc Tuy province. 324 South Vietnam also realised its claim in the Spratlys by occupying 5 
features in 1973. It also awarded eight oil exploration contracts to American and Canadian oil 
companies; some of these contracts overlapped with the western edges of the Spratlys. Taiwan, 
China and the Philippines opposed South Vietnam's activities. 325 
Despite many attempts by South Vietnam to consolidate their claim, North Vietnam did 
not make any claim over the Spratlys. In addition, in the letter of DRV Premier, Pham Van 
Dong, of 1958 and a Declaration by the DRV government on 9 May 1965, it expressed its 
support to the Declaration of China which declared the 12 miles of the territorial sea's width for 
Chinese maritime areas including those surrounding the Paracels and the Spratlys. 
321 On 15 October 1950, France officially ceded its rights in the Paracels to Vietnam. Chemillier-Gendreau, op. cit., 
note 35, p. 43; Also, on 4 June 1949, French president enacted the Law Modifying the Status of Cochin China 
(former name of South Vietnam called by France) which was approved by the French National Assembly and 
Council, to acknowledge the unification of South Vietnam into Vietnam. This unification was argued to refer to the 
Spratlys as well because the Spratlys were attached to Baria province of South Vietnam and the 1949 law made no 
reservation on the fate of the Spraltys. For further, Cameron (ed. ), Vietnam Crisis :A Documentary History, (Ithaca 
and London : Cornell University Press, Vol. 1,1971), p. 128 and Valero, op. cit., note 254, p. 340. 
322 Quoted in Samuels, op. cit., note 5, p. 79. 
323 Cordner, op. cit., note 300, p. 63. 
324 Valero, op. cit., note 254, p. 342. China protested South Vietnam's actions but took no retaliation. 
325 Samuels, op. cit., note 5, p. 99. 
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In 1975, when the North and South of Vietnam were reunited, the united Vietnam 
continued the occupation and control of South Vietnam in the Spratlys. Then, Vietnam 
officially made claims over the Paracels and Spratlys by issuing a white book in 1979326 and a 
Decree of Council of Ministers on 9 December 1982 on Vietnamese territory. In the meantime, 
Vietnam also expanded its occupation to 13 features in the Spratlys 327 
The claim of the united Vietnam in 1975 was criticised of violating the principle of 
estoppel as during the period 1954 to 1974, North Vietnam expressed its support for China's 
sovereignty in the two archipelagos. 328 In order to have the answer to the estoppel issues, it 
would be necessary to examine the legal status of North Vietnam, South Vietnam and the 
united Vietnam after 1975. 
The two Vietnams de facto existed by the establishment of the South Vietnam 
government since 1949. In 1954, after the military failure in Dien Bien Phu, France had to sign 
a Geneva Agreement on Vietnam in which she recognised DRV as an independent state and the 
military demarcation line at the 17th parallel was only a provisional boundary. The unification 
of Vietnam was to be decided by general election after two years. 329 However, after France 
withdrew from Vietnam, the South Vietnamese government which was supported by the 
United States not bound by the Geneva Agreement rejected the general election and fortified 
the South into a separate and independent state. In the 1960s, in the context of the Cold War, 
both the North and South Vietnamese governments were parties to various international treaties 
and received recognition from other states, particularly from those of the same ideology. The 
North and South Vietnam also participated in the World Health Organisation (WHO) and 
World Meterlogy Organisation (WMO) as full and separate members. 330 Thus, although the 
326 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic of Vietnam, White Book on Viet Nam's Sovereignty over the 
Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagos, (Hanoi, 1979), also at UN Doc. A/34/541: S/13565,19 October 1979. 
327 Odgaard, op. cit., note 16, p. 70. 
328 The support of North Vietnam was argued through the 1958 and 1965 Declarations to express its 
g2overnment position on the Declaration on Territorial Sea of China. 
9 Article 14 of the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Vietnam For full text see 
http: //www. yale. edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/indoch/inch001. htm (accessed on 20 December 2005). 
330 For ROV, by 1966, approximately 60 states recognised it as an independent state and more were to follow after 
the conclusion of the Paris Agreements in 1973. For DRV, besides the recognition of the socialist bloc, from from 
1969, headed by Sweden, Western and non-aligned countries started to formally recognized DRV and to establish 
relations on an ambassadorial level, especially after the conclusion of the Paris Agreement in 1973. For details, see 
Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference to Government in 
Exile, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 98-9 and Konrad G. Bühler in State Succession and Membership in 
International Organisation: Legal Theories versus Political Pragmatism (The Hague, London and Boston: Kluwer 
Law International, 2001), p. 72-6. 
109 
CHAPTER 3. LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES RELATING TO THE 
SPRATLYS: AN HISTORICAL APPROACH 
North and South governments of Vietnam did not recognise each other, under international law, 
they were two independent states. 331 
However, the pro-American policy and the revenge policy of the South Vietnamese 
government towards Communist people led to the establishment of the National Revolutionary 
Front of South Vietnam on 20 November 1960. The Front took the lead in a war in order to 
uphold the government of the Republic of Vietnam and stop the interference of the United 
States. With regard to the activities of this front, in June 1969, a Provisional Revolutionary 
Government (PRG) for South Vietnam was founded and became one party in the dialogue with 
the United States regarding restoring peace in Vietnam and was one of the parties involved in 
concluding the final peace agreement 332 The PRG, by November, 1969, was recognised by 28 
states. Others declared their intention, equivalent to recognition, to establish diplomatic 
relations with it (eg. Gabon, the UK, Canada) or established diplomatic relations by setting up 
information offices (e. g. Denmark, Finland, France, Norway and Sweden) or concluded 
bilateral agreements with that government, a fact which could be regarded as conclusive form 
the point of view of recognition (e. g. Algeria, Sweden). 333 The PRG also received the offer for 
loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1975 334 
With the military victory, the PRG took control of the territory of South Vietnam, 
renamed Saigon as Ho Chi Minh City, thus leading to the change of government in ROV. 
Then, on 25 April 1976 the North and South of Vietnam were merged by a general election and 
a National Assembly was elected including delegates from North and South. At the first 
meeting of the Assembly on 25 June 1976, the united Vietnam changed its name to the 
331 This point is also supported by James Crawford in The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2nd cd., 2006), p. 472-7, Hanna Szego Bokor in Questions of International Law (The Hague, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986), p. 24-8 and Konrad G. Bühler in ibid, p. 72-80. 
332 The 1973 Paris Peace Accords on Ending War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam For full text see website of Portland 
State University (quoted the text from the source of the US Department of state: Ending the Vietnam War 
documents), online at 
http: //www upa pdx edu/IMS/currentproiects/TAHv3/Content/Vietnam/Paris%2OPea2e%2OAccord%201973 pdf. 
(accessed on 25 July 2007). 
333 Hanna Szego Bokor, op. cit., note 331, p. 28 and M. J. Peterson, Recognition of Governments: Legal 
Doctrine and State Practice, 1815-1995 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997), p. 118. 
334 The request for hard currency loan of about $20 million against Vietnam's 'gold tranche' and a cash for its $20 
million of Special Drawing Rights was made by the South Vietnam government in April 1975. Although this 
government was taken over by the Provisional Revolutionary Government, in early May 1975 the spokesman of the 
IMF said the IMF was still ready to honour the requests if the newly-victorious government desired. This 
information was covered by Washington Post, 6 May 1975, p. Al 1, referred by Peterson, op. cit., note 333, p. 136. 
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Republic Socialist of Vietnam with the capital in Hanoi. 335 It also issued a new constitution in 
1980 which provided a new state structure for the united Vietnam government 336 The united 
Vietnam also attained a seat as a new state in the United Nations on 20 September 1977. 
From the fact that both North and South Vietnam (either under the Saigon 
administration or the PRG) de facto existed with wide recognition before 1976 as two 
independent states and a united Vietnam was formed by the two by a general election, had a 
new national assembly with the equal representative from the North and the South, had a new 
constitution and constituted a new government structure, the formation of a united Vietnam is 
the merger of the two Vietnams. 
As a newly created state, the united Vietnam could succeed from both the North and the 
South Vietnams. More exactly, in this period, there were two successions. The first was the 
succession of the PRG to the Saigon government in 1975 after the collapse of the latter and the 
second was the succession of the united Vietnam to both the North and the South Vietnam 
governments in 1976. One should raise a question of what principle applied to this succession 
as this issue was considered as complicated in theory due to the complex history of the 
unification. 337 However, from the fact that the united Vietnam, unlike the case of the formation 
such as German, Tanzania, etc., did not declare that all international treaties and agreement 
concluded by North and South Vietnam would remain in force, it could be inferred that the 
united Vietnam did not succeed automatically to treaties made by the two predecessor 
Vietnams. Instead, what the united Vietnam did in practice in the following years after the 
merger proved that it applied the principle of clean slate. Indeed, it chose to success some 
treaties and declared to be bound by some others which concluded by both the North and South 
Vietnam prior to July 1976. 
335 These information is reported in widely publication, including James Crawford, op. cit., note 331, p. 476-7 
and V. L. Luu, Nim Muai Näm Ngogi Giao Viet Nam, (Hä NQi: Nhä Xuat Bin CEng an Nhän dän, Top 1, 
1996), p. 323. 
336 The old government structure headed by a premier with individual responsibility to a new one headed by a 
chairman of ministerial council with collective liability. Significant changes also happened in legislature 
bodies. 
337 One may raise the question of the similarity between this unification with the case of Germany. However, the 
two Germanies were united by a Unification Treaty which Article 23 provided that the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) was to accede to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The Unification Treaty also details 
various points concerning succession in which Article 11 confirming the continuance of the treaties to which the 
old FRG was a party, and Article 12 providing for consultations with treaty partners to decide upon the treaties to 
which the former GDR was a party. For further discussion on succession of Germany see James Crawford, op. cit., 
note 331, p. 523-25 and Jan Klabbers et al., op. cit., note 236, p. 20 
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With regard to the treaties and constituent instruments of international organisations 
concluded by North Vietnam, as the treaties concluded by North Vietnam prior to 1976 were 
mainly with socialist countries and limited in numbers, practice of the united Vietnam 
concerning succession to these treaties was a few. For exapmple, the united Vietnam choose to 
inherit the majority of these treaties, except the letter of DRV Premier, Pham Van Dong, of 
1958 and a Declaration by the DRV government on 9 May 1965 concerning the 1958 
Declaration on the Territorial Sea of China and its membership in the WHO and WMO. 338 
Regarding the treaties concluded by the South Vietnam, as South Vietnam was members of 
various treaties and international organisations, the practice of the unified Vietnam concerning 
these treaties was more diversified. For example, the united Vietnam succeeded $145 million 
in economic debts owned by the former ROV (this loan were made by the United States on 
concessional terms form 1960-1975 to support the development of economic infrastructure and 
to finance the importation of agricultural and other commodities), the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (which accessed by the ROV on 11 
August 1950) and the memberships of South Vietnam, including their constituent instruments, 
of the Food and Agricure Organisation, International Atomic Energy Agency, IMF, Asian 
Development Bank (including the responsibilities as borrower with respect to all loans 
extended by the Bank for the benefit of South Vietnam prior to 2 July 1976), International 
Telecommunication Union, Universal Postal Union and World Intellectual Property 
Organisation. Meanwhile, it declared not be bound by the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear 
Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, the 1968 Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, the 1972 Safeguards Agreement, and the memberships of International Civil Aviation 
Organisation, the World Tourism Organisation, the Asian Rice Trade Fund and the Association 
of Natural Rubber Producing Countries. 339 
As a result of the application of the principle clean slate to its succession, the united 
Vietnam could succeed to the claim over the Spratlys of the South Vietnamese government. In 
fact, the South Vietnamese government maintained its occupation and control over the Spratlys 
"a Concerning the letter of DRV Premier of 1958 and a Declaration by the DRV government on 9 May 1965, the 
united Vietnam issued a white book in 1979 in order to make officially made claims over the Paracels and Spratlys 
on the basis of continuing the claim of South Vietnam and refusing the position of North Vietnam. Regarding the 
membership in the WHO and WMO which both North and South Vietnam were member prior to 1976, the united 
Vietnam chose to inherit the membership of the South and terminated the membership of the North, thereby the 
united Vietnam was listed as a member of these organisation from the date that ROV became a member. For details 
of the succession of the united Vietnam in WHO and WMO, see Konrad G. Bühler, op. cit., note 330, p. 83-5 339 For further discussion on these successsions, see Konrad G. Bühler, op. cit., note 330, p. 85-93 
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until the military forces of the PRG were replaced in 1975. In deed, North Vietnam did support 
the 1958 Declaration on the Territorial Sea of China in 1958 and 1965. These declarations of 
China stipulated that the straight baseline method would likewise apply to the Paracels, 
Macclesfield Bank, the Spratlys and all other islands belonging to China. The DRV Premier did 
not make any reservation to this stipulation when he stated the support of DRV; therefore, he 
indirectly and implicitly recognised China's sovereignty in the Paracels and Spratlys. However, 
as a successor of North and South Vietnam, the united Vietnam which began its status with a 
clean slate, it could choose which obligations and rights to inherit from North and South 
Vietnam. As a result, Vietnam would only have been bound by the position adopted by the now 
defunct North Vietnam if it opted to be so. As has been made clear, it renounced that position 
and so is not bound. 
There might be another argument about the stability of boundary treaties that prevented 
the changing position of the united Vietnam concerning the claim over the Spratlys. Under 
Article 11 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, "a 
succession of states does not as such effect (a) a boundary established by a treaty; or (b) 
obligations and rights established by a treaty and relating to the regime of a boundary. " In the 
case concerning the claim over the Spratlys, North Vietnam and China did not conclude any 
treaty concerning their boundary regarding the Spratlys. There were only unilateral declarations 
concerning drawing baselines of China and the declarations of Vietnam expressing its position on 
the Chinese baselines. It is arguable that unilateral declaration is an exception of treaty on 
boundaries and cannot have the same effect as treaty on boundaries as a declaration from a state 
concerning boundary may receive oppose from others while a treaty does not. In this case, it is 
submited that unileral declarations cannot be assimilated with treaties establishing a boundary 
stipulated under Article 11 of the 1978 Vienna Convention. Furthermore, the unification of the 
two Vietnams was actually a long process of gaining independence from France and the United 
States. Article 16 of 1978 Vienna Convention is applicable in this case when providing that "[a] 
newly independent state is not bound to maintain in force, or to become a party to, any treaty by 
reason not only of fact that at the date of succession of states the treay was in force 
in respect of 
the territory to which the succession of states relates. " This is to say Article 16 affumes the 
possibility of clean slate principle to any treaties in the case of succession of newly independent 
state. Therefore, given that this is a situation of succession of a new unified Vietnam, the question 
113 
CHAPTER 3. LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES RELATING TO THE 
SPRATLYS: AN HISTORICAL APPROACH 
of estopple does not arise. In other words, the claim of an united Vietnam over the Spratlys was 
based on succession from that of South Vietnam and did not violate the estoppel principle. 
4.2. Title claimed by China 
In 1949, the Communist Party's victory in the mainland forced the Nationalist Party to 
flee to Taiwan. Similar to Vietnam, this led to the recognition of two governments of China, the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) in the mainland and the Republic of China in Taiwan, 
during the 1960s. With regard to title over the Paracels and Spratlys, despite China's absence 
from the San Francisco Conference, in August 1951, Chou En-Lai, Foreign Minister of the 
People's Republic of China (China) reacted to the San Francisco Draft stating that 
the draft deliberately stipulates that Japan shall renounce all claims to Nan-wei 
(Spratlys) Island and to Hsi-sha (Paracels) Archipelago, but does not mention the 
problem of the restitution of sovereignty. In fact, the Paracels Archipelago and Spratlys 
Island, as well as the whole Spratlys Archipelago, and the Chung-sha (Macclesfield 
Bank), and Tung-sha (Pratas) archipelagos have always been Chinese territory. Though 
occupied for some time during the war of aggression unleashed by Japanese 
imperialism, they were taken over by the then Chinese government following Japan's 
surrender. The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China 
declares herewith: The inviolable sovereignty of the People's Republic of China over 
Spratlys Island and the Paracels Archipelago will by no means be impaired, irrespective 
of whether the American-British draft for a peace treaty with Japan should make any 
stipulations and of the nature of any such stipulations. 340 
China also claimed that Article 2(f) of the San Francisco Treaty was implied to 
recognise such title of China as in a bilateral meeting with Japan on territory issues, Japan 
repeated the renouncement of her rights to all of the occupied territories before the Second 
World War. 34' However, at the San Francisco conference, the USSR proposed an amendment 
that would have made the San Francisco Peace Treaty provide for a recognition of China's 
sovereignty over Taiwan, Pratas, the Pescadores, the Paracels, the Spratlys and Macclesfield 
Bank. The proposal was, however, rejected by 46 of the 52 conference participants. 
342 
In order to clarify Article 2(f) of the San Francisco Treaty, the examination of previous or 
subsequent treaties concluded in relevant issues might be useful. If the provisions of the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty are read together with two earlier agreements between the Allies, it 
becomes clear that China has no tenable claim to sovereignty over either the Spratlys or the 
340 Quoted in Samuels, op. cit., note 5, p. 79. 
3" Article 2(f) states "Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratlys Islands and the Paracels 
Islands". Quoted in Odgaard, op. cit., note 16, p. 65. 
342 Valero, op. cit., note 254, p. 331. 
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Paracels. Firstly, the Cairo Declaration of 27 November 1943, issued by the UK, USA and 
Chiang Kai-Shek's Nationalist China, declared that it was the purpose of the Allied Powers to 
strip Japan of "all the islands in the Pacific which she seized or occupied since the beginning of 
the First World War in 1914, and that all the territories that Japan had stolen from the Chinese, 
such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China", 
without mentioning either the Spratlys or the Paracels. Secondly, the omission in the Cairo 
Declaration was later affirmed in the Postdam Declaration issued by the USSR, UK and USA on 
2 July 1945. This constituted an international acknowledgement that neither of the disputed 
archipelagos was Chinese territory. By making the distinction between the "islands in the 
Pacific", on the one hand, and the "territory stolen from China", on the other, without including 
the Spratlys and Paracels in the latter class, the Cairo Declaration may be construed as indicating 
that the archipelagos were not considered Chinese territories. 343 Moreover, in a Joint 
Communique on the 29 September 1972 between the PRC and Japan, the latter recognised the 
PRC as the sole legal government of China and reaffirmed its stand of complying with the terms 
of the Postdam Declaration which, by reference to the Cairo Declaration, specifically mandates 
the return of Taiwan and the Pescadores, but not the Spratlys and the Paracels, to China. 344 
Therefore, Article 2(f) of the San Francisco Treaty did not have any implied stipulation 
concerning the title of China over the Paracels and Spratlys (as China claimed). Thus, the 
statement of the Foreign Minister in 1951 might be considered as the first time that China made 
an official claim to the Spratlys. This claim was not followed by any physical presence in the 
Spratlys. However, China frequently reiterated its claim from 1951 to 1960.345 Among these 
statements, the one that is noteworthy is the Declaration on Territorial Sea which China issued in 
September 1958. This Declaration extended China's territorial sea waters to the 12 nautical mile 
limit and announced the application of the straight baseline method for China's coastal lines, the 
Paracels Islands, Macclesfield Bank, Spratlys Islands and all other islands belonging to China. 346 
With regard to Taiwan, following the surrender of Japan, it took over from Japan the 
occupation of the Paracels and Spratlys. However, this occupation did not include all features 
of the Spratlys and was disrupted sometime from 1950 to 1956 when Taiwan faced difficulties 
347 Valero, op. cit., note 254, p. 331. 
W Ibid. 
345 For details, see Samuels, op. cit., note 5, p. 86-89. 
346 Point 2 and 4 in the Declaration, for full text, see Greenfield, Jeanette, China's Practice in the Law of the 
Sea, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), Appendix 1. 
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in the conflict with mainland China. The occupation by Taiwan originated from the placement 
of the two archipelagos under the jurisdiction of the Governor General of Taiwan through the 
Kao-hsiung District by Japan. However, as Japan had no legal right to the two archipelagos, it 
could not transfer any rights to Taiwan. Furthermore, the occupation by Taiwan was at the Itu 
Aba Island, a feature which was included in the 1933 sovereignty declaration of France. As the 
title of France was well established in the colonial period, and then was transferred to the South 
Vietnamese government, the occupation by Taiwan was illegal and could not have any effect 
on establishing title to the Spratlys. Thus, irrespectively the fact that Taiwan would be 
considered as either an independent party or a part of China, the occupation by Taiwan of Itu 
Aba was not an effective occupation in the Spratlys. 
4.3. Title claimed by the Philippines 
In 1956, Thomas Cloma, a Philippines's businessman `discovered' some features in the 
Spratlys archipelago. He later named these features as Kalayaan ('Freedom land' in the 
Philippines' language), planted the Philippines' flag and claimed the ownership of it. 
347 Cloma's 
discovery was strange as the archipelago had been long known by the states in the South China 
Sea region after the sovereignty declaration and occupation by France since 1933 and the 
occupation by Japan during the Second World War. In fact, there was little room to explain the 
so-called `discovery'. From 1950 to 1956, after Japanese and French troops withdrew from the 
Spratlys, due to changes in the domestic situations of both China and Vietnam, the Spratlys, in 
this period, was unoccupied. The San Francisco conference ended with the renouncement by 
Japan of the Paracels and Spratlys but no clarification on the title of either of them. Therefore, 
Cloma took this opportunity to "discover" the major part of Spratlys including Spratly Island, Itu 
Aba, Nam Yit Island, Thitu Island, North Danger Reef, Mariveles Reefs, etc. The discovery was 
then developed into a claim and stated by Cloma's declaration on 21 May 1956 that "the claim 
was made by citizens of the Philippines, and not `on behalf of the Government of the 
Philippines', because we were not authorised to do so. This will, however, have the consequent 
effect of the territory becoming part of the Philippines. s348 The official response of Philippine 
government showed their hesitancy and it was not clear whether they supported or opposed 
3147 Odgaard, op. cit., note 16, p. 66. 
348 Quoted in Samuels, op. cit., note 5, p. 82. 
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Cloma's claim. This could be seen in the note of the Vice President of the Philippines in 
December 1956: 349 
As regards the seven-island group known internationally as Spratlys, the Philippines 
government considers these islands under the de facto trusteeship of the victorious 
Allied Powers of the Second World War, as a result of the Japanese Peace Treaty, 
signed and concluded in San Francisco on September 8,1951, whereby Japan 
renounced all its rights, title and claim of the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel 
Islands, and there being no territorial settlement made by the Allied Powers, up to the 
present with respect to their dispositions. It follows, therefore, that as long as this 
group of islands remain in that status, it is equally open to economic exploitation and 
settlement by nationals or any members of the Allied Powers in the basis of equality 
of opportunity and treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters relating 
thereto. 
When Cloma failed to convince Philippine government, he declared, on 6 July 1956, 
the establishment of a separate government for the `Free Territory of Freedomland' with its 
capital on Flat Island. 
Examining the legal significance of the `discovery' by Cloma in 1956, one could easily 
see that it was carried by an individual, without the authorisation of Philippine government and 
later, as shown by the statement, was not endorsed by Philippine government. Moreover, the 
object of the discovery, the Spratlys, as identified in the Vice President's note was known 
internationally and in fact it was of title of South Vietnam, thus it was not res nullius. 350 The 
actions of Cloma were also met with strong protests from France, Britain and the 
Netherlands. 351 Therefore, the act of Cloma in 1956 did not comply with international law in 
acquisition and thus could not have the effect of establishing the Philippines' title to the 
Spratlys. In fact, except for the claim from Cloma, Philippine government, through the above 
mentioned statement did not make any sovereignty claim over the Spratlys. 
This situation was changed in 1971 when Taiwan opened fire on a Philippines' boat in 
response to the Philippines's demand that Taiwan withdraw from the Itu Aba Island. This 
request was followed by a declaration that 53 islands, cays, shoals and reefs, known as 
Kalayaan and occupied by Thomas Cloma in 1956 belonged to the Philippines. Among 53 
features claimed by the Philippines, 10 may generate full maritime zones, 352 namely the Itu 
Aba Island, Loaita Islands, Thitu Island, Sand Cay, Nanyit Island, West York Island, Flat 
349 Quoted in ibid, p. 83. 
350 The Note of the Vice President mentioned the seven islands which constituted the internationally known 
S1ratlys implicitly referred to in the list of Spratlys' features in France's Sovereignty Declaration in 1933. 
3 
TI 
See Samuels, op. cit, note 5, p. 81-86. 
352 According to the result of Chapter 2, supra. 
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Island, Nanshan Island, Northeast Cay and Southeast Cay. The Philippines also started to 
deploy a military force on three Spratlys features. Taiwan refused to move from Itu Aba, and 
denied having carried out the shooting incident. South Vietnam and China also protested 
against the move of the Philippines. Despite ignoring Thomas Cloma's claim " in 1956, the 
Philippines reaffirmed their claim in 1972 and expanded their military occupation. 353 
1971 was the first time the Philippines made an official claim that it had title to 53 
features which it `regarded as res nullius and may be acquired according to the modes of 
acquisition recognised under international law which are occupation and effective 
administration' . 354 In addition, in a Presidential Decree in 1978, the Philippines further stated 
that the Kalayaan Island Group "does not legally belong to any state or nation, but by reason of 
its proximity, ... vital security, ... history, indispensable need and effective occupation and 
control, established in accordance with international law ... must now 
be deemed to belong and 
subject to the sovereignty of the Philippines". 355 
The claim of the Philippines was based on geographical proximity or contiguity which 
was sometimes used by the other states in the nineteenth century. The claim was based on the 
argument that islands close to the land territory of a state, but outside the territorial sea, were 
claimed on the basis of contiguity doctrine. In the Islands of Palmas case, one of the 
contentions of the United States in respect of sovereignty over the Island of Palmas was based 
on its proximity to the Philippines. However, the arbitrator rejected this argument and remarked 
that "[a]lthough States have in certain circumstances maintained that islands relatively close to 
their shores belonged to them in virtue of their geographical situation, it is impossible to show 
the existence of a rule of positive international law to the effect that islands situated outside 
territorial water should belong to a State from the mere fact that its territory form the terra 
firma (nearest continent or islands of considerable size)". 356 Furthermore, Judge Huber clarified 
that isolated acts of display of sovereignty carried more weight than continuity of territory, even 
if such continuity was combined with the existence of natural boundaries. 
357 Thus, contiguity, 
unaccompanied by effective occupation cannot serve as an independent basis for territorial 
claims. Effective, peaceful and continuous display of state authority is the sole test for 
353 Odgaard, op. cit., note 16, p. 68. 
354 Quoted in Samuels, op. cit, note 5, p. 89. 
355 Presidential Decree No. 1599, quoted in Valencia et al., op. cit., note 16, p. 34. 
356 Island of Palmas Arbitration (1928) 2 RIAA, p. 829 at p. 854-855, reprinted in (1928) 22 AJIL 867 at 893. 
357Ibid, p. 894. 
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acquiring sovereignty over terra nullius. The decision of the Permanent Court in the Eastern 
Greenland case3s8 also followed this precedent by giving the title over Greenland to Denmark, 
a country further away than Norway and the other claimants. 
With regard to the relevance of contiguity doctrine to sovereignty claims, some scholars 
further suggested that the importance of contiguity to title was relative and in certain 
circumstances, the legal consequences could prove to be determinative, at the initial state of 
title, if it was conjoined with effective occupation of the territory and if there was no competing 
superior state authority of another state. 359 Therefore, contiguity of territory could be valid 
consideration under international law only within the general framework of the process of 
territory acquisition. 
In this case, Philippine claim was merely based on proximity and was not supported by 
any effective occupation, except the `discovery' and occupation of Cloma. However, as 
analysed above, the `discovery' in 1956 was conducted by an individual who was not 
authorised or endorsed by Philippine government, thus might not be a legal ground for 
Philippine title. Title to a territory is "created as a consequence of legal procedure relating to the 
establishment and recognitions360 and geographical proximity alone does not confer title to 
land territory. 361 Although its distance to the centre of the Spratlys is the shortest, 362 the 
Philippines could not rely solely on geographical proximity to claim sovereignty over the 
Spratlys. 
4.4. The new claimants: Malaysia and Brunei 
Malaysia entered into the dispute by publishing a map of its continental shelf, including 
3 features of the Spratlys, in 1979.363 In 1983, Malaysia occupied and officially claimed 
sovereignty over these features by stating that Swallow Reef "has always been and is part of the 
territory of Malaysia". 364 Malaysia further developed her claims into four features in the 
358 Eastern Greenland case, PCU, Series A/B, No. 53. 
359 Lauterpacht, "Sovereignty over Submarine Areas" (1950) 27 BYIL 417 at 428-29; Waldock, "Disputed 
Sovereignty to the Falkland Islands Dependencies" (1948) 25 BYIL 342 at 343-44; Surya P Sharma, 
"Relevance of the `Contiguity' Doctrine to International Disputes including the Spratly Dispute" (1992) 
Journal of Malaysia Comparative Law, 81 at 86. 
360 Ian Brownlie, op. cit., note 214, p. 127. 
361 Y Jennings, op. cit., note 216, p. 74-76; and Island Palmas Case, 1928,2 RIAA, p. 829, reprinted in (1928) 
22 AJIL 867 at 893-4. 362 For distance from Spratlys to littoral states in the South China Sea, see supra, Chapter 1 and infra, Figure 33. 
363 Mark J. Valencia, Malaysia and the Law of the Sea, (Malaysia: Institute of Strategic and International 
Studies, 1991), p. 66. 
364 Odgaard, op. cit., note 16, p. 70. 
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Spratlys, namely the Ardasier Reef, Swallow Reef, Royal Charlottes Reef and Louisa Reef, in 
the statement of the Malaysian Deputy Foreign Minister in 1988 in which he said that they are 
`within Malaysia's continental shelf area' . 365 China and Vietnam soon opposed Malaysia's 
actions. The Philippines also went further by awarding some contracts to foreign oil companies 
in the Reed reef, east of the Spratlys, in 1978. It also established an administrative body for the 
Spratlys in 1988 366 
Brunei was the last claimant entering the dispute. After gaining independence in 1984, 
Brunei inherited a continental shelf partly delimited by the United Kingdom. On behalf of 
Brunei, the United Kingdom already protested the Malaysian claim to the Louisa Reef on its 
1979 map 367 In 1987 and 1988, the Surveyor General of Brunei reportedly printed a map to 
define the fishery and continental shelf of this country which included the Louisa Reef 368 
However, Brunei took no actions to fortify its claims. 
The claims of Malaysia and Brunei are based on a reverse application of the continental 
shelf doctrine. As under the international law of maritime delimitation, "land dominates the 
sea" has been well recognised, it is the land which gives rise to the maritime zones including 
the continental shelf area, and not vice versa. In the dictum of the North Continental Shelf 
case, 369 concerning the relations between a title to a territory, continental shelf and adjacency, it 
was stated that "it is evident that by no stretch of imagination can a point on the continental 
shelf situated say a hundred miles or even much less, from a given coast, be regarded as 
`adjacent' to it, or to any coast at all, in the normal sense of adjacency, even if the point 
concerned is nearer to some one coast than to any other' . 370 Moreover, continental shelf rights 
do not themselves amount to sovereignty but are restricted to sovereignty rights in exploring 
and exploiting the sea bed and subsoil of the submarine areas as nowhere in Article 76 (which 
describes in detail what constitutes the continental shelf) and 77 (which outlines the sovereign 
rights of a state for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the resources of its continental 
shelf) is there reference to how sovereignty rights over islands themselves is to be 
36S Mark J. Valencia et al., op. cit., note 16, p. 36. 366 Chemillier-Gendreau, op. cit., note 35, p. 55. 367 Although the claim of Brunei took place in the 1980s, it shared the same nature as the claim of Malaysia. 
For the ease of the readers and to list the full members of the parties to the dispute in this chapter, Brunei's 
claim was discussed in this period along with Malaysia's claim. 368 Daniel J. Dzurek, op. cit., note 39, p. 22. 369 North Continental Shelf Case, Judgment, ICJ Reports (1969), p. 3 (hereafter referred to as North 
Continental Shelf case), at para. 41. 
370 Ibid, para. 41. 
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determined. 371 According to the examination in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the Swallow Reef, 
Royal Charlottes Reef and Louisa Reef are islands under the definition of Article 121(1) of the 
1982 LOSC, thus the sovereignty over these islands must be acquired under international law 
concerning territory acquisition, not by the application of continental shelf regime. 372 
Therefore, the arguments of Malaysia and Brunei for their claim to these reefs are groundless. 
4.5. The stronger claim from the end of the Second World War to 1980 
The end of the Second World War and the new development of the international law of 
the sea created a complicated situation for the South China Sea dispute. After the Second 
World War, Japan renounced all rights and title, but the San Francisco Treaty did not clarify the 
fate of the Paracels and Spratlys. China made its first official claims to the Spratlys, but did not 
have any occupation in the archipelago. Taiwan's title was illegally transferred from Japan, 
thus its occupation in the Itu Aba Island could not be considered effective occupation. Also in 
this period, Vietnam was divided into two states: the North and the South. North Vietnam, by 
the statement of Premier Pham Van Dong of 1958 and 1965, excluded itself from the dispute 
and in fact, it did not have any occupation in the Spratlys. Meanwhile, South Vietnam legally 
succeeded to the claim of France and maintained effective occupation in the Spratlys. At the 
end of this period, the united Vietnam, as a new states created by the merger of the North and 
South Vietnams, succeeded the claim of South Vietnam over the Spratlys. 
With the effect of the 1982 UNLOSC in heightening the awareness of littoral states 
about the role of islands in generating maritime zones, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei 
entered the dispute. Based on a broad interpretation of the 1982 LOSC, the claims of Malaysia 
and Brunei reveal many weaknesses. The claim of the Philippines was also not very well based 
on international law as it was merely based on the proximity doctrine. The only occupation was 
taken by Cloma in 1956 as an individual without authorisation or endorsement by the 
Philippine government. 
In sum, although there were the new entrants of the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei, 
the main competition over the claim was still between China and Vietnam. Despite facing 
difficulties in its domestic situation, Vietnam still held the strongest position based on its 
legitimate claim and occupation. Taiwan, although in a weaker legal position, had an advantage 
371 Brian K. Murphy, "Dangerous Ground: The Spratly Islands and International Law" (19941995) Ocean & 
Coastal L. J., 187 at 199. 
372 For details of the analysis, see supra Chapter 2, section 2. 
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by its military presence on the biggest island, the Itu Aba. The PRC was in the weakest position 
as it had only made the first official claim over the Spratlys, but did not have any control and 
occupation. 
5. Further developments strengthening claims of the parties from 1980 to the 
present 
5.1. The military activities of China 
With the new occupation of Malaysia and the expansion of the military forces of 
Vietnam and the Philippines in the Spratlys, China was the only party that did not land troops 
in this archipelago. Recognising this weakness, China issued a publication by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of China named "China's indisputable sovereignty over the Xisha and Nansha 
Islands" in 1980.373 From this document, China states that the Spratlys archipelago has "always 
been part of Chinese territory' . 374 Furthermore, in 1988, making use of the isolated situation of 
Vietnam, China initiated a military attack against Vietnam. This resulted in the loss of at least 
70 Vietnamese soldiers and two warships and instituted Chinese occupation in 7 features of the 
Spratlys. 
This was the second use of force by China, and the more serious, the first being at the 
Paracels in 1974. This act violated international law on the prohibition of the use of force in 
international relations which is clearly recognised in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which, 
certainly, since the Nicaragua case375 has become international customary law. The act of 
China expressed the unwillingness of China in using any 'judicial institution to solve the 
dispute, instead, it was willing to occupy the Spratlys' features by any means including the 
illegal use of force. The 1988 incident also had the negative effect of igniting the militarisation 
of the dispute. Other parties including the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia deployed their 
military forces and occupied as much as possible in order to cope with the threat from China. 
The 1990s continued to demonstrate a big difference between China's words and deeds 
in its policy towards the South China Sea dispute. On the one hand, for the first time, China's 
Prime Minister Li Peng stated that China accepted a joint development solution for the 
373 Full text can be found in Beijing Review, 18 February, 1980 and in UN Doc. A/35/93: S/13788. 
374 China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China's Indisputable over the Xisha and Nansha Islands, (Beijing, 
1980) in (1980) 21BeýingReview, p. 15. 
37S Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA), Merits, Judgment ICJ 
Reports (1986), p. 14 (hereafter referred to as the Nicaragua case), at para. 188. 
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Spratlys. 376 On the other hand, China built permanent structures on the Fiery Cross Reef in the 
same year. China also conducted regular patrols, set up a weather station and expanded its 
occupation. 377 Moreover, in 1992, China awarded an exploitation contract to a small oil 
company, Crestone of the United States, in the Vanguard Bank and the Blue Dragon Area, 
which Vietnam considered part of its continental shelf. 378 Most noteworthy, in 1995, China 
expanded its occupation in the Mischief Reef and had military clashes with the Philippines 
there. 379 
After the Mischief Reef incident, there was no further use of military action to 
consolidate occupation. There were only several small clashes related to illegal fishing, e. g. in 
2000, the Philippines opened fire at Chinese vessels and killed the captain. 380 Also, there was a 
clash between a United States Navy EP-3 Aries intelligence aircraft and a Chinese F-8 fighter 
plane over the South China Sea which China considered within its sovereignty claim. 381 
5.2. The reaction of other claimants 
In reply to China's moves, Vietnam not only sent protests, but also awarded a 
concession in the same area to another US oil firm, Conoco and later to Mobil in 1996. 
Vietnam increased its possessions in the Spratlys to 21 features in 1992. Vietnam installed 
television receiving stations, a fishing port and coastal artillery and anti-aircraft guns on a 
number of features. The Philippines also reacted strongly after the Mischief incident. The 
Philippines reinforced its garrison in the Thi Tu Island and conducted regular patrols by armed 
forces to inspect China's activities in the Mischief Reef. Malaysia also expanded its control in 
the Spratlys by opening a tourist resort on the Swallow Reef and building a military station in 
1991. 
To some extent, the expansion of China in this period brought unity to the other 
claimants, especially after the Philippines became the next victim and Vietnam joined ASEAN 
376 In an interview with reporters of Singapore's newspaper on 20 August 1990, Premier Li Peng said that 
"under the premise that China has indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha Islands, China is willing to 
temporarily shelve the question of sovereignty over Nansha so as to joint develop the resources in Nansha 
together with ASEAN countries" (Quoted in Chen Hurng-yu, "A Comparison Between Taipei and Peiking in 
Their Policies and Concepts Regarding the South China Sea" (9/2003) Issues and Studies 22 at 45). This 
statement was also reiterated in the visit to Malaysia and the Philippines of Premier Li in December 1990 and 
April 1991 respectively. 
37 Odgaard, op. cit., note 16, p. 72. 378 Timor, op. cit., note 9, p. 20. 
379 For details, see Odgaard, op. cit., note 16, p. 73-77. 
380 Other clashes over fishing rights were discussed in Chapter 1, Section 2.2, supra. 
391 Timor, op. cit., note 9, p. 1 and 20. 
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in 1995. Under the initiation of Indonesia, the South China Sea Workshops were held to create 
a negotiating forum for the countries in the region on the South China Sea dispute, in the 1990s. 
With the participation of China in the second workshop in 1991, it was the first time that China 
had to accept to join in a multilateral negotiating forum. However, the progress made by these 
workshops is minimal as China's claim to sovereignty over the Spratlys, as well as the other 
South China Sea island groups is non-negotiable. In 2002, after much effort, the most important 
achievement of the negotiations was the concluding of the Declaration on the Code of Conduct 
(DOC) in which principles for the conduct of the parties in the South China Sea dispute were 
set out. Unfortunately, this document only had recommendary effect 382 
5.3. The latest development 
With only recommendary effect, the DOC has proved unable to prevent the parties 
from escalating their claims. There have been some bad incidents in the south China Sea 
recently. Taiwan showed its displeasure at being excluded from the DOC by searching and 
expelling Vietnamese fishing boats from the Spratlys area in October 2003. Vietnam, for its 
part, also moved forward to launch tourist visits in the Spratlys archipelago at the same time. 
China still exploited fishing resources in the disputed areas. 383 Furthermore, the Philippines 
media reported on 7 November 2003 that their Armed Forces discovered new territorial 
markers with Chinese inscriptions on several unoccupied reefs and shoals in the Spratlys 
archipelago and had monitored two Chinese navy vessels operating since September at the 
Mischief Reef. The new markers, however, were then reportedly moved. 
384 
The tensions in fishing rights and new markers was suspended recently due to the fact 
that the Philippines and China entered into an agreement for joint exploitation in yet-to-be 
selected areas of the South China Sea, between the Philippines National Oil Company and the 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation, on September 2003 
385 This new arrangement 
worries the other claimants as it shows that China is gaining initial success in its policy of 
settlement in the South China Sea through bilateral negotiations. However, Vietnam also joined 
in this agreement in March 2005. This movement was hailed as a diplomatic breakthrough for 
382 For further, see Chapter 5, Section 3.1.2, infra. 
383 Supra, Chapter 1, section 2.2. 
384 Sources: The Comparative Connection, Pacific Forum `s Quarterly Electronic Journal on East Asian 
Bilateral Relations, Volume of 4t' quarter 2003, online at http: //www. csis. orglpacfor/cceiournal. html 
(accessed on 2 February 2005). 
3gs The Press Release of The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, online at 
httn: //www dfa gov nh/news/nr/pr2004/sep/pr524. htm (accessed on 19 October 2004). 
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peace and security in the region and led to a hope for substantial cooperation for the South 
China Sea dispute. Feeling excluded, Taiwan on 23 March 2004 sent a ship and installed a 
"bird observation station" on Banthan low tide elevation and on 16 December 2005 deployed 
600 more soldiers and built an air strip in the Itu Aba Islands. 386 Most recently, on 12 and 13 
February 2007, Taiwan conducted military maneuver at water in the west of Itu Aba Island. 
These activities received constant protest from the Vietnamese government 387 
5.4. Conclusion on the current position of the parties in the dispute 
The latest development of the dispute demonstrated that China is decisive in 
maintaining its claim in the Spratlys. It is willing to use all means to protect its "national 
sovereignty", even by the illegal use of force against any country which challenges its interest. 
However, a ray of hope for the dispute settlement appeared in the guise of the new agreement 
between China, the Philippines and Vietnam, and the suspension of serious military tension in 
the last decade. Notwithstanding, all the practice in the last period only has the effect of 
strengthening, but does not change the legal status of the claims of all parties. 
From the analysis of Chapter 2, the Spratlys are not an archipelago in legal terms. The 
consideration of the Spratlys as one group is convenient as all features of the Spratlys share the 
same geographical location and history. Thus, the presence of multiple sovereignty claims to 
many features of the Spratlys may be considered as a series of conflicting claims which some 
claimants contested more than others. Also, from the analysis of the legal regime of the 
Spratlys, these sovereignty claims will have significant effect particularly with 12 islands which 
can generate full maritime zones. 
Through much upheaval in the historical development of the region, the Spratlys is now 
an object of overlapping sovereignty claims among six parties. China and Taiwan claim the 
entire Spratlys on the basis of historical title. However, this claim faced the problem of 
authenticity and accuracy. In addition, China only has its occupation of 10 features of the 
Spratlys since 1988 by illegal use of force, but none of them may generate full maritime 
386 Taiwan built 1,150-meter runway and a control tower on the island in order to handle the takeoff and 
landing of C-130 aircraft, but insisted in public that the airstrip was intended for 'humanitarian purposes' such 
as emergency rescue efforts for sick or injured merchant seamen or fishermen who might encounter 
difficulties in the treacherous waters. Sources: Central News Agency, "Government Has Plans for Airstrip on 
Taiping Island", Taipei Representative Office in the U. K., Taiwan Update No. 49, December 16,2005, at 
http: //www. roc-taiwan. ore/UK/TaiwanUpdate/nsl151205m. htm (Accessed on 4 January 2007). 
387 For Vietnamese declaration on these incidents, see website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam: 
http: //www. mofa. gov. vn/en/tt baochi/pbnfn/ns070214165133 (accessed on 12 March 2007). 
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zones. 388 Taiwan occupies only one feature which may generate full maritime zones, but from 
the invalid transfer of title by Japan. 
Brunei and Malaysia were the last as well as the weakest parties in the dispute. They 
claim a few features, none of them may generate full maritime zones, on the basis that these 
features locate on their continental shelf. This is a reverse application of international law and 
cannot help these countries establish title as the 1982 LOSC only stipulates the rights of coastal 
states towards the continental shelf base on their entitlement from their mainland and islands. In 
fact, Malaysia occupies 6 features, but none of them may generate full maritime zones. Brunei 
is the only country which does not have any occupation to demonstrate its claim. 
The Philippines claims the large number of features in the Spratlys, including 10 islands 
that may generate full maritime zones, based on the `discovery' of Cloma in 1956 and the 
proximity doctrine. However, the `discovery' of Cloma in 1956, was conducted by an 
individual and was not authorised or endorsed by the Philippines government until their first 
official claim in 1971. In addition, merely basing a claim on proximity cannot enable the 
Philippines to establish title over the Spratlys under international law. However, the Philippines 
currently occupy 8 features of which 6 may generate full maritime zones. 
Vietnam claims the entire of the Spratlys on the basis of historical title from the official 
documents of the Kingdom of Annam which recorded the intention to establish title over the 
Spratlys in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Vietnam also claims on succession the title 
established by France in 1939. The succession title from France was claimed based on the 
protectorate relations between France and Vietnam under the Patentre Treaty of 1884 and the 
official transfer of control in the Spratlys of France to the South Vietnamese authority in 1950. 
From this time South Vietnam claimed and exercised its authority over the Spratlys until it 
transferred this right to the Provisional Revolutionary Government in 1975 and the united 
Vietnam in 1976. Currently, Vietnam occupies 21 features, the largest number of features, of 
which 5 features may generate full maritime zones. Thus, Vietnam holds the strongest position 
on legal argument on the dispute. 
The occupation situation and the claims of the parties in the Spratlys with the legal 
status of the occupied features (which are achieved from Chapter 2) can also be illustrated by 
the following map: 
'$$ For details of the names of the features in the Spratlys, see Annex 2, infra. 
126 
CHAPTER 3. LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES RELATING TO THE 
SPRATLYS: AN HISTORICAL APPROACH 
O : StgnOS a4n : an0 cz 
Q ýs. 'dn^s Il', tt full marnn? e 
"A', 
. er' am's occupatror 
" 
-" ... _.. _ mod'... __ _. 
` 
. 




pAUey fee/ c 
,. `Er _ .. 
r 
Gx: ýey G'ar Nee', ý_ 
ýT a 





Cenral fief Pearsa lkef 
Spratly ! nano PEE .^ Aper 
Laca f -ef AU t%ESr J; E'ef East Reef 
A 
f. c ný rn A f _ s . ýu .. a eE 
AE- - P--E' 
, 3-r R-1 Y4, g&$, er Ref 
Fief 




ýL'vWý9 Reef 1' 
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6. Conclusion 
Over the centuries of historical development, the South China Sea dispute currently 
has six parties. China and Taiwan are sharing the same claim over the entire of the Spratlys 
on the basis of historic title. Vietnam also claims the entire of the Spratlys on historic title 
and succession. The Philippines claim a large of features, including 10 islands which may 
generate full maritime zones, on the basis of discovery and proximity. Malaysia and Brunei 
claim a small number of features on the basis that these features locate on their continental 
shelf, but none of them may generate maritime zones. However, the legal analysis from this 
389 Map drawn by Mapinfo. 
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Chapter reveals that with the problem of authenticity and accuracy, China and Taiwan have 
some weaknesses in their claims. The Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei are also in weak 
legal positions as their legal arguments are not well founded in international law. 
Furthermore, currently China, Malaysia and Brunei occupy none of the islands which can 
generate maritime zones. Thus, Vietnam with its strongest legal arguments and largest 
number of occupied features, including 5 islands that may generate full maritime zones, 
holds the strongest position in the dispute. 
The next Chapter will bring the sovereignty issues forwards and examine them in 
the context of maritime delimitation in order to achieve different scenarios of entitlements 
in generating maritime zones. This approach may help the parties to have a better view on 
the possible maritime zones generated from their sovereignty claims, thus may facilitate the 
final solution to the dispute. 
r 
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CHAPTER 4. PROSPECTS FOR MARITIME DELIMITATION FOR THE 
WATERS OF THE SPRATLYS 
1. Introduction 
In addition to the sovereignty issue, maritime delimitation is the second major issue in the 
South China Sea dispute. Of the six claimants to the South China Sea dispute, China and Taiwan 
claim a vast maritime area, based on historical title, which even covers large parts of maritime 
spaces from the mainland of Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines. With the presence of 
the Spratlys and its effect in generating maritime zones, the maritime spaces generated from the 
coastlines of Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines might also overlap with each other. 
This chapter will examine the overlapping in detail and analyse how the international law relating 
to maritime delimitation will be applied to a possible maritime delimitation in the waters of the 
Spratlys. This might not arrive at a concrete maritime boundary as there is no solution to the 
sovereignty issues at the moment. However, it will lay out all the elements for the maritime 
delimitation process for different scenarios. Also, it will analyse the effect of the Spratlys in 
maritime delimitation and thus clarify the actual role of the Spratlys in generating maritime zones 
for the parties concerned. Before going on to analyse the situation of the South China Sea, it will 
be necessary to introduce the applicable law from the international law concerning maritime 
delimitation. 
2. Contemporary international law concerning maritime delimitation 
2.1. The method for maritime delimitation 
The maritime delimitation process requires the identification of an appropriate method of 
delimitation in accordance with the appropriate relevant circumstances of each case. The result of 
this process is the equitable solution. 390 The development of the law concerning maritime 
delimitation is currently well established and the starting point of any delimitation is the 
entitlement of a state to a given maritime area. The concept of distance as the basis of entitlement 
become increasingly intertwined with that of natural prolongation by referring to the provisions of 
Article 76 on continental shelf and Article 56 on EEZs of the 1982 LOSC. 
391 
390 Malcolm Evans, "Maritime Boundary Delimitation: Where Do We Go from Here? " in David Freestone, 
Richard Barnes and David Ong, The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), p. 137 at 145. 
391 Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago Award, 2006, paras. 224-5. 
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The "equidistancerelevant circumstances" approach is the current recognised principle 
for the maritime delimitation process and has been applied in recent cases, namely Qatar v. 
Bahrain'392 Cameroon v. Nigeria, 393 Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago, 394 and Guyana v. 
Suriname. 395 Accordingly, the maritime delimitation method now calls for first determining 
provisionally, the equidistance line and then asking whether there are any special circumstances 
or relevant factors requiring this initial line to be adjusted with a view to achieving an equitable 
solution. 396 The elements of an equitable solution in reaching a determination of a boundary line 
over maritime areas as provided for in Articles 74 and 83 of the 1982 LOSC, in conjunction with 
the broad reference to international law elaborates that "equitable considerations per se are an 
imprecise concept in the light of the need for stability and certainty in the outcome of the legal 
process' . 397 This approach since the Qatar v. Bahrain case398 has been recognised as being 
applied without distinction between opposite and adjacent coasts in maritime delimitation. 399 
Since the equidistant method is the one which can ensure total predictability, the 
equidistance/relevant circumstances approach is also welcome as a means of enhancing the 
predictability of the law concerning maritime delimitation. 
392 The Court in this case states "first provisionally draw an equidistance line and then consider whether there 
are circumstances which must lead to an adjustment of that line". (ICJ Report, 2001, p. 40 at para. 230). 393 In this case, the Court stressed that "delimiting with a concern to achieving an equitable result, as required 
by current international law, is not the same as delimiting in equity. The Court's jurisprudence shows that, in 
disputes relating to maritime delimitation, equity is not a method of delimitation, but solely an aim that should 
be borne in mind in effecting the delimitation" (ICJ Report, 2002, para. 294). 
39 The Tribunal in this case reaffirmed that "[t]he determination of the line of delimitation ... normally follows a two-step approach. First, a provisional line of equidistance is posited as a hypothesis and a practical 
starting point. While a convenient starting point, equidistance alone will in many circumstances not ensure an 
equitable result in the light of the peculiarities of each specific case. The second step accordingly requires the 
examination of this provisional line in the light of relevant circumstances, which are case specific, so as to 
determine whether it is necessary to adjust the provisional line in order to achieve an equitable result... 
Certainty is thus combined with the need for an equitable result" (2006 Award, para. 242). 
395 The Tribunal in this case elaborated that "in the course of the last two decades international courts and 
tribunals dealing with disputes concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive 
economic zone have come to embrace a clear role for equidistance. The process of delimitation is divided into 
two stages. First the court or tribunal posits a provisional equidistance line which may then be adjusted to 
reflected special or relevant circumstances" (2007 Award, para. 335). In the latest case between Nicaragua 
and Honduras, although there were exeptional geographical situations giving rise to the decision of the Court 
not to apply the equidistance/ relevant circumstances in delimiting maritime zones for the two countries, the 
Court at the same time emphasized that "equidistance remains the general rule" (ICJ Report, 2007, para. 281). 
396 ICJ Press Notice 2002/38. Also, see Evans, op. cit., note 390, p. 147. 
397 Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago Award, 2006, para. 230. 
398 Yoshifumi Tanaka, "Reflections on Maritime Delimitation in the Cameroon/Nigeria Case" (2004) 53 
ICLQ 369 at 376. 
399 This was also reaffirmed in the Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago case at para. 315. 
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2.2. Relevant circumstances 
Regarding the second stage in the maritime delimitation process, the specific criteria 
applicable to effect a delimitation, the judgments of recent cases concerning maritime 
delimitation show that the neutral criteria of geographical characteristics prevailed over area- 
specific criteria, such as geomorphological aspects or resource-specific criteria, such as the 
distribution of fish stocks (with very few exceptions). aoo In the Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration, aol the 
Tribunal addressed four claimed relevant circumstances, namely proportionality, the perpetuation 
of the traditional fishing regime, the presence of gas and oil resources and the effect of mid-ocean 
islands, but only the last one was regarded as relevant in maritime delimitation based on the 
argument that certainly where territorial waters had to be delimited, the mid-sea islands could not 
be discounted altogether, and had to be somehow weighted. 402 In Qatar v. Bahrain, the Court 
considered only two among five examined circumstances relevant to maritime delimitation. The 
presence of low tide elevations and islands was considered as relevant circumstances, 403 whereas 
the security interests, economic interests and proportionality were rejected by the Court as 
400 So far, the exception was only in the Jan Mayen case, 2006 Award, para. 228. 401 Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration Award, Permanent Court of Arbitration award series, (The Hague: T. M. C. 
Asser Press, 2005). 
402 With regard to proportionality, the technical expert carried out computations that the coastal length ratio Yemen: 
Eritrea was 1: 1: 31, while the equivalent water-areas ratio was 1: 1: 09. Although the test for equity by a reasonable 
degree of proportionality between coastline length and the areas appertaining to states was first recognised in the 
North Continental Shellf case and followed consistently in other cases, the Tribunal in this case considered that these 
rates resulted in no disproportion (paras. 39-43 and 165-168 of the Award). Addressing the claim for the 
perpetuation of the traditional fishing regime, the Tribunal affirmed that "[n]either party had succeeded in 
demonstrating that the line of delimitation proposed by the other would produce a catastrophic or inequitable effect 
on the fishing activity of its nationals or detrimental effects on fishing communities and economic dislocation of its 
nationals" (para. 72). Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that "the evidence and arguments advanced by the parties in 
the matter of fishing and fisheries could have no significant effect on the Tribunal's determination of the delimiting 
that would be appropriate under international law in order to produce an equitable solution between the parties" 
(para. 74; For comment, see Antunes, "The 1999 Eritrea-Yemen Maritime Delimitation Award and the 
Development of International Law" (2001) 50 ICLQ 299 at 339). This view was also taken in the third issue 
regarding the gas and oil resources. The Tribunal noted that mineral resources have not yet been found in the area, 
thus it played no role in the delimitation. In addition, the Tribunal was not taking into account the pattern of oil 
concessions issued by both states which suggested the existence of a mid-sea separation line because such 
concessions had been issued before the decision on sovereignty (paras. 75-86). The argument for the relevance of 
islands in maritime delimitation was at paras. 119 and 154-5, however, the Tribunal did not give clear explanation of 
the reduced effect of the Zuqar and Hanish islands (paras. 160-2). 401 The low tide elevation Fasht al Azm was considered as a relevant circumstance due to the two possibilities 
that it would be part of Sitrah Island or it would be used as a basepoint creating an equidistance line or stand 
as an independent low tide elevation. The Court concluded that for both possibilities, it would lead to dis- 
proportionality, thus Fasht al Azm was a special circumstance that led to the adjustment of the delimitation 
line passing between Fasht al Azm and Qit'at ash Shajarah. (para. 218). Also, the presence of a tiny island 
Qit'at Jaradah was also considered as relevant circumstance which led to the choice of a delimitation line 
passing immediately to the east of Qit'at Jaradah. However, the Court did not give a concrete explanation of 
the effect of this island on proportionality (para. 219). 
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relevant circumstances. 404 In the Cameron v. Nigeria case, four elements were considered but all 
were rejected as relevant circumstances. 405 In the Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago case, 406 six 
claimed relevant circumstances of flying fish activities, the relevant coasts and their projection, 
proportionality, regional consideration, activities of the parties in the dispute and entitlement of 
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles were examined by the Tribunal. However, again, the 
Tribunal arrived at a limited result of one relevant circumstance from the relevant coast and their 
projection and rejected the relevance of all others. 407 In the Guyana v. Suriname case, in both 
404 Regarding the security interests that were claimed by Qatar, the Court was silent in this point. However, it 
was argued that with the shift of the delimitation line further Qatar mainland coast from the effect of the Fasht 
al Azm, the Court might have implicitly considered security interests (Yoshifumi Tanaka, "Reflections on 
Maritime Delimitation in the Qatar/Bahrain Case" (2003) 52 ICLQ 53 at 62). The Court did not take into 
account on economic interests as the pearling industry effectively ceased to exist a considerable time ago 
(para. 236). Also, dealing with the recourse from Qatar to the proportionality test of the equity in maritime 
delimitation, the Court concluded that the disparity in the length of the coastal fronts of the parties could not 
be considered such as to necessitate an adjustment of the equidistance line (para. 243). 405 ICJ Report, 2002, p. 303. In this case, first, the Court did not consider that the configuration of the concavity of 
the Gulf of Guinea and the coastline of Cameroon which expected to be very similar to the geography of the North 
Continental Shelf case represented a relevant circumstance. (For the claims of Cameroon based on its configuration 
coastline see ICJ Report, ibid, paras. 272-3. For the Court conclusion on this issue see ICJ Report, ibid. para. 297. 
For comment on the approach of the Court on this point, see Evans, op. cit., note 390, p. 150-1. ) Second, the Court 
accepted that the presence of islands had sometimes been considered as a relevant circumstance, especially when 
such islands lie within the zone to be delimited and fall under the "wrong side" of sovereignty. In the present case, 
however, the Bioko Island is a territory of a third State, Equatorial Guinea. Thus, the Court concluded that the 
effect of the Bioko Island on the seaward projection of the Cameroonian coastal front was an issue between 
Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea and not between Cameroon and Nigeria; consequently, Bioko was not a relevant 
circumstance (paras. 298-9). Third, the Court recognised that substantial differences in the lengths of the parties' 
coastlines might lead to the adjustment of the provisional delimitation line. However, in the present case, the Court 
held that whichever coastline of Nigeria was regarded as relevant, the relevant coastline of Cameroon was not 
longer than that of Nigeria and denied the relevance of proportionality (paras. 300-1). Finally, although oil 
concessions have sometimes been relevant in the case law regarding maritime delimitation, such as the 
Tunisia/Libya (ICJ Report, 1982, p. 18), Gulf ofMaine (ICJ Report, 1984, p. 246), Guinea/Guinea Bissau ((1986) 25 
ILM 251) and St Pierre and Miquelon (St Pierre and Miquelon Case (1992) 31 ILM 1145) cases, in this case, the 
Court viewed that `oil concessions and oil wells are not in themselves to be considered as relevant circumstances 
justifying the adjustment or shifting of the provision delimitation line' (para. 304). 
406 
Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago Arbitration Award (2006). 
X07 The Tribunal recalled the judgments of the Jan Mayen, Gulf of Maine and Libya/Malta cases to conclude 
that coastal frontages was a circumstance relevant to delimitation and that their relative lengths might require 
an adjustment of the provisional equidistance line (Jan Mayen case, ICJ Report, 1993, para. 68; Gulf of Maine 
case, ICJ Report, 1984, p. 246, Libya/Malta case, ICJ Report, 1985, p. 13. The Tribunal referred to these cases 
at para. 327of the 2006 Award). However, this did not require the drawing of a delimitation line in a manner 
that was mathematically determined by the exact ratio of the lengths of the relevant coastlines. The degree of 
adjustment depended on the circumstances of each case (para. 328). In the situation between Barbados and 
Trinidad and Tobago with the coastal length ratio generated from the coastal frontage between Trinidad and 
Tobago and Barbados being 8: 2: 1 in favour of the former, the Tribunal concluded that the broad coastal 
frontages of Trinidad and Tobago and the disparity in coastal lengths between the parties were relevant 
circumstances to be taken into account in the delimitation (2006 Award, paras. 329 and 334). 
Regarding flyingfish activities, the Tribunal found that although communities in Barbados were 
heavily dependent upon fishing and that the flyingfish fishery was central to that dependence, the evidence 
supporting Barbados's claim were distinctly fragmentary and inconclusive to support for the traditionally 
flyingfish fisheries off Tobago. Also, the Tribunal believed that 'Injury does not equate with catastrophe. Nor is 
injury in the course of international economic relations treated as sufficient legal ground for border adjustment" 
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delimitation for the territorial sea and the EEZ and continental shelf, the Tribunal have considered 
many claims of relevant circumstances, e. g. historic title, geogpraphical features, geographical 
configuration of the relevant coastlines, navigation interests and the conduct of the parties. 
However, only navigation interest was concluded as a relevant circumstance leading the 
adjustment of the maritime boundary for territorial sea delimitation. 408 
The application of the various criteria depended on the specific circumstances of each 
case, thus the identification of the relevant circumstances became a necessary step in determining 
the approach to delimitation. 409 However, the judgments of these recent cases create a trend that 
some objective criteria, namely natural prolongation, maritime projection of the relevant 
coastlines, proportionality and the presence of islands are usually taken into account. Meanwhile, 
resource-related criteria had been treated more cautiously. The emphasis on objective criteria also 
(paras. 266-7). Thus, the Tribunal concluded that "even if Barbados had succeeded in establishing one or all of its 
core contentions, it does not follow that, as a matter of law, its case for adjustment would be conclusive' (para. 269). 
With regard to proportionality, the Tribunal examined the development of the principle of proportionality in 
decisions of international courts and tribunals to conclude that "proportionality is a relevant circumstance to be 
taken into consideration in reviewing the equity of a tentative delimitation, but not in any way to require the 
application of ratios or mathematical determination in the attribution of maritime areas... [Proportionality plays the 
role of] final test to ensure that equitableness is not contradicted by a disproportionate result" (para. 337). Therefore, 
in this case, the Tribunal would review the effects of the line of delimitation in the light of proportionality as a 
function of equity after having taken into account any other relevant circumstance (para. 338). Regional 
consideration was claimed by Trinidad and Tobago from the treaties between Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela 
and between France and Dominica. The Tribunal examined the context and content of those treaties and found that 
they were either not relevant or res inter acta in respect of Trinidad and Tobago and only reflected the limits of 
Barbados' maritime claim, thus could not be considered relevant in the maritime delimitation between Barbados 
and Trinidad and Tobago (paras. 339-49). The parties also claimed some activities like seismic shoot and 
recognition of sovereignty as relevant circumstances. However, the Tribunal found that neither party conducted 
significant activity relevant to the exercise of its own claimed jurisdiction in the dispute area. The Tribunal held that 
oil wells, similar to the conclusion of the Cameroon v. Nigeria case are not in themselves to be considered as 
relevant circumstances, unless based on express or tacit agreement between the parties applicable in this context. 
Also, although the seismic activity was regarded as significant in the Aegean Sea case (Aegean Sea case, Judgment, 
ICJ Reports (1979), p. 3), it was only applicable for the application of provisional measures, not definitive maritime 
boundary like in this case. Therefore, activities of either party, or the responses of each party to the activities of the 
other did not constitute a relevant circumstance (paras. 361-6). Finally, with Trinidad and Tobago's claim of 
entitlement of continental shelf beyond 200 nm the Tribunal did not take it into account as relevant circumstance 
but it did not explain the reason in detail. The Tribunal was aware of the problems posed by the relationship in that 
maritime area of the continental shelf and EEZ rights, however, it found no need to deal with it in this case 
((para. 368). 
' In delimiting territorial sea, the Tribunal found that there was no historic title and geographical feature that 
justify for the adjustment of the maritime boundary (para. 297). In delimiting the EEZ and continental shelf, the 
Tribunal took the view that the relevant coastlines did "not present any marked concavity or convexity. " Therefore, 
after careful examination, the Tribunal concluded that "the geographical configuration of the relevant coastlines 
does not represent a circumstance that would justify any adjustment or shifting of the provisional equidistance line 
in order to achieve equitable solution. " In addition, with regard to the conduct of the parties, the Tribunal supported 
the conclusions of other awards and judgments in the St Pierre et Miquelon, Lybia/Malta, Cameroon v. Nigeria and 
Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago that I concession and oil wells are generally not in themselves to be considered 
as relevant circumstances justifying the adjustment or shifting of the provisional delimitation line and thus the oil 
practice of the parties cannot be taken into account int he maritime delimitaiton of the martime boundary in this 
case (paras. 386-91,2007 Award). 
4" Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago, 2006 Award, para. 233. 
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shows the movement towards a more predictable and certain set of law concerning maritime 
delimitation. 
2.3. Tlie use of single or multiple maritime boundaries 
Also concerning maritime delimitation, the issue of single, multiple or separate 
maritime boundaries is a complicated issue which has not been clearly dealt with in the case 
law so far. alo The judgement in the Libya/Malta case, 411 reaffirmed by the Barbados v. 
Trinidad and Tobago, 412 confirmed that both the EEZ and the continental shelf coexisted from 
the fact that within 200 nautical miles from a state's baselines distance was the basis for the 
entitlement to each of them. If the parties ask for a common boundary both of the EEZ and 
continental shelf that is what they will get 413 However, the Court has also confirmed that there 
is no rule to decline the possibilities of either single or multiple lines. 414 In fact, the using of 
separate maritime boundaries is complicated because of technical problem of different 
jurisdictions in the seabed and the water column above in delimitation and implementation. The 
continental shelf regime gives coastal state sovereign rights over the seabed and subsoil only. 
However, in order to exploit the shelf, the coastal states requires access to the super-adjacent 
410 Although the Court arrived at a single maritime boundary, it did not clarify that is the law. In some cases, 
the results were just based on the wishes of the parties, for example, in the Gulf of Maine and the Libya/Malta 
cases. In the others, the Court just arrived at single boundary but presented no explanation as to why such 
single maritime boundary was adopted. They are the Eritrea/ Yemen Award, the Qatar v. Bahrain and the 
Cameroon v. Nigeria cases. Most recently, the Tribunal in Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago had a chance to 
deal with the issue, but it tried to avoid by the argument that the parties had already agreed with single 
maritime boundary in delimitation of the first two segments, and thus it was not necessary to examine the 
other possibility in the last segment. 
411 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), Judgment, ICJ Reports (1985), p. 13. 
412 Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago Arbitration Award, 2006, para. 226. 
413 M D. Evans, "Delimitation and the Common Maritime Boundary" (1993) 64 BYIL 283, at 329. 
414 In the Gullf of Maine case, the Court noted that it might only imply that there were certainly no rule to the 
contrary in respect of single line, but there was no material impossibility to multiple boundaries either (The Gulf of 
Maine case, ICJ Report, 1984, para. 27 and Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 219). Furthermore, in the Guinea-Bissau/Senegal case, Judge Weeramantry shows that if 
one holds the view that the various regimes are conceptually distinct, then logically, the boundaries are themselves 
to be considered as conceptually distinct. He accepts the practical advantages in having common line, but sees this 
as flowing not from any trend or doctrinal necessity, or even desirability, but simply from the decision of the parties 
to seek a single line. However, as with the Chamber in the Guy 'of Maine case, he did not consider whether it is 
permissible to ask the Court to undertake such an exercise in the first place (The Guinea-Bissau/Senegal Maritime 
Delimitation Arbitration Award (1989), reported in (1992) 31 ILM p. 36 and The opinion of Judge Weeramantry is 
at p. 168-173, quoted in Evans, op. cit., note 413, p. 319). Tunisia, on the other hand, support single boundary by the 
argument that "given that the coastal state, under Article 56 of the draft Convention, possesses, in the EEZ, 
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural resources of the seabed and its subsoil, it is 
difficult to conceive how the limits of the EEZ could differ from those of the continental shelf inside the 200 miles" 
(Quoted in Dissenting opinion of Judge Oda in Tunisia v. Libya, ICJ Report, 1982, p. 157 at 232). 
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water column. 415 The specific geology makes the use of multiple boundaries difficult causing 
the technical problems in implementation when the water column and the seabed belong to 
different jurisdictions. This gives rise to the application of the majority case law and state 
practice to single and common maritime boundaries. 
Notwithstanding, state practice shows that delimiting single or common maritime 
boundaries is still not recognised as the only method for maritime delimitation of the EEZ and 
continental shelf. Some states still use separate maritime boundaries in their delimitation. For 
example, in the 1978 Tones Strait Treaty between Australia and Papua New Guinea, 416 the 
boundaries for the fisheries and seabed in the central area of Tonres Strait are diverged. The 
seabed line follows a modified median line between the mainlands of the two countries, whereas 
the fisheries jurisdiction turns sharply to the north, to enclose some inhabited islands of Australia 
and then abruptly turns south to rejoin the seabed line. 417 Another example of separate maritime 
boundaries can be found in the Maritime Delimitation Treaty between Indonesia and Australia in 
1997, in which Article 7 provides that EEZ sovereignty rights and jurisdiction are limited to the 
water column, and that continental shelf sovereignty rights and jurisdiction are applicable to the 
seabed . 
418 Furthermore, some states also endorse the separatist approach to the relationship 
between the EEZ and continental shelf and imply that separate lines might be used for their 
delimitation by the stipulation of their national legislation. 419 
Separate maritime boundaries are also justifiable in cases where the continental shelf 
and the EEZ have different outer edges, i. e. when the coastal state is eligible to apply Article 76 
in which the maximum breadth of the continental shelf may be extended beyond 200 nautical 
miles. In this case, beyond 200 nautical miles, the maritime boundary is only delimited for the 
continental shelf and the water above this area is not the EEZ of the states concerned. 420 The 
41 Stuart Kaye, "The Use of Multiple Boundaries in Maritime Boundary Delimitation: Law and Practice" 
11998) 49 AYIL 49, at 61, Attard, ibid, at 216-7. 
16 For full text of the Agreement, see 
http: //www. un. or /gDepts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/AUS- 
PNG 1978TS. PDF (accessed on 30 April 2006). 
41 'For further discussion, see Stuart Kaye, op. cit., note 415, at p. 65-72. 
418 For full text of the Agreement, see 
http: //www. un. ore/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/AUS- 
IDN1997EEZ. Qdf (accessed on 30 April 2006). 
419 For example, Bulgaria (Act of 8 July 1987 OSR CDII, p. 3), Indonesia (Act No-5 on Indonesian EEZ, 18 
October 1983 OSR CD I, p. 103) and Vanuatu (Maritime Zones Act No. 23 of 1981 OSR CDII, p. 124) 
(Statistics provided by M D. Evans, "Delimitation and the Common Maritime Boundary" (1993) 64 BYIL 
283-332 at 297). 
420 Prosper Weil, The Law of Maritime Delimitation- Reflections (Cambridge: Grotius Publications Limited, 1989), 
p. 134. 
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separate maritime boundary may also be accepted in delimiting continental shelf and fishery 
zones as different regimes to the EEZ. Within fishery zones coastal states only have sovereign 
rights towards fisheries, e. g. the delimitation in the Torres Strait Treaty. Therefore, although it 
is more practical to achieve a single boundary, the law of maritime delimitation does not rule 
out the possibility of delimiting separate boundaries for continental shelf and fishery zones and 
for the EEZ and continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. The application will very much 
depend on the choice of the parties. 
3. Maritime claims of the parties in the South China Sea dispute 
The maritime claims of the parties in the South China Sea dispute can be divided 
into two groups. China and Taiwan are so far away that their maritime zone generated from 
the mainland will not have any overlapping with the Spratlys' water. 421 However, these two 
parties make a historic claim which covers almost all of the South China Sea. Other states, 
namely Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, due to their closer distance to the 
Spratlys may have overlapping between the maritime zones of their mainland with those of 
the Spratlys (with the hypothesis that the Spratlys belong to different jurisdictions). So far, 
except the Philippines, the littoral states have not made any official maritime claims. 
Therefore, this part will primarily examine the maritime claims generated from the 
mainland of Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Then it will analyse the 
historic maritime claims of China and Taiwan. 
3.1. Maritime claims of coastal states 
3.1.1. Claims regarding baselines 
The starting point of maritime delimitation is the entitlement of a state to a given 
maritime area and within 200 nautical miles from a state's baselines distance is the basis for 
the entitlement to the parties concerned, i. e. baselines are also play an important role in 
identifying the entitlement of the parties to a dispute. Of all the parties concerned, Vietnam, 
China, Taiwan and the Philippines laid down their claims regarding baselines. However, 
since the mainlands of China and Taiwan are too far away from the Spratlys, their claims 
regarding baselines from their mainlands will not affect the maritime delimitation of the 
421 Due to the large distance from China and Taiwan (see Figure 33, infra), even in the case of natural 
prolongation, the continental shelf of China and Taiwan will not produce any overlapping with those of the 
Spratlys. 
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Spratlys' water. Hence this section will only focus on the baselines claimed by Vietnam 
and the Philippines. 
Vietnam declared straight baselines, in the Statement of 12 November 1982, 
through 11 basepoints from the South to the North along the coastline. 422 Almost all parts 
of the baselines will relate to the South China Sea maritime delimitation except two parts, 
namely the part in the Gulf of Tokin and the Western part, near the Gulf of Thailand. The 
entire baseline forms in a shape of a semicircle with six major lines which can be seen in 
Figure 22 as follows: 
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Figure 22. Baselines of Vietnam4'; 
422 For full text of the statement, see 
http: %%%N\%' un org. Dept., los LFGISLATIONANDTREATIES, PDFFIL1: S VNM lytt2 
Statcmcnt. pdt 
(accessed on 13 April 2006). 
47 Map drawn by Mapinfo. 
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The baselines of Vietnam is criticised of violating Article 7 of the 1982 LOSC. 424 
Accordingly, the straight baselines are applicable where the coasts which are "deeply 
indented and cut into" and have "the presence of a fringe of islands" along them 425 The 
straight baselines are also required not to "depart any appreciable extent from the general 
direction of the coast" and "sufficiently closed link to the land domain". 426 Although some 
parts of claimed baseline may be legitimate, e. g. from basepoints A8 to A7 and partly from 
A7 to A6 since they are applied to the area where the Vietnamese coasts are "cutting into", 
other parts are departed from the general direction of the Vietnamese coast, particularly 
from basepoints A2 to A7. Therefore, the claim of Vietnam regarding baselines is not 
completely legitimate and may not be used as the basis for entitlement of the mainland of 
Vietnam. 427 
424 Straight baseline method was originally discussed at the Hague Conference for the Codification of 
International Law in 1930. However, the balance of opinion is still strongly against the use of straight 
baseline. Then, with the success of Norway in Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case in 1951, the straight baseline 
method was for the first time recognised legitimately under the international law of the sea. In Anglo- 
Norwegian Fisheries case, the Court ruled in the Norwegian's favour on the justification that the coast of 
Norway was skjaergaard, deeply indented and cut into, thus the application of the straight baseline method 
would help to simplify the form of territorial waters. Another purpose of the judgment was to secure the 
Norwegian economic interests through long usage in the waters nearby her coastline. 424 The judgment of the 
Fisheries case on the straight baseline method was codified in Article 4 of the 1958 UN Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, and then in Article 7 of the 1982 LOSC. The Court also had an 
opportunity to further develop the application of straight baseline in the recent case between Qatar and 
Bahrain (ICJ Report, 2001). For detailed discussion of these conditions of the Article 7, see W. Michael 
Reisman and Gayl S. Westerman, Straight Baselines in International Maritime Boundary Delimitation, 
(Macmillan, 1992); UN Publications, The law of the Sea: Baselines- An Examination of the Relevant 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1989) and Prescott, "Straight Baselines: 
Theory and Practice" in E. D. Brown and R. R Churchill, The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: Impact 
and Implementation (The Law of the Sea Institute, 1987), p. 288. 
425 Article 7 provides that "[i]n localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a 
fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining appropriate 
, 
points may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured". 
26 Article 7(3) of the 1982 LOSC. 
427 In the Qatar v. Bahrain case, although under the 1982 LOSC, straight baselines were applicable for 
Bahrain, they were not used in the drawing of equidistance lines in the judgment of the Court as Bahrain 
failed to declare the application of straight baseline before the submission of the case with Qatar. In this case, 
the Court did not deny that "the maritime features east of Bahrain's main islands are part of the overall 
geographical configuration; it would be going too far, however, to qualify them as a fringe of islands along 
the coast. The islands concerned are relatively small in number. Moreover, in the present case it is only 
possible to speak of a "cluster of islands" or an "island system" if Bahrain's main islands are included in that 
concept. In such a situation, the method of straight baselines is applicable only if the State has declared itself 
to be an archipelagic State under Part IV of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, which is not true of 
Bahrain in this case. " Therefore, Bahrain was not entitled to apply the straight baseline in drawing of 
equidistance lines (ICJ Report, 2001, p. 40 at paras. 214-5). 
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The Philippines defined their baselines in the Republic Act No. 3046 of 17 June 
1961 and then amended in the Republic Act No. 5446 of 18 September 1968.42x` The 
Philippines, due to their archipelagic state status, are entitled to apply archipelagic 
baselines. Under the Republic Act of 1968, the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines 
were defined by 80 straight baselines. Details of the baselines will be illustrated in Figure 
23 as follows: 
1= 
_w ry. 












Figure 23. Baselines of the Philippines429 
42" For full text of the Acts, see 
httj): //ww, A,. un. org Depts/los LEGISLATIONANDTREATIFS POPFILES MIL 1961 Act. ndf and 
http: ' wwx%w un org`Dents los LEG ISLATIONANDTREATIES! PDFFILES, PIIL 1968 Act. ndf (accessed on 
13 April 2006). 
429 Sources: United Nations, The Law of the Sea: Baselines: National Legislation with Illustrative Maps. 
(Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 1989), p. 259. 
139 
CHAPTER 4. PROSPECTS FOR MARMM E DELIMITATION FOR THE WATERS OF THE SPRATLYS 
Among many segments of the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines, only the 
Western part is related to the maritime delimitation of the South China Sea. The application 
of the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines in these segments is lawful430 and may be 
used in maritime delimitation in the South China Sea. Thus, all the basepoints in the 
Western segments may be used for defining the equidistance line. 
In addition to the archipelagic baselines, the Philippines also claims the "baselines" 
for their claimed features of the Spratlys. The Presidential Decree No. 1596 of June 1978 of 
the Philippines declared an area 
[fJrom a point [on the Philippine Treaty Limits] at latitude 7°40' North and 
longitude 116°00' East of Greenwich, thence due and West along the parallel of 
7°40' N to its intersection with the meridian of longitude 112°11' E, thence due 
north along the meridian of 112°10' E, to its intersection within the parallel of 9°00' 
N, thence northeastward to the intersection of the parallel of 12°00' N to its 
intersection with the meridian of longitude 114°30' E, thence, due East along the 
parallel of 12°00' N to its intersection with the meridian of 118°00' E, thence, due 
South along the meridian of longitude 118°00' E to its intersection with the parallel 
of 10°00' N, thence Southeastwards to the point of the beginning at 7°40' N, latitude 
and 116000'E longitude 
as part of the Philippine territory on the basis of proximity, security and terra nullius. This 
area is illustrated in Figure 24 below. 
From the earlier analysis in Chapter 2, even if the Philippines successes with its 
sovereignty claim over the Spraltys, it will be unable to use the Spratlys' features as 
basepoints for their archipelagic baselines 431 Therefore, such maritime area for the Spratlys 
under the Decree No. 1956 is claimed on the groundless basis of international law 
regardless the legality of the sovereignty claim of the Philippines. 
430 International law regarding archipelagic baselines stipulates, at Article 47(1) of the 1982 LOSC, that "[a]n 
archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost 
islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands 
and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 
1 and 9 to 1". Besides the conditions of being the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago, 
Article 47(4) of the 1982 LOSC further provides that the basepoints of archipelagic baselines may also draw 
from the low tide elevation provide that "lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently above sea 
level have been built on them or where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not 
exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea form the nearest island". 
431 See supra, Chapter 2, Section 5.1. 
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Figure 24. Maritime claims of the Philippines over the Spratlys432 
3.1.2. The EEZ 
The EEZ is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea where the coastal 
states have sovereignty rights of management and control of virtually all economically 
oriented activities. 433 The breadth of the EEZ is determined by Article 57 of the 1982 
LOSC and "shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is measured". However, these rights do not exist ipso facto and 
ab initio as different from the continental shelf, the Convention is silent in indicating that 
the rights of coastal states in the EEZ do not depend either on occupation or on any express 
432 Map drawn by Mapinfo. 
°; ` Details of the rights and duties of the coastal states are stipulated in Article 56 of the LOSC. 
141 
CHAPTER 4. PROSPECTS FOR MARITIME DELIMITATION FOR THE WATERS OF Tf E SPRATLYS 
proclamation. 434 A number of writings on this issue agree that the EEZ must be declared. 435 
With regard to the practice of coastal states in the South China Sea, Vietnam, Malaysia and 
the Philippines have already made declarations and enacted legislation to determine their 
EEZs in which they declared an EEZ of 200 nautical miles. 
Paragraph 3 of the Statement on Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, Exclusive Zone 
and Continental Shelf of 12 May 1977 of Vietnam provided that "[t]he exclusive economic 
zone of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is adjacent to the Vietnamese territorial sea and 
forms with it a 200-nautical-mile zone from the baseline used to measure the breadth of 
Vietnam's territorial sea' ; 436 
Malaysia also enacted the Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1984 in which Article 3 
provided that "[t]he exclusive economic zone of Malaysia.. . is an area beyond and adjacent 
to the territorial sea of Malaysia and ... extends to a distance of two 
hundred nautical miles 
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured' . 437 
Session 1 of the Presidential Decree No. 1599 of 1978 of the Philippines also 
stipulated that "[t]here is hereby established a zone to be known as the exclusive economic 
zone of the Philippines. The exclusive economic zone shall extend to a distance of two 
hundred nautical miles beyond and from the baseline from which the territorial sea is 
measured: provided, that, where the outer limits of the zones as thus determined overlap the 
exclusive economic zone of an adjacent or neighbouring State, the common boundaries 
shall be determined by agreement with the State concerned or in accordance with pertinent 
generally recognised principles of international law delimitation' . aas 
Brunei is the only adjacent state which did not enact any legislation concerning the 
exclusive economic zone. However, it declared a 200 nautical miles fishery under the 1984 
Fishery Limit Act 439 
434 Similar to Article 77(3) of LOSC on the continental shelf. 
435 Attard, The EEZ in the Law of the Sea Convention (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 58. 
436 For full text of the Statement, see 
http: //www. un. or. e/Deptts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/VNM 1977 Statement. pdf 
accessed on 8 April 2005). 
37 For full text of the Act, see 
http: //www. un. orz/Dents/Ios/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/MYS 1984 Act. pdf (accessed on 
8 April 2005). 
438 For full text, see 
http: //www. un. orgfDepts/Ios/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILESIPHL 1978 Decree. pdf (accessed 
on 8 April 2005). 
439 This Act was amended in 2002. Source: The Brunei Fishery Department at 
http: //www. fisheries. eov. bn/home. htm (accessed on 14 March 2006). 
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Figure 25. EEZs of Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippine in the adjacent water 
to the Spratlys 440 
3.1.3. The continental shelf 
The continental shelf of a coastal state under Article 76 of the 1982 LOSC is 
defined as comprising: 
the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial 
sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of 
the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines 
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of 
the continental margin does not extend up to that distance. 
440 Map drawn by Mapinfo. 
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The continental margin comprises the submerged prolongation of the land mass 
of the coastal State, and consists of the seabed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope 
and the rise. It does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the 
subsoil thereof. 44' 
The most important facet of the continental shelf is that it is the natural prolongation 
from the land territory of coastal states. As a product of nature, the prolongation is not 
consistent and depends on the geographical characteristics of the coastline and seabed of 
coastal states. In order to determine the breadth of the continental shelf, the outer edge of 
the continental shelf plays a key role in determining whether a continental shelf is within or 
extends beyond 200 nautical miles. Article 76 of the LOSC continues to clarify the method 
for determining the outer edge of the continental shelf, at paragraph 4. 
(a) For the purposes of this Convention, the coastal State shall establish the outer 
edge of the continental margin wherever the margin extends beyond 200 nautical 
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, 
by either: 
(i) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to the 
outermost fixed points at each of which the thickness of sedimentary 
rocks is at least 1 per cent of the shortest distance from such point to the 
foot of the continental slope; or 
(ii) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to fixed 
points not more than 60 nautical miles from the foot of the continental 
slope. 
(b) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the foot of the continental slope 
shall be determined as the point of maximum change in the gradient at its base. 
If the outer edge of the continental shelf is within 200 nautical miles, the breadth of 
the continental shelf will be 200 nautical miles. If the outer edge of the continental shelf 
extends beyond 200 nautical miles, the breadth of the continental shelf will be limited by 
two criteria set out in paragraph 5, namely (i) 350 nautical miles from the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured and (ii) 100 nautical miles from the 
2,500 metre isobath, which is a line connecting the depth of 2,500 metres. However, in any 
442 case, the breadth of the continental shelf shall not exceed 350 nm from the baselines 
The rights of a coastal state towards the continental shelf exist ipso facto and ab 
initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land. If the coastal state does not explore the 
continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one can undertake these activities 
041 Article 76(1) and (3). 
442 Article 76(6) of the LOSC. 
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without the express consent of the coastal state. The rights of the coastal state over the 
continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or any express 
proclamation. 443 However, the chart and relevant information, including geodetic data, 
permanently describing the outer limits of the continental shelf must be deposited with the 
Secretary General of the UN. 444 In addition, in cases where the limits of the continental 
shelf exceed 200 nautical miles, the coastal states have to submit the information related to 
the delineation to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 445 
Of the four coastal states of the South China Sea region under current examination, 
Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines have made declarations and enacted legislation 
regarding their continental shelves. Vietnam stated that 
[t]he continental shelf of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam comprises the seabed 
and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond the Vietnamese territorial sea 
throughout the natural prolongation of the Vietnamese land territory to the outer 
edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the 
baseline used to measure the breadth of the Vietnamese territorial sea where the 
outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance . 
446 
The Philippines, by a proclamation of their president, No-370 in 1968, also claimed 
all the mineral and other natural resources in the seabed of their continental shelves. The 
proclamation did not apply the method of Article 76 of the LOSC but used the "depth of the 
superadjacent waters admits of the exploitation" of natural resources to measure the breadth 
of the continental shelf. 447 In a similar approach to the Philippines, Malaysia defined that 
"continental shelf' means the sea-bed and subsoil of submarine areas adjacent to 
the coast of Malaysia but beyond the limits of the territorial waters of the States, 
the surface of which lies at a depth no greater than two hundred metres below the 
surface of the sea, or, where the depth of the superadjacent water admits of the 
exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas, at any greater depth. 448 
443 Article 77 of the LOSC. 444 Articles 76(9) and 84 of the LOSC. " Article 76(8) of the LOSC. For details of the procedure for coastal state to establish the outer limit of the 
Continental Shelf, see the Annex II of 1982 LOSC. For analysis, see Robert W. Smith and George Taft, 
"Legal Aspects of the Continental Shelf' in Peter J. Cook and Chris M. Carleton (ed. ), Continental Shelf 
Limits: The Scientific and Legal Interface, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 17 at 20-24. 
"6 Paragraph 4 of the Statement on the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive Economic Zone 
and the Continental Shelf of 12 May 1977, op. cit, note 436. "' Presidential Proclamation No. 370 of 20 March 1968 Declaring as Subject to the Jurisdiction and control of 
the Republic of the Philippines all Mineral and other Natural Resources in the Continental Shelf, for full text, 
see http: //www. un. ore/Dents/los/LEGISLATTONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/PHL 1 68 Proclamation. ndf 
accessed on 8 April 2005). 
"Article 2 of the Continental Shelf Act 1966 of Malaysia, for full text, see 
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The stipulations of the Philippines and Malaysia rely on the 1958 Convention on the 
Continental Shelf. These out of date stipulations can be justified because their legislation 
was enacted long before the 1982 LOSC came into effect 449 Brunei, although it has not 
enacted any legislation regarding its continental shelf, reportedly printed a map defining its 
fishery and continental shelf limits in 1988. 
Although the details of the delineation of the continental shelves are not available 
from the legislation of the states concerned, based on the geographical characteristics of the 
seabed in the South China Sea, predictions as to the breadth of their continental shelves can 
be made. For the Philippines, due to the presence of the deep Palawan Trough which 
separates the Spratlys from the Philippines archipelagos, the outer edge of the continental 
shelf of the Philippines, in the coastal area adjacent to the Spratlys, is likely to be within 
200 nautical miles, and thus their continental shelf may be measured by 200 nautical miles. 
This situation is opposite in the case of Southeast Vietnam and the Northwest of the 
Sarawak of Malaysia. Within these areas, the outer edge of the continental shelves likely 
extends beyond 200 nautical miles, and thus these countries may have continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles. However, in order to delineate that outer limit, these countries 
need to decide the methodologies to be applied according to Article 76(4) and submit the 
information concerning the outer limits to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf. The limits of the shelf established by a coastal state on the basis of the 
recommendation of the Commission will be final and binding. 
450 At the moment, Vietnam 
and Malaysia have not submitted the information related to their continental shelf limits. 
However, in the maximum cases where the outer limits of some parts of the continental 
shelf of Vietnam and Malaysia can extend to 350 nautical miles or 100 nautical miles from 
the 2,500 metre isobath, it likely has limited effect on the maritime spaces of the Spratlys as 
these areas are further south in the Gulf of Thailand. The outer limits of the coastal states 
can be estimated on a map as follows: 
http"//www un org/Dents/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILESIMYS 1966 Act. ndf (accessed on 
8 April 2005). 
449 Although currently they are parties to the 1982 LOSC, they have not made changes to comply with the 
Convention. 
450 Article 76(8) of the 1982 LOSC. 
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Figure 26. Continental shelves of Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippine in the 
adjacent water to the Spratlys4 51 
3.2. Historic maritime claims of China and Taiwan 
Unlike Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei, the maritime zones from the 
mainland of China and Taiwan will not have any effect on the waters of the Spratlys as the 
distance from the Spratlys to mainland China and Taiwan is too far. 
452 However, China and 
Taiwan lodge another historic maritime claim. In 1947, the Government of the Republic of 
China published a map which contained 11 dotted lines in the South China Sea. This map 
5 was later included in the Atlas of Administrative Areas of the Republic of China in 1948.; ` 
451 Map drawn by Mapinfo. 
as: For concrete distance, see Chapter 1, sufra and Figure 33, in/ru. 
453 Zou Keyuan, "The Chinese Traditional Maritime Boundary Line in the South China Sea and its Legal 
Consequences for the Resolution of the Dispute over the Spratly Islands" (1999) 14(1) /JMCL, p. 27 at 33. 
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This was the official confirmation of the Government of China to the map, as before 1947 
the map was compiled only by individuals, and was extended south from 15 to 4 degrees 
North latitude to include the entire Spratlys and James Shoal. 454 However, up to 1948, no 
explanation was given for the reasons or purpose of drawing the dotted lines on the map. 
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Figure 27. The First Chinese Official Map with 11 Dotted Lines455 
After 1949, when the People's Republic of China was established, both China and 
Taiwan claimed to represent the entirety of China and succeeded to the map. China and 
Taiwan interpreted the meaning of the dotted lines differently. Taiwan considered the 
dotted lines as the boundary for its historic water in the South China Sea. In 1993, the 
Taiwan Government adopted new South China Sea Policy Guidelines which said "the 
South China Sea area within the historic water limit is the maritime area under the 
jurisdiction of the Republic of China, '. 456 In 1997, the Draft of the Territorial Sea Law 
mentioned that the "ROC's historic waters and its area shall be promulgated by the 
"" The earliest compiled map was found in 1914. For details of the origin and evolution of the map, see Zou 
Keyuan, ibid, p. 32-34 and Li Jinming and Li Dexia, "The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China 
Sea: A Note" (2003) 34 ODIL, p. 287 at 287-90. 
455 Zou Keyuan, op. cit., note 453, p. 29. 
456 Quoted in Kuan-Ming Sun, "The Policy of the Republic of China Towards the South China Sea" (1995) 
19(5) Marine Policy, p. 401 at 430. 
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Executive Yuan". 457 Although these wordings were dropped from the final text of the Law, 
Taiwan made an official statement that the dropping of such wording was not an 
abandonment of the official position of Taiwan that the water areas within the lines were 
historic waters of China. 458 
China, on the other hand, has not made any official explanation of the lines. During 
the 1960s, China removed two segments in the Gulf of Tokin to keep nine segments left in 
the dotted line. Other Chinese legislation on the law of the sea, e. g. the 1958 Declaration on 
the Territorial Sea and the amended Declaration on the Territorial Sea in 1992 did not 
mention the lines. However, in practice, China claims sovereignty over both the Paracels 
and Spratlys and exercises her rights in maritime spaces in many areas of the South China 
Sea. Granting a concession to the Crestone Energy Corporation to exploit oil in an area 
between the Vanguard Bank and the Prince of Wales Bank, 160 nautical miles off the 
Vietnamese coast, showed China's exercising her rights in maritime spaces and implied 
China's maritime claims. 
Due to China's ambiguity in explaining the significance of the dotted line, there are 
three different assumptions made as to the significance of the line. The first assumption is 
that the line shows the territorial claims of China to the islands within the line. 459 This 
means that the dotted line is only used to illustrate the territorial claims of China to islands 
in the South China Sea including the Paracels and the Spratlys. In this case, the question of 
sovereignty claims of China was discussed earlier in this thesis 460 The second assumption 
is that China regards the line as her maritime boundary line. 461 If the line is regarded as a 
maritime boundary, it may be relied upon two bases: (i) the water within the line is 
considered as the maritime zones of the Paracels and Spratlys and the line is the meridian 
line of these zones and the maritime spaces of other states and (ii) similar to the 
interpretation of Taiwan, the water within the line is the historic water. For the first basis, 
the legitimacy of the line will be dependent on the sovereignty issues which were discussed 
457 Quoted in Cheng-yi Lin, "Taiwan's South China Sea Policy" (1997) 37(4) Asian Survey, p. 323 at 325. 
"ss Zou Keyuan, op. cit., note 453, p. 37. 
459 This is the opinion of some Chinese scholars quoted in Cheng-yi Lin, op. cit., note 457, p. 291. 
40 See supra, Chapter 3. 
461 For the argument for this assumption, see Zou Keyuan, op. cit., note 453, p. 52. 
149 
CHAPTER 4. PROSPECTS FOR MARITIME DELIMITATION FOR THE WATERS OF THE SPRATLYS 
elsewhere. 462 On the second basis, China and Taiwan share the same claim of historic 
waters. 
Historic waters together with historic bay, under international law of the sea, are a 
subject of controversy. Some scholars have tried to suggest a definition of historic water. 
For example, Blum defines that "the term `historic water' is applied nowadays in respect of 
maritime areas in general, with the reference to bodies of water which - in spite of their 
being situated beyond the normal limits of a State's maritime domain- are treated as if they 
were part of the maritime appurtenance of the littoral State, '. 463 Bouchez offers another 
definition that "[h]istoric waters are waters over which the coastal State, contrary to the 
generally applicable rules of international law, clearly, effectively, continuously, and over a 
substantial period of time, exercises sovereignty rights with the acquiescence of the 
community of States". 464 D. P. O'Connell also lays out three circumstances which could be 
considered as historic water: "(1) bays claimed by states which are greater in extent, or less 
in configuration, than standard bays; (2) areas of claimed waters linked to a coast by 
offshore features but which are not enclosed under the standard rules and (3) areas of 
claimed seas which would, but for the claim, be high seas because not covered by any rules 
specially concerned with bays or the delimitation of coastal waters (maria clausa)9'. 465 
In the Fisheries case, the Court clarified that "historic waters are usually meant 
waters which are treated as internal waters but which would not have that character were it 
not for the existence of an historic title". 466 Furthermore, under the studies of the UN 
Secretariat in 1962, as requested by the UN International Law Commission, the common 
perception on historic water was described thus: 
The State which claims `historic waters' in effect claims a maritime area which, 
according to general international law, belongs to the high seas. As the high seas 
are res communis omnium and not res nullius, title to the area cannot be obtained 
by occupation. The acquisition by historic title is `adverse acquisition, ' akin to 
acquisition by prescription; in other words, title to `historic water' is obtained by 
462 If the argument is that the water within the dotted line is the maritime spaces generated from the Paracels 
and Spratlys, China can only claim these maritime zones once it has lawful title to both the Paracels and 
Spratlys. This issue was discussed in Chapter 3 in which China would unlikely have the full title of China to 
the two archipelagos. Therefore, the dotted line will not be legitimate under this interpretation and there is no 
need to examine further. 
463 Yehuda Z. Blum, Historic Titles in International Law, (The Hague: Maritinus Nijhoff, 1965), p. 26 1. 
464 Leo J. Bouchez, Regime of Bays in International Law, (Leyden, A. W. Sijthoff, 1964), p. 281, quoted in Zou 
Keyuan, op. cit., note 453, p. 40. 
465 D. P. O'Connell, The international Law of the Sea, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, Vol. I, 1982), p. 417. 
4" Fisheries Jurisdiction, Judgment, ICJ Reports (1951), p. 116 at 130. 
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a process through which the originally lawful owners, the community of states, 
are replaced by the coastal State. Title to `historic waters, ' therefore, has its origin 
in an illegal situation which was subsequently validated. This validation could 
not take place by the mere passage of time; it must be consummated by the 
acquiescence of the rightful owners. 467 
Despite all efforts to clarify the concept of historic water, no definition of `historic 
water' was given in the LOSC. The 1982 LOSC only refers to historic bay and historic title 
when it stipulates on the regime of bays, the delimitation of the territorial sea between 
states with opposite or adjacent coats and limitation and exception in dispute settlement 468 
This may be deliberate because `historic water' is treated as internal water, thus by such a 
limited mentioning, the LOSC only allows the application of `historic water' in the case of 
bays and within internal and territorial waters. Also, the International Law Commission 
suggested that States need to fulfil three conditions in order to claim `historic water', 
namely (i) the actual exercise of coastal state authority over the area, (ii) continuity over 
time of this exercise of authority and (iii) the attitude of foreign states to the claim 469 In a 
recent US case, the US Supreme Court also clarified that 
[t]o make a historic waters claim, a State must show that the United States exercises 
authority over the area, has done so continuously, and has done so with the 
acquiescence of foreign nations. This exercise of sovereignty must have been, 
historically, an assertion of power to exclude all foreign vessels and navigation, 
including vessels engaged in "innocent passage, " i. e., passage that does not 
prejudice the coastal State's peace, good order, or security. 47 
In the case of China, the water area it claims is huge, covering almost all maritime 
spaces in the South China Sea. This area has never become the internal waters of China; 
other countries still have freedom in navigation and exercise sovereignty rights in the 
adjacent waters of the Spratlys. In fact, China only landed in the Spratlys in 1988 after a 
naval attack with Vietnam. The publication of the map without interpretation of the 
function of the dotted line on the map will not be sufficient to prove China's actual and 
continuous exercising authority in this water. 
467 UN Doc. A/CN. 4/143,9 March 1962, titled "Judicial Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic 
Bays", (1962) 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, p. 3 at 16, quoted in Zou Keyuan, "Historic 
Rights in International Law and in China's Practice", (2001) 32 ODIL, p. 149 at 151. 
468 For example, Article 10(6) says that "[t]he foregoing provisions do not apply to so-called "historic bays"; 
Article 15 mentions "by reason of historic title" as the exception in applying the meridian line in maritime 
delimitation, etc. 
469 UN Doc. A/CN. 4/143,9 March 1962, titled "Judicial Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic 
Bays", (1962) 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, p. 3 at 13, referred in Zou Keyuan, op. cit., 
note 467 at p. 151. 
470 Alaska v. US. 545 US 75.125 S. Ct. 2137 (2005) at 2141. 
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Furthermore, other states have never expressed their recognition of China's claim. 
A Vietnamese official said that the dotted line of China was exaggerated and legally 
groundless. "There is nothing in the international law of the sea that can justify this kind of 
claim. "471 Indonesia also expressed its concern over the publication of Chinese maps 
showing the unclear dotted lines. Hasjim Djalal, a senior Indonesian diplomat, commented 
that "the Chinese territorial claims are limited towards the islands and all rights related 
thereto, and not territorial claims over the South China Sea as a whole". 472 Dr Hamzah, the 
Director General of the Maritime Institute of Malaysia also indicated that the line as a claim 
over the entire South China Sea was "frivolous, unreasonable and illogical". 473 Therefore, if 
the dotted line represents the maritime boundary of China in the South China on the basis 
of historic water, due to the lack of actual exercising authority and the objection of the 
states concerned, such a claim will not conform to the international law of the sea. 
The final assumption regarding the meanings of the dotted line is that it stands for 
China's claim of historic rights as in June 1998 China officially promulgated the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act in which Article 14 says that "the provisions of 
this Act shall not affect the historic rights of the People's Republic of China! '. 474 The 
concept of `historic rights' is even more complicated to interpret than `historic water'. The 
general acceptance is that historic rights are not the source of as great a degree of 
jurisdictional control as historic water. However, it is not clear whether the historic rights 
claimed by China are equal to the rights in territorial sea, the EEZ and continental shelf 
regime. If China wants to interpret historic rights regarding natural resources in the 
continental shelf, these rights will violate the rights of the coastal states which are 
generated ipso facto and ab initio from their mainland. 475 Therefore, the so-called historic 
rights claimed by China within the dotted line waters are not well founded in the 
471 Huynh Minh Chinh, "Sovereignty of Vietnam over Hoang Sa (Paracels) and Truong Sa (Spratlys) and 
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in the Bien Dong Sea (South China Sea)" in ASEAN in the 21' Century: 
Opportunities and Challenges, (Hanoi: Institute for International Relations, 1996), p. 98-9. 
472 Hasjim Djalal, "Conflicting Territorial and Jurisdictional Claims in the South China Sea" (1979) 7 
Indonesian Quarterly, p. 3 at 42. 
473 B. A. Hamzah, "Conflicting Jurisdiction Problems in the Spratlys: Scope for Conflict Resolution" (Paper 
presented in the Second Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Bandung, 
Indonesia, 15-18 July 1991), p. 199-200, referred in Zou Keyuan, op. cit., note 453, p. 38. 
474 For full text see, (1998) 38 Law of the Sea Bulletin, p. 28-31 or online at 
http: //www. un. org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/chn 1998 eez act. pdf (accessed 
on 8 April 2005). 
05 Article 78 of the 1982 LOSC. 
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international law of the sea. If China wants to imply the rights with regard to living 
resources in the water only, the LOSC is silent in clarifying whether these rights are equal 
to the regime of the EEZ or not. However, in a similar situation, the Eritrea/ Yemen case476 
dealt with the historic rights concerning fishery by establishing a res communis region for 
both Eritrea and Yemen where the fishermen of both countries would enjoy free access. 
The Award stated that as the fishery practice was traditionally conducted and the fishing 
industry was formed an important part of both economies concerned. 477 Also, in the 
Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago case, 478 when Barbados requested a historical right over 
flyingfish fisheries within the EEZ of Trinidad and Tobago, although the Tribunal found it 
lacked jurisdiction over the issue, it recommended that the parties negotiate a satisfactory 
solution to coordinate and ensure the conservation and development of the flyingfish 
stocks. 79 These awards implied that historic fishery might exist, but depended on the 
negotiation of the parties concerned, particularly in cases where the area for historical 
fishery was within the EEZ of other countries like in the Barbados V. Trinidad and Tobago 
case. This might be applied to the claims of China and Taiwan, and thus their claims might 
be recognised as the rights to living resources in the water of the claimed area. 
Given the analysis of the three assumptions as to the significance of the dotted line 
claimed by China and Taiwan, the only possibility is for the historic maritime claim of 
China and Taiwan to be recognised as historic rights in fisheries. In this case, as the fishery 
practice has not solely belonged to China, 480 negotiation as the suggested in the Barbados 
v. Trinidad and Tobago case481 should be conducted between China, Taiwan and the other 
states for joint exploitation of the fishery resources in the waters of the Spratlys. This 
means that China and Taiwan cannot enjoy other rights such as those of the EEZ regime. 
3.3. Overlapping areas: The hypothesis 
From the examination in Chapter 2, twelve islands of the Spratlys are likely to have 
entitlement to full maritime zones. With the presence of the Spratlys in the middle of the 
476 Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration Awards. For discussion on the traditional fishing regime in this case, see 
Antunes, "The 1999 Eritrea-Yemen Maritime Delimitation Award and the Development of International 
Law" (2001) 50 ICLQ 299 at 305-7. 
477 Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration Awards, ibid, paras. 62-64. 
478 Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago, 2006 
"9Ibid, paras. 285-293. 
480 For information on fisheries practice in the region, see Section 2.2, Chapter 1, supra. 
48 ' Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago Award, 2006, paras. 292-3. 
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South China Sea and their ability to generate maritime spaces, many overlapping maritime 
zones will be created. However, the details of these overlapping zones will depend on the 
title to the Spratlys. So far, the parties concerned have only lodged territorial claims, but 
have not clearly made their maritime claims. In order to estimate the overlapping maritime 
zones in detail, some hypothesis as to the title of the Spratlys will be made. In each 
hypothesis further assumptions will be made regarding the possibility of the recognition of 
the historic fishing rights of China and Taiwan. 
The first hypothesis is that the Spratlys would belong to several countries. If this 
title came without the recognition of the fishing rights of China and Taiwan, there would be 
two groups of overlapping zones, namely (i) the overlapping between the EEZs and 
continental shelves of the mainlands of coastal states and those of the features of the 
Spratlys which belong to other states and lie opposite their coasts and (ii) the overlapping 
of EEZs and continental shelves among the features of the Spratlys (which belong to 
different states). If the title came with the recognition of historic fishing rights for China 
and Taiwan, in addition to the above noted overlapping areas, there would be overlapping 
between the historic fishing rights of China and Taiwan and the fishing rights in the EEZs 
of coastal states from their mainland and from the features of the Spratlys. 
The second hypothesis is that the Spratlys would belong to Vietnam. If the historic 
fishing rights of China and Taiwan were not recognised, the overlapping areas would be 
between the EEZs and continental shelf of Vietnam generated from the Spratlys' features 
with those of the mainlands of the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. If the historic fishing 
rights were recognised, there would be further overlapping between historic fishing rights 
of China and Taiwan and the fishing rights of other coastal states in their EEZ. In this case, 
Vietnam would have the fishing rights over the EEZ from its mainland and from the 
Spratlys' features, whereas the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei would only have the 
fishing rights of the EEZs from their mainland. 
The last hypothesis would be that the Spratlys belong to China and Taiwan. If this 
title came alone without historic fishing rights, the overlapping maritime zones would be 
between the EEZs and continental shelf of China and Taiwan from the Spratlys' features 
with those from the mainland of the coastal states. If in addition to the title to the Spratlys, 
China and Taiwan also had historic fishing rights, there would be further overlapping 
between the historic fishing rights of these two parties with the fishing rights from the EEZ 
154 
CHAPTER 4. PROSPECTS FOR MARITIME DELIMITATION FOR THE WATERS OF THE SPRATLYS 
of the coastal states as the maritime line which China and Taiwan claimed for historic 
rights covered the larger area than the EEZ of the Spratlys itself. 
In addition, there are some islands in the Spratlys which do not qualify under 
Article 121(3), and which can only generate the internal water, territorial sea and 
contiguous zone. They are located quite distantly from the mainland of coastal states that 
no territorial sea overlapping occurs, but closely enough to be within the EEZ and 
continental shelf of the coastal states. This may create exceptional cases where the 
overlapping zones occur between the internal water, territorial sea and contiguous zone of 
these islands of the Spratlys and the EEZ and continental shelf of the coastal states. 
In conclusion, whatever the hypothesis as to titles are, there might be four possible 
types of overlapping maritime zones which need to be delimited, namely (i) to delimit EEZ 
and continental shelf overlapping between the Spratlys' features and coastal states, 482 (ii) to 
delimit EEZ and continental shelf overlapping among the Spratlys' features themselves, 
483 
(iii) to delimit overlapping between the internal water, territorial sea and contiguous zone of 
the islands of the Spratlys and the EEZ and continental shelf of the coastal states484 and (iv) 
to define the fishing zone for the historic fishing rights of China and/or Taiwan and the 
fishing rights of the EEZ of coastal states (whatever these rights generated from the 
mainland and/or from the some features of the Spratlys which they have title to them). 
485 
Figure 28 illustrates the approximate EEZ from the mainlands of Vietnam, Malaysia 
and the Philippines by the red, yellow and blue lines respectively. The grey circles are the 
EEZ of the Spratlys' features. Thus, the dotted blue areas are the maximum overlapping 
between the EEZ of the mainlands of littoral states and those of the Spratlys, with the 
assumption that all features which lie opposite these mainlands do not belong to the 
relevant coastal states. With the location of the Spratlys' features, the Amboyna Cay 
(currently occupied by Vietnam) may generate a major overlapping with the maritime 
zones of the mainland of Malaysia; the North Danger Reef, Loaita Bank and Tizard Bank 
(currently occupied by Vietnam, the Philippines and Taiwan) may cause significant 
overlapping with maritime zone from the mainlands of Vietnam and the Philippines; and 
482 See Figure 28 and 29, infra. 
483 See Figure 30, infra. 
484 See Figure 31, infra. 
485 See Figure 32, infra. 
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the Spratly (which is currently occupied by Vietnam) may cause a major overlapping with 
the maritime zone from the mainland of Vietnam and Malaysia. 
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496 Map drawn by Mapinfo. 
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Figure 29 illustrates the maximum overlapping between the continental shelf of the 
littoral states and those of the Spratlys' features. The particular situation is that with the natural 
prolongation, the outer edge of the continental shelf of the South of Vietnam and the North of 
Malaysia may be extended to the maximum width of 350 nautical miles. However, these areas 
are unlikely to increase the overlapping with the continental shelf of the Spratlys as they are 
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Figure 30 illustrates the overlapping of the EEZ and continental shelf among the 
features of the Spratlys themselves. Of all the features of the Spratlys, the maximum 
number of islands which can generate full maritime zone is 12.488 The grey circles illustrate 
the EEZ and continental shelf of these features. If these features belong to different states, 
they will create overlapping among themselves. The dotted pink area illustrates the 
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49K See supra, Chapter 2, Section 3. 
489 Map drawn by Mapinfo. 
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In addition to twelve islands which can generate full maritime zones, there are 
twenty three islands in the Spratlys which can only generate internal water and territorial 
sea. 49° Among these islands, some of them are located within the EEZ of littoral states (but 
outside the territorial sea), thus this may cause exceptional overlapping between the 
territorial seas of these features with the EEZ of littoral states. The slashed blue area in 
Figure 31 illustrates the overlapping of such features in the EEZ of Malaysia and the 
Philippines. 491 
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490 See supra, Chapter 2, Section 2.1. 
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Figure 32. Area covered by historic fishery claim of China493 
Figure 32 illustrates the possible overlapping of fishery rights between China and 
Taiwan and those of littoral states. The dotted yellow area is the historic fishery claimed by 
4 93 Map drawn by Mapinfo. 
160 
CHAPTER 4. PROSPECTS FOR MARITIME DELIMITATION FOR THE WATERS OF THE SPRATLYS 
China and Taiwan. If this area is recognised, it will cause overlapping with the fishery 
rights from the EEZ of the mainlands of Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines. This 
overlapping will also occur with the fishery rights generated from the EEZ of the features 
of the Spratlys, if these three states have title to them. 
4. The prospects of maritime delimitation in the South China Sea dispute 
As examined in the earlier part of this chapter, the overlapping maritime zones in 
the Spratlys may be classified into four groups: (i) EEZ and continental shelf overlapping 
between the Spratlys' features and coastal states, (ii) EEZ and continental shelf overlapping 
among the Spratlys' features themselves, (iii) overlapping between the territorial sea of 
some features of the Spratlys with the EEZ of coastal states and (iv) overlapping between 
the historic fishing zone of China and the EEZ of coastal states (from the mainland and/or 
from some features of the Spratlys). Among these four groups of overlapping zones, the 
overlapping of EEZ and continental shelf, i. e. the overlapping area of groups (i) and (ii), is 
the main source of dispute and is subject to the application of the equidistance/relevant 
circumstances principle. The overlapping regarding historic fishing rights of group (iv) may 
be considered as a relevant circumstance in the EEZ and continental shelf delimitation. 
Group (iii) will be examined later in a separate consideration. 
4.1. Equidistance as the provisional boundary for EEZ and continental shelf 
delimitation 
With the new progress of international law concerning maritime delimitation, the 
maritime delimitation method will begin with drawing an equidistance line as a provisional 
boundary, then, it will be adjusted to take account of the relevant circumstances in order to 
achieve an equitable result. 
In drawing an equidistance line at the first stage of the delimitation between the 
EEZ and continental shelf, it is necessary to identify the relevant coasts and baselines of the 
parties concerned. "The equidistance line is the line every point of which is equidistant 
from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each 
of the two states is measured. "494 
494 The method was stated in the Qatar v. Bahrain case, ICJ Report, 2001, para. 177. 
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Of all the parties to the dispute, China and Taiwan are so distant from the Spratlys 
that their maritime spaces generated from the mainland will not create any effect on the 
waters of the Spratlys. Therefore, the baselines which will be taken into account for 
drawing equidistance lines are those of the mainland of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia 
and Brunei. 
Due to the unresolved territorial question, the title to the Spratlys is still unknown. 
This section will examine the relevant coast and basepoints of the Spratlys in maritime 
delimitation in general, without any specific implication for title of the Spratlys. As the 
maritime delimitation for the Spratlys' waters will focus on the overlapping among 
maritime zones generated not only from the mainland of the coastal states, but also from 
the Spratlys' features, it is likely that the equidistance line may also draw from the 
basepoints of the Spratlys' features as well. This is the case when the Spratlys' features are 
nearby the coast of a coastal state but do not belong to that state. For example, normally 
without the presence of the Spratlys' features, maritime zones between the Philippines and 
Vietnam do not overlap. With the presence of the Spratlys' features and supposing that they 
belong to one of the two or belong to a third country, overlapping might be created between 
the maritime spaces of the Spratlys' features with those of the mainland coast of one of the 
two. In this case, basepoints of the Spratlys' features also participate in the drawing of an 
equidistance line. As examined in Chapter 2, the Spratlys feature may generate their 
maritime spaces in groups. Accordingly, the basepoints for drawing an equidistance line are 
some of the features or some low tide elevations of the Spratlys 495 
In theory, in the maritime delimitation between the Spratlys and the littoral states (if 
the Spratlys belong to different jurisdictions), the baselines of the Spratlys and of the 
mainland will be used to draw the equidistance line as the first step in the maritime 
delimitation process. However, due to the tiny size of the Spratlys' features, it is submitted 
that the Spratlys may be given a reduce effect for the full effect of the mainland of littoral 
states. This is also in line with the trend to consider small islands as relevant circumstances 
in maritime delimitation. 496 In maritime delimitation among the Spratlys' features 
"s For details, see Chapter 2, supra. 
496 For further discuss on the role of Spratlys' features as relevant circumstances in maritime delimitation, see 
infra, Section 4.2.1. 
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themselves (if they are belong to different jurisdictions), the baseline of each group of 
features497 will be used to draw the equidistance lines. 
4.2. Relevant circumstances to be taken into account 
Relevant circumstances as discussed in the previous section of this chapter might 
vary and include geographical, economic, social, security and legal factors. Searching for 
these circumstances in a prospect maritime delimitation for the Spratlys' waters, some 
potential relevant circumstances may include the presence of tiny islands, the access to the 
fishery and hydrocarbon resources, security interests of coastal states, navigation interests 
in the South China Sea and the historic title of China and the Philippines. However, in the 
trend of building up a more predictable law for maritime delimitation, the recent case law 
has not paid much attention to the economic, social, security and legal circumstances like in 
the previous ones. Geographical circumstances seem to be the only element to be taken into 
account, but in a more strict and careful manner to identify their real effect on maritime 
delimitation. This section will examine to what extent these circumstances can produce an 
effect on the maritime delimitation in the South China Sea dispute. 
4.2.1. The e ect of small islands in maritime delimitation 
With the location at the middle of the South China Sea, the Spratlys usually are 
assumed a high level of importance in maritime delimitation by the party to the dispute. 
This is partly due to the provisions of the 1982 LOSC that islands which qualify under 
Article 121(3) are entitled to generate full maritime zones. This explains the rush to occupy 
features of the Spratlys and fortify claims over this archipelago since the 1970s. In fact, it is 
true that the majority of overlapping maritime zones is the product of the maritime areas of 
the islands of the Spratlys and the maritime zones of the mainland of the littoral states or 
overlapping among the features of the Spratlys themselves. Thus, the islands of the Spratlys 
will serve two roles. The first role is as relevant circumstances to expand the maritime 
zones of a littoral state if it is adjacent to the mainland of that state or vice versa if it is 
opposite. However, as all of the islands in the Spratlys are very tiny, these islands will 
likely not have a full effect in maritime delimitation with the maritime zones of the 
mainland of littoral states. The second role is as a source of title to generate maritime zones 
in maritime delimitation among the features of the Spratlys themselves. 
497 See supra, Chapter 2, Section 5. 
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Effect of islands in maritime delimitation has been treated in different ways in case 
law and state practice according to their size and their location in respect of the coasts 
between which the boundary will be drawn. With the `wrong side' or `midway' islands, 
their effects in maritime delimitation are normally reduced for the effect of the mainland of 
coastal states. 98 This is particularly true in the case of small and uninhabited islands. In the 
Anglo-French Arbitration, 499 there were three features which led to the adjusting of the 
equidistance line, namely Eddystone Rock, Channel Island and Scilly Islands. With its 
adjacent position to the French coastline, the Eddystone was given full effect Soo 
Meanwhile, located on the wrong side which are very near the French mainland, the 
Channel Island was an enclave with only 12 nautical milessol and the Scilly Islands was of 
half effect. 502 Even with some larger islands like the Jan Mayen in the Jan Mayen case, 503 
which is 30 miles length and 2 miles width, and the Kerkenas Island, with considerable 
population, economic significance and a large area of 69 square miles in the Tunisia/Libya 
case, 504 both were given approximately half effect in maritime delimitation. Similar 
conclusions can also be found in cases namely the Gulf of Mainesos and Libya/ Malta506 
cases. In St Pierre and Miquelon Arbitration, 507 the St Pierre and Miquelon Islands were 
capable of generating full maritime zones, but were only given 24 nautical miles in the 
Western segment of the maritime boundary. A reduced effect was also found the wide of 
their maritime zones in the Southern segment where there was no obstruction with opposite 
or literally aligned with the Canadian coasts. 508 In the recent case of Eritrea/Yemen 
Arbitration, small islands, namely the single island of al-Tayr and the island group of al- 
498 Bowett, "Islands, Rocks and Low Tide Elevations in Maritime Boundary Delimitations" in Jonathan I. 
Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, op. cit., note 98, p. 131 at 151. 499 Case concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and France Republic, Decision of June 30,1977, Report of the Arbitration Awards, 
11979 )18 ILM, p. 339 (hereafter referred to as Anglo-French Arbitration). 
00 Ibid, para. 144. 
501 Ibid, paras. 189-202. 
S02 Ibid, paras. 243-251. 
sos ICJ Report, 1993, at paras. 60-61 and 68-69. 304 ICJ Report, 1982, at paras. 79 and 126. sos Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (US v. Canada), Judgment, ICJ Reports 
(1984), p. 246 (hereafter referred to as the Gulf of Maine case). In this case, the Seal Island, Mud Island and 
other adjacent features of Canada were given half effect due to their dimensions and geographical position, 
ICJ Report, 1984, para. 222. 
The un-inhabited island of Filfla of Malta was ignored for the application of equitable principle, ICJ 
Report, 1985, para. 64. 
507 (1992) 31 ILM 1145 
S08 For details, see the illustration map and the reasoning of the Arbitration at ibid, p. 1148 and paras. 69-7 1. 
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Zubayr were even discounted altogether. 509 In Qatar v. Bahrain, the Court also reduced the 
effect of the small island of Qit'at Jaradah in order to avoid proportionality. 510 In Cameroon 
v. Nigeria, islands belong to a third country was also ignored as relevant circumstances in 
maritime delimitations 1 
The same approach was found in state practice. For example, in the Torres Strait 
Treaty between Australia and Papua New Guinea, 512 a number of small islands of Australia 
in the Tones Strait which located on the wrong side and very near the coastline of Papua 
New Guinea are only given 3 nautical miles of territorial sea and no effect on continental 
shelf delimitation. In eleven other maritime delimitation treaties namely the delimitation of 
Colombia-Jamaica, Finland-Sweden, Dominican Republic-United Kingdom (Turks and 
Caicos), Thailand-Vietnam, Equatorial Guinea-Nigeria, Ireland-United Kingdom, Iceland- 
Norway, Saudi Arabia-Yemen, Estonia-Finland-Sweden and Algeria-Tunisia, the effect of 
small islands was also discounted or ignored. 513 
The case law and state practice shows that the ability of small islands in generating 
maritime zones depends on the size of island, its population and its location. The closer the 
island is to the mainland of its country, the greater its power is to generate a full zone. In 
contradiction, if the islands are located on the wrong side or at the middle of the meridian 
line dividing the overlapping maritime zones of two adjacent or opposite states, the further 
away the islands are, the weaker the effect that islands are able to generate. In some 
situations, if the maritime zones of islands cause distortion for the maritime delimitation, 
the islands may exert no effect. 514 In all the discussed cases, small islands have a maximum 
of half effect in maritime delimitation, even with those islands which have considerable 
population and economic significance such as the Kerkenas in the Tunisia/Libya case. 515 it 
is also noteworthy that the maximum half effect of all the small islands in these cases was 
obtained with the back up of the coastline from the mainland. 516 Therefore, it is submitted 
$09 Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration, paras. 147-8. 510 However, the Court did not give a concrete explanation of the reduction. ICJ Report, 2001, p. 40, at para. 219. 5: 
21 
ICJ Report, 2002, p. 303, at paras. 298-9. 
5Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, op. cit., note 98, Report 5-3, p. 929. 513 For details, see the analysis of Victor Prescott and Gillian Triggs, "Islands and Rocks and Their Role in 
Maritime Delimitation" in David Colson and Robert W. Smith (ed. ), International Maritime Boundaries, 
Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2005, Vol. 5), p. 3245 at 3255-9. 
14 This is also the conclusion of Bowett, op. cit, note 498 and Prescott, ibid. $15 Continental Shelf Case (Tunisia v. Libya), Judgment, ICJ Report (1982), p. 18. 
516 The Jan Mayen was an exception. It stood individually in maritime delimitation with the Greenland 
without the involvement of the mainland of Norway. However, as the Greenland was also an island, thus they 
165 
CHAPTER 4. PROSPECTS FOR MARITIME DELIMITATION FOR THE WATERS OF TI1F SPRATLYS 
that without the supportive effect of the mainland, the islands would have less effect if they 
stood individually in maritime delimitation with a mainland. 
In the current dispute, the Spratlys' features are located at considerable distances 
from the mainlands of the coastal states with the nearest features to the coastline of the 
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Figure 33. Distance from some nearest features of the Spratlys to coastal states 
5 1" 
All of the features are too small (smaller than most of the cases mentioned above)519 
and have no inhabitants. Furthermore, they stand as opposite "coasts" without the 
had equal effect in generating maritime zone. Therefore, the reduced effect of the Jan Mayen in maritime 
delimitation was not because Jan Mayen is an island, but because of the proportionality between the coastal 
length of the two islands. 
51 Information calculated from Mapinfo program, for illustration, see Figure 33. 
s" Map drawn by Mapinfo. 
5 19 For their sizes and other characteristics, see infra, Annex 1. 
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supportive effect of any mainland in maritime delimitation with the coasts of the mainland 
of littoral states. Hence, being small islands in maritime delimitation with mainlands, the 
features of Spratlys themselves may be relevant circumstances that lead to the adjustment 
of the equidistance lines. Without the supportive effect of a mainland, the effect of the 
Spratlys in maritime delimitation with littoral states might be much lower than those of the 
cases mentioned above. 520 One of the possibilities is that effect of these features will be 
reduced for the full effect of the mainland. 521 That is to say, title to the features of the 
Spratlys will not bring much benefit for the parties concerned in maritime delimitation with 
the mainland. 
Maritime delimitation between the mainland and the Spratlys gives rise to the 
existence of the shaded area (the maritime zone of the Spratlys after giving full effect to the 
coastal states). Within this area, as a source of entitlement, the Spratlys' features have vital 
effect in generating maritime zones for the parties. In fact, as all features are of the same 
status, maritime delimitation among them is likely to be decided by the equidistance line. 22 
The more features that the parties have title to, the more maritime zone they have. To this 
extent, the Spratlys play a significant role in maritime delimitation. 
$20 The only case which shares similar geographical situation to the South China Sea case was the St Pierre 
and Miquelon Arbitration. However, the St Pierre and Miquelon are of 237 and 210 square kilometres 
respectively, much bigger than the biggest feature of the Spratlys which is only about 0.4 square kilometres. 
Taking into account their size and inhabitation, the St Pierre and Miquelon were only given 24 nautical miles 
in the Western segment and a much reduction in the wide of their maritime zone in the Southern segment in 
maritime delimitation with some islands and coast of the mainland of Canada (For details, see (1992) 31 ILM 
1145 at paras 18-23 and 69-71). With much smaller in size and having no inhabitation, it is submitted that the 
effect of the Spratlys must be smaller than those of St Pierre and Miquelon. 
Even in a theoretical scenario that the Spratlys would be considered as opposite "coasts" in maritime 
delimitation with the mainland of littoral states, the disparity of 1 to thousands between the coast length of the 
Spratlys and the mainland would well be considered as an extreme disproportion that lead to an adjustment of 
the meridian lines. In the Gulf of Maine case, a ratio of only 1 to 1.38 was considered as sufficient to justify a 
correction of a median line delimitation (ICJ Report, 1984, para. 222). For discussion on the role of 
proportionality in maritime delimitation, see Tanaka Yoshifumi, "Reflection on the Concept of 
Proportionality in the Law of Maritime Delimitation", (2001) 3(16) IJMCL 433. 
52$ See illustration in Figure 34, infra. 
522 For further discussion, see infra, Section 5 of this Chapter. 
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Figure 34. EEZ of the Spratlys after giving full effect to the coastal states 523 
4.2.2. The access to the fishery and hydrocarbon resources 
Economic interests are usually under the consideration of the parties in maritime 
delimitation process because, in many cases, economic interests are the cause of the dispute 
5`' Map drawn by Mapinfo. 
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and the reasons for states seeking resolution to the dispute. However, economic factors 
have not played a significant role in the judgment of the ICJ and the Arbitration Tribunal so 
far. In the Tunisia/Libya case, s14 Tunisia requested the Court consider its poverty in 
maritime delimitation with Libya due to the lack of natural resources like agriculture and 
minerals, whereas Libya is rich of oil, gas and agriculture resources. 525 The Court made 
clear that 
these economic considerations cannot be taken into account for the delimitation of 
the continental shelf appertaining to each Party. They are virtually extraneous 
factors since they are variables which unpredictable national fortune or calamity, 
as the case may be, might at any time cause to tilt the scale one way or the other. A 
country might be poor today and become rich tomorrow as a result of an event 
such as the discovery of a valuable economic resource. 526 
In other cases, namely the Gulf of Maine, 527 Libya/Malta528 and Guinea/Guinea 
Bissau529 cases, the requests of the parties concerning economic resources including 
fishery, navigation and petroleum resources were also dismissed by the Court and the 
Tribunal. More recently, in the Eritrea/YemenS30 and Qatar v. Bahrain cases, 
531 economic 
factors like traditional fishing rights and the presence of a pearling bank did not play any 
role at all in maritime delimitation. In the Cameroon v. Nigeria case, 
532 the Court also ruled 
that "oil concessions and oil wells are not in themselves to be considered as relevant 
circumstances justifying the adjustment or shifting of the provision delimitation line". 
533 
Most recently, in the Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago case, 534 the Tribunal also rejected 
the flyingfish fishery activities of Barbados as a relevant circumstance in maritime 
delimitation in the Western segment between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. 
535 
However, one cannot completely rule out the role of the economic factor. This can 
be seen from the state practice in concluding maritime delimitation agreements, e. g. a 
number of maritime delimitation treaties among states, such as the 1980 treaty between 
524 ICJ Report, 1982. 
25Ibid, para. 106. : 
26 Ibid, para. 107. 
527 ICJ Report, 1984, paras. 236-7. 
528 ICJ Report, 1985, paras. 50-1. 
$29 Guinea/Guinea Bissau Maritime Delimitation Case (1986) 25 ILM, p. 251 (hereafter referred as 
Guinea/Guinea Bissau), at paras. 121-3. 
530 The Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, paras. 47-74. 
s31 ICJ Report, 2001, p. 40 at para. 236. 
$32 ICJ Report, 2002. 
s" Ibid, para. 304. 
34 Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago, 2006. 
$as Ibid, paras. 266-9. 
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France (Guadeloupe and Martinique) and Venezuela, 536 the 1972 treaty between France (St. 
Pierre and Miquelon) and Canada, 537 etc. 538 all take economic factors as relevant 
circumstances. The Court itself once stated that "the economic preoccupations so 
legitimately put forward by the Parties should quite naturally encourage them to consider 
mutually advantageous cooperation with a view to achieving their objective, which is the 
development of their countries". 539 Hence, in addition to sovereign title -a basis for 
generating maritime rights and other geographical characteristics as special circumstances - 
economic interests are factors which should be taken into account in maritime delimitation 
in order to arrive at an equitable solution. Otherwise, at the least, economic interests are 
conditions for states to establish cooperation to obtain better mutual benefits for the parties 
concerned. This is also the right approach in the case of the Spratlys where hydrocarbon 
and fishery resources are considered abundant in the adjacent water of the archipelago and 
they are one of the main causes of the dispute. At the moment, as the fishery and 
hydrocarbon are not fully explored, the access to these resources may not be taken into 
account as special circumstances in a prospect maritime delimitation. However, these 
factors should be considered for further cooperation among the states in the region in order 
to sustainably and peacefully manage the resources of the South China Sea. 
4.2.3. The elect ofhistoric title of China and the Philippines 
The historic title of China was already discussed in the earlier part of this 
Chapter. 540 In the maximum possibility, the historic claim of China would only be 
recognised as an historic right relating to fishing. If this right is recognised solely for China 
due to their traditional practice in the South China Sea, the outer limit of the zone for the 
fishing rights of China might create a relevant circumstance in maritime delimitation. That 
limit may be recognised as the boundary for fishing rights between China and the coastal 
states. However, such recognition would hardly occur as the dominance in fishing by 
China's fishermen only took place before the 150" century. After this time, China lost its 
maritime power and the resources in the South China Sea were exploited by several coastal 
s36 Report No. 2-11 in Chamey and Alexander, op. cit, note 98, Vol. 1, p. 603. 
s37 Ibid, Report No. 1-2, p. 387. 
53s For further details of state practice concerning economic interests in maritime delimitation treaties, see 
Barbara Kwiatkowska, "Economic and Environmental Considerations in Maritime Boundary Delimitations" 
in Chamey and Alexander, op. cit, note 98, Vol. 1, p. 75. 
539 Guinea/Guinea Bissau, (1986) 25ILM252, paras. 123. 
540 See Section 3.2, supra. 
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states as well as some European maritime powers. 54' Currently, fishing in the South China 
Sea also does not solely belong to China's fishermen. 542 Therefore, a similar approach to 
the Eritrea/Yemen case may be suitable for situation of the South China Sea. In the 
Eritrea/Yemen case, although the historic fishing right was not a relevant circumstance for 
maritime delimitation, the arbitration directed the parties to commence negotiations, in 
good faith, with a view towards concluding an agreement describing the ways in which 
nationals of both parties may use the resources of the mid-sea islands and their maritime 
zones, as those zones were described in the Award of the Tribunal, and details a mechanism 
of binding dispute resolution to settle any and all disputes arising out of the interpretation 
or application of the agreement. 543 
With regard to the historic title of the Philippines, it is noteworthy to mention the 
Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain, concluded in Paris on 10 December 
of 1898 in which Article 3 provided that "Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago 
known as the Philippines islands lying within the following lines... "Saa Accordingly, a 
system of lines defined by various parallels of latitude and meridians of longitude was 
issued. These lines are illustrated as the red line in an approximate rectangle shape in 
Figure 35 as follows: 
541 For further discussion, see Section 2.1, Chapter 3, supra. 
542 For information on fisheries practice in the region, see Section 2.2, Chapter 1, supra. 
543 The Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration Awards, paras. 87-112. 
544 4 Whiteman Digest of International Law, p. 286. 
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Figure 35. Baselines of the Philippines 
545 Sources: United Nations, The Law of the Sea: Baselines: 
National Legislation with Illustrative Maps. 
(Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 1989), p. 259. 
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In connection to Article 3 of the 1898 Peace Treaty, the Philippines government 
implies historic claim in their constitution that "the national territory comprises the 
Philippines archipelago, with all the islands and the waters embraced therein, and all the 
other territories belonging to the Philippines by historic right or legal title... "546 If the 
historic right that the Philippines mentioned in the constitution refers to the treaty limit 
lines in the 1898 Peace Treaty, the water area bound inside these lines may be considered 
as internal or territorial water, thus may affect the basepoints for defining an equidistance 
line. The answer to this issue is not clear since the Philippines has not clarified their 
position on this point. 
However, another treaty concerning the boundary between the Philippines and 
Northern Borneo between the United Kingdom and the United States signed on 2 January 
1930 stated that "all islands to the north and east of the said line.. . shall 
belong to the 
Philippines Archipelago, and all islands to the south and west of the said line shall belong 
to the State of North Borneo". 547 The line mentioned in this treaty is the same line as the 
1898 Treaty. Hence, it can be argued that both treaties refer to islands, that is the land 
territory, and not the areas of the sea within the defined lines. The reasons to use the 
specified lines may be justified by the practical method which is convenient for a large 
number of islands of the Philippines archipelago. Those lines should not be considered as 
any claim for the water inside as internal or territorial waters. 48 Therefore, it is submitted 
that the treaty limit of the Philippines may be ignored in maritime delimitation and the 
equidistance line for maritime delimitation will be drawn from the basepoints of the 
Western segment of the Philippines archipelagic baselines. 
4.2.4. Navigation and security interests 
Navigation and security interests may be other issues which can be raised as 
relevant circumstances in maritime delimitation as the South China Sea is considered as 
546 Article I of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, in force since 17 January 1973, full text of 
the Article available at 
http: //www un ore/Det)ts/Ios/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/PHL 1973 Constitution. pdf 
(accessed on 30 April 2006). 
sal 4 Whiteman Digest of International Law, p. 287. 
saa Max Sorenson, "The Territorial Sea of Archipelagos" (1959) 6 Netherlands International Law Review, 
cited in Dubner, The Law of Territorial Waters of Mid-Ocean Archipelagos and Archipelagic States, (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), p. 41. Similar interpretation is placed upon British legislation concerning the 
Queensland Barrier Reef, the Cook Islands and the Fiji Islands. For details, see ICJ Judgment in the Fisheries 
case, Pleading, Oral Arguments, Documents, Vol. II, Reply of the UK, p. 522, quoted in 4 Whiteman digest, 
p. 287. 
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possessing strategic positions for the navigation and security of the coastal states. 549 With 
regard to the navigation interests, all the main routes for international navigation follow the 
sea between Vietnam and the Spratlys. These routes are neither too close to the water of 
Vietnam nor that of the Spratlys, thus they are likely within the EEZ, and under the 1982 
LOSC the freedom of navigation will not be affected. Within the water of the Spratlys 
itself, there is no navigation route as the Spratlys is always considered a source of hazard 
for navigation. Hence, there is no reason to consider navigation interests as relevant 
circumstances for maritime delimitation. This may only be a topic for further cooperation 
among states concerned to ensure the safety of navigation. 
With regard to the security interests, the usage of the Spratlys depends on the title to 
this archipelago and this is left unanswered due to the difficulty in solving the sovereignty 
issue. However, due the fact that the Spratlys have long stood in the perception of the 
littoral states as of strategic importance for their security policy, 550 security interests may be 
raised as relevant circumstances in any maritime delimitation process for the South China 
Sea. From state practice and case law, security interests often appeared in the request for an 
adjustment of the parties. This included the cases of Anglo-French Arbitration, ss, Gulf of 
Maine, s52 Malta/Libyassj and most recently in Qatar v. Bahrain. 554 However, the Court 
and Tribunal in these cases ruled out the possibility of using security interests as relevant 
circumstances by reasoning that "common defence arrangements may require an 
examination of valid considerations of political ... character' , 
sss but were not relevant to 
determining the boundary, particularly when the delimitation was "not so near to the coast 
of either parties as to make the questions of security a particular consideration". 556 Even in 
the Qatar v. Bahrain case where the Jazirat Hawar island locates very close the coast of 
549 See Section 1.2, Chapter 1, supra. 550 Ibid 
551 In this case, securities interests of both France and the UK were the continuous continental shelf between 
their mainlands and the Channel Islands. For details of their arguments, see Anglo-French Arbitration Award, 
1979) 18 ILM, p. 399 at paras. 161 and 175. 52 The security interests in Gulf of Maine were the predominant interest that the US claimed it provided for 
the defence of the region. For details, see US Memorial, paras. 131-2. 553 Security interests were also considered as a concern of both Libya and Malta in this case where the 
maritime delimitation area was close to the centres of populations and the Maltese idea of `apron of 
jurisdiction. ' For details, see Maltese Memorial, para. 149 and Libyan Counter-Memorial, para. 2 10. ssa Qatar raised the arguments concerning its security interests (Counter-Memorial submitted by Qatar, 1997, 
230-1), but the Court was silent on this issue. ýss 
Judgment of the Gulf of Maine case, ICJ Report (1984), para. 59. ss6 Judgment of the Malta/Libya case, ICJ Report (1985), para. 51. 
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Qatar, the Court did not considered the security interests of Qatar as relevant circumstances 
in maritime delimitation. In the South China Sea case, the distance from the Spratlys to the 
coastal states is much larger. Even though the Spratlys was used for military purposes to 
attack some coastal states during the Second World War, currently, with modem military 
technology, distance is no longer a good justification for security. Thus, it is submitted that 
security interests may not be considered as relevant circumstances for maritime 
delimitation in the South China Sea dispute. 
4.3. Should a single maritime boundary be applied in the South China Sea dispute 
The application of a single or separate maritime boundary has not been a common 
rule in the law of maritime delimitation. For the practical method, the single maritime 
boundary has been chosen in case law and the majority of state practice. However, the 
application in fact will depend on the specific situation of each case and the choice of the 
parties concerned. 
In the South China Sea, elements leading to the application of the separate maritime 
boundary may be the prolongation of the seabed of Vietnam and Malaysia and the historic 
fishing rights of China and/or Taiwan. Regarding the prolongation of the seabed of 
Vietnam and Malaysia, as discussed earlier in this chapter, 
557 if Vietnam and Malaysia 
submit the outer edge limit of the continental shelf to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf and have the acceptance from the Commission, their continental shelf 
may be expanded to a maximum width of 350 nautical miles or 100 nautical miles from the 
2,500 metre isobath. Meanwhile, the largest distance from the centre of the Spratlys to 
coastal states is less than 400 nautical miles, 558 thus the maritime overlapping between the 
Spratlys and the coastal states will occur in both the EEZ and the continental shelf. 
In theory, it might be possible to delimit a separate maritime boundary 
for the EEZ 
and the continental shelf as the prolongation might be considered as relevant circumstance 
to shift the maritime boundary for continental shelves further for coastal states. However, 
in 
practice, as the overlapping between the Spratlys and the coastal states will occur in both 
the EEZ and the continental shelf, delimiting separate maritime boundaries will hardly 
occur because of the difficulty in exploiting the resources of the EEZ and the continental 
 Section 3.1.2 this Chapter, supra. 
558 For details, see Section 1.1, Chapter 1, supra and Figures 28 and 29, supra. 
175 
CHAPTER 4. PROSPECTS FOR MAR FJME DELIMiTATTON FOR THE WATERS OF THE SPRATLYS 
shelf if these two zones belong to different jurisdictions. However, separate maritime 
boundaries may be used for the fishing zone and the continental shelf. This is the case when 
the historic fishing right of China is to be recognised or a common fishing zone will be 
established in the South China Sea. Furthermore, as the sovereignty is still unresolved, the 
parties may arrive at a concession to joint exploitation of the resources in the South China 
Sea. In this case, it is also possible for them to choose different zones for each field of 
cooperation, e. g. different limits for exploiting living resources and mineral resources. In 
addition, as the maritime spaces under the consideration of this thesis are the maximum 
possible due to the broad interpretation of Article 121(3) , 
559 if the parties concerned agree 
on the other capacity of the Spratlys in generating maritime zones, the maritime 
overlapping between the mainland of coastal states and the Spratlys will be reduced and 
open to the possibility of separate maritime boundaries. Again, the use of single or separate 
maritime boundaries is greatly dependent on the choice of the parties in the South China 
Sea dispute. 
If the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf do not agree with the 
extended outer edge of the continental shelf of Vietnam and Malaysia, the normal breadth 
of 200 nautical miles will be applied. In this case, it will be likely that the maritime 
delimitation in the South China Sea results in a single maritime boundary. However, from 
the consideration process of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, some 
legal issues may be clarified. The precedents set by the submission of Russia, Brazil, 
Australia and Iceland560 recently showed that in addition to the geographical consideration, 
the Commission also received the statements of countries concerned regarding their 
potential overlapping of maritime zones from the submission . 
561 By considering whether 
the reaction of these countries should be taken into account, the Commission might have to 
deal with some issues concerning maritime zones generation among these states. 
562 In the 
$59 For details of the arguments, see Section 3.5, Chapter 2, supra. 560 For information relating to these submissions, see http: //www. un. orc/DeRts/los/clcs new/clcs home. htm 
(accessed on 16 April 2006). 
561 For example, the Russia submission was reacted to by five states, namely Canada, Norway, Japan, 
Denmark and the United States. For full text of these reactions, see CLCS. 01.2001. LOS/CAN, 
CLSC. 01.2001. LOS/DNK, CLCS. 01.2001. LOS/JPN, CLCS. 01.2001. LOS/NOR and CLCS. 01.2001. LOS/ 
USA online at http: //www. un. orj/Depts/los/clcs new/clcs home. htm (accessed on 16 April 2006). 562 For example, in making recommendations to Russia with regard to Norway's reaction, the Commission 
referred to the treaties between the two countries in the Barents and Bearing Seas. Also, by examining the 
relevance of Japanese note, the Commission indicated that all the seabed of the Sea of Okhotsk is part of the 
legal continental shelf and can hardly be considered to be prejudicial to the position of Japan with respect to 
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case of the South China Sea dispute, if the submission of Malaysia and Vietnam is rejected 
by other littoral states, the overlapping can only result from the Spratlys, thus the 
Commission to some extent will have to clarify the legal status of the Spratlys in generating 
maritime zones. This no doubt will help narrow down the dispute and facilitate its 
settlement. 
4.4. Possible maritime delimitation method for overlapping between territorial sea 
and EEZ 
Among the features of the Spratlys, the Fiery Cross Reef, Pearson Reef, Pigeon 
Reef, Barque Canada Reef, Mariveles Reef, Royal Charlotte Reef, Louisa Reef, Alicia Reef 
and Commodore Reef and two groups of features, namely the Union Reef and the Swallow 
Reef with some nearby low tide elevations, qualify under Article 121(1) but not Article 
121(3), thus can only generate the internal water, territorial sea and contiguous zone. 563 
However, as distance from some of these features to the coastal states is more than 48 
nautical miles (the double breadth of the contiguous zone) but less than 224 nautical miles 
(the total breadth of a contiguous zone with a EEZ) overlapping among the territorial sea, 
contiguous zone and even internal water of these features with the EEZ of coastal states 
will likely occur in some areas, e. g. with the EEZ of Malaysia. 564 
In these situations, as the maritime zones are not of the same type and differ in their 
breadth, the equidistance principle cannot be applied in maritime delimitation. International 
law in maritime delimitation is also silent on this issue. However, from case law and state 
practice the "wrong side" island in maritime delimitation normally will not be given full 
effect. Particularly in the case of small and uninhabited islands like the features of the 
Spratlys, enclaving may be considered the proper solution for them in maritime 
the territorial dispute or delimitation of the continental shelf with the Russia Federation. For the summary of 
the recommendation of the Commission to Russian in the Report of the Secretary-General to the Fifty-seventh 
session of the General Assembly under the agenda item Oceans and the Law of the Sea, see A/57/57/Add. 1 
(paras. 38-41), online at 
httn: //daccessdds. un. ore/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO2/629/28/PDF/N0262928. pdf? OpenElement (accessed on 16 
April 2006) 
For a discussion on the consideration of the Commission together with the reaction of other states to the 
submission of Russia and Australia, see C. Johnson and A. G. Oude Elferink, "Submission to the Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in the Cases of Unsolved Land and Maritime Dispute: The Significance 
of Article 76(10) of the Law of the Sea Convention", in David FreeStone, Richard Barnes and David Ong, 
The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 161 at 167-71 and 
173-6. 
563 For details, see Section 5.2.2, Chapter 2, supra. s64 For illustration on map, see Figure 31, supra. 
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delimitation, i. e. these features may be given maritime space of 12 nautical miles if their 
maritime zones are overlapping with the EEZ of the coastal states. This is also the 
suggested solution for maritime delimitation among the Spratlys' features between those 
who qualify under Article 121(1), i. e., only having internal water, territorial sea and 
contiguous zones and those who qualify under Article 121(3) as having an EEZ and 
continental shelf. 
4.5. Some observations on the prospects of maritime delimitation in the South 
China Sea dispute 
If the parties to the dispute agree with each other for a maritime delimitation in the 
Spratlys' waters of the South China Sea, the method and relevant circumstances which 
have been examined in this chapter may be applied for a prospect maritime delimitation 
process. This process may arrive at a prospect result as follows: 
(1) A full effect of the mainland in any maritime delimitation between the 
Spratlys and the littoral states. 
(2) Equidistance lines as maritime boundaries for any maritime delimitation 
among the Spratlys' features with the same effect in generating maritime 
zones, i. e. all qualify under Article 121(3) or 121(1). 
(3) Enclaves for any maritime delimitation between the features of the 
Spratlys which only qualify under Article 121(1) with the EEZ and 
continental shelf of the mainland of littoral states or of other features of 
the Spratlys which qualify under Article 121(3). 
However, the difficulties in settling the sovereignty issues also results in a deadlock 
in the maritime delimitation. The titles to the mainland of littoral states and islands of the 
Spratlys are the basis for generating maritime zones thus define and delimit the overlapping 
areas. Hence, as far as the sovereignty issues have not been solved, there is no definite 
maritime boundary for the maritime issues. There is only the possibility to facilitate the 
dispute settlement through clarifying some legal issues including primarily the validity of 
the outer edge of the continental shelf of Vietnam and Malaysia and possibly the ability of 
the Spratlys to generate maritime zones of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf, if Malaysia and Vietnam submit their delineation of the outer limit of the continental 
shelf to the Commission. 
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Although not having the effect of reducing maritime spaces which generated from 
the mainland of coastal states, the Spratlys will have a vital role for states to acquiring 
maritime zones in the shaded area (the maritime zones of the Spratlys after giving full 
effect to the mainlands of littoral states as in Figure 36, supra). This results from the 12 
islands which may generate full maritime zones. Therefore, the next part of this chapter will 
take a closer look at how the entitlement over these islands affects the maritime 
delimitation result. 
5. A closer look at the maritime delimitation prospect of the shaded area 
5.1. The effect of the Spratlys' features in maritime delimitation 
The effect of the Spratlys' features on maritime delimitation can be divided into two 
groups. Of 35 islands of the Spratlys resulted from the analysis of Chapter 2,23 of Article 
121(3) are able to generate only internal water and territorial sea. These islands (unless they 
overlap with each other) will be enclaves if they are located within the overlapping area, 
and thus they do not reduce much the maritime rights of littoral states. The major 
overlapping will be produced by 12 others (of Article 121(2)) which may generate full 
maritime zone. 565 From Chapter 3, Vietnam, China and Taiwan make their claims to all of 
them. The Philippines claims 10. Only Malaysia and Brunei did not claim any of the 12 
islands. In fact, of these 12 islands, Vietnam occupies 5 (namely the Southeast Cay, Sand 
Cay, Nanyit Island, Spratly Island and Amboyna Cay), the Philippines occupy 6 (namely 
the Northeast Cay, Thitu Island, West York Island, Flat Island, Nanshan Island, and Loaita 
Island) and Taiwan occupies 1 (the Itu Aba Island). 
Of the 12 islands which may generate full maritime zones, the Spratly Island and 
Amboyna Cay are further southward and excluded from the claim of the Philippines. Both 
of them will create overlapping with maritime zones generated from the mainland of 
Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei. In fact, according to the conclusions from the previous 
section, overlapping between maritime zones of the Spratlys' features and those generated 
from the mainland may result in the full effect of the mainland. However, any state which 
563 However, not all of them will produce significant overlapping for all littoral states as detail was examined 
in Section 3.3, supra and 12 is the maximum result of the application of Article 121(3) (See Chapter 2, 
Section 3.5, supra). 
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has entitlement to these two islands is still able to control a large maritime area in the south 
of the shaded area. 
566 Map drawn by Mapinfo. 
180 
CHAPTER 4. PROSPECTS FOR MARITIME DELIMITATION FOR THE WATERS OF THE SPRATLYS 
The other ten islands are located in the central area, approximately midway between 
Vietnam and the Philippines. Northeast Cay, Southeast Cay, Thitu Island, Loaita Island, Itu 
Aba Island, Sand Cay and Nanyit Island are close together at the middle of the north of the 
shaded area. West York Island, Flat Island and Nanshan Island are rather eastward and 
close to the Philippines. All of them will create major overlapping with the maritime zones 
of the mainland of Vietnam and the Philippines, particularly the latter. However, the 
delimitation between maritime zones of the Spratlys and littoral states, as examined above, 
gives rise to the full effect of the mainland. Entitlement to any of these features will have 
significant effect in generating maritime zone in the north of the shaded area. 
5.2. Delimitation of the shaded area: Some hypotheses 
Some concrete outcomes of the delimitation in the shaded area will be achieved 
based on different hypotheses on the entitlement of such 12 islands as follows: 
(1) If China or Taiwan succeeds with their claim over all 12 islands, the shaded area 
will belong to China and Taiwan. If, in any case, the full effect of the mainlands in 
maritime delimitation between the Spratlys and the mainlands cannot be reached, all littoral 
states will be affected with the worst effect belong to the Philippines as they are closest to 
the Spratlys. 
(2) If Vietnam succeeds with their claim over all 12 islands that may generate full 
maritime zones, Vietnam will have entitlement to the entire of the shaded area. If, in any 
case the full effect of the mainlands in maritime delimitation between the Spratlys and the 
mainlands cannot be reached, all littoral states, except Vietnam, will be affected in which 
the worst effect still belongs to the Philippines as they are closest to the Spratlys. China and 
Taiwan will loose nothing as their coasts are to far away to overlap with the maritime zones 
generated from the Spratlys' features. 
(3) If the Philippines succeeds with their claim over 10 claimed islands, the 
Philippines will have entitlement to the North of the shaded area. The entitlement to the 
South will belong to any state which has title to the Spratly Island and the Amboyna Cay. 
Vietnam, China and Taiwan are all claimaints to these two islands. The delimitation line 
between the North and the South of the shaded area in this scenario will be the equidistance 
line of the most southward feature of the 10 islands, i. e. the Nanyit Island with the Spratly 
Island and the Amboyna Cay (the line named AB and BD respectively as illustrated in 
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Figures 37 below). On the basis of the entitlement to the Spratly Island and the Amboyna 
Cay, the southern area may belong to one party (either Vietnam, China or Taiwan) or may 
be further divided into two (any two of the three parties if each of them only has title to one 
island). Again, in this case equidistance line will be applied (the line named CE as 
illustrated in Figure 37 below). 
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If, in any case, the full effect of the mainlands in maritime delimitation between the 
Spratlys and the mainlands cannot be reached, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei will be 
affected, in which the worst effect will be towards Malaysia and Brunei as they are the 
closest states to Amboyna Cay. 
(4) If the entitlement to the 12 islands is divided according to the current situation of 
occupation, Vietnam will have title to the Southeast Cay, Sand Cay, Nanyit Island, Spratly 
Island and Amboyna Cay. The Philippines have title to the Northeast Cay, Thitu Island, 
West York Island, Flat Island, Nanshan Island, and Loaita Island and Taiwan has title to the 
Itu Aba Island. With the title to the Spratly Island, the Amboyna Cay, Nanyit Island and 
Sand Cay, Vietnam will have entitlement to the south of the shaded area. The maritime 
boundaries in the south of the shaded area will be the equidistance lines drawn between the 
Nanyit Island and Sand Cay of Vietnam and the Itu Aba Island of Taiwan (AB and BE lines 
in Figure 38 below), and between the Sand Cay and the Loaita Island of the Philippines 
(CD in Figure 38 below). With title to the Northeast Cay, Thitu Island, West York Island, 
Flat Island, Nanshan Island, and Loaita Island, the Philippines will have entitlement to a 
maritime zone at the North of the shaded zone. This area will be delimited by equidistance 
lines between the Loaita Island and Sand Cay of Vietnam (the CD line), between the Loaita 
Island and Itu Aba Island of Taiwan (the CF line), between Thitu Island and Southeast Cay 
of Vietnam (the GH line) and between the Northeast Cay and Southeast Cay of Vietnam 
(the GI line). In central of the shaded area, with the entitlement to the Itu Aba Island, 
Taiwan will have title to a maritime area delimited with Vietnam in the South by the AB 
and BE lines, and with the Philippines in the North by EF line. 
Combining all the delimitation result, under this hypothesis, the Philippines will 
have title to the north of the shaded area which is defined by the DCEF lines, excluding the 
small area defined by the HGI for the Southeast Cay which belong to Vietnam. Taiwan will 
have title to a maritime zone at the central of the shaded area defining by the ABEF lines. 
Vietnam will have title to two zones, one in the south defining by the ABECD lines and 
one in the central defining by the HGI lines. For illustration on maps, see Figures 38 and 39 
below. 
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Figure 39. Maritime delimitation for the shaded area with the hypothesis that entitlement 
will be generated according to current occupation (the closer look)"9 
5.3. Observation on the title to the Spratlys toward maritime delimitation prospect 
of the shaded area 
From the above mentioned effect of the Spratlys in maritime delimitation and some 
hypothesised outcomes, the sovereignty claims of the parties only serve two roles. On the 
one hand, it helps the parties generate entitlement to maritime space in the shaded zone. On 
the other, it enables the encroaching on the maritime zones of the Philippines and Malaysia 
by the enclaving of some Article 121(3) islands. Thereby, with no Article 121(3) island 
located in their EEZ from the mainland, Vietnam, China and Taiwan will loose nothing 
from their maritime zone which is generated from their mainlands, but only gain more from 
any title established to the Spratlys' features. Only Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines 
may loose some maritime zone due to the enclaving of some Article 121(3) features of the 
Spratlys, but the loss is not much. However, they can also gain some more maritime space 
S69 Map drawn by Mapinfo. 
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if they are successful with their sovereignty claims to some of the Spratlys. However, all 
the extended maritime zones from the Spratlys will only be achieved if some features of the 
Spratlys are to be accepted to pass Article 121(3). Thus, ultimately, the sovereignty issue is 
only important and complicated in generating maritime right in the shaded area. This 
conclusion may, therefore, help the parties compromise on the sovereignty issue for a more 
effective way of solving the dispute. 
6. Conclusion 
Due to the presence of many features of the Spratlys in the middle of the South 
China Sea, the maritime overlapping is increased significantly among littoral states, thus 
creating the most complicated ever maritime dispute in state practices. Applying the 
contemporary international law to this maritime dispute, the equidistance lines will be used 
as a starting point to generate the provisional maritime boundary. Two equidistance lines 
are drawn for different types of overlapping, one for the overlapping between EEZ and 
continental shelf generated from the mainland of littoral states and those generated from the 
Spratlys' features, and the other for overlapping among the Spratlys' feature themselves. 
Thereafter, all relevant circumstances in the maritime delimitation will be taken into 
account to adjust the meridian line for an equitable result. Although many circumstances 
may be claimed to be relevant in maritime delimitation of the South China Sea dispute, 
such as the presence of tiny islands, the access to the fishery and hydrocarbon resources, 
the security interests of coastal states, navigation interests in the South China Sea and the 
historic title of China and the Philippines, the actual relevant circumstance in maritime 
delimitation between the mainland and the Spratlys may only be the presence of the tiny 
and uninhabited islands of the Spratlys. Examination of state practices and judgments of the 
ICJ shows that in most of the cases, tiny islands which located on the wrong side have a 
maximum of half effect or are even ignored in order to maintain the equitable result for the 
maritime delimitation. The maritime delimitation in the South China Sea may not be an 
exception to this trend, thus the islands of the Spratlys are likely to give a reduced effect in 
maritime delimitation. Hence, coastal states may still have full maritime space in maritime 
delimitation with the Spratlys. Notwithstanding, the reduced effect of the Spratlys' features 
is not applied to the maritime delimitation among themselves. Therefore, equidistance line 
will likely be the maritime boundaries for delimitation in the shaded area. 
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As the sovereignty issue in the South China Sea dispute is unlikely to be solved in 
the short term, there is no definite maritime boundary for the maritime issues. However, 
from the analysis for a prospect maritime delimitation of Spratlys waters of the South 
China Sea, the actual role of the Spratlys in maritime delimitation was identified. The 
SPratlys will not have the effect to reduce the maritime zone generated from the entitlement 
of the mainland of littoral states. They only have the effect to generate maritime zone in the 
shaded area. This clarification may help reducing the illusion of the parties toward the 
ability to generate maritime zones of the Spratlys. This also clarifies that with the 
maximum approach taken from Chapter 2 that some of the features of the Spratlys may 
generate full maritime zone, there is no high sea in the South China Sea, thus limits the 
number of the parties concerned. 
Based on a prospect maritime delimitation, the complicated issue concerning 
maritime delimitation is to delimit the shaded area. currently, while waiting for a 
Permanent solution to the sovereignty issue which is no doubt not easy to be reached in the 
Coming time, the parties concerned may agree to negotiate some kind of cooperation for 
this area in order to better management the South China Sea. The next chapter will 
bring 
the analysis of the sovereignty and maritime issues forward to examine all available 
feasible solutions for the South China Sea dispute. 
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CHAPTER 5. JUDICIAL OR DIPLOMATIC METHODS: THE FEASIBLE 
SOLUTIONS TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE 
1. Introduction 
Analysis in the previous chapters shows that the core of the South China Sea 
dispute is the entitlement to 12 features of the Spratlys which may generate full maritime 
zones in the shaded zone for the parties. A prospect of maritime delimitation will arrive at 
the full effect for the mainland of littoral states in generating maritime zone and the use of 
equidistance line as maritime boundaries in the shaded area (with the hypothesis that the 
Spratlys' features belong to different jurisdictions). However, since the sovereignty issue 
has yet to be resolved, no definite solution for maritime delimitation is available either. 
In order to settle a dispute, Article 33(1) of the UN Charter provides a list of dispute 
settlement means including negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, 
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements. These peaceful means can 
be classified into two groups, namely settlement through judicial institutions and 
diplomatic measures. This chapter will examine the prospects of these methods in settling 
the South China Sea dispute. 
2. Judicial method: The possibility of using an arbitration constituted under 
Annex VII of the LOSC 
2.1. The impossibility ofjurisdiction of the ICJ and international arbitration 
The ICJ and international arbitration have jurisdiction over a dispute on the basis of 
the consent of the states concerned. Consent can be given by a means of a compromissory 
clause in a treaty or a declaration, e. g. under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute. Alternatively, 
parties to a dispute may also give their consent through a special agreement or an 
arbitration compromis in response to a particular dispute. 570 
In the South China Sea dispute, the strategic positions of the Paracels and Spratlys 
and other interests from their surrounding waters are of crucial importance and the parties 
are aware of the weaknesses in their arguments. Thus, the parties are in favour of keeping 
5'0 John Merrills, International Dispute Settlement, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 127-130. 
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the status quo of the dispute rather than submitting the dispute to any judicial settlement 
mechanism in order to face the risk of becoming a loser. 
China usually states that the country has strong evidence to prove its sovereignty over 
both archipelagos. It also has an advantage of having a better understanding of the procedures 
of the ICJ by having a representative judge at this Court. However, China has still not 
accepted the Court's jurisdiction over the South China Sea dispute. The Philippines, which 
can be considered radical in the region with its general acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction 
since 1972, however, entered a reservation regarding the South China Sea dispute. 57' Taiwan 
has not yet been recognised as a state, and so cannot use the ICJ jurisdiction. Malaysia and 
Brunei which are considered as having weak arguments in the case also seemingly never 
want to invoke the ICJ procedure to solve this dispute. Only Vietnam expresses its 
willingness to the judicial settlement mechanism. 572 In addition, the parties have not reached 
(and possibly will never reach) any special agreement to submit the dispute to any judicial 
settlement mechanisms. Lacking the consent of the parties, the ICJ and international 
arbitration will not have any jurisdiction over the South China Sea dispute. 
2.2. Dispute settlement under Part XV of the LOSC 
The fact that only Vietnam was willing to submit the South China Sea dispute to a 
judicial institution would not rule out the possibility of settling the dispute by judicial 
method. The recent award of the Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago case proved the success 
of the unilateral submission of Barbados thus settling its dispute, concerning maritime 
delimitation with Trinidad and Tobago, by means of a tribunal constituted under Annex VII 
of the 1982 LOSC. 
571 The Declaration of the Philippines to the jurisdiction of the ICJ states that 
"Provided, that this declaration shall not apply to any dispute 
e. arising out of or concerning jurisdiction or rights claimed or exercised by the Philippines 
i. in respect of the natural resources, including living organisms belonging to sedentary 
species, of the sea-bed and subsoil of the continental shelf of the Philippines, or its analogue 
in an archipelago, as described in Proclamation No. 370 dated 20 March 1968 of the 
President of the Republic of the Philippines; or 
ii. in respect of the territory of the Republic of the Philippines, including its territorial seas and 
inland waters; " 512 Chemillier-Gendreau, Monique, op. cit., note 35, p. 133. Also, in a private interview with Valencia, an 
official of the Vietnamese government confirmed this position, for details, see Valencia et at, op. cit., note 16, p. 33. 
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A tribunal constituted under Annex VII is one of the dispute settlement methods 
which are provided at Part XV of the 1982 LOSC. 573 Reference to international law 
concerning dispute settlement, Section 1 of Part XV requires the parties to the 1982 LOSC 
to settle their dispute by peaceful means according to their choice. Section 2 of Part XV 
provides for compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions if the parties fail to reach 
settlement under Section 1. However, the freedom of the parties is still ensured as Article 
287 in Section 2 allows parties the choice of forum, including the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the ICJ, the Arbitral Tribunal and the Special Arbitral 
Tribunal. In theory, if the parties do not choose their forum, any procedure may be used. 
However, the ICJ, ITLOS, and Arbitral Tribunal have contentious jurisdiction, thus do not 
have jurisdiction over a dispute without the consent of the parties. In this regard, the 
Arbitral Tribunal is the only means which may be used if the parties did not make their 
choice under Article 287. Article 298 further offers states the opportunity to make optional 
written declaration excluding the operation of procedures provided for in Section 2. 
Accordingly, 
when signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time thereafter, a 
state may, without prejudice to the obligations arising under section 1, declare in 
writing that it does not accept any one or more of the procedures provided for in 
section 2 with respect to one or more of the following categories disputes: 
(a) (i) disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15,74 and 83 
relating to sea boundary delimitations, or those involving historic bays or titles, 
provided that a state having made such a declaration shall, when such a dispute 
arises subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention and where no 
agreement within a reasonable period of time is reached in negotiations between 
the parties, at the request of any party to the dispute, accept submission of the 
matter to conciliation under Annex V, section 2; and provided further that any 
dispute that necessarily involves the concurrent consideration of any unsettled 
S73 For further discussion on the dispute settlement mechanism of the 1982 LOSC, see John Merrills, op. cit., 
note 570, Chapter 8, p. 182; Robin Churchill, "Some Reflections on the Operation of the Dispute Settlement 
System of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea Convention during its First Decade" in FreeStone, D., 
Barnes, It and Ong, D. (eds. ), The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), p. 388; Natalie Klein, Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); J Collier and A. V. Lowe, The Settlement of Disputes in 
International Law: Institutions and Procedures, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), Chapter 4; E. D 
Brown, "Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea: the UN Convention Regime" (1997) 21(1) Marine 
Policy 17; Alan E. Boyle, "Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: Problems of 
Fragmentation and Jurisdiction" (1997) 46(1) ICLQ 37; Jonathan I. Charney, "The Implications of Expanding 
International Dispute Settlement Systems: the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea" (1996) 90 AJIL 69; 
Shigeru Oda, "Dispute Settlement Prospects in the Law of the Sea" (1995) 44(4) ICLQ 863; and A. O. Adede, 
The System for Settlement of Disputes under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Drafting 
History and A Commentary, (Dordrecht, Boston and Lancaster. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987). 
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dispute concerning sovereignty or other rights over continental or insular land 
territory shall be excluded from such submission; 
(ii) after the conciliation commission has presented its report, which shall state 
the reasons on which it is based, the parties shall negotiate an agreement on the 
basis of that report; if these negotiations do not result in an agreement, the 
parties shall, by mutual consent, submit the question to one of the procedures 
provided for in section 2, unless, the parties otherwise agree; 
(iii) this subparagraph does not apply to any sea boundary dispute finally settled 
by an arrangement between the parties, or to any such dispute which is to be 
settled in accordance with a bilateral or multilateral agreement binding upon 
those parties; 
If a party fails to make declaration under this article, it will be bound by the 
decision of the procedure of Section 2 without any limitations. 
In the Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago case, Trinidad and Tobago did not make 
their choice under Article 287 and did not declare any limitation under Article 298, 
therefore, they had to agree to settle their dispute by the binding decision of an arbitral 
tribunal in accordance with Annex VII without any limitations other than those inherent in 
the terms of Part XV and Annex VII. 574 This precedent could have been applied to the 
South China Sea dispute as until August 2006 the parties to the South China Sea dispute 
had not made their choice of forum under Article 287 and had not declared limitation under 
Article 298. Unfortunately, the precedent of the Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago case made 
the parties in the South China Sea vigilant. Four months after the Award of Barbados v. 
Trinidad and Tobago was held, China made their declaration proclaiming that "China does 
not accept any of the procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention 
with respect to all the categories of disputes referred to in paragraph 1 (a) (b) and (c) of 
Article 298 of the Convention". 575 This declaration ruled out the possibility of using 
unilateral submission and a chance was missed for settling the South China Sea dispute by a 
judicial institution. Notwithstanding the limitation of Article 298 on judicial settlement, the 
point (a)(i) of the article provides that a state that makes declaration under the article is still 
bound to accept compulsory conciliation. 576 If conciliation is unsuccessful the parties have to 
submit the dispute to one of the compulsory settlement procedures unless they agree on some 
other procedure. Unfortunately, this compulsory provision once again opts out delimitation 
S74 Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago Award, 2006, paras. 191-217. 
57$ The declaration of China was made on 25 August 2006. For full text see 
http: //www. un. orR/Depts/los/convention agreements/convention declarations. htm#China%2OUpon%20ratifi 
cation (accessed on 20 July 2007) 3'6 Procedure for compulsory conciliation is provided at Annex V of the 1982 LOSC. 
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disputes involving questions of title to territory. Therefore, compulsory conciliation cannot be 
applied to the South China Sea dispute either. 577 
However, the dispute settlement mechanism of the 1982 LOSC may still be useful in 
facilitating the dispute settlement. It may help narrow the differences of the parties in 
application of the 1982 LOSC in the South China Sea dispute, such as the application of 
Article 121(3) (which plays a key role in defining the status of the Spratlys), the application 
of straight baseline and the application of the outer limit of the continental shelf. The correct 
application of these issues will help generate the exactly overlapping maritime zones in the 
region, thus facilitate the dispute settlement. Also, if the parties in the dispute agree to pool 
their sovereignty for joint development in certain areas of the South China Sea, the tribunal 
can also play a helpful role in defining the joint development area. 578 
In addition, if a cooperation mechanism is established, the dispute settlement of the 
1982 LOSC, particularly the special arbitral tribunal under Annex VIII, may provide an 
effective dispute settlement mechanism for any dispute emerging during the cooperation 
process. The fields which fall under jurisdiction of a special arbitral tribunal instituted under 
Annex VIII, namely disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the articles of 
1982 LOSC relating to (1) fisheries, (2) protection and preservation of the marine 
environment, (3) marine scientific research, or (4) navigation, including pollution from 
vessels and by dumping579 are vital for any cooperation regime in a semi-enclosed sea like 
the South China Sea. 58° 
Being members to the 1982 LOSC, all littoral states in the South China Sea are bound 
by the obligation of the Convention, in which dispute settlement mechanism is one of the 
novel issues that the parties have both rights and obligation to invoke to settle their maritime 
dispute. Making use of this mechanism will certainly facilitate the parties to settle the South 
China Sea dispute. 
577 Collier and Lowe made a conclusion that delimitation disputes involving question of title to territory may 
be excluded entirely from the compulsory settlement procedures under the provision of Article 298(1)(a) of 
the 1982 LOSC. See John Collier and Vaughan Lowe, The Settlement of Dispute in International Law, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 93, fn53. 
7E In the Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago case, Barbados raised a request for a fishery regime. However, 
the Tribunal held that as neither of the parties directed a dispute over their respective rights and duties in 
respect of fisheries, the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction on this issue (Paras. 276-7 of the Award). Thus, it is 
submitted that if the parties had agreed to submit the issue related to the limit of a cooperation boundary to the 
Tribunal, the Tribunal would had jurisdiction on this issue. 
579 These fields are provided under Article I of Annex VIII of the 1982 LOSC. 
580 For further discussion on a prospective cooperation regime, see infra this chapter. 
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2.3. The authority of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
(CLCS) under Article 76 of the 1982 LOSC 
In addition to the provision of Part XV, Article 76 of the 1982 LOSC also provides 
a mechanism under the CLCS in which, indirectly, the continental shelf of coastal states 
will be reviewed. By providing a recommendation for a legitimate outer limit of the 
continental shelf, to some extent, the review of the CLCS will facilitate the delimitation of 
the overlapping continental shelves. 
Article 76 lays out the method to measure the continental shelf in which normally 
the width of the continental shelf is 200 nautical miles, but in the special case where the 
natural prolongation of the seabed is beyond 200 nautical miles, subjected to certain 
geographical conditions, the width of the continental shelf can be extended to a maximum 
of 350 nautical miles from a state's baseline or 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 metre 
isobath. 581 In these cases, paragraph 8 of Article 76 requires that information on the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles shall be submitted to the CLCS. The CLCS in 
its turn shall make recommendations to coastal states on the matter of establishment of the 
outer limit of the continental shelf. The limit of the continental shelf, established on the 
basis of the recommendation, shall be final and binding. 582 
581 Article 76, paras. 4,5 and 6 of the 1982 LOSC. The geographical conditions required for the outer limit of 
the continental shelf are listed under paragraph 4 that: "(i) a line connecting the outermost points where the 
`thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least one percent of the shortest distance from such point to the foot of 
the continental slope', or (ii) a line connecting points `not more than 60 nautical miles from the foot of the 
continental slope"'. For discussion of the application of these technical requirements, see United Nations, The 
Law of the Sea: Definition of the Continental Shelf: An Examination the Relevant Provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (New York: UN publication, 1993), Cook, P. J and C. Carleton 
(eds. ), Continental Shelf Limits: The Scientific and Legal Interface, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 
and Ron Macnab, "The Case for Transparency in the Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf in 
Accordance with UNCLOS Article 76" (2004) 35(1) ODIL, 1 at 2-7. 
sae The full text of Article 76(8) provides that: "Information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured shall be submitted 
by the coastal state to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set up under Annex lI on the 
basis of equitable geographic representation. The Commission shall make recommendations to coastal States 
on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf. The limits of the shelf 
established by a coastal state on the basis of these recommendations shall be final and binding. " Annex 11 of 
the Convention provides further detail on the structure and functions of the Commission that the Commission 
is to be composed of an elected group of 21 technical specialists which have the following functions: 
(a) to consider the data and other material submitted by coastal states concerning the outer limits of the 
continental shelf in areas where those limits extend beyond 200 nautical miles, and to make 
recommendations in accordance with Article 76 and the Statement of Understanding adopted on 29 
August 1980 by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea; 
(b) to provide scientific and technical advice, if requested by the coastal state concerned during the 
preparation of the data referred to in subparagraph (a). 
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The procedure by which the CLCS makes recommendations based on the 
information from the coastal states is elaborated on in Annex II of the 1982 LOSC and the 
Rules of Procedure. 583 Accordingly, the member states which generate a continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles must submit the information of the outer limit of their 
continental shelf to the CLCS as soon as possible but, in any case, within 10 years of entry 
into force of the Convention for that state. 584 Taking into account the difficulties that 
developing states are facing in preparing the information for submission, at the 11th meeting 
of member states to the Convention in 2001, the parties agreed that for state parties for 
which the Convention enters into force before 13 May 1999, the 10-year time shall be taken 
as commencing on that date. 585 A subcommission, which is established for each submission 
and consists of seven members, subject to the information submitted by coastal states will 
make recommendations on the limit of the continental shelf. 586 The recommendation of the 
subcommission will be approved by the two-third majority vote of the members of the 
CLCS 587 If the coastal state does not agree with the recommendation, it may make a 
revised or new submission to the CLCS within a reasonable time. 588 
In the case that the consideration of the subcommission and CLCS is related to land 
and maritime dispute, such consideration will not be dealt with in the dispute, unless the 
With regard to the stipulation that the recommendation of the Commission will be final and binding, there 
were some concerns as to whom the recommendation will have such effect. Ted L. McDorman analysed the 
states' opinions during the third UNCLOS in 1980 and opinions from scholars and concluded that the more 
convincing interpretation of "final and binding" is that it refers only to the submitting state in that the 
submitting state, having delineated its outer limit of the continental shelf and that limit having not being 
challenged by other states, cannot subsequently change the location of its outer limit. To this extent, and this 
extent only, would the outer limit be "final and binding", not be contestable and perhaps become an obligation 
erga omnes. For detail of the discussion, see Ted L. McDorman, "The Role of the Commission on the Limits 
of the Continental Shelf: A Technical Body in a Political World" (2002) 17(3) IJMCL, 301 at 313-7. S83 Rules and Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (hereafter Rules and 
Procedure), Doc. CLCS/40 of 2 July 2004. sas Article 4 of Annex II of the 1982 LOSC. 585 Decision regarding the date of commencement of the ten-year period for making submissions to the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set out in Article 4 of Annex II to the LOSC, Doc, 
SPLOS/72 on 29 May 2001, para. (a). 
586 Members of the subcommission as well as of the Commission are drawn exclusively from states that have 
ratified the Convention. The CLCS consists of 21 elected experts in the fields of geology, geophysics, or 
hydrography, who serve in their private capacities. Members are elected for five-year terms. In principle, 
members may be nominated by any state party, but in practice, individual member nominations tend to 
originate from each nominee's home state. For discussion on the qualification of members of the Commission 
and the choice from states, see Neol Newton St. Claver Francis, "The Continental Shelf Commission" in 
Myron H. Nordquist & John Norton Moore (eds. ), Oceans Policy : New Institutions, Challenges and 
Opportunities, (The Hague : M. Nijhoff, 1999), p. 141-145. 
s' Article 3,4 of Annex II of the 1982 LOSC. 
Sea Article 8, ibid. 
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parties concerned have given their prior consent . 
589 Both paragraph 10 of Article 76 and 
Article 9 of Annex II of the 1982 LOSC state that the consideration of the Commission on 
the limits of the continental shelf shall not prejudice matters relating to delimitation of 
boundaries between states with opposite or adjacent coasts S90 In fact, if any state submits 
the information of its continental shelf limits including the limit of overlapping areas to the 
CLCS, the other states concerned, due to related interests in the overlapping areas have to 
raise their voice at the CLCS to protect their rights. Precedents from the three submissions 
before the CLCS recorded no such consent for the review of the CLCS. Third parties only 
react to express their point of view that the recommendation made by the CLCS is without 
prejudice to the eventual delimitation among them. 59' As a result of the opposition of the 
third parties, the CLCS advises the submission state to revise its submission in a manner 
that does affect the overlapping areas. 592 Although it cannot delimit the maritime 
overlapping unless the parties give their consent, the review by the CLCS will facilitate the 
delimitation process by creating certainty about the legitimate location of the outer limit of 
continental shelf for the parties in a dispute, in the case that such limit extends beyond 200 
nautical miles. 
5e9 The procedure for giving consent is provided in Paras. 4 and 5 of the Annex I to the Rules and Procedure. 
Accordingly, the Commission's basic position regarding submission where a land or maritime dispute exists 
is that it will not consider and qualify them, unless all states that are parties to the dispute have given their 
ýrior consent. 
90 Indeed, the CLCS does not have a similar role to an arbitrator or judicial institution. Also, during the 
negotiation of the UNCLOS, the negotiators were unable to reach a consensus on how Article 76 on the 
Commission and the dispute settlement provisions were to interrelate, thus the result brought no explicit 
wording in either Part XV or Article 76 on the relationship. In addition, this distinction is verified by other 
provisions of the 1982 LOSC such as Article 83 which specifically articulates the means by which continental 
shelf delimitation between opposite or adjacent states is to be addressed and Article 134(4) which also 
reinforces the distinction by providing that the provisions of Part XI are not to affect the establishment of the 
outer limits of the continental shelf in accordance with Part VI of the Convention or the validity of 
delimitation agreement between states. For further discussion, see Ted L. McDorman, op. cit., note 582, p. 312 
and 317 and Nordquist, A Commentary, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Vol. 11), p. 883. 
591 So far, Russia, Brazil, Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, France, Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland have made submissions under Article 76(8) to the Commission. Their 
submissions include the limit of overlapping areas, thus drawing the attention of neighbouring countries. In 
the case of Russia, five states, namely Canada, Denmark, Japan, Norway and the United States, have 
expressed their reaction to the Commission. For details of the submission and the reaction, see website of the 
CLSC: http: //www. un. org/depts/los/clcs new/clcs home. htm (accessed on 26 February 2006) and C. 
Johnson and A. G. Oude Elferink, "Submission to the CLCS in Cases of Unresolved Land and Maritime 
Dispute: The Significance of Article 76(10) of the LOS Convention", in David FreeStone, Richard Barnes and 
David Ong, The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 161 at 
167-78. 
592 For example, the CLCS recommended that the Russian Federation made its best efforts to effect an 
agreement with Japan in accordance with paragraph 4 of Annex I to the Rules and Procedure of the 
Commission. For detail, see C. Johnson and A. G. Oude Elferink, Mid, p. 171. 
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In the South China Sea case, as Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei are likely to be able 
to extend some parts of their continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles, they are 
obliged to submit information on their continental shelf limits to the CLCS and establish 
their continental shelves according to its recommendation. However, the continental 
shelves of Malaysia and Vietnam are opposite and overlap and with the presence of the 
Spratlys, Vietnam and Brunei also have some overlapping continental shelve areas. The 
submission may also face reaction from China, Taiwan and the Philippines due to their 
maritime claims in the South China Sea. Thus, the CLCS will only have authority to 
examine the outer limits of their continental shelves in combination with the overlapping 
area if all parties agree. Otherwise, the CLCS may facilitate the settlement of the South 
China Sea dispute by its recommendation on the outer limit continental shelf of these 
countries. 
3. Diplomatic method: Negotiation for a joint cooperation regime 
As no judicial method will be applicable to settle the South China Sea dispute, 
diplomatic means will be the only way to help the party end their dispute. This method was 
used during the 1990s by the initiation of Indonesia. 593 Drawing the lessons from the 
diplomatic measures in the 1990s will ensure this method be applied more effectively in the 
future. 
3.1. Lessons from the diplomatic measures in the 1990s 
3.1.1. The South China Sea Workshops 
In the 1980s, with more participants and the escalation of claims, the South China 
Sea dispute became a prominent issue which might pose threats to Southeast Asian 
security. The serious use of force in 1988 by China confirmed this concern. This situation 
gave rise to the need for confidence building and cooperation to diffuse the tension in the 
dispute. Under the sponsorship of Canada, Indonesia started its mediation role in the South 
China Sea dispute in 1989.594 Three main objectives and modalities were set out for the 
593 Although in the South China Sea dispute, Indonesia is not directly involved, it has indirect interests as it is 
claiming Natuna Islands which is near the Spratlys archipelago and its maritime zones are adjacent to the 
disputed area. Therefore, Indonesia was keen to play an active and objective role in diplomacy to mediate the 
dispute with the aim of helping parties concerned and keeping an eye on the dispute evolution and improve its 
own position in the region. 
594 Dr Hasjim Djalal, the ambassador of Indonesia to Canada, acknowledged the dangerous situation of the 
South China Sea dispute and understood how the dispute related to his country. He had an idea to convene 
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mediation process, namely, to promote dialogue and mutual understanding between the 
parties through the exchange of views and ideas; to encourage the parties concerned to seek 
solutions to their disputes by creating a conducive atmosphere; and to develop concrete 
cooperation on technical matters in which everyone would and could agree to cooperate. 59S 
In order to reach these goals, the meetings were planned to be held informally and 
to avoid the sensitive territorial issues. After the first workshop, named the Workshop on 
Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea, was held in 1990 in Bali, almost 
annually and to early 2005, fourteen workshops have been convened in Indonesia. 596 The 
participants of these workshops reached a consensus that the South China Sea dispute 
should be settled peacefully and the use of force could not be considered as a means to 
solve the dispute. They also agreed to restrain their practices in order not to exacerbate the 
dispute. This then was considered as a guideline for the dispute settlement. 397 The 
participants in the workshops also decided to establish Technical Working Groups (TWG) 
on marine scientific research, marine environmental protection, safety of navigation and 
resources management and legal matters. The TWG consisting of technical experts, hold 
meetings annually from which research on a variety of projects has brought the discussions 
of the workshops into more substantive matters. 598 
some informal meetings to discuss confidence building and cooperation. In 1989, while working together on a 
workshop on petroleum joint development in Southeast Asia, he met Professor Ian Townsend-Gault 
(Professor of the British Columbia University in Canada). The two developed Dr Djalal's idea into a proposal 
and submitted it to the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs. This gave them the financial support for the 
first phase of the initiative in which Dr Djalal, under the authorisation of the Indonesian Foreign Minister, 
visited ASEAN members in 1989 to discuss his idea of holding informal meetings on the South China Sea 
dispute. The ideas received support from ASEAN member countries. 
svs Hasjim Djalal, "Indonesia and the South China Sea Initiative", (2001) (32) ODIL, 97-103 at 98. 
s% For time and dates of these workshops, see Annex 3, infra. 
s" The first workshop was held with ASEAN members to lay down the framework for later discussions. In 
the second, China, Vietnam, Taiwan and landlocked Laos were also invited. This workshop was especially 
important as China accepted to attend in a multilateral discussion, including Taiwan even though this was 
only an informal meeting. In this workshop, several issues were discussed including marine scientific 
research, marine environmental protection, safety of navigation and resources management. For detail, see 
Hasjim Djalal and Ian Townsend-Gault, "Preventive Diplomacy: Managing Potential Conflicts in the South 
China Sea" in Herding Cats (ed. ), Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, (United States Institute of Peace 
Press, 1999), p. 113 at 115. 
s'" Two TWGs on marine Scientific Research and a TWG on Resource Assessment were established in the 
third workshop in 1992. Three other TWGs on Marine Environmental Protection, Legal Matters and Safety of 
Navigation were established in the fourth workshop in 1993. 
The TWG on Marine Scientific Research had 6 meetings from 1993 to 1998. The meetings focused 
on three main issues namely biodiversity protection, study on tides and sea level changes and regional 
cooperation in the field of marine science data and information networks in the South China Sea. These topics 
were developed into projects and discussed under Group of Experts (GEM). Among them. the proposal for 
biodiversity protection was adopted in the 6" workshop in 1995. 
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3.1.2. The Code of Conduct 
Also in an attempt to build trust and confidence among parties concerned in the 
South China Sea dispute, there was another process conducted in the framework of ASEAN 
in order to draft a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. The idea of building a Code of 
Conduct for the South China Sea emerged from 1992 when China enacted its Law on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and signed a contract with the US Crestone Oil 
Company. The law states that the territorial land of China includes "... the Dongsha (Pratas) 
Islands, the Xisha (Paracels) Islands, the Nansha (Spratlys) Islands and other islands that 
belong to the People's Republic of China". 599 China expressed its willingness to use navy 
forces to enforce the contract with Crestone in the area claimed as continental shelf of the 
mainland of Vietnam. 600 In reply to these aggressive acts of China, the foreign ministers of 
the member countries of ASEAN issued the Declaration on the South China Sea in July 
1992 urging all the concerned parties to solve the dispute by peaceful means and to build a 
code of international conduct in the South China Sea. 601 
The TWG on Marine Environmental Protection had three meetings from 1994 to 1998. To work in 
further detail on the topic, the TWG established a group of experts and a training programme. The Group of 
Experts (GEM) had another meeting on environmental protection in 1997 and the Training Programme for 
ecosystem monitoring also was held in the same year. 
The TWG on Resource Assessment convened twice in 1993 and 1998. The topic was divided into 
three study groups, namely a study group on geological basin, one on hard minerals and one on living 
resources. The three appointed coordinators to assist the study groups were Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand 
respectively. The work of the first group resulted in the proposal to compile a database on non-living non- 
hydrocarbon resources of the South China Sea which was approved in the 9" workshop in 1998 and 
implemented in 1999. The second group faced difficulty due to the sensitive territorial and jurisdictional 
issues. The third group arrived at a proposal for stock assessment and an implementation programme which 
were later discussed at the joint meetings with the TWG on legal matters and the workshops. 
The TWG on Safety Navigation met three times from 1995 to 1998 to discuss four main issues 
namely (1) cooperative efforts regarding hydrographic data and mapping; (2) developing a training 
programme for seafarers and mariners; (3) developing cooperative efforts against unlawful activities at sea 
and (4) developing cooperative efforts regarding environmental protection. These topics were then discussed 
in further detail under GEMs. 
The last TWO, TWG on Legal Matters had five meetings from 1995 to 2000. They discussed a 
number of legal issues involving developing cooperative activities including the environmental legislation and 
zone of cooperation issues. These two issues were then discussed in more detail under a GEM and a study 
group. 
For the statistics on time and places of the TWGs meetings, see Annex 4, infra. s" Article 2 of the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone on February 25d' 1992. For full text, 
see http: //www. un. org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN 1992 Law. pdf 
(accessed on 21 October 2005). 
600 For analysis on the China's practice, see supra, Chapter 1, Section 2.1. 601 Paragraph 1 and 4 of the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, Manila, Philippines, 22" July 1992. 
For full text of the Declaration, see website of the ASEAN Secretariat: http: //www, ascansec. org/3634. htm 
(accessed on 21 October 2005). 
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After the 1992 Declaration, the formulation and drafting of the Code of Conduct 
were discussed in the meetings of ASEAN Summit Meeting, ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, 
ASEAN Regional Forum (the ARF), the Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the 
South China Sea and the TWG on Legal Matters. The discussion lasted seven years from 
1992 to 1999. During the discussion, the two bilateral Codes of Conduct which China 
signed with the Philippines and Vietnam in 1995 were considered as an example of how the 
Code of Conduct for the South China Sea would be drafted . 
602 
In 1999, the Philippines on behalf of ASEAN countries, prepared a draft to discuss 
along with the Chinese draft. However, differences in the positions of China and ASEAN 
led to the prolongation of the adoption of the Code until 4 November 2002 at the 8`h 
ASEAN Summit. 603 The Code was not adopted with binding effect as expected, as it was 
only a recommendation under the name of the Declaration on the Code of Conduct (DOC). 
Although not legally binding, the DOC is considered a step forward in the establishment of 
the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea in the future. 
3.1.3. Achievements and limitations o the diplomatic measures in the 1990s 
Lasting for more than ten years, the South China Sea Workshops, initiated by 
Indonesia, have obtained encouraging achievements which help to increase the regional and 
international awareness of the South China Sea dispute, create a forum for parties 
concerned to exchange their points of view and build confidence towards each other, and 
promote many cooperation projects in the field of marine research and environmental 
protection among littoral states. The workshops are also successful in having the 
involvement of China in the multilateral negotiation process (although informally), thus 
leading to the concluding of the DOC. 
However, due to the informality, the workshops only provide a forum for the 
exchange of viewpoints and discussion on how to cooperate, and lacks mechanisms for 
binding commitments and implementation. The parties attempted to foster cooperation, 
602 The two Codes of Conduct were signed in August and November 1995 respectively. 
6°3 The two drafts contained some differences. China wanted the Code to apply to the Spratlys only and any 
solutions to the dispute should be dealt with through bilateral negotiations. While ASEAN members preferred 
that the Code would apply to both the Paracels and Spratlys and the dispute would be solved through 
multilateral negotiation. The ASEAN draft also emphasised refrain from inhabiting and erecting structures on 
presently inhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features in the disputed area while China's draft was 
silent on this issue. For discussion, see Yann-huei Song, "Codes of conduct in the South China Sea and 
Taiwan's Stand" 24 (2000) Marine Policy, 449 at 445. 
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however, most of the issues were raised and concluded without any agreement. Despite the 
fact that the DOC was signed in 2002, infringement still incurs no punishment, except 
verbal oppose from other states. While the workshops were undertaken from 1991 with the 
participation of China since the second workshop and its idea for joint development, China 
still used force to occupy Mischief from the Philippines. It was this incident that ignited an 
arms race, especially for the navy forces of the states in the region. Later on, the 
development of Vietnam and China in building new tourism resorts in the Spratlys and 
Paracels features, the further clashes among the fishing vessels of China, the Philippines, 
Vietnam and Taiwan showed the ineffectiveness of the non-binding effect of the DOC in 
maintaining stability for the region. In addition, one of the key issues for cooperation that 
of conflicting sovereignty claims was still left aside from the discussion. 
3.2. Diplomatic measures in the future: Towards a joint development regime 
3.2.1. Why diplomatic measure should focus on joint development 
The failure of the diplomatic measures in the 1990s shows that sticking to 
sovereignty claims, while lacking of a binding dispute settlement mechanism, cannot settle 
the dispute. Conflicts still occur among the parties and put the security of the region at a 
great danger due to the mounting need for natural resources in the South China Sea, 
especially the fisheries and hydrocarbon resources. 604 During the last decades, the countries 
in the South China Sea region have formed the most dynamic economic development 
region of the world. As the country with the highest economic growth for the last two 
decades and accounting for one fourth of the world population, China needs oil to produce 
fertilizer to guarantee sufficient agricultural production to feed its enormous population and 
to fuel the many industries of the country like textile, transportation, metallurgy, etc. 
605 
ASEAN countries also have a great demand for the hydrocarbon, fishery and other 
resources of the South China Sea in order to develop their economies. 
06 
604 See supra, Chapter 1, Section 2. An author even suggested that if a third world war would happen, it 
would originate from the South China Sea, see Ian Slater, WWIII. " South China Sea, (New York: Ballantine 
Books, 1996). 
60$ It was estimated that by 2010, China will need to import 100 million tonnes of crude oil annually if no 
large oil fields are found. The oil demand of China has been increasing between 5-5.5 percent annually since 
the 1990s. Source: Valencia et at, op. cit., note 16, p. 83. 
For further discussion, see supra, Chapter 1, Section 2. 
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Besides economic reason, it is also noteworthy that the South China Sea is a semi- 
enclosed sea in which the marine system is naturally unified. Littoral states are parties to 
the 1982 LOSC, and thus they abide by the cooperation obligation under Article 123 of the 
1982 LOSC. Accordingly, they have an obligation to cooperate in exploration and 
exploitation of living resources, protection of the marine environment and scientific 
research to which, primarily, is the need for building a fishery management regime to 
protect the resources and maintain the security in the region. 607 
All the above mentioned reasons suggest that diplomatic measures will only be 
effective if they take into account the quest for an interim measure to meet the economic 
demand of the parties as well as to maintain security and peace in the region. Among many 
interim measures, joint development is proving its success in state practice. 
So far, joint development as cooperative state practice in the exploitation of 
resources that straddle maritime boundaries has grown significantly. In 1989, the British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law found 12 bilateral treaties providing for 
joint development of resources of the continental shelf, 608 and today, about 30 such 
agreements have been concluded. 609 Several new joint areas have been negotiated, 
involving states in many different parts of the world 610 Many of them are very successful 
in implementing and providing a mechanism for cooperation among states in cases of 
overlapping maritime areas. For example, the Timor Gap Treaty which was concluded by 
Indonesia and Australia in 1989 was renewed under the name of the Timor Sea Treaty after 
the independence of East Timor in 2002. This model was considered the most well 
structured mechanism for joint development. 611 The 1959 Antarctica Treaty also has been 
successful in harmonising the interests and claims of multiple parties and preserved 
607 So far, fishing activities in the South China Sea were out of control and led to the fish stock shortage and 
clashes among fishermen and soldiers among the littoral states. See details, supra, Chapter 1, Section 2.1. 6$ Hazel Fox, Paul Mcdade, Derek Rankin Reid, Anastasia Strati and Peter Huey, Joint Development of 
Offshore Oil and Gas, (British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 1,1989), p. 33. 609 David Ong, "Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits: "Mere" State Practice or 
Customary International Law? " (1999) 93(4) AJIL 771, at 787-795, particularly footnote 139, p. 787-8. 610 The new joint areas under negotiation are between Colombia and Jamaica, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, 
Nigeria-Sao Tome and Principe, Cambodia and Vietnam, etc. For discussion see, David Anderson, 
"Developments in Maritime Boundary Law and Practice" in David A. Colson and Robert W. Smith (ed. ), 
International Maritime Boundaries, (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, Vol. 5,2005), p. 3199 at 3216. 011 For discussion of the joint development under Timor Gap and Timor Sea Treaties, see Stuart Kaye, "The 
Timor Gap Treaty: Creative Solutions and International Conflict" (1994) 16 Sydney L. Rev., p. 72 and Gillian 
Triggs and Dean Bialek, "The New Timor Sea Treaty and Interim Arrangements for Joint Development of 
Petroleum Resources of the Timor Gap" (2002) 3 Melb J. Int'1 L., p. 322. 
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Antarctica for peaceful cooperation in scientific research and environmental protection. 612 
In east and south-east Asian regions, state practice in joint development has also proved its 
success through the implementation of some bilateral treaties between Thailand and 
Malaysia, Vietnam and Malaysia and South Korea and Japan. 613 
From its success in state practice, joint development is also suggested as a feasible 
solution for the South China Sea. 614 Building a joint development regime may also be the 
wishes of the parties as China proposed joint development in the statement of Chinese 
Premier Li Peng in 1990 and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in 1995. Most recently, a 
positive signal was the reaching of an agreement, for conducting research on hydrocarbon 
potential in the north-eastern of the South China Sea between China, Vietnam and the 
Philippines. 615 
3.2.2. Requirements for a possible ioint development model in the South China Sea 
A joint development as an agreement between two states to develop so as to share 
jointly in an agreed proportion by interstate cooperation and national measure the 
offshore oil and gas in a designated zone of seabed or subsoil of the continental 
shelf to which both or either of the participated states are entitled in international 
law. 616 
612 For discussion, see Christopher C. Joyner, Antarctica and the Law of the Sea, (Dordrecht, Boston, London: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992). 
613 These treaties were concluded in 1979,1992 and 1974 respectively and still enforce. For details, see 
Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, op. cit., note 98, Report 5-13(2), p. 1099, Report Number 5-19, 
p. 2341 and Report 5-12, p. 1057 respectively. 
s" The suggestion was initially introduced by the Jose de Venecia, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the Philippines in the meeting of 26 September 1988. Then, this was discussed by a number of 
scholars, namely Mark Valencia, Prescott, Monique, etc. For further discussion of the origin of the idea for 
joint cooperation, see Hurng-yu Chen, `Ile Prospects for Joint Development in the South China Sea", 
December 1991 Issues and Studies, 112 at 114-6. 
bis China and the Philippines reached an agreement to joint scientific research between the Philippines 
National Oil Company and the China National Offshore Oil Company in the South China Sea in September 
2004. Vietnam also joined in this agreement in March 2005. This movement was hailed as a diplomatic 
breakthrough for peace and security in the region. For details of the agreement, see Press Release of The 
Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, online at 
http: //www. dfa. gov. ph/news/pr/pr2004/sep/Xr524. htm (accessed on 19 October 2004). 
Under this joint exploration agreement in the Eastern area of the Spratlys among China, the Philippines and 
Vietnam, the survey vessel of China collected seismal data from the seabed on 16 November 2005 and the 
statistics of hydrocarbon resources for the region is expected to be available in the coming years. (China, 
Vietnam and the Philippines end seismal survey in the South China Sea, for detail see: htto: //tuoitre. com. vn 
accessed on 20 November 2005)). 
16 Definition of a group of researchers of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law 
published in Hazel Fox et al., op. cit., note 608, p. 45. The concept of international joint development is not 
understood in a uniform way. For example, a group of lawyers at the East-West Centre Workshop in 1980 
agreed that "used as a generic term, joint development extends from unitization of shared resources to 
unilateral development of a shared resource beyond a stipulated boundary, and various gradations in 
between". (Quoted in Masahiro Miyoshi, "The Basis Concept of Joint Development of Hydrocarbon 
Resources on the Continental Shelf. With Special Reference to the Discussions at the East-West Centre 
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This definition provides that joint development is the product of the cooperation 
among state concerned which results in an agreement. From the point of view of 
international law, it would be advisable to restrict this to an inter-governmental agreement 
and exclude joint venture between a government and a company. 617 The content of the 
agreement for joint development must design a specific zone for joint development, method 
of appointment, choice of operator, financial provisions, the regulatory authority and the 
identification of the laws to be applied. Other points that may also be included are 
provisions on safety, health, requirements prohibiting pollution and for the protection of the 
marine environment, and a procedure for dispute settlement. 618 These legal features of joint 
development were reflected with flexible application in state practice depending on the 
scope of the cooperation and the situation of each case. 
The situation of the South China Sea dispute involving multiple claims in both 
sovereignty and maritime issues and a complicated dispute history with much tension and 
confidence deterioration by military clashes raises the need for a special regime of 
cooperation. 
First, a possible joint development mechanism for the South China Sea should be 
able to harmonise the multiple sovereignty claims of the parties. Currently, there are 6 
Workshops on the South-East Asian Seas" (1988) 3 IJECL I at 5). Lagoni, in a report on joint development at 
the 1988 Warsaw meeting of the International Law Association, defined that "joint cooperation is the 
cooperation between states with regard to the exploration for and exploitation of certain deposits, fields or 
accumulation of non-living resources which either extend across a boundary or lie in an area of overlapping 
claims". (Lagoni was a Rapporteur to the EEZ Committee of the International Law Association. For details, 
see R. Lagoni, Report on Joint Development of Non-living Resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 
(Warsaw: Warsaw Conference of the International Committee on the Exclusive Economic Zone, International 
Law Association, 1988), p. 2 quoted in Hazel Fox et al., op. cit., note 608, at p. 44). Valencia also suggested 
that "international joint development is the common exercise of sovereignty rights by two or more states for 
the purpose of exploration and exploitation of the non-living resources of an area under national jurisdiction" 
(Mark Valencia, "Taming Troubled Waters: Joint Development of Oil and Mineral Resources in Overlapping 
Claim Areas" (1986) 23 San Diego L. Rev., p. 661 at 683). Townsend-Gault and W. G. Stormont recently also 
suggested "an offshore petroleum joint development arrangement as typically one where two or more 
countries enter into a formal agreement for cooperative development of and the sharing of revenues derived 
from oil and gas activities within a given offshore area by pooling their sovereign rights with respect to that 
area" (I. Townsend-Gault and W. G. Stormont, "Offshore Petroleum Joint Development Arrangement: 
Functional Instrument? Compromise? Obligation? " in G. H. Blake (ed. ), The Peaceful Management of 
transboundary resources, (London: Graham Le Trotman, 1995), p. 51). 
61 Masahiro Miyoshi, "The Basis Concept of Joint Development of Hydrocarbon Resources on the 
Continental Shelf: With Special Reference to the Discussions at the East-West Centre Workshops on the 
South-East Asian Seas" (1988) 3 IJECL I at 5. This is the correct approach as the nature of joint cooperation 
is the cooperation between states. The involvement of a private company, if any, will only under the 
authorisation of one of states concerned and by another agreement in the implementation phrase, i. e. a 
`concession' agreement or an `internationalised' contract. 
618 Hazel Fox et al., op. cit., note 608, p. 46. 
203 
CHAPTERS. JUDICIAL OR DIPLOMATIC METHODS: THE FEASIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE 
SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE 
claimants to the dispute in which four of them, namely Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines 
and Vietnam, are in a close relationship within ASEAN framework. This association is 
heading forward to a common community by approving its charter by the end of this 
year. 619 The fifth party is China and in comparison with other parties, it is a large and rising 
power. Although China does not have the strongest legal position, it has the strongest 
influence based on its size and economic, military and political strengths which creates 
difficulties in balancing the rights and obligations of the parties in a joint development 
mechanism. Thus, any joint development arrangement must take into account China's 
interests. The position of China also creates difficulties, as it does not accept the 
recognition of Taiwan in any form, whereas Taiwan's role in some areas, e. g. fisheries, 
cannot be ignored. Although Taiwan has not been successful in establishing its statehood, it 
is recognised as a special entity with relative independent rights and obligations under 
international law. Taiwan is also a party with separate claims to the Spratlys in the South 
China Sea dispute. The fact that all of these parties differ not only in their interests, but also 
in their power may affect the cooperation of the joint development regime. Therefore, 
harmonising the diversified interests of these parties and taking into account the realpolitik 
in the region would be a crucial point for the success of the mechanism which differs from 
most of the other bilateral joint development agreements. 
Second, with much confidence deterioration, such mechanisms must provide a tool 
for confidence building. The confidence among these parties was ruined by not only the 
direct military clashes in 1974,1988 and 1995, but also the inconsistent policy of China 
relating to the South China Sea. Moreover, the confidence among ASEAN parties 
themselves was also at a low level due to the affect of the differences of their idealism 
during the Cold War. Therefore, a possible joint development mechanism for the South 
China Sea should primarily facilitate confidence building by providing forums for parties to 
exchange points of view, to highlight policy transparency, and to restrain from further use 
of force thus complicating the status quo. These are the preconditions for cooperation of a 
joint development mechanism. 
61' This target was set out that the Joint Communique of the 40th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Manila 
on 29-30 July 2007. For more information see: http: //www, aseansec. orgl20764. htm (accessed on 31 July 
2007), particularly at points 20 and 21 of the Communique. 
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Finally, joint development is a model which generally applies to the exploitation of 
hydrocarbon resources. However, in a broader understanding, this model of cooperation can 
be extended to other resources such as living resources, environment, navigation, etc. 
Depending on the negotiation of the parties concerned, the cooperation models in these 
fields may have different names, but they share the same nature as a kind of cooperation 
activity among the parties to deal with the transboundary resources, e. g. the common name 
for cooperation in fishery is called joint fishery agreement, joint fishery zone, etc. In the 
situation of the dependent maritime environment of a semi-enclosed sea of the South China 
Sea, such a regime for cooperation should cover a wide range of issues. These issues varies 
including environment protection, marine scientific research, navigation safety and natural 
resources exploitation. This is also a requirement which makes the joint mechanism for the 
South China Sea differ from other bilateral joint development models which mainly cover 
joint exploration and exploitation in fishery or hydrocarbon resources. 
Although the South China Sea dispute has some unique characteristics, there is no 
doubt that the examination of the main legal features of joint development in state practice 
will help to build up a suitable model for the South China Sea. 
3.3. A closer look at the goal for diplomatic measure: A suitable regime for joint 
development in the South China Sea dispute 
3.3.1. Area or cooperation 
The purpose of joint development is to exploit the straddling seabed deposits lying 
across the boundary of the states or in a disputed area. Thus, joint development may be 
designed for either an area where the parties have already reached a boundary or in an 
overlapping area. In the former scenario, the parties may anticipate the issue of straddling 
resources by mineral deposit clauses. This is the practice of state in many maritime 
delimitation agreements, e. g. agreement between Great Britain and Norway in 1965,620 
620 Article 4 of the agreement between Great Britain and Norway stipulates that: "If any single geological 
petroleum structure or petroleum field, or any single geological structure or field of any other mineral deposit, 
including sand or gravel, extends across the dividing line and the part of such structure or field which is 
situated on one side of the dividing line is exploitable, wholly or in part, from the other side of the dividing 
line, the contracting parties shall, in consultation with the licensees, if any, seek to reach agreement as to the 
manner in which the structure or field shall be most effectively exploited and the manner in which the 
proceeds deriving there from shall be apportioned. " For full text of the Agreement, see Jonathan 1. Charney 
and Lewis M. Alexander, op. cit., note 98, Vol. 2, Report 9-15, p. 1879. In line with this provision later on in 
1976-1979, the two countries concluded some joint development agreements relating exploitation oil and gas 
205 
CHAPTER 5. JUDICIAL OR DIPLOMATIC METHODS: THE FEASIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE 
SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE 
between Iran and Qatar in 1969,621 or the more recent between China and Vietnam in 
2000,622 etc. 623 Also in this case, if the parties are aware of the presence of cross boundary 
resources, the parties may negotiate and conclude another agreement relating to joint 
development of these resources along with the boundary agreement. For example, South 
Korea and Japan, during the negotiation process for maritime delimitation also reached an 
agreement on joint development in 1974.624 This possibility suggests that even if the South 
China Sea is settled by judicial method, joint development may still be used for exploiting 
the straddling natural resources (if they exist). 
In the latter scenario, joint development is applied in an overlapping area allowing 
the parties joint control and exploitation of the resources for their economic interests while 
the boundary has not been reached. This application could be seen from some state practice 
such as the 1979 Thailand and Malaysia joint development agreement625 and the 1989 
Timor Gap Treaty. 626 These kinds of arrangement do not overcome the problem of 
delimitation directly as they do not address the problem. Thus, joint development in this 
case is also considered as one of the interim measures while the parties have not yet to 
reach the final solution. However, by enabling the development of the resource on a 
cooperative basis, it may help to remove an element of competition from the process of 
delimitation and thereby facilitate a resolution. 627 In addition, if the parties agree to shelve 
the maritime delimitation for an indefinite time, joint development in this situation will be 
still considered a final solution. 
If no solution is reached on the sovereignty and maritime issues, the area for 
cooperation in the South China Sea should be the overlapping area. The problem in the 
reservoir in the boundary area. For discussion on these agreements, see Masahiro Miyoshi, op. cit., note 617. 
p. 7, David Ong, op. cit., note 609, at 773 and Lagoni, "Oil and Gas Deposits Across National Frontiers" 
(1979) 73 AJIL 215 at 225-6. 621 For full text of the Agreement, see Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, ibid. Report 7-6, p. 1511. 622 Agreement between China and Vietnam on the Delimitation of Territorial Sea, the Exclusive Economic 
Zone and Continental Shelf in Beibu Bay/ Bacbo Gulf. For full text of the Agreement, see David A. Colson 
and Robert W. Smith (eds. ), op. cit., note 513, Report 5-25, p. 3745. 623 For analysis on mineral deposit clauses, see Lagoni, op. cit., note 620, at 229-233. 624 For details of the negotiation and full text of the agreements, see Jonathan 1. Charney and Lewis M. 
Alexander, op. cit., note 98, Vol. 1, Report 5-12, p. 1057. 625 Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, International Maritime Boundaries, ibid, Report 5-13, 
p. 1099. 
axe Jonathan I. Chamey and Lewis M. Alexander, op. cit., note 620, Vol. 2, Report 6-2(5), p. 1245. 627 Charles Robson, "Transboundary Petroleum Reservoirs: Legal Issues and Solutions" in G. H. Blake, 
op. cit., note 616, p. 3 at 12. 
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South China Sea case is that some of the maritime claims are not clarified. 628 Thus, several 
proposals were made for the cooperation area in the South China Sea. The most 
comprehensive is the proposal of Mark J. Valencia in which four options are listed as 
follows: 
(A) The cooperative area will be the area enclosed by a line equidistant between 
undisputed baselines of the littoral countries and the Spratlys features. This proposal was 
also made by Professor Prescott which he suggested for both the Spratlys and the 
Paracels. 629 Valencia argues for the choice of this option that the use of equidistance lines is 
usually in accordance with international law. However, it should be noted that by 
application of equidistance lines, the Spratlys would be recognised as having equal effect in 
generating maritime zone with the mainland territory of the littoral states. This will cause 
distortion as all the Spratlys' feature are tiny. In addition, Valencia also justifies this option 
on the basis of the nine dotted lines in the maritime claims of China and Taiwan which are 
not well based on in international law. 630 ThUS, it is submitted that this option is not suitable 
for the cooperative area in the South China Sea. 
(B) The cooperative area will be the area beyond 200 nautical miles from 
legitimate coastal baselines, and beyond the legal limit of coastal continental shelves. This 
option seems to match with the shaded area achieved from a prospect maritime delimitation 
process after giving full effect to the mainland of the littoral states 631 Thus, it is submitted 
that this area may be applicable for a cooperative zone in the South China Sea. 
(C) The cooperative area will be the area claimed by three or more claimants. 
This option is an approach derived from the foundation ideas of the joint cooperation 
regime that joint cooperation is used to avoid the complexity of the maritime boundary 
where parties to the dispute pool their sovereignty for cooperation. Accordingly, the 
maritime claims of the parties would dictate the expansion of the area for joint cooperation. 
This might be the correct approach in order to identify the area for joint development. 
Applying this to the South China Sea dispute, on the one hand, this approach will simplify 
the identification of the zone for joint development by just combining all the maritime 
claims. On the other hand, it encourages the parties to expand their claims in order to 
628 See supra, Chapter 4, Section 3. 
629 Victor Prescott, The South China Sea: Limits of National Claims, (Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 1996). 630 See supra, Chapter 4, Section 3.2. 
631 See supra, Chapter 4, Section 4. 
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increase their ability to participate in joint cooperation. Therefore, this approach must be 
based on legitimate maritime claims, 632 i. e. we can combine this option with option B to 
arrive at some smaller zones with different participants within the entire cooperative zone. 
(D) The cooperative area will be the area enclosed by a line connecting the 
outermost Spratlys' islets (or all drying reefs). 633 This option can be justified on the basis of 
the analogy of archipelagic waters. In the case of archipelagic states, due to the dependence 
of the islands, the 1982 LOSC allows archipelagos to connect the outer points to form the 
archipelagic baseline. However, in this case, as the Spratlys does not qualify an 
archipelagic state, the legitimacy of the application of this line is controversial. 
Furthermore, it will result in a smaller area in comparison with option B. Therefore, this 
option is not likely to be accepted. 
Given the above analysis, it is submitted that the area beyond 200 nautical miles 
from legitimate coastal baselines and beyond the legal limit of coastal continental shelves 
should be used as a cooperative zone for the South China Sea. 634 Depending on the 
recommendation of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, this may result 
in two different areas: one beyond the EEZ of coastal states, the other beyond the 
continental shelf, if some littoral states delineate their continental shelf beyond 200 nautical 
miles in compliance with the recommendation of the Commission. Within this/these areas, 
the parties may decide to further divide into smaller areas according to parties' claims 
according to option C, in order to facilitate the cooperative activities. The zones for 
cooperation can be illustrated in the following figures. 
632 The nine dotted lines in maritime claims of China and Taiwan would not be taken into account as they 
violate international law and the weaker effect of the Spratlys' features will be counted as analysed in Chapter 
4, Sections 3.2 and 4.2.1, supra. 633 Mark J. Valencia et al., op. cit., note 16, p. 205. 634 Wei Cui argued that the area enclosed by a line equidistant between undisputed baselines of the littoral 
countries and the Spratlys' features under option A was the fair solution to the dispute. However, his 
argument is based only on the purpose of harmonising the maritime claim of all parties without considering 
the legitimacy of the maritime claims of each party and the status of the Spratlys under international law. For 
details, see Wei Cui, "Multilateral Management as a Fair Solution to the Spratlys Dispute" (2003) 36 Vand. I.. 
Transnat'1 L., 799 at 833-7. 
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6i5 Map drawn by Mapinfo. This area would also be the joint cooperation area with regard to sovereignty 
rights over continental shelf if the continental shelves of littoral states have the same outer limit of 200 
nautical miles as the EEZs. 
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Figure 40. Recommended area for cooperation with regard to sovereignty rights over the 
EEZ in the South China Sea635 
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continental shelves in the South China Sear' 
6 
3.3.2. Method of beneallocation and other financial provision 
Primarily, the aim of the parties in entering a joint development agreement is the 
economic interest generated from the exploited natural resources. Thus, the method of 
benefit allocation plays an important role in the negotiation stage in reaching a joint 
`'"' Map drawn by Mapinfo with the hypothesis that the continental shelves of some littoral states are allowed 
to delineate beyond 200 nautical miles. 
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development agreement and later on in the implementation phase. State practice showed 
that for most of the cases, states choose to allocate the benefit from the exploitation 
activities as well as financing the operation in equal basis. 637 This is the most popular 
approach as it brings a fair share for the parties. However, particularly in some cases, due to 
the location of the resources, the parties may agree on an unequal share among them. This 
unequal share may be reflected by an unbalanced ratio for benefits from the exploitation 
activities, such as the 60: 40 percentage production for Norway and the UK respectively 
stipulated in the 1976 Agreement between the UK and Norway. 638 In a more complicated 
provision, the unequal share may also be reflected by the establishment of different zones 
in which the parties are entitled to different benefits. This could be seen from the 
stipulation of the Timor Gap Treaty in which three zones (A, B and C) were established. 639 
The different size of each zone alone reflected the unequal benefit for the parties. Also, in 
zone A, the 50: 50 ratio of benefit in the 1989 Treaty between the two states was replaced 
by a 90: 10 split in favour of East Timor by the revision in 2002 640 
In addition to the stipulation on benefit allocation and financial contribution to the 
operation activities, the parties may also need to clarify the provision relating to tax and 
obligation to contribute to the Seabed Authority (if applicable). 
Although from state practice the obligations and rights are mainly allocated among 
the parties on the basis of sovereign equality principle, it is not the case for the South China 
Sea dispute where the claims of the parties vary in scope and legal strength. China, 
including Taiwan, and Vietnam claim the entire of the Spratlys whereas the Philippines, 
637 For example, the equal share on profit and benefit from joint development can be seen from Point 7 of the 
1969 Agreement between Abu Dhabi and Qatar and Point 1 of Annex II of the 1974 Agreement between 
France and Spain, etc. (For full text of these agreement, see Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, 
op. cit., note 620, Vol. 2, Report 7-9, p. 1541 and UN website at 
httl2: //www un org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/FRA- 
ESPI974CS. PDF (accessed on 24 July 2006)). 638 Agreement between the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the Kingdom of Norway relating to the exploitation of the Frigg Field Reservoir and the 
transmission of gas from there to the United Kingdom, London 10 May 1976. For full text, see Churchill et 
al. (eds. ), New Directions in the Law of the Sea (London and Oceana: British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, 1977, Vol. 5) at p. 398. 6" For details, see Article 4 of the 1989 Treaty. Zone B lies at the southern end of the Zone covering 5,178 
square nautical miles and is administered by Australia. Zone C is of 1,576 square nautical miles and lies at the 
northern end of the Zone under the jurisdiction of Indonesia, now replaced by East Timor. Zone A is the 
largest and central area with 9,375 square nautical miles and is under joint development. 600 Article 4 of the Timor Sea Treaty, full text available at 
http: //www. un ore/Depts/Ios/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/AUS- 
TLS2002TST. PDF (accessed 21 October 2005). 
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Malaysia and Brunei only claim part of it. The legal strength of the claims of Vietnam is 
also considered stronger than that of the other claimants. 41 Thus, it is submitted that the 
equal principle should not be applied to allocate the benefit in any joint development of the 
South China Sea. 
In order to achieve a fair solution for benefit allocation, one of the options is that the 
parties should recognise each other's claims. Then, the benefit allocation will be based on 
the area where they claimed. That means the entire cooperative zone would be further 
divided into smaller zones according to the number of claimants. In each small zone the 
equal principle may be applicable. This way, each claimant would have a compatible share 
with their claims. 
Another option is that the parties should recognise the current occupation as the 
basis for benefit allocation. If this recognition is reached, the maritime delimitation will be 
feasible, so that granting a relative ratio of the maritime zone to the parties. This ratio might 
be used for benefit allocation for the prospect joint development of the South China Sea. 
This allocation is based on the status quo of the dispute. 
The two above mentioned benefit allocations only serve as suggestions to the 
parties. Which option will be agreed will totally depend on the wills of the parties in the 
negotiation process and also the contribution of the parties to facilitate exploration and 
exploitation. 
3.3.3. Choice of operator and reigulatory authority 
When questions over the identification of the cooperation zone and financial 
provisions are reached, the next issues, which also play an important role for the success of 
the joint development activities, are the choice of operator and regulatory authority. State 
practice shows great flexibility in stipulating these issues. Overall, 
state practice can be 
formulated into three types, namely operating and regulating through one of the parties, 
through a system of joint ventures between states or their nationals, and through an 
international joint authority. 
Operating and regulating through one of the parties is the simplest manner of 
cooperation among states as it allows one state to manage the development of the deposits 
located in the joint development zone on behalf of both states and there is no institution 
641 See discussion supra, Chapter 3. 
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needed to be established. It offers the advantage of reducing the administrative cost and 
processing of the exploitation activities without the delays involved in setting up a new 
system. This way of operating and regulating may particularly be suitable for bilateral joint 
development. However, it requires the reduction or even loss of autonomy by the state 
whose sovereignty rights are administered by the other state. Thus, many states are 
reluctant to put themselves in this position, especially when the joint development is 
designed for the disputed areas. 642 Therefore, it was only applied in some early joint 
development agreements, e. g. the 1958 Saudi Arabia-Bahrain 643 and the 1969 Abu Dhabi- 
Qatar Agreements. 644 
The second option from state practice is that of establishing a system of joint 
ventures. This system requires the participation of all parties in the development process on 
its own or through authorised nationals. It may lead to the establishment of an 
administrative body where all parties have a representative. Following this way, all parties 
have equal rights not only to the benefit but also to the regulating of the development. 
Thus, it is the most popular model in state practice. This can be seen from a number of joint 
development agreements, e. g. the agreements between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 6°s Japan 
642 The states fear appearing to accept, however, implicitly, a status quo that confers de facto jurisdiction on 
the other state, even if the de jure position is explicitly reserved. Such apparent acceptance may cast doubt on 
the strength of these states' claims to the area. For more discussion, see Hazel Fox et al., op. cit. note 608, 
p. 149 and 152 and David Ong, op. cit., note 609, p. 788. 6" Jonathan I. Chamey and Lewis M. Alexander, op. cit., note 620, Report 7-3, p. 1489. The Agreement 
divided a disputed area of continental shelf in the Persian Gulf between the two parties. It simultaneously 
provided for the equal sharing of the net income derived from the exploitation of the Fashtu bu Saafa 
Hexagon, an area lying on the Saudi side of the delimited continental shelf boundary. Saudi had the 
sovereignty rights and administrated the designed area, meanwhile, Bahrain only entitled to half of the net 
revenues from the designed area. 
644 Jonathan I. Chamey and Lewis M. Alexander, op. cit., note 620, Report 7-9, p. 1541. The Agreement 
provided that both states had equal rights of ownership over a single oil field, the Hagl El Bundug, even 
though the delimitation placed most of the field within the maritime jurisdiction of Qatar. The development of 
the field was solely conducted by Abu Dhabi and its company, the Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Co.. 
°`s The 1965 Agreement between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia divided the zone into the neutral and annexed 
zones in which Article III stipulated that each state exercised the "rights of administration, legislation and 
defence over the part annexed to its territory". However, the natural resources are shared. In the neutral zone, 
each state entered into a separate concession agreement with one company in respect of its undivided 50% 
interest. Each state had equal representatives on the board of directors of the company. The terms of each 
concession agreement differ. The onshore zone was treated somewhat differently. Each state entered into a 
concession agreement with two separate (and) unrelated companies which differed in its terms from that of 
the other. For full text of the agreement, see Sayed M. Hosni, "Partition of the Neutral Zone" (1966) 60 AJIL 
735 at 744-49. 
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and Korea, 646 Malaysia and Vietnam, TM7 Colombia and Jamaica, "8 and Argentina and the 
Untied Kingdom. 649 
The final choice in state practice to operate and regulate the joint development 
activities is to establish a supra-national authority. This is the most complicated option 
which requires a much higher level of cooperation than the two previous options and which 
reduces national autonomy. The agreement among states under this option leads to the 
establishment of an international joint authority with legal personality, licensing, and 
regulatory powers and a comprehensive mandate to manage the development of the 
designed zone on the parties' behalf. Such joint authorities are strong institutions, with 
extensive supervisory and decision-making powers and wide ranging functions, as opposed 
to the weak liaison or consultative type of bodies under the direction of the parties 
6" The 1974 Agreement between Japan and South Korea stipulated that the exploration and exploitation in a 
defined joint development zone would be carried out in further divided subzones by entities nominated by 
both states under a joint operating agreement (Articles I1I(1), IV(l) and V(1)). Each entity had exclusive 
operational control over the relevant subzone (Articles V(1) (b) and VI). Strategic control of hydrocarbon 
development in the joint zone is retained by the two states by requiring that both of them approve the joint 
operating agreements (Article V(2)). A joint Committee was established from equal representative of both 
states, however, it had only a limited role for liaison purposes only (Article XXV). For full text of the 
Agreement, see Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, op. cit., note 98, Report 5-12, p. 1057. 60 The 1992 Memorandum of Understanding between Malaysia and Vietnam nominated the respective 
national oil companies, Petronas of Malaysia and Petrovietnam of Vietnam to undertake the exploration and 
exploitation of petroleum within the defined area of overlapping continental shelf claims (Article 3(a)). Both 
parties agreed to urge their national companies to conclude a commercial agreement on the exploration and 
exploitation of petroleum in the defined area (Article 3(b)). The commercial agreement was subject to the 
approval of the two governments (Article 3(b)). For full text of the Memorandum, see Jonathan I. Charney 
and Lewis M. Alexander, op. cit., note 98 , Vol. 3, Report Number 5-19, p. 
2341. 
648 The 1993 Treaty between Colombia and Jamaica stipulated the joint management and control of the parties 
over the exploration and exploitation of the living and non-living resources in the defined zone (Article 3(1)). 
The Agreement particularly required agreement of both states on activities related to the development of non- 
living resources, marine scientific research and marine environmental protection (Article 3(2) and (3)). A 
Joint Commission was set up to facilitate these joint actions and to perform any other functions assigned to it 
by the parties within the ambit of the agreement (Article 4(1)). The conclusions of the Joint Commission were 
to be reached by consensus and were recommendatory only, unless they were adopted to be binding by the 
parties (Article 4(3)). For full text of the Treaty, see Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, op. cit., 
note 98, Vol. 3, Report Number 2-18, p. 2179.0 649 The 1995 Joint Declaration by Argentina and the United Kingdom also established a facilitative Joint 
Commission which was in charge with submitting recommendations to the two governments on marine 
environmental protection, as well as the promotion, development and coordination of the hydrocarbon regime, 
both within the designed special area of cooperation and beyond (Paras. 2-4). The coordination of the 
exploration and exploitation activities was assigned to a subcommittee of the commission (Para. 4(b) (i-v)). 
Under the Declaration, the parties agreed to cooperate not only in encouraging offshore activities in the 
Southwest Atlantic but also in regulating the different stages of offshore activities undertaken by commercial 
operators, including the eventual abandonment of installations (Paras. 2 and 7). Petroleum exploration and 
exploitation in the special area of cooperation was expected to proceed on a joint venture basis, with 50% 
licensed by the Falkland Islands government and 50% by Argentina. For full text of the Declaration, see UK- 
Argentina: Joint Declaration cooperation over the offshore activities in the South West Atlantic, (1996) 11 
IJMCL 113. For discussion, see Churchill, "Falkland Islands - Maritime Jurisdiction and Co-operative 
Arrangements with Argentina" (1997) 46 ICQL 463. 
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established under the second option, described above. 650 Examples of this structural option 
can be seen from the agreements between Sudan and Saudi Arabia, 651 Malaysia and 
Thailand, 652 Timor Gap, 653 and Guinea-Bissau and Senegal. 654 
The Antarctica model, in particular, does not follow any of the three common 
options. Under the 1959 Antarctica Treaty, the basis document for the cooperation of 
parties concerned, a permanent Antarctic Treaty Secretariat was established in 2004 in 
Buenos Aires, Argentina to regulate the cooperative activities in this region. However, the 
actual administration is placed under a special intergovernmental regime operating through 
biennial (annual with effect from 1992) Consultative Meetings held in rotation in member 
states and adopting recommendations by consensus. This is a flexible regime that can be 
'50 Miyoshi, "The Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in Relation to maritime boundary delimitation" (1999) 5 Maritime Briefing 3 at 43-44. `s' The Joint Commission established in the 1974 Agreement between Sudan and Saudi Arabia had legal 
personality as a body cooperative in both Saudi Arabia and Sudan. The Commission was empowered to 
consider and decide in accordance with the conditions it prescribes the applications for licenses and 
concessions concerning exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed in the common 
zones. For full text of the Agreement, see Churchill et at (eds. ), New Directions in the Law of the Sea (London: Oceana : British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1977, Vol. 5) at p393. 652 Malaysia and Thailand initially committed in Article 3(2) of the 1979 Memorandum that all their rights 
and responsibilities over all the non-living natural resources of the seabed and subsoil were designed for joint development. All the cooperation activities are designed to be managed by a Malaysia-Thailand Joint 
Authority which is in charge of controlling all aspects of policy and decision-making for the exploration and 
exploitation of the non-living natural resources in the joint development area. The Joint Authority will not be 
able to proceed in either the domestic or international arena, and especially not the international arena, 
without prior approval from both government. Thus, the Joint Authority does not have independent legal 
competence in relations with other outside entities, except strictly in commercial matters (Article 7(2Xe)). For 
full text of the Agreement, Jonathan I. Chamey and Lewis M. Alexander, op. cit., note 98, Report 5-13(2), 
p. 1099. 
653 The Timor Gap Treaty established one of the most complex and comprehensive management mechanisms 
which consisted of two levels, the Ministerial Council and the Joint Authority. The Ministerial Council is 
made up of ministers designed in equal number from time to time by the two states. It is a principal decision 
making body which is in charge with all matters relating to the exploitation for and the exploitation of 
petroleum in Zone A (Article 6). The responsibility of the Ministerial Council varies from giving direction to 
the Joint Authority, amending the petroleum mining code, approving production sharing contract proposed by 
the Joint Authority, etc. The Joint Authority is a subordinate body for the Ministerial Council, having 
responsibility for day to day management of activities relating to the exploration for and the exploitation of 
petroleum resources in zone A (Article 7 and 8). In order to fulfil this duty, the Joint Authority is entrusted to 
have juridical personality and legal capacity under the laws of both states. The Joint Authority is consisted of 
equal executive directors of each country which are appointed by the Ministerial Council. For full text of the 
Agreement, Jonathan I. Chamey and Lewis M. Alexander, op. cit., note 98, Report 6-2(5), p. 1245; also, see 
infra, Section 3.2.1. 
64 Under the 1993 Agreement and 1995 Protocol between the two states, an international (joint) Management 
and Cooperation Agency for Maritime Spaces was established to supervise joint exploration and exploitation 
activities within the designed Joint Exploitation Zone in accordance with proportions agreed upon in relation 
to the living (50: 50) and non-living (85: 15 in favour of Senegal) continental shelf resources (Article 2). The 
agency is also responsible for environmental protection in the designed joint exploitation zone (Article 23 of 
the Protocol). For full text of the Agreement and Protocol, see Jonathan I. Chamey and Lewis M. Alexander. 
op. cit., note 98, Vol. 3, Report Number 4-4(4) and 5, p. 2251 and 2257. 
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evolved to accommodate new circumstances and demands by the adoptions of 
recommendations and the conclusion of additional conventions and protocols on specific 
issues in the annual consultative meetings. Thus, after the Antarctic Treaty, the parties 
extended their cooperation by concluding some other treaties such as the 1964 Agreement 
Measures for the Conservation of Antarctica Fauna and Flora, 1972 Convention on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Seals, the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources and the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the 
Antarctic Treaty. 655 Furthermore, the number of parties participating in the regime was also 
increased from 12 original consultative parties to 45 with an additional 16 consultative and 
17 non-consultative. They include the seven nations that claim portions of Antarctica as 
national territory (some claims overlap) and 21 non-claimant nations. 656 All of the treaties 
constituted by the Antarctica Treaty System have allowed the claimants and non-claimants 
to co-exist and develop Antarctica in a flexible and pragmatic cooperative manner. 
The choice of regulatory model and operator will depend on the position of parties 
concerned in the dispute, namely their political and economic consideration, the nature of 
the dispute and the degrees of national sensitivity. 657 
In the South China Sea dispute, the fields available for cooperation vary from those 
related to non-economic interests such as marine scientific research, marine environmental 
protection, safety of navigation and communication at sea, search and rescue operation and 
combat of transnational crime to those related to economic interests, namely joint 
exploitation in fishery and hydrocarbon resources. To gradually develop a mechanism for 
cooperation for such a wide range of activities, a well structured mechanism is ideal but not 
il 
ass For full text of these documents, see httv: //www. antarctica. ac. uk/About Antarctica/Treaty/ (accessed on 
27th January 2006). 
6% Claimant nations are Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, NZ, Norway, and the UK. Non-claimant 
consultative nations are Belgium, Brazil (1975/1983), Bulgaria (1978/1998) China (1983/1985), Ecuador 
(1987/1990), Finland (1984/1989), Germany (1979/1981), India (1983/1983), Italy (1981/1987), Japan, South 
Korea (1986/1989), Netherlands (1967/1990), Peru (1981/1989), Poland (1961/1977), Russia, South Africa, 
Spain (1982/1988), Sweden (1984/1988), Ukraine (1992/2004), Uruguay (1980/1985), and the US (the years 
in parentheses indicate when a consultative member-nation acceded to the Treaty and when it was accepted as 
a consultative member). Non-consultative members, with year of accession in parentheses, are Austria (1987), 
Canada (1988), Colombia (1989), Cuba (1984), Czech Republic (1962/1993), Denmark (1965), Estonia 
(2001), Greece (1987), Guatemala (1991), Hungary (1984), North Korea (1987). Papua New Guinea (1981), 
Romania (1971), Slovakia (1962/1993), Switzerland (1990), Turkey (1996), and Venezuela (1999) 
(Czechoslovakia acceded to the Treaty in 1962 and separated into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993). 
Source: Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, available online at 
http: //www. scar. org/treaty/signatories. htm] (accessed on 3 June 2006). 
657 Hazel Fox et al., op. cit. note 608, at p. 115. 
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feasible at the moment when the political situation in the South China Sea region is still 
complicated and sensitive. The best option for a regulatory body at the early stage may be 
the bureaucratic networking mechanism, to some extent similar to the Antarctica model. In 
such a bureaucratic networking mechanism, only a Secretariat which is in charge of 
administrative duty needs to be established. The main regulatory duty could be placed 
under a special intergovernmental regime operating through annual meetings of all 
participants. All decisions, recommendations and treaties will be approved by consensus. 
Besides all parties to the dispute, other states which have related interest in the South China 
Sea like the rest of the ASEAN members, Japan, Russia and the United States may be 
invited to participate with observer status. The annual meetings may start with cooperation 
in non-economic interested fields in order to easily reach consensus among the parties, thus 
boost confidence building before further discussion on more complicated issues relating to 
economic interested fields. Furthermore, the parties may also agree to establish a 
cooperative mechanism with other organisations such as the IMO and UNEP to increase the 
effectiveness of the cooperation activities in the fields of marine environmental protection 
and safety of navigation and communication at sea. 
However, so far the Antarctica model only shows its success in non-economic 
beneficial fields like scientific research and environmental protection, much still have to be 
done if the parties would like to cooperate in economic fields like exploitation of living and 
non-living resources. Meanwhile, in the South China Sea, the economic interests of the 
parties concerning fishery and hydrocarbon resources are a key point lying behind the 
parties' claims and are unavoidably to be dealt with. Therefore, the thesis will not suggest 
the copy of the Antarctica model to the South China Sea dispute. The way of dealing with 
sovereignty issue of the Antarctica model by shelving was actually the common way of 
other joint development models. The merits of the Antarctica model, which the South 
China Sea could learn from, lie at the way to gradually develop the cooperation field 
through negotiations. The thesis suggests the parties of the South China Sea dispute to 
follow this way in building up a bureaucratic networking for cooperation at the early stage 
of the cooperation. In the later stage when the parties agree to cooperate in economic field, 
well-structured model may be established. Particularly, stipulations related to the allocation 
of contractors in the exploitation of fishery and hydrocarbon resources may need to be 
further discussed once the parties agree to cooperate in these fields. 
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3.3.4. Applicable law 
With the nature of the cooperation activities among states, joint development is 
primarily regulated by the joint development treaty. However, such treaties only serve as 
guidelines and principles for the cooperation among the parties. In the implementation 
phase, the parties usually agree to apply national legislations to regulate the issues 
concerning concession, contract, tax, tort, etc. Depending on the agreement of the operator 
and regulatory authority, the parties may allow the application of the national legislation of 
one party to the entire development activities658 or of all the parties in their respected 
operating subzones. 659 However, the application of more than one set of laws in joint 
development may sometimes create conflict among the choice for the applicable law in the 
joint area. Furthermore, the choice of any national legislation to be applied in the joint area 
also leads to the fear of the situation of an autonomous 'government within a government'. 
In this case, the parties may legislate a completely new set of laws for the joint area or 
harmonise the existing laws. 660 
In the South China Sea dispute, the application of any national legislation will 
unlikely be accepted by the parties concerned. Hence, the building of applicable law for a 
prospect joint development regime can be learnt from the Antarctica model. Accordingly, 
observers, scientific personnel, and members of staff accompanying any such persons, shall 
be subject only to the jurisdiction of the contracting parties of which they are nationals in 
respect of all acts or omissions occurring while they are in the cooperative zone for the 
purpose of exercising their functions. The application law in fields of fishery and 661 
ass For example, in the 1969 Agreement between Abu Dhabi and Qatar, the application law was that of Abu 
Dhabi as this country was the sole operator in the joint development zone (Article 7). For full text, see op. cit., 
note 644. 
659 For example, the 1974 Agreement between Japan and South Korea designed subzones in which one party 
had exclusive operational control and applied its national legislation (Article V and VI). For full text, see 
op. cit., note 646. 
660 For example, Article 4 of the 1974 Agreement between Japan and Korea provides an element of concurrent 
jurisdiction which, in itself, would require a degree of harmonisation. The rights of regulation and 
enforcement as regards fishing, navigation, surveys, prevention of pollution and other similar matters extend 
to the area and must be respected by the Joint Authority. If offences against both laws occurred, adjustments 
would be made by the customs officials to consider the judicial procedures and evidentiary requirements of 
both countries. The framework within which such procedures would be operated might be a new organisation 
set up on a functional basis specifically for this purpose. For more discussion, see hazel Fox et al., op. cit. 
note 608, p. 143-145. . "' Article VIII of the Antarctic Treaty. For full text, see 
http: //www. antarctica. ac. uk/About Antarctica/Treat y/ (accessed on 27" January 2006). 
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hydrocarbon resources should be subjected to further detail in separate agreements among 
states. 
3.3.5. Sovereign issue 
In the case where joint development is designed for an area in which the parties 
already reached a boundary, the sovereignty issue will not be a problem as it was decided 
by the boundary. However, if joint development is applied to a disputed area, sovereignty is 
another important issue that the parties need to clarify. State practice showed several ways 
to deal with this issue. 
First, other parties to the dispute may pool their sovereignty rights giving such right 
solely to one of the parties. This option requires the concession of other states to the one 
holding sovereignty. This only occurs if one party has a stronger position over the others in 
the dispute. 662 
Second, the parties may decide to create a co-ownership or condominium over the 
disputed area. By this option, the sovereignty rights of each state are merged into a new 
legal structure in exchange for defined rights and obligations. There is no single well- 
established form of condominium or resource sharing with recognised legal attributes in 
international law. The parties may choose to base them on national legal systems which 
provide various forms of sharing. Some forms give rise to rights in rem and are governed 
by the law of property. Others are created by the institutional or corporate structure and 
may be governed by company or trust law. And others depending on contract or good faith 
are governed by the law of contract and equitable principles. 663 Example of establishment 
condominium over a disputed area may be seen from the Antarctica model. Article 4 of the 
Antarctica provides that all the sovereignty claims over Antarctica have been frozen in a 
662 For example, in the Svalbard model, the joint development agreement recognises Norwegian sovereignty 
over Svalbard subject to the reservation of certain economic rights and duties to other treaty members in an 
equal manner with Norway. The sovereignty was granted for Norway because of Svalbard's geographical 
adjacency to the Norwegian mainland, Norwegian interests on Svalbard and the need to find a proper solution 
of the dispute. For discussion on the application of the Svalbard model, see Robin Churchill and Geir 
Ulfstein, Marine Management in Disputed Areas: The case of the Barents Sea, (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1992), p. 23. For full text of the Agreement, see League of Nations Treaties Series, Vol. 2, p. 8. Also 
in Annex II of Bo Johnson Theutenberg, The Evolution of the Law of the Sea: A Study of Resources and 
Strategy with Special Regard to the Polar Regions, (Dublin: Tycooly International, 1984). 
"' Hazel Fox et al., op. cit., note 608, p. 48. Example of this option can be seen from the 1922 Uqair Treaty 
between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in which the two states agreed to share equal rights in the neutral zone. 
This arrangement was capable of being construed as giving each state one half undivided share in the oil 
underground and 50% of the oil actually produced in the neutral zone, consequently each state enjoyed a right 
to receive in kind and separately dispose of its proportionate share of oil and in the event of any under-lifting 
had an inherent right to make up in kind, out of future production, such imbalances. 
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condition that permits the parties to continue to disagree vehemently on where, when, how 
and whether sovereignty has been properly acquired by states on or offshore of the 
continent, without jeopardising the treaty's ability to function. 6" Furthermore, the Article 
requires that no new claim or enlargement of an existent claim can be asserted while the 
treaty remains in force and no acts or activities which occur while the Treaty is in force can 
constitute a basis for any state "asserting, supporting, or denying a claim to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica" . 
66S 
Third, states may agree to convey their sovereign rights to a supra-national authority 
created for the purpose of joint development. Under international law, the supra-national 
authority is the new holder of sovereign rights and is empowered to deal with all the 
activities concerning joint development without further consent from the parties. This 
option requires not only the pooling of sovereignty by the states concerned but also a 
complicated and high-level structure for the joint authority. 666 The., options for the 
sovereignty issue reflect the positions of states in a joint development agreement and lead 
to choice of operator and regulatory authority which have been examined earlier in this 
section. 
In the South China Sea dispute, while the sovereignty issue has yet to be resolved, 
similar to other joint development models, the cooperation should be built on the 
condominium of the parties concerned in which the parties agree shelving the sovereignty 
claim. The parties may agree to pool their sovereignty for a certain period, e. g. 25 years, 50 
years or 100 years. This agreement shall not prejudice the final settlement at anytime in the 
future. That means, after this period, the parties may reach agreement to extend the effect of 
the treaty for cooperation or reach a definite and final solution. In another options, the 
parties may give joint cooperation permanent status, i. e. joint cooperation equal to a final 
"4 Paragraph I of the Article 4 of the Antarctic Treaty provide that 
Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as: 
(a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica; 
(b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of claim to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its activities or those of its 
nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise; 
(c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or non- 
recognition of any other State's rights of or claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica. 
66s Paragraph 2 of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. 
666 This option can be seen from the 1979 Thailand/Malaysian Agreement, the Timor Gap, etc. 
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resolution for the dispute. However, this requires a high consensus and definite pooling of 
sovereignty of the parties concerned, thus it is unlikely to be achieved in the coming time. 
3.3.6. Dispute settlement 
Dispute settlement in a joint development arrangement can be understood in two 
ways. On the one hand it refers to the dispute settlement procedure for those disputes which 
arise from joint development activities by the parties. Dealing with this kind of dispute, the 
joint agreement needs to clarify the applicable law, the jurisdiction applicable for the 
disputes. Again, it may depend on the agreement of the parties concerning the choice of 
operator and regulatory authority. This leads to the jurisdiction of the court of one or all of 
the parties and application of their respective national legislations or agreed body of law. 667 
Alternatively, the parties may also set up a mechanism of arbitration by an ad hoc tribunal 
to settle the dispute concerning joint development among them. 668 All the above mentioned 
options may be applied to the South China Sea dispute. Accordingly, with regard to 
disputes occurring during cooperation, the parties may make a general statement to refer to 
all peaceful settlement means under international law. However, in a more effective 
manner, the parties also may agree to set up an ad hoc arbitral tribunal to settle their 
dispute. 
On the other hand, dispute settlement is also understood as the relationship between 
joint development and the final settlement of the whole area in the case that joint 
development is designed for an overlapping zone. In this case, states may make an 
observation that joint development will be without prejudice to the final solution to the 
dispute. 669 Parties to the South China Sea dispute should also follow this way, otherwise 
they agree to use joint development as a final solution for the South China Sea dispute. 
Regarding the relations between joint development and maritime delimitation, the former 
do not overcome the problem of the latter directly as it does not address the problem. 
However, by enabling the development of the resource on a cooperative basis, joint 
"" The jurisdiction of the Court of one party can be seen in the case that a country has sole right to control the 
joint development. The jurisdiction of all parties can be seen in the case that the joint development designs 
subzones and allocates each subzone to one party. 
66° For example, that is the agreement of parties in the Japan-South Korea Joint Development Agreement 
(Article XXVI), op. cit, note 646. 
66' For example, Article XXVIII of the Japan-South Korea Joint Development Agreement stipulates that 
"[n]othing in this Agreement shall be regard as determining the question of sovereign rights over all or any 
portion of the Joint Development Zone or as prejudicing the positions of the respective parties with respect to 
the delimitation of the continental shelf', op. cit., note 646, at p. 1085. 
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development may remove an element of competition from the process of delimitation and 
thereby facilitate the final resolution 670 
In addition to all the main issues discussed above, other provisions concerning 
health, safety and pollution may also be included to ensure the sustainable development and 
protection of the environment. 
4. Conclusion 
The landmark award of the Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago case opened the 
possibility of settling the South China Sea dispute by unilateral submission to the dispute 
settlement mechanism of the 1982 LOSC. However, the recent reservation of China 
submitted in compliance with Articles 298 has made such unilateral submission impossible 
to be invoked. The dispute settlement of the 1982 will only be used to help facilitate the 
dispute settlement through interpreting some articles of the 1982 Convention whose 
application is vital to the dispute. 
As no judicial method is likely to be used, diplomatic measure is the only way for 
the parties to settle the South China Sea dispute. With the lessons learned from the 
diplomatic measures of the 1990s and taking into account the current situation in the South 
China Sea dispute, diplomatic measures in the future aiming at a joint development regime 
are likely to be an effective and feasible solution. The availability of an united and rich 
living and non-living resource of a semi-enclosed sea, an improving political environment 
and the common economic interests in the South China' Sea region suggest that joint 
development may be an acceptable arrangement for the parties in the South China Sea 
dispute while the final solution to the sovereignty issues and maritime delimitation is still 
unlikely to be achieved in the coming time. Comprehensive state practice in many regions 
of the world also endorses this suggestion. However, due to the presence of multi- 
sovereignty claims and lack of confidence among the parties, due to the military clashes, 
any cooperation mechanism in the South China Sea should be built with the purpose not 
only to accommodate a wide range of cooperation activities, but also to facilitate a forum 
for confidence building among the parties. This can be started with a form of a bureaucratic 
networking mechanism, to some extent similar to the way that the parties develop their 
cooperation in the Antarctica model. 




Disputes concerning territorial and maritime claims between states are always 
complicated and protracted. This is absolutely true in the case of the South China Sea 
where an archipelago with hundreds of features lying in the middle of one of the biggest 
semi-enclosed seas of the world is under dispute. The availability of natural resources 
including fisheries, hydrocarbon deposits and a world nexus for navigation is the incentives 
behind the claims of the parties. Over the centuries, six claimants to the dispute, namely 
Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam escalated their sovereignty 
claims even to low tide elevations and submerged features and maintain military 
occupation at all features. Multiple sovereignty claims also lead to potentially complicated 
maritime overlapping. So far, the sovereignty issue is still in deadlock and the same 
situation can be cited for maritime delimitation. Solutions to both the sovereignty and 
maritime issues of the dispute are assumed to be great difficult and complicated. However, 
this thesis has proved that the dispute is not as complicated as usually thought. Under the 
application of contemporary international law to the dispute feasible solutions are available 
for dispute settlement. 
With regard to the subjects of the dispute, the application of Article 121 of the 1982 
LOSC to the situation of the Spratlys results in a sharp reduction in the number of islands 
which qualify for territorial sovereignty claims under international law. Accordingly, of the 
hundreds of features of this archipelago, only 35 are islands and among them 12 potentially 
qualify under the test of Article 121(3) in generating full maritime zones. Taking into 
account that all the features of the Spratlys are tiny and uninhabited, these numbers are 
achieved by the most generous approach in the application of Article 121. 
The Spratlys have been objects of sovereignty claims through centuries of historical 
upheaval in the region. The parties to the dispute have used various legal arguments 
including discovery, prescription, effective occupation, state succession, recognition, 
estoppel principle, proximity and the 1982 LOSC to support their sovereignty claims. 
However, the application of international law concerning territorial acquisition reveals that 
most of the legal arguments contain many weaknesses and may not have legal impact in 
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building titles for the parties. China and Taiwan claim the entire Spratlys on the basis of 
historical title, but their claims face the problem of authenticity and accuracy. Brunei and 
Malaysia claim a few features of which none may generate full maritime zones, on the 
groundless basis that these features are located on their continental shelves. The Philippines 
claims a large number of features, including 10 islands that may generate full maritime 
zones, based on `discovery' and proximity. However, the `discovery' which was conducted 
by an individual, without the endorsement of the Philippine government, and proximity 
were not sufficient to establish title for the Philippines under international law. Vietnam 
holds the strongest legal position with its claims on the basis of historical title from the 
official document of the Kingdom of Annam in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
and of the successions from France in 1950 and from South Vietnam in 1976. The current 
occupation on the largest number of features of the Spratlys, including 5 islands which may 
generate full maritime zones, further consolidates the strongest position of Vietnam in the 
South China Sea dispute. 
As the location of the Spratlys is at the middle of the South China Sea, the multiple 
sovereignty claims at the Spratlys' features create the most complicated case ever for 
maritime delimitation. The complication is even worse in the absence of a solution to the 
sovereignty issue. The thesis overcomes the sovereignty problem by formulating 
hypotheses; thereby a prospective maritime delimitation is mapped out under the 
contemporary international law concerning maritime delimitation. Taking into account the 
most complicated possibility from Chapter 2, that of 12 islands in the Spratlys generating 
full maritime zones and the existence of multiple sovereignty claims as analysed in Chapter 
3, the maritime overlapping zones may be categorised into two main groups: EEZ and 
continental shelf overlapping between the mainland of littoral states and the 12 islands of 
the Spratlys, and EEZ and continental shelf overlapping among islands of the Spratlys 
themselves. It is well recognised that for maritime delimitation under international law the 
equidistance will be applied as a starting point in generating the provisional maritime 
boundary, thereafter, all relevant circumstances will be taken into account to adjust the 
meridian line for an equitable result. Applying this process to delimit the two groups of 
maritime overlapping in the South China Sea dispute, the equidistance line will be drawn as 
the provisional boundary. Then, the examination - of all possible relevant circumstances, 
such as the effect of small islands, the access to fishery and hydrocarbon resources, the 
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effect of historic title of China and the Philippines and the navigation and security interests, 
reveals that there may be only one actual relevant circumstance, namely the presence of the 
tiny and uninhabited islands of the Spratlys. Hence, the islands of the Spratlys are likely 
given a reduced effect for the full effect of the mainland of littoral states in a maritime 
delimitation process between them. However, this is not the case for maritime delimitation 
among 12 islands of the Spratlys themselves. In this situation, the islands of the Spratlys 
have equal effect as the sources of entitlement for maritime zones, so that the equidistance 
lines are likely to be the maritime boundaries in maritime delimitation between them. The 
reduced effect of the Spratlys in maritime delimitation with littoral states shows that the 
actual complicated zone for maritime delimitation is the shaded area (a maritime area of the 
Spratlys after giving full effect to the mainland of littoral states): In order to arrive at some 
additional concrete prospects, further hypotheses are made on the basis of entitlement of the 
parties in this area. Accordingly, four maritime boundaries for this area are drawn on the 
basis of sovereignty claims and occupation of the parties over the Spratlys' features. 
In addition to two main groups of overlapping, the Spratlys' features may create an 
exceptional overlapping between the maritime zones of their Article 121(3) islands, i. e. 
internal water, territorial sea, and contiguous zone, and the EEZ and continental shelf of the 
mainland of littoral states. These overlapping zones may be simply delimited by giving the 
islands of the Spratlys the enclaved effect. 
The prospective maritime delimitation process reveals that the sovereignty claims of 
the parties over the Spratlys' features only serve two roles. On the 
one hand, it helps the 
parties generate entitlement to maritime space in the shaded zone. On the other, it enables 
encroaching on the maritime zones of the Philippines and Malaysia by the enclaving of 
some Article 121(3) islands. Thereby, with no Article 121(3) island located in their EEZ 
from the mainland, Vietnam, China and Taiwan will lose nothing from their maritime zones 
which are generated from their mainlands, but only gain more from any title established to 
the Spratlys' features. Only Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines may lose some maritime 
zones due to the enclaving of some Article 121(3) features of the Spratlys, but that is 
immaterial loss. However, they can gain some more maritime space if they are successful 
with their sovereignty claims to some features of the Spratlys. All the extended maritime 
zones from the Spratlys will only be achieved if some features of the Spratlys are accepted 
to pass the test of Article 121(3). Ultimately, the sovereignty issue is only important and 
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complicated in generating maritime rights in the shaded area. Although the maritime 
boundaries are drawn on the basis of hypotheses since there is no definite maritime 
boundary in the absence of a solution to the sovereignty issue, the prospective maritime 
delimitation may help to reduce the illusion of the parties with regard to their ability to 
generate maritime zones of the Spratlys. This may clarify the non-existence of high sea in 
the South China Sea, resulting in the limitation of the number of the parties concerned. This 
conclusion may, therefore, help the parties to negotiate some kind of cooperation in order 
to better manage the South China Sea while waiting for a permanent solution to the 
sovereignty issue. 
The prospects of the sovereignty and maritime issues reveal that Vietnam has some 
advantages of legal position, occupation and maritime delimitation in the dispute. Thus, 
relying on the recent precedent set by the Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago case, one of 
the solutions to the South China Sea dispute could have been the unilateral submission by 
Vietnam to the dispute mechanism of the 1982 LOSC. However, due to the limitation 
which is recently made by China under Articles 298, such unilateral submission was a 
missed chance to settle the South China Sea dispute by a judicial institute. 
Diplomatic measure towards a joint development regime is likely the only option 
for the parties concerned. Joint development has shown a success for states as a provisional 
arrangement for maritime dispute when the parties have yet to agree to a final solution, to 
cooperate in exploration and exploitation of the transboundary resources. This model is also 
suggested for the South China Sea in order to overcome the deadlock of the diplomatic 
attempt in the 1990s. Taking into account the availability of united and rich living and non- 
living resources of a semi-enclosed sea, an improving political environment and the 
common economic interests in the South China Sea region, joint development, or more 
broadly, joint cooperation is likely to be an acceptable arrangement for the parties in the 
South China Sea dispute while the final solution for sovereignty issue and maritime 
delimitation has yet to be reached. Through state practice and the particular situation of the 
South China Sea dispute, it is submitted that a suitable joint development regime should be 
built in the form of a bureaucratic networking mechanism. If the parties in the South China 
Sea are successful in applying a joint development mechanism in their dispute, this may 
prove another success of joint development, establishing a new trend in state practice in 
managing ocean resources and settling maritime dispute. With more consistent state 
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practice, joint development, a measure which is yet to be a legal obligation, may become an 
emerging rule of customary international law and offer another option for the parties to settle 




Natural conditions of the Spratlys features671 
1. North Danger Reefs 
Name Location Natural conditions 
Northeast Cay 11°28'N, 114°21'E Area: 685x90m; Height: 3m; Covered with grass and thick trees in 1963 
Southwest Cay 11°26'N, 114°20'E Area: 650x280m; Height: 4-6m; Covered with a 10 metre coconut tree, 
grass with low bushes and guano with considerable scale. Also, 
reported to have two wells. 
North Reef 11 °28'N, 114°22'E Above water only at low tide 
South Reef 11123'N, 114'18'E Above water only at low tide 
Trident Shoal 11°20'N, 114°42'E Submerged atoll 
Lys Shoal 11 °20'N, 114°34'E Submerged atoll 
2. Thitu Reefs 
Name Location Natural conditions 
Thitu Island 11°03'N, 114°17'E Area: 22ha; Height: 3.5m; Covered with low bushes, coconut palms 
and plantain trees 
Sandy Cay 11°03'N, 114°13'E A low sand cay; fringing reef above water at high tide 
3. Loaita Bank 
Name Location Natural conditions 
Loaita Island 10°41'N, 114°25'E Area: 6ha; Height 2m; Covered with mangrove bushes in 1933, 
above which rose coconut palms and other small trees. 
Lankiam Cay 10°44'N, 114°31'E Area: a few hectares; A sand cay which above water at high tide 
West York Island 11°05'N, 115°01'E Area: 500x320m (15 ha); Covered with mangroves and coconut 
palms (1963) 
Loaita Cay 10°44'N, 114°21'E A sand cay, above water at high tide 
Irving Reef 10°53'N, 114°56'E Above water only at low tide 
Subi Reef 10°54'N, 114°06'E Above water only at low tide. Surrounded a lagoon 
Menzies Reef 11 °09'N, 114°49'E Awash at low tide 
671 Mark J. Valencia et al., op. cit., note 16, Appendix 1, p. 227; David Hancox and Victor Prescott, op. cit., 
note 35 and Research of the Boundary Committee of Vietnam, op. cit., note 41. 
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4. Tizard Bank 
Name Location Natural conditions 
Itu Aba Island 10°23'N, 114°21'E Area: 960x400m (0.46km2 or 46ha); Height: Sm; Covered with 
shrubs, coconut and mangroves in 1938 and have guano deposit 
Sand Cay 10023'N, 114°28'E Area: 7ha; Height: 3m; Covered with trees and bushes in 1951 
Eldad Reef 10°21'N, 114°42'E Only a few large rocks are naturally above water at high tide 
Nanyit Island 10°11'N, 114°22'E Area: 104m2; Height: 6m; Covered with trees, bushes and grass 
Gaven Reef 10°13'N, 114°12'E A sand dune with 2m height 
Petley Reef 10°24'N, 114°34'E Above water only at low tide 
Whitsun Reef 10°00'N, 114°43'E Some rocks naturally above water at high tide 
Discovery Great Reef 10°10'N, 114°10'E Several rocks above water at high tide; Most of the reef is above 
water at low tide 
Discovery Small Reef 10001'N, 114°02'E Above water only at low tide 
5. Union Reefs 
Name Location Natural conditions 
Sin Cowe Island 9°52'N, 114°19'E Contained two sand cays, 4m and 2.5m height 
Johnson South Reef 9°43'N, 114° 18'E Naturally above water only at low tide 
Collins Reef 9°45'N, 114° 14'E Also known as Johnson North Reef, above water at high tide 
Lansdowne Reef 9°46'N, 114°22'E Sand dune with fringing reef 
Loveless Reef 9°49'N, 114°16'E Above water only at low tide 
Hughes Reef 9°55'N, 114°30'E Above water only at low tide 
Higgens Reef 9°48'N, 114°24'E Above water only at low tide 
Kennan Reef 9°53'N, 114°27'E Above water at low tide 
Holiday Reef 9°49'N, 114°23'E Above water only at low tide 
Zhangxi Jiao 9°46'N, 114°24'E Partly above water only at low tide 
6. Jackson Atoll 
Name Location Natural conditions 
Flat Island 10°50'N, 115°49'E , Length from 90 to 210 m; A low flat, sandy cay with large guano 
deposit but no vegetation. 
Nanshan Island 10°45'N, 115°49'E 575m length, 2.5m height; Covered with coconut trees, bushes 
and grass in 1963 
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7. London Reefs 
Name Location Natural conditions 
Spratly Island 8°38'N, 111°55'E Area: 13-15ha; Height: 2.5m; Covered with bushes, grass, guano in 
1963; Fringing reef is above water at low tide 
West Reef 8°52'N, 112°15'E East part is a sand cay with 0.6m height; West part is coral reef which 
is above water only at low tide. Between them is a lagoon 
East Reef 8°52'N, 112°46'E Rocks up to lm height. Enclosed a lagoon 
Cuateron Reef 8°53'N, 112°51'E Coral rocks only; 1.5m at the highest; no lagoon 
Central Reef 8°55'N, 112°24'E Coral reef; Barely submerge at high tide, surrounded a lagoon 
Ladd Reef 8°38'N, 111 °40'E Naturally above water only at low tide; Coral lagoon 
8. Other independent features 
Name Location Natural conditions 
Fiery Cross Reef 9°37'N, 112°58'E Coral reef, surrounded lagoon; Submerged at high tide except 
for one prominent rock 1m height at the southwest 
Prince Consort Bank 7°56'N, 109°58'E Coral reef that shallowest natural depth is 9m 
Vanguard Bank 7°30'N, 109°35'E Shallowest natural depth is 16m 
Grainger Bank 7°52'N, 110°29'E Shallowest natural depth is 9-11 m 
Prince of Wales Bank 8°04'N, 110°30'E Shallowest natural depth is 7m 
Bombay Castle 7°50'N, 111°40'E Also known as Rifleman Bank; Sand and coral with shallowest 
natural depth of 3m 
Amboyna Cay 7°51'N, 112°55'E Area: 1.6ha; Height: 2m; Sand and coral with guano deposit and 
little vegetation. Surrounded by fringing reef 
Barque Canada Reef 8°10'N, 113°18'E Coral, highest rocks at 4.5m; 18m length; Much of the reef is 
above water at high tide; 21 nm from Amboyna Cay 
Pearson Reef 8°58'N, 113°41'E Two sand cays, 2m and lm height, lie on the edges of a lagoon; 
l4nm from Alison Reef 
Alison Reef 8°51'N, 114°00'E Naturally above water only at low tide. Enclosed a lagoon 
Pigeon Reef 8°52'N, 114°39'E Numerous rocks are naturally above the high water line; 24 nm 
from Cornwallis South Reef 
Cornwallis South Reef 8°44'N, 114°11'E Naturally above water only at low tide. Enclosed a lagoon 
Investigator Shoal 8°08'N, 114°40'E Large submerged atoll with an area of about 205 km2 
Erica Reef 8°07'N, 114°10'E Reef is above water only at low tide. Enclosed a lagoon 
14 nm from Mariveles Reef 
Mariveles Reef 7°59'N, 113°50'E A sand cay; Height: 1.5-2m; surrounded by two lagoons; 35 nm 
from Barque Canada Reef 
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Dallas Reef 7°38'N, 113°48'E Naturally above water only at low tide. Enclosed a lagoon; 5nm 
from Ardasier Reef 
Ardasier Reef 7°38'N, 113°56'E Naturally above water only at low tide. Enclosed a lagoon; 10 
nm from Investigator Shoal 
Swallow Reef 7°23'N, 113°48'E Area: 6.2 ha; Height: 3m; Treeless cay and rocks; 14 nm from 
Dallas Reef 
Royal Charlotte Reef 7°00'N, 113°35'E A sand dune with no vegetation, plus rock ups to 1.2m height. 
Most of the reef is slightly submerged at high tide; 30 nm from 
Swallow Reef 
Louisa Reef 6°20'N, 113°14'E Few of rocks in the surface with lm height; Reefs is 1.2nm 
length; 41 nm from Royal Charlotte Reef 
Alicia Reef 9°25'N, 115°26'E A sand cay, 1,2m height. Enclosed by a lagoon; 29 nm from 
Mischief Reef 
Commodore Reef 8°21'N, 115°17'E A sand cay, 0.5m height, surrounded by two lagoons; 28 nm 
from Investigator Shoal 
Livock Reef 10011'N, 115018'E Above water only at low tide; 28 nm from Jackson Atoll 
Mischief Reef 9°55'N, 115°32'E Some rocks above water at low tide; has a lagoon; 50 nm from 
Union Bank 
Second Thomas Reef 9°43'N, 115°50'E Submerged reef 
First Thomas Shoal 9°20'N, 115°57'E Above water at low tide. When the reef dries rocks standing one 
metre high help delineate a shallow linear lagoon; 27 nm from 
Alicia Reef 
Half Moon Shoal 8°52'N, 116°16'E Awash reef. Parts of the reef dry exposing a lagoon with depths 
down to 27 metres. 
Boxall Reef 9°36'N, 116°11 'E Above water only at low tide 
Royal Captain Shoal 9°01'N, 116°40'E A few rocks are above water at low tide. Surrounds a lagoon 
Reed Bank 11°20'N, 116°50'E Shallowest natural depth is from 9-16m 
Iroquois Reef 10°37'N, 116°10'E Above water only at low tide 
Bombay Shoal 9°26'N, 116°55'E Several rocks are exposed at low tide. Surrounds a lagoon; 27 




Names of the occupied features in both English and occupant's name in Spratlys672 
Occupant 
Feature occupied 
(in English name) 
Feature occupied 
(in occupant's name) 
Also claimed by 
China Eldad Reef Andajiao Taiwan, Vietnam 
Mischief Reef Dongmonjiao Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines 
First Thomas Shoal Xinyi Jiao " 
Subi Reef Zhubi jiao 
Gaven Reefs Nanxunjiao 
Loai Ta Cay Shuanghuang 
Whisun Reef 
Johnson South Reef Chiguajiao to 
Kennan Reef Ximenjiao 
Hughes Reef Dongmen jiao 
Cuarteron Reef Huayangjiao 
Fiery Cross Reef Yongshujiao 
Taiwan Itu Aba Island Taiping dao China, Vietnam 
Vietnam Southwest Cay Däo Song Tfr Tay China, Taiwan, the Philippines 
South Reef DA Nam 
Petley Reef Dä Nüi Thj 
Sand Cay Däo Son Ca 
Nam Yit Island DAo Nam Yiet 
Discovery Great Reef Däo DA Len 
Sin Cowe Island Däo Sinh Ton 
Sin Cowe East Island DAo Sinh Un Döng 
Pigeon Reef Dä Ti6n Nil 
to Cornwallis South Reef Dä Nüi Le 
Alison Reef Bäi Tbc Tan 
Pearson Reef Da Phan Vinh to 
East Reef Dä Döng 
Central Reef DA Gina 
West Reef Da Täy 
Barque Canada Reef Bäi Thuy n Chäi China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia 
612 Compilation based on Odgaard, op. cit., note 16, p. 77,78; Mark J. Valencia et al., op. cit., note 16, Plate 1, 
p. 254 and Chemillier-Gendreau, op. cit, note 35, Appendix 4, p. 178. 
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" Amboyna Cay Däo An Bang " 
Spratlys Island Däo Try öng Sa China, Taiwan 
Lansdowns Reef Dä Len Dao " 
Collins Reef Dä Co Lin 
Sandy Cay Däo Son Ca 
The Philippines Northeast Cay Parola China, Taiwan, Vietnam 
Thi Tu Island Pagasa 
West York Island Likas 
Lankiam Cay Panata 
Loaita Island Kota 
Nanshan Island Lawak 
Flat Island Patag 
Commodore Reef Risal China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia 
Malaysia Swallow Reef Terumbu Layang 
Layang 
China, Taiwan, Vietnam 
Ardasier and Dallas 
Reefs 
Terumbu Ubi 
Mariveles Reef Terumbu Mantanani China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines 
Louisa Reef Barat Kecil China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei 
Erica Reef Terumbu Siput 




Time and place of the South China Sea workshops673 
Year Meetings Venue 
1990 1" Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the 
South China Sea 
Bali, Indonesia 
1991 2"d Workshop Bangdung, Indonesia 
1992 3`d Workshop Yogyakarta, Indonesia 
1993 4`h Workshop Surabaya, Indonesia 
1994 5'" Workshop Bukittinggi, Indonesia 
1995 6" Workshop Balikapapan, Indonesia 
1996 7`h Workshop Batam, Indonesia 
1997 8'h Workshop Puncak, Indonesia 
1998 9t' Workshop Jakarta, Indonesia 
1999 10th Workshop Bogor, Indonesia 
2001 11th Workshop Banten, Indonesia 
2002 12`h Workshop Jakarta, Indonesia 
2003 13t' Workshop Medan, Indonesia 
2004 14th Workshop The Philippines 
673 Adapted from Yann-Heui Song, "Cross-strait Interactions on the South China Sea Issues: A Need for 




Time and venue of the meeting under TWG, GEM and study group 
Year Meetings Venue 
1993 TWG on Marine Scientific Research 1 Manila, Philipppines 
TWG on Marine Scientific Research 2 Surabaya, Indonesia 
TWG on Resource Assessment I Jakarta, Indonesia 
1994 TWG on Marine Scientific Research 3 Singapore 
TWG on Marine Environmental Protection I Hangzhou, China 
1995 TWG on Marine Scientific Research 4 Hanoi, Vietnam 
TWG on Safety Navigation 1 Jakarta, Indonesia 
TWG on Legal Matters 1 Phuket, Thailand 
1996 TWG on Marine Scientific Research 5 Mactan, Cebu, Philippines 
TWG on Safety Navigation 2 Brunei Darussalam 
GEM on Biodiversity Protection Cebu, Philippines 
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